Pre-famine Conditions Persist in Parts of Ethiopia
Compelling evidence indicates that people are facing pre-famine conditions in parts of Afar, Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya and Somali Regions, as well as pockets in Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' (SNNP), Gambella, Dire Dawa and Harari Regions. According to indicators monitored by FEWS NET:
- Recurrent droughts and poverty have
increasingly eroded the capacity of most rural households in Ethiopia to
withstand drastic declines in their incomes resulting from adverse weather
and economic conditions.
- Households whose livelihoods largely depend on crop and livestock production have suffered substantially reduced crop yields or near-total crop failure due to low and erratic rainfall during the last two consecutive rainy seasons (belg and meher), an unusual occurrence within the same year (Figure 1).
- The FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment
Mission to Ethiopia, in its report released on December 30, 2002, indicated
that Ethiopia faces a massive food grain deficit of over 1.8 million metric
tons in 2003, most of which needs to be filled through food aid, given
the country's limited ability to import food commercially.
- Widespread livestock deaths in Afar
and Somali Regions that peaked between June and August 2002 have left many
pastoralists and agro-pastoralists dependent on relief assistance for most
of the year.
- Grain prices have increased abruptly
since May 2002 to substantially above-average levels, with a disproportionate
impact on the purchasing power of already vulnerable groups. Unseasonably
early increases in grain prices in some rural markets have already put
food staples out of reach of poor households.
- In cash crop producing areas in western,
southwestern and eastern parts of the country, last year's coffee harvest
is estimated to have declined by 20 to 30 percent due to the drought, adversely
affecting the incomes of up to 15 million Ethiopians. Chat, a mild stimulant
and a major source of cash income in parts of Ethiopia, has also been similarly
- Rural household resilience is weakening
in the faced of frequent drought and inadequate assistance. Traditional
livelihood coping strategies continue to weaken further as evidenced by
increased sale of both non-productive and productive household assets (such
as jewelry and plow oxen, respectively) and consumption of wild "famine
foods," some of which are toxic unless prepared properly.
- Migration of people from the countryside
has increased the usual numbers of beggars and homeless in the cities.
- Recent nutrition survey results and
field reports are revealing deepening food crisis in previously identified
areas and additional needs in emerging food crisis areas. If the short
belg (March-May) rains prove to be poor, as predicted by the National Meteorological
Services Agency (NMSA), further increase in emergency relief requirement
can be expected as of July.
- Despite ongoing food aid distributions, very high malnutrition rates persist in many areas (Figure 2). Global acute malnutrition (GAM) in children under 5 years exceeds 10 percent in many survey areas, indicating a "serious" situation that calls for adequate general rations, according to World Health Organization standards. GAM exceeds 15 percent in several zones of the country, a level considered "critical."
- In some of the worst drought affected
areas for which nutrition data are available, crude and children under-five
mortality rates exceed emergency levels of 1/10,000/day and 2/10,000/day,
- Some of the drought-affected areas become inaccessible at the peak of the summer rains as of mid-July. Pre-positioning of approximately 80,000 MT of food aid to these areas is required in May and June until the areas become accessible again at the end of the rainy season in September/October.
Donor food and non-food aid pledges against the December Appeal remain far short of requirements (Table 1). Pledges against non-food emergency relief requirements are critically low, thereby severely undermining the effectiveness of food aid interventions. This is reflected in the persistence of very high rates of malnutrition in many areas. Assuming accelerated delivery of already pledged food aid, available supplies will only cover needs through June, which coincides with the start of the hungry (lean) season in many areas. The Emergency Food Security Reserve is expected to run out at the end of April as more food aid grain is borrowed from the Reserve than repayments are made.
Table 1. Status of Emergency Relief Requirements and Pledges by Sector in 2003, as of March 14
|Food Aid (cereals, blended food and vegetable oil)||
618,890 MT (or 42%)**
|Water and sanitation||
US$ 20 M
US$ 5.5 M
US$ 14.5 M (or 73%)
|Health and Nutrition||
US$ 28.8 M
US$ 5.9 M
US$ 22.9 M (or 80%)
|Agriculture and Livestock (seeds, animal health, etc.)||
US$ 18.0 M
US$ 15.8 M
US$ 2.2 M (or 12%)
US$ 5.6 M
US$ 1.3 M
US$ 4.3 M (or 77%)
US$ 0.6 M
US$ 7.1 M (or 92%)
Source: UN Country Team Presentation,
14 March 2003.
*Revised figures based on reassessment of current needs. **The shortfall (60%) for blended food is critical.
Recommendations for Further Action
Relief interventions in many areas are inadequate to counter an impending humanitarian disaster. Given the severe shortfalls in food and non-food aid resources, FEWS NET recommends the following actions to help the country pull itself out of its present food crisis and begin the process of recovery:
- The Ethiopian Government should contribute
additional food aid from its own resources as it did in 2000 (100,000 MT)
and 2002 (47,600 MT) as a sign of leadership and commitment to heading
- The USG, EU and other donors, as well
as the "non-traditional" food donors, should promptly make further
significant food aid pledges to help Ethiopia overcome its current food
- Donors should urgently make substantial
pledges towards non-food emergency relief requirements, as shown in Table
- Donors and NGOs intending to purchase food aid from surplus producing areas in Ethiopia should buy in phases and in maximum-size lots of 20,000 MT in order to prevent price hikes for consumers.
Without question, the sheer magnitude of Ethiopia's 2003 emergency food needs appears daunting. Yet, unlike the 1984/85 famine, viable institutions -- such as the DPPC, EFSR and Government-donor coordination mechanisms -- are in place to monitor and analyze food security conditions as well as catalyze and coordinate an effective response delivery to the affected population. A large-scale humanitarian catastrophe can and must be averted through early, appropriate and adequate response to the 2003 emergency by the Ethiopian Government and the wider humanitarian community.