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DR Congo

Social Science in Humanitarian Action: Politics, factions and violence; listening to local voices on Ebola - Local media update #3 (February-April 2019)

Attachments

This brief summarises local media and messages circulating via social media outlets including WhatsApp and local radio and press outlets in the Beni and Butembo areas of North Kivu, DRC between February and April 2019. It also captures the growing number of warning messages and written threats transmitted as part of the escalation of violence against Ebola response teams during this period.
The brief was developed by Rachel Sweet (Harvard, University of Notre Dame) for the Social Science in Humanitarian Action Platform with support from Juliet Bedford and Ingrid Gercama (Anthrologica). For further details on the issues contained in this brief please contact Rachel Sweet (rsweet2@nd.edu) or Juliet Bedford (julietbedford@anthrologica.com).

Overview

• During February-April 2019, escalating attacks against Ebola treatment centers (ETCs) repeatedly interrupted response activities.
Significant shifts in messages during this period reflect the growing violence, most notably by directly threatening attacks or by implicating local political figures in propagating false narratives about response efforts. Local messages help explain some of the escalating violence and also expose numerous factions in local opinion about the Ebola virus.

• Some messages incite violence, although most demand more effective response efforts including a more transparent vaccination strategy and clearer, non-partisan commitment from response team members. Although the attacks are highly visible, communities continue to make repeated attempts to communicate peacefully with the Government of Congo and international responders to voice their concerns.

• Those inciting violence suggest that initial attacks against ETCs and personnel were a reaction, at least in part, to perceptions that political motives had tainted response efforts. The restriction of voting rights in Beni-Butembo during the 30 December 2018 presidential elections reinforced suspicions of political agendas behind (and/or manipulating) the Ebola outbreak. The political affiliation of key response leaders, involvement of state security forces in response efforts and the use of Ebola as a campaign tool in advance of the March 2019 legislative elections further undermined the perceived neutrality of the response.

• Since mid-April a more extreme set of messages has continued to threaten direct violence (including killings and arson) against response personnel as well as local authorities and civilians who support response efforts. One notable change over the last few months has been the increase in written threats again the response being made / distributed by self-described perpetrators of attacks. Other messages remind observers that armed actors involved in the attacks operate under the backing of ‘political sponsors’ and suggest that Ebola has become a tool of political infighting at the local level.

• Although some narratives still contest that Ebola is not a ‘real’ disease (that it is a ‘hoax’), most do not question the veracity of the disease. Rather, concerns are couched in general fatigue and distrust, and many are incredulous that the virus continues to spread.
Communities see themselves as ‘doing their part’ to contain Ebola (e.g., hand washing, safe burials1 ) and question the motives of response teams: they view the significant financial and technical resources mobilised around Ebola as being at odds with the progress of the response. Some question whether political agendas and/or financial interests dampen the response’s commitment to ending the outbreak.

• Messages repeat previous concerns that medical personnel may misdiagnose other illnesses as Ebola; that hygiene standards disrupt lifestyles including day-to-day gestures of community building and cohesion like greetings2 ; that local authorities and religious leaders who support response efforts receive money or bribes from response teams; and that response personnel are paid to kill patients. Ongoing attempts by local authorities and media outlets to curb ‘resistance’ were met by a round of messages threatening violence against them.

• Some new misinformation has also emerged, suggesting for example that response teams contaminate latrines with the Ebola virus.3 Messages by civil society leaders and local journalists allege that local politicians are behind the mis- and dis-information that is circulating.

• The third Strategic Response Plan stresses a shift towards local ownership of the Ebola response. In the context of North Kivu, ownership must go beyond conventional understandings of ‘community’ to be multi-factional and multi-associational and must avoid empowering certain individuals and/or population groups at the expense of others. Messages reinforce the need to build trust across communities and with the numerous different population factions, particularly by adjusting response activities in light of local feedback. Civil society leaders who have medical training should be actively included in the response and supported to have a greater role. The involvement of traditional associations such as Kyaghanda-Yira, customary chiefs and religious authorities remains critical. Local journalists urge response teams to “redo” material so that communications are kept up-to-date and are responsive to the evolving situation. They continue to stress that all materials must be translated into local languages (Congolese Swahili and Kinande).

• Systems that strengthen community-based surveillance and locally-led response actions require further investment. In emphasising local ownership, local stakeholders have suggested that positive incentives for community members to support the response would be welcome. These should not be in the form of financial remuneration, but suggestions include promoting a “best prevention prize” to award communities, neighborhoods, or villages who effectively support (and contribute to) the Ebola response. Changing the approach to instigate broader community-level incentives may also help reduce suspicions regarding the flow of Ebola money and power to the benefit of some individuals but at the expense of others.