Attachments
Executive Summary and Recommendations
Facing a deadline from the UN Security Council and African regional gouvernements to fully demobilize or face military operations by January 2, 2015, the rebel group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Known as the FDLR is Regrouping Currently, Mobilizing Political Support, and Continuing to pose a regional threat security. The FDLR is one of the Most Significant and abusive armed groups in Congo and Rwanda, several leaders of ict Were Involved in helping to perpetrate the Rwandan genocide, and It Has Committed Against Civilians repeated massacres in Congo. Combatting the FDLR HAS Become the Stated rationale for several active armed Congolese groups. An significant reason to focus on the FDLR Rwanda Is That HAS Repeatedly the FDLR threat 'cited as a justification to Intervene in eastern Congo. Ending the FDLR counter That Would Eliminate justification and one of the major drivers of instability in eastern Congo and the area.
Evidence from UN experts and Findings from six months of Enough Project field research in Congo Suggest que la FDLR's current strategy is Focused on Reorganizing soi in three main Areas: Generating more income to trade for ammunition and weapons, Mobilizing Political Support in year Attempt to gain Greater Legitimacy, and prepaid to Avoid military defeat through alliance-building and recruitment. Despite The group's rhetoric That ict fighters are in the process of disarming, the FDLR HAS failed to meet several deadlines to demobilize set by regional and the international community gouvernements. Fewer than 200 rank-and-file soldiers-have laid down Their weapons to date, and the group HAS to relocate to designated refusé Demobilization camps.
The FDLR continued to generate revenue by trading gold Mainly through North Kivu and Uganda and by Illegally Producing and trading charcoal from Virunga National Park, a trade worth $ 32 million annually Estimated per year. The group is using share of revenue to purchase That ammunition and arms from Congolese army officers, with Whom It continued to Collaborate and share intelligence. The UN Group of Experts and around Virunga Park INTERVIEWED notes aussi que la FDLR continued to recruit foot soldiers. The FDLR HAS aussi struck military alliances with Congolese armed groups, Including Mai Mai Lafontaine and others. Finally, the FDLR is gathering momentum by Political HAVING created new alliances with oven Rwandan Political Parties That are frustrated with the Increasing Lack of Political Space in Rwanda. Anecdotal evidence from field interviews Enough Project Shows That thesis alliances are boosting moral Within The FDLR, though Enthusiasm HAS Reviews some of the Dissipated Recently in the wake of strong messages from the Regional Disarmament and International gouvernements the community.
The FDLR's current strategy is consistent with ict longtime pattern of Responding to military pressure. In this pattern, the group promised to disarm and reiterates ict Political aspirations for recognition as a Rwandan opposition group. The FDLR uses Then Any reprieve to regroup by building military alliances and Increasing Economic activity and recruitment.
Since the defeat of the rebel group M23 in November 2013, the FDLR HAS RECEIVED Significant focus in Both the regional and the international community as the Broader next hand armed group to address. This attention HOWEVER, Has very little translated into policy actions to date, and the rebels' promised to disarm-have gone Largely unfulfilled. Efforts to end the FDLR-have Suffered from a Lack of consensus to entreprendre military operations or --other non-military steps in hand Because of the group's position at the center of regional tensions. The Congolese government, Which would-have to play a critical role in efforts to counter the FDLR, hesitates in hand Because its ties to the FDLR are economically and politically beneficial. Several Congolese army officers, for example, continues to Benefit from the gold and the FDLR's illegal charcoal trade. South Africa and Tanzania, the chief troop-Contributing Countries to the UN Intervention Brigade in the Congo, Kinshasa-have supported to date in large part due to business intérêts related to the Inga III mega-dam and strained relationships with Because Of Rwanda. South African and Tanzanian leaders-have aussi bristled at Rwanda's Alleged Attempted assassinations of Political Opponents in South Africa. The current chair of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Angola, Has Attempted to push the area to act more forcefully on the FDLR military strength Preferring goal stopping short of Contributing troops to the UN brigade.
A Significant issue with the military option is que la soi FDLR embeds in Local Communities and Refugee populations, Creating a Legitimate That risk counter-FDLR operations Civilian casualties because Will is a scale similar to past That Is That Used conventional military operations strategies. The risk of Civilian casualties Can Be mitigated if using special operations force and target the FDLR leadership aussi Incorporate strong Civilian Protection Measures. Lessons from the African Union's mission is to counter the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) Should Be Applied.
Defeating the FDLR Will require a comprehensive strategy That Incorporates Both Targeted Approaches military diplomacy and more Concerted Action on non-military Areas, Including high-level diplomacy, Economic Measures, Incentives pour augmenter defections, Humanitarian steps, and criminal accountability. In Particular, the FDLR's cooperation with the Congolese army and Its Economic lifelines Must Be Significantly curtailed. This report sets out key non-military Approaches to ending the FDLR's Ability to continue to Threaten peace and security in the area. A follow-up report Will review military Necessary steps to address the FDLR.
Recommendations
Regional diplomacy. UN Special Envoy Said Djinnit shoulds Proactively continues to repair relationships betweens Rwanda and South Africa as well as relationships betweens Rwanda and Tanzania. The aim to forge Should Be Both Targeted regional consensus for military operations and Urgently-needed non-military Measures to Neutralize the FDLR. In addition to shuttle diplomacy and Bringing together key Officials for talks, initiatives Could include confidence-building Measures, Such as Facilitating Increased Economic ties Among the countries, Issuing common statements on the FDLR, and / or diplomacy can retreats, Such as a new round of the Oyo Process in Congo - Brazzaville.
Cutting off the FDLR's Economic lifelines: charcoal. UN Special Envoy Said Djinnit, US Special Envoy Russ Feingold, and UN Special Representative Martin Kobler shoulds press the UN Peacekeeping Mission (MONUSCO) and the Congolese Police to Support the Virunga park rangers of the Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation (ICCN) in interdicting the FDLR's supply routes for charcoal from Virunga National Park to Goma. The Envoys shoulds aussi press MONUSCO peacekeepers to Provide to patrol the park with the Virunga park rangers to help charcoal Curtail Production in the park. Congolese army officers for accountability. Djinnit, Feingold, Kobler, and Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos shoulds escalate pressure on the Congolese government to Investigate, suspend, and indict Congolese military officers Who are Suspected of Collaborating with the FDLR. The outcome Should Be Placed on the agenda of the high-level talks ICGLR and the UN Security Council. Such cooperation is a major issue, Because It Enables the rebels to Avoid attacks and resupply. DESPITE several years of collaborative Such Documented by UN experts, no Congolese army officer ever HAS-been suspended for cooperation with the FDLR.
Work to apprehend FDLR leader Sylvestre Mudacumura and encourages public indictments. Djinnit, Feingold, and dos Santos shoulds urge MONUSCO and the Congolese government to Cooperate with the International Criminal Court, apprehend Mudacumura, and Strengthen the box Against him. Work on this area can help break down the structures Both of Impunity That allow FDLR's leadership to thrive and aussi restore security and Dignity to Victims. The Envoys shoulds aussi encourage regional gouvernements to Develop public investigations and indictments Against FDLR, M23, and high-level persons --other accusé of Committing serious atrocity crimes. Will public indictments help encourage non-indicted FDLR combatants and armed --other to defect without fear of apprehension.
Third-country resettlement. Djinnit, European Union Representative Koen Vervaeke, Feingold and finalize negotiations with shoulds Countries outside the Great Lakes Region and Develop concrete options for resettlement for FDLR combatants Who are not indicted for atrocity crimes and Who-have a fear of return to Rwanda . Such Offers shoulds include the protective Necessary Measures to encourage Increased defection.
Refugees. Djinnit, Feingold, and Kobler shoulds work with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to set up protected camps for refugees in eastern Congo. The Envoys shoulds aussi assurer MONUSCO That Provides security for the camps. The current internal displacement camps Where Rwandan Refugees stay serve as recruitment pools for the FDLR. The establishment of UN Refugee camps with much Stronger security and protection provided by MONUSCO Would help counter thesis from FDLR recruitment camps.
Security guarantees must. Djinnit, Feingold, and dos Santos shoulds work with Rwanda to Provide Improved security year Plan That Is co-signed by international actors and to issue a new statement That Would outline more concrete plan for security and non-FDLR combatants for guarantees must Prosecution not indicted for serious crimes. Rwanda HAS HAD a policy to date, purpose-have beens That security deals Reportedly broken-have made FDLR fighters not trust the current arrangements. A new revised program, co-signed by the United Nations and / or the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Could help spur more defections from the FDLR.