Author: Stephanie Wolters1
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Executive Summary
One year after the inauguration of a transition government, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is facing its most serious crisis since war broke out between rebel factions and the government of the late President Laurent Kabila in August 1998. An ethnically-based armed faction led by General Laurent Nkunda, a former officer in the Rwandan-backed Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-G), is threatening to reignite full-scale war in the eastern part of the country, and the Congolese government has responded by sending tens of thousands of troops to the region. These armed groups now face one another across the frontline in North Kivu and Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu province and a city which General Nkunda briefly seized militarily in late-May. In Kinshasa, dialogue between the leaders of the various armed factions which now make up the new government, has all but come to a standstill, and latent mistrust has openly resurfaced. In these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine that the crisis will be managed politically, and there are strong indications that a flare-up, if not a prolonged bout of fighting, will erupt in the days and weeks to come.
Although the military crisis in the Kivus dominates the political scene at the moment, it is not the only issue which threatens the transition process. Infighting within the components of the government, as well as between them, has been the main reason for serious delays on key issues such as the re-formation of a national army, the nomination of provincial governors and the promulgation of key laws. Extensive interviews with key political actors in the Congolese capital Kinshasa indicate that these delays can be attributed to a great extent to certain spoiler elements who do not stand to gain from the culmination of the transition process in elections, now tentatively scheduled to take place in July 2005. Although each group pledges its commitment to the transition process and its desire to go to the elections at the scheduled time, all are more than ready to point fingers at their colleagues whom they blame for the various delays. It is clear that the transition government has not managed to consolidate itself, and that the various parties within it are still acting in their own sectional interests.
This situation report will attempt to describe the state of each component as well as their positions on key issues. It will also look at the attitudes that the various components have towards one another and how this impacts the functioning of the transition government. Finally, this situation report will also look at some of the key laws which have been passed and those currently being discussed in parliament, as well as the progress made by the five transition institutions. While recent events in the eastern part of the country will be briefly discussed, this situation report does not aim to provide a thorough analysis of those events, nor does it aim to provide an in-depth analysis of the ethnic conflict in that area. Instead, it aims to consider the impacts these events have on the effectiveness and viability of the transition government.
Background
The transitional government
The current transition government was inaugurated on 30 June 2003 following the signing in April 2003 of the Global and All-Inclusive Peace Accord in Pretoria. It is composed of representatives of the three main belligerent groups, the Rwandan-backed Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-G), the Ugandan-backed Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) and the ex-government of Joseph Kabila (henceforth to be identified as members of the Parti Pour la Reconstruction et le Devéloppement (PPRD)), as well as the representatives of smaller armed groups, the RCD-National (RCD-N) and the RCD/ Kisangani Liberation Movement (RCD/K-ML) and opposition political parties, civil society and the Mayi-Mayi militia.
The RCD-G, MLC and ex-government components are the largest components in the transition government and hold the majority of senior-level positions in the national assembly and the senate as well as ministerial posts. The other components all have representatives at ministerial level as well as in the national assembly and the senate.
Since its inauguration, the transition government has met with several delays in implementing key aspects of the peace accord, most notably the reintegration of the national army, the nomination of provincial governors and of regional military commanders as well as the promulgation of key laws such as the amnesty law, the nationality law and the military law. These delays have generally been attributed to high levels of distrust among the various parties and the concurrent unwillingness to reach compromise on key appointments, as well as a certain level of technical incompetence within the transition government.
With regard to the extension of the transition government's authority beyond the capital Kinshasa, two achievements have been registered to date: the appointment of military commanders for the country's eleven military zones at the start of the year, and the nomination and inauguration of new provincial governors in early May. Both of these issues involved extensive negotiations, and the repartition of posts indicates that the three main belligerents at least are still holding on to power in their key constituencies. A case in point is the maintenance of two key senior political and military RCD-G officials in North Kivu province, where RCD-G ally Eugene Serufuli remained governor, and where General Obed, another key RCD-G ally was appointed head of the eighth military region. On the side of the ex-government, the appointment of a member of the PPRD as governor of Katanga province, a post that was to be designated by the Mayi-Mayi component, indicates not only the ex-government's desire to control the important, mineral-rich province, but also the extent to which it has managed to appropriate key elements of other components into its own.
The rebellion in the East
Since the appointment of new military commanders throughout the country, it has become clear, particularly in the eastern part of the country, that the various components have maintained their command and control structures. In Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu province, the appointment of General Nabiolwa, a former officer in Mobutu's army, quickly misfired when he attempted to disarm Major Kasongo who was discovered harbouring weapons caches in his compounds. Kasongo was subsequently arrested and brought to Kinshasa against the objection of the RCD-G which threatened to drop out of the transition process if he was not returned to Bukavu. Faced with this threat, President Kabila allowed Kasongo to return to Bukavu; this did not fully calm the situation, however. Subsequent clashes between Nabiolwa and his second-in-command, Colonel Jules Mutebutsi, a former RCD-G officer, plunged the city into fear and cost dozens of lives. Nabiolwa was recalled to Kinshasa and was subsequently replaced by General Mbuza Mabe, also a senior officer in Mobutu's army.
In late-May tensions again erupted when dissident troops led by General Laurent Nkunda joined Mutebutsi's forces and captured the town of Bukavu for several days in spite of the presence of MONUC forces in the city. According to Nkunda, he attacked the town to prevent atrocities against the Banyamulenge (ethnic Congolese Tutsi) community which he accused government forces of committing. Several thousand people, many of them Banyamulenge, fled the city for fear of reprisals against their community. Nkunda later retracted his accusations that government forces were preparing a genocide of the Banyamulenge community, then changed his tune again, demanding an independent enquiry. Meanwhile after over a week of fighting which killed more than 100 people, Nkunda and his forces abandoned Bukavu and retreated to positions north of the city, where he currently remains. Mutebutsi and an unknown number of his troops meanwhile fled across the border to neighbouring Rwanda, where they currently remain.
The Kinshasa government reacted to the crisis by dispatching tens of thousands of Forces Armées de la RDC (FARDC) troops to the eastern part of the country, and issuing an arrest warrant for Nkunda and Mutebutsi. Meanwhile General Rubiwasiri Obed, the officially-appointed commander of the eighth military region remains in his post in Goma, and his position is unclear. According to one senior Congolese military official, Obed's hands are tied; he has no effective control over the troops supposed to be under his command, but he does not feel safe appealing to Kinshasa for help, or openly denouncing Nkunda's actions.
"Obed is complicit in the events of Goma. He is the commander, but he has mostly Rwandophone and Banyarwanda troops who answer to militia commanders (such as Nkunda). Obed can't come out and say it because he would have to tell the whole story and implicate himself to some extent."2
Others are convinced that Obed is himself closely involved in the rebellion and that he has rallied his troops to Nkunda.3Either way, the situation is extremely precarious. The transition government will have to reassert its control over the eastern part of the country, an objective it is currently pursuing militarily. Nkunda, however, who is estimated to have at least 10,000 well-trained troops loyal to him is fighting for his life (there is a warrant for his arrest and he has been accused of crimes against humanity for his role in the extrajudicial killings of over 100 civilians and soldiers which followed the May 2002 mutiny in the city of Kisangani)4 and is unlikely to surrender. Equally worrisome is the implication of the Rwandan government in the matter. It is widely believed that Rwanda is providing at least logistical and material support to Nkunda and his men, and this is likely to increase as FARDC troops retake key areas and move towards reestablishing control over Goma.5 Already other political hardliners such as Bizima Karaha, an RCD deputy who recently defected from the transition government, have accused the FARDC of having Interahamwe troops in its ranks.6
The presence of the Interahamwe on Congolese soil was one of the primary reasons for which the Rwandan government became involved in the DRC, and any movement of FARDC troops towards the Rwandan border could provoke the Rwandan government to again send troops to the DRC. In the week prior to 18 July, there were numerous skirmishes between the FARDC and Nkunda's troops in the areas of Kalehe and Minova. On 17 July reports from Goma indicated that hundreds of people had been fleeing the town in the previous days, fearing an outbreak of fighting.7Meanwhile, Obed failed to attend an emergency summit of the leaders of the country's military zones which was held in Kinshasa on 18 July.
The reintegration of the Congolese army
Lack of progress on the critical issue of reforming a new Congolese army has been perhaps the most significant failure of the transition government. Military and political observers from the various components officially recognise this, but are simultaneously unwilling to submit themselves to the process. According to one senior Congolese military official, the issue has not yet been seriously addressed in negotiations between the RCD-G, the MLC and the ex-government, the three main belligerents who still control the bulk of the armed forces in the country. "There is no interest in going ahead with the reintegration of the army. The various actors need to balance their power, this balance comes from the military."8
Meanwhile, the various representatives of the components acknowledge that progress on the issue is key, but blame one another for the delay in action. At the same time that they accuse other components in the government of wanting to maintain their military intact as a means of leverage, the various parties themselves tacitly argue that this is necessary for them to survive in the current context of deep distrust between the parties and military and political instability.9According to one senior Congolese military official, the events in Bukavu may be an opportunity to impress upon the various actors that they can no longer tread water on the issue: "If the events of Bukavu had not happened, there would not be any discussion of reintegration until after the transition. Maybe now it can happen."10 With military clashes occurring daily and civilians beginning to flee Goma for fear of fighting in the city, this is an unlikely scenario, however desirable it may be.
1 Stephanie I. Wolters is a freelance journalist and currently writes the Economist Intelligence Unit's DRC Quarterly Country Report. Between 2001 and 2003 Stephanie was Chief News Editor of MONUC's Radio Okapi in the DRC.
2 Interview with senior Congolese military official, Kinshasa, July 2004.
3 Interview with senior government official, Kinshasa, July 2004.
4 Interview with senior Congolese military official, Kinshasa, July 2004.
5 Ibid, and interviews with journalists and senior diplomats in Kinshasa, July 2004.
6 Lettre au Camerade Azarias Ruberwa Manywa, president du RCD, Goma, July 9, 2004.
7 Radio Okapi news report, July 17, 2004.
8 Interview with senior Congolese military official, Kinshasa, July 2004.
9 Interview with senior government and military officials, Kinshasa, July 2004.
10 Ibid.
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