Executive Summary
Background
With the agreement to establish a confidence-building Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) between Ethiopia and Eritrea, it was decided that additional coordination mechanisms were necessary. As such, a three-tiered coordination mechanism was developed to facilitate humanitarian assistance in the TSZ (see Annex 5 for further details). The Steering Committee noted in March 2001, that since the TSZ had yet to be established and it was therefore impossible to conduct a comprehensive needs assessment, a rapid assessment should be carried out. In addition, a one-day appraisal of three locations in areas expected to fall into the TSZ, conducted by UN agencies on 1 March 2001 (See Annex 6 for further details), noted a general lack of baseline data and a need for further data collection. In this context, the Technical Advisory Sub-Committee on Assessments and Information proceeded to plan a rapid assessment.
Aims and Objectives
The aim of the rapid assessment was to collect baseline data including information on access, education, food and agriculture, health, infrastructure (including status of roads, electricity and civil administration buildings), shelter, population figures, and water and sanitation. It was envisaged that the baseline data would:
- provide updated information in otherwise inaccessible areas;
- facilitate GoE decisions concerning return;
- provide an initial basis for planning emergency humanitarian interventions prior to, or in tandem with, the return of populations;
- generate potential UNMEE-funded Quick Impact Projects (QIPs);
- provide initial indications on rehabilitation and reconstruction requirements; and
- facilitate preliminary co-ordination for activities in the TSZ.
Methodology
It was decided that the focus of the rapid assessment would be on the region of Gash Barka as the area was previously inaccessible and is, according to current data, an area to which many IDPs will return. Furthermore, the Technical Sub-Committee was informed that UNMEE Military Observers had already collected a considerable amount of data from the neighbouring region, Debub. It was also recognised that two settlements in the Southern Red Sea region (Dembe Sima and Musa Ali) should be assessed at a later stage. Priority villages in Gash Barka were identified by ERREC.
The rapid assessment was conducted by UN agencies (OCHA, UNDP/PoWER, UNFPA, and UNICEF), ERREC, and sub-zonal level representatives of the civil administration. The involvement of civil administrators was deemed important for two principal reasons. Firstly, they have detailed information about the status of villages prior to the recent conflict. Secondly, as yet, no civil administration has returned to the border areas in question. Thus, the rapid assessment, which was complemented by UNMEE security escorts, provided an opportunity for first-hand data collection by representatives of the civil administration.
Five sub-zones of Gash Barka are expected to fall partially or completely into the TSZ, once it is established: Gogne, Golij, Laelay Gash, Molki and Shambuko. Three team sites were identified for logistics purposes, Tokombia, Shambuko and Golij. Tokombia team site was responsible for the sub-zone of Laelay Gash and the southern part of Gogne. As Laelay Gash was the prioritised sub-zone, the largest number of personnel was sent there. Shambuko team site was responsible for the sub-zones of Shambuko and, as a lesser priority, Molki. A smaller number of staff were dispatched to Golij due to its ranking as lowest priority (based on the fact that the area has been accessible, IDP returns have taken place, and a number of humanitarian programs are ongoing).
During the planning stage, UNMACC, EMAC, and HALO Trust provided valuable information on the presence of landmines and UXOs in the areas to be assessed. In a number of cases, it was recommended that certain villages be excluded from the assessment due to a known mine threat or a lack of information in this regard. As mentioned, UNMEE provided each team with a security escort throughout the assessment.
The Rapid Village Assessment (RVA) questionnaire was employed as the main data collection tool (see Annexes 3 and 4, which include the questionnaire and guidelines for completion). The RVA questionnaire was devised in Kosovo and utilised to collect baseline data. The questionnaire was adopted and used by the peacekeeping mission, UN agencies, and NGOs. It covers all main sectors, can be completed rapidly, and does not require the involvement of highly skilled practitioners. The questionnaire was modified to ensure its relevance to Eritrea. The supporting database, into which all the data will be entered, will generate basic reports.
It should be noted that the rapid assessment is not a damage assessment. Rather, it is a stocktaking of the current situation in villages in border areas expected to fall into the TSZ which documents the status of homes, community buildings (including civil administration buildings, schools, and health facilities) and basic services available to populations in these areas. The rapid assessment does not aim to provide a comprehensive health status report, nor detailed information on needs and requirements. These are to be concluded by skilled practitioners once the areas of concern have been highlighted through the rapid assessment.
Findings
The findings of the rapid assessment are presented in the three assessment team reports that follow this executive summary. The following represents a broad overview of these findings.
Status of Populations and Return
Generally, populations that resided in areas in close proximity to the border have been displaced and have not been able to return to date. Most villages in these areas are therefore entirely devoid of their former inhabitants. In villages located further north, some have been able to remain while portions of the population have fled. Little or no return has taken place in these areas. Yet further away from the border most or all of the original inhabitants remain. Those who fled have been able to return safely (please refer to the three team reports and assessment data for details regarding each village visited)
Shelter and Status of Community Buildings
As above, southern areas, i.e. close to the border, have been severely affected by the war. Larger towns such as Shambuko, Biskuka, Shilalo, Tokombia, and Om Hajer have suffered significant damage to homes and community buildings (including civil administration buildings, health centers, and schools). Since populations have also been displaced from these areas, many buildings (such as homes which are often built in the traditional manner using mud and straw) have suffered due to lack of up-keep. Shops and other buildings of economic significance have been severely damaged.
Inadequate Supply of Safe Water
Water resources are strained to the limit in almost every inhabited village assessed. As a result of war-related damage, looting, and a lack of maintenance, many wells in the assessed areas are currently not functioning. Consequently, most villagers currently residing in border areas do not have access to adequate and safe water. Many travel to distant functioning wells or use unprotected sources nearby (such as shallow wells dug in riverbeds). The lack of adequate clean water poses a grave threat to the well-being of populations that have remained and will become a serious health concern when IDPs return to these areas.
Food and Food Security
Currently, many residing in the assessed areas are relying on food-aid delivered by ERREC. Many are currently waiting to plant although there is a general lack of seeds, tools, and draught animals. Meanwhile, the lack of water has made small-scale gardening difficult. In southern areas, the mine threat is keeping many away from their fields. It is essential that support be given to promote agricultural activity prior to the upcoming summer rains and agricultural cycle. If this period of cultivation is missed, the Government and international community will be faced by another year of significant dependence on food-aid by the returning villagers.
Regarding livestock, villagers report that a considerable number of their sheep and cows have died as a result of the limited water and pasture available. Looting or rustling has further reduced herds.
Few Functioning Health Facilities
In most areas visited, hospitals and health facilities were severely damaged during the recent conflict. Most require rehabilitation and reconstruction. In addition, many intact facilities are currently not functioning due to a lack of staff, equipment and essential drugs.
General Lack of Educational Opportunities
Rehabilitation and reconstruction of schools, provision of school materials and return of teachers is essential to continue or, in some instances, to restart formal education. There is particular concern about children in villages, which were not evacuated but did not receive any formal education, sometimes for up to two years. It should however be noted that children are prime sources of labor in the collection of water. Given the lack of adequate water supplies in many areas, children are spending significant amounts of time on this chore even if there are functioning schools.
Recommendations
The aim of this report is to provide general recommendations within the scope and limitations of the rapid assessment. It is the belief of the Technical Sub-Committee that whilst individual agencies involved in the rapid assessment may wish to follow up immediately with interventions, it is the role of the Sectoral Working Groups (SWG) to prioritize and co-ordinate a rapid response as well as provide the forum by which to involve the entire humanitarian community. Detailed data will be available in electronic format within the database and will be shared with SWGs. It is therefore recommended that the SWGs meet immediately to accomplish this and facilitate a rapid response to the rapid assessment. (Recommendations are not given in any order of priority)
Findings of rapid assessment should be used to initiate urgent interventions
The findings and data of the rapid assessment provide information than can allow for immediate humanitarian interventions. Urgent interventions should be initiated based on the findings of the rapid assessment before any further assessment work is done in these areas. To the extent possible, humanitarian assistance components in the current Consolidated Appeal (2001) should be redirected to related emergency needs in the TSZ
Use of QIPs to jumpstart humanitarian interventions
UNMEE's Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) offer a fast-disbursing capacity with which to respond in a timely manner while other UN agencies, donors and NGOs re-programme and raise additional funding for interventions in the TSZ. However, UNMEE's resources in this area are limited and should not be considered a panacea.
Facilitate return and functioning of civil authority
In order to ensure the return to functioning civil society for those who have remained as well as the smooth return of IDPs, civil administration needs to be both in place and functional.
Urgent need to extend humanitarian assistance to remaining populations
Villagers who remained, and therefore did not receive the assistance provided to those in IDP camps, are currently relying on a combination of traditional coping mechanisms and ad hoc food-aid delivered by ERREC. Many have lost their livelihoods and are struggling to survive without basic services. The majority do not have access to adequate and clean water, functioning health facilities, or education.
Urgent need for immediate response to encourage return
Mine-related interventions and projects aimed at providing basic services, especially water, shelter, health and education are essential to encourage return. As mentioned above, it should be stressed that it is vital that returns begin in time for the annual planting season, which usually begins in May (depending on the onset of the long rains). Returnees should be provided with tools and seeds so that they can begin farming activities immediately upon their return.
Intensification of Mine Action efforts
The threat of landmines is limiting population movements and participation in meaningful economic activities. The de-mining of the roads leading to towns and villages south of the Gash River should be considered a priority as should mine surveys of agricultural land belonging to the Government and other large farms along Gash Barka and fertile rain-fed areas. It is also critical that landmine awareness education be extended to those remaining populations who have not been part of awareness campaigns to date.
Rapid Village Assessment Reports:
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