Attachments
The Georgian government’s decision to suspend its bid to join the European Union has sparked countrywide protests. Tbilisi should halt its violent response and engage with the political opposition to define a way forward. Western states should target responses to avoid harm to ordinary Georgians.
Mass protests taking place across Georgia since 28 November have been met with force. The government has used tear gas, truncheons and water cannons against the protesters, who have erected barricades and set off fireworks to ward off the police special forces deployed to contain the unrest. Other security services personnel have now reinforced the police. Georgia’s ombudsman has accused the authorities of torturing demonstrators, referencing evidence of beatings in custody. The United States and several European countries have denounced the repression, and numerous Georgian officials have resigned from posts in key ministries. The evolving crisis risks undermining the already contested legitimacy of the Georgian Dream government, re-elected in October, and further weakening Tbilisi’s tenuous relationship with the European Union. The government should de-escalate lest it find itself in a corner where it can turn only to Moscow for support, risking even more turmoil. For their part, the U.S., the EU and EU member states should take care that their response does not hurt Georgian citizens more than the government. As for the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, EU personnel monitoring the lines of contact there have helped foster stability, and Brussels should aim for them to continue in this role.
An Abrupt Reversal
Georgia’s protest wave began within hours of an announcement by Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze that Georgia would suspend its EU membership bid until at least 2028. The EU had already decided in late June to freeze Georgia’s accession process, pending rescission of a new Georgian law that requires any entity receiving substantial funding from abroad to register as a foreign agent. In addition to reflecting growing distance between the Georgian Dream government and Brussels on issues relating to civil and political rights, the government’s decision shined a spotlight on differences with respect to both legislation that is misaligned with EU values and standards concerning political freedoms and regulatory reform, where Tbilisi has also lagged behind the EU’s expectations.
But the government’s November move resonated especially poorly with the Georgian public, as it signalled Georgian Dream’s rejection, at least for the near term, of integration into Europe. For years, the party had insisted that it was committed to this project, even as many of its policies and actions contravened EU standards and requirements. In its campaign for the 26 October parliamentary elections, from which Georgian Dream emerged victorious despite reports of substantial irregularities, its core message was a promise to pursue integration without giving up Georgia’s unique identity. This pledge was meant to appeal to a populace that, for some time, has favoured EU integration by a wide margin.
The government’s abrupt reversal sparked outrage among both ordinary citizens and opposition activists who were already accusing the party of rigging the October elections. Georgian Dream’s political opposition argues that turning away from Brussels also means a turn toward Moscow. This is something the party continues to deny, even as its tenure in office – which began in 2012 – has seen renewed trade and markedly improved relations with Russia.
The protests come on the heels of several earlier rounds over the last year. Until now, the most intense period was in April and May, when Georgians came out into the streets to denounce the “foreign agents” law mentioned above. This law, now in force, requires media outlets, non-governmental organisations and other groups that receive more than 20 per cent of their funding from abroad to register as foreign agents. Critics argue that it echoes Russian laws intended to silence dissent and opposition. The next surge of demonstrations, which greeted Georgian Dream’s declared victory in October, were smaller in scale. The current unrest dwarfs both, and, notably, has spread throughout Georgia rather than being mostly confined to the capital. The government’s response has also been far harsher, with widespread use of tear gas, water cannons, arrests and beatings, both on the street and in custody. The country’s ombudsman has publicly described the police custodial violence as torture.
Looking for Leverage
As the violence has intensified, several hundred teachers have resigned, along with defence, justice and foreign ministry staff and a handful of Georgian ambassadors to Western countries, who have cited as the reason their rejection of Kobakhidze’s announcement. Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili, who has no formal party affiliation and whose term is due to end on 14 December, has denounced the October elections as illegitimate and vowed to remain in office until a new government is elected. Throughout Georgia, residents are flying EU flags as a signal of their opposition to the government’s actions. Numerous popular clubs and bars have halted business to show solidarity with the protesters.
Many outside actors are also making clear their disapproval of the state’s violence against protesters. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have imposed visa sanctions on key Georgian officials, barring them from entering these countries. The U.S. has suspended an engagement program with Georgia that involved bilateral working groups in key policy areas of defence and security; economics, trade and energy; democracy; and cultural and people-to-people contacts. The EU, which has yet to weigh in as an institution on the legitimacy of October’s elections, pending results of an investigation by the Georgian prosecutor, is examining its options. The Georgian opposition has called on the EU to impose its own sanctions on the ruling party’s leaders. But as Georgian Dream seems to have drawn a line in the sand between itself and the EU, it is unclear that such sanctions can do much other than show displeasure. It is the Georgian people who hold the most meaningful leverage over the government at the moment.
The government has tried to reduce that leverage with accusations. On the fourth day of unrest, Prime Minister Kobakhidze insinuated that the protests were at least partly fomented from outside the country, accusing two foreign nationals, one Russian and one British, of “illegally entering the parliament building”. But Kobakhidze also placed blame closer to home. The prime minister has accused the opposition of “coordinated violence” and an attempt to overthrow the constitutional order, intimating that he might ask the Constitutional Court to declare opposition parties, in his words, “unconstitutional”. (During the 2024 election campaign, Georgian Dream had pledged to ban some opposition groups if it prevailed.) Local media reported that opposition coalition leader Zurab Djapardze was arrested and later released. But other opposition parties and politicians continue to report beatings, searches and arrests.
Messaging from Moscow
While Georgian Dream faces opposition at home and in the West, Moscow is clearly more sympathetic to the party’s challenges. The Kremlin claims that external forces (albeit presumably not from Russia) are trying to destabilise Georgia. It has drawn parallels to both the 2004-2005 and 2013-2014 protest waves in Ukraine. The latter preceded the ouster and flight from Kyiv of then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, which was followed by Russia’s seizure of Crimea and the start of the first phase of the Russo-Ukrainian war.
Russian media echo the Georgian and Russian governments in blaming protests on foreign interference. Along with the rebel offensive in Syria, they portray the Georgian protests as part of a concerted effort by Russia’s adversaries to divert its resources away from its war in Ukraine. The similar rhetoric that has been coming from Georgian Dream and Russian sources does not necessarily imply collusion (although it may reflect a partly shared worldview), but some degree of cooperation and coordination may be possible in the future.
It seems unlikely that Georgian Dream would align itself publicly with Russia, as doing so would engender strong domestic frustration and surely even greater unrest across Georgia. Much as the country has gained from renewed trade with Russia since 2012, its closer ties with Europe, and the ability of Georgians to travel and work there have created real opportunities, cementing the desire for integration. Reversing Georgia’s trajectory after more than two decades would be a harsh blow to the many Georgians who have staked their futures on it, politically and economically. Whether or not Georgian Dream wants to, however, the more it cracks down on protesters and stifles dissent, the more it may find itself relying on Moscow and falling further under its influence.
Facing the Risks
With an opposition and a president contesting elections, the latter refusing to step down and mass protests growing, the Georgian Dream government faces real risks to its ability to govern going forward. Should they persist, crackdowns and constraints on the opposition will likely galvanise more anger at the government among Georgians, which will build over time. Rather than continue down this path, the Georgian Dream government should recognise that the protests reflect a broad desire among the Georgian population, including Georgian Dream voters, to pursue EU integration. If the government seeks stability, it should change course and talk to protest leaders and opposition representatives about a face-saving way to walk back the November announcement and rebuild its credibility with Georgians regarding EU integration. The EU and its member states can offer to help mediate in such discussions, although they should prepare to be rebuffed.
The EU should also prepare itself for the tough choices it will face if Georgian Dream’s crackdown on dissent and opposition continues. In the past, EU officials have considered suspending the bloc’s visa facilitation agreement with Georgia, granted in 2017 as part of efforts to strengthen ties between Tbilisi and Brussels. But now, with protests under way, such an action could easily backfire, creating the appearance that the EU is punishing the citizens who have taken to the streets in opposition, rather than the government that has turned its back on the bloc.
The EU ... should take care that any measures [it takes] in response to events in Georgia do not inadvertently punish ordinary Georgians for their government’s acts.
With this consideration in mind, the EU and its member states should take care that any measures they take in response to events in Georgia do not inadvertently punish ordinary Georgians for their government’s acts. They should ensure that any sanctions are narrowly targeted to people demonstrably responsible for abuses. Brussels should also stick to its commitment to await the conclusion of the investigation into electoral fraud before voicing a view as to the legitimacy of October’s elections. To be sure that its position remains clear to all, Brussels should also publicly reiterate that the EU integration process can resume when Tbilisi reverses course on legislation that runs counter to the bloc’s standards and maintain its programs supporting Georgia’s beleaguered civil society. Lastly, of course, Brussels should keep its door open to Georgian dissidents, including opposition leaders, if they come to be in danger. The U.S. should follow the EU’s lead on all positions and pronouncements relating to the future of Georgian integration.
For now, none of these events have had a visible impact on the relationships between Georgia and its breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These regions have been de facto independent since the 1990s, and declared themselves separate states in 2008, after a short war between Russia and Georgia. Russia, which has kept them economically afloat all this time and in 2008 recognised their independence, has given no reason to doubt its continued support. The stability on those lines today owes a good bit to the EU mission that patrols and monitors the line of contact between government-controlled Georgia and the breakaway regions and surrounding territory. That mission, in place since 2008, has helped foster security, prevented incidents from escalating and enabled contacts between residents on different sides of the line, including through crucial mediation efforts. Whatever comes next in Georgia, and between Tbilisi and the EU, the mission and its record of mediation puts Brussels in a unique position to continue facilitating dialogue between Tbilisi and the breakaways, which is a role it should play as long as it is able.