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DR Congo + 1 more

Evaluation of the Common Humanitarian Fund - Country Report: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) May 2015

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Executive Summary

  1. This Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) country report of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) provides an overview and summary of the findings of the country level assessment undertaken in the context of a broader global evaluation of the CHF carried out in the second half of 2014. It is one of five country-level assessments prepared as part of the overall review.

  2. The CHF in DRC, known as the Pooled Fund, was together with Sudan established as an initial pilot CHF. It has been in place since 2006 and has made important humanitarian response contributions to the crises in the country during the last eight years. The CHF was able to attract significant donor support and channel these funds to a range of projects across the country implemented by United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Complementarity with Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) allocations, which have been more limited and support emergency interventions by the United Nations agencies alone, has been largely achieved.

  3. On the whole partners view the CHF positively. It has been a key fund in the DRC context and has been subject to constant revision through a process of learning, constant need for adaptation and incorporation of new frameworks. It has significant influence on the humanitarian system in DRC. Invariably, revisions to the CHF and its overall direction have also depended on, and been a product of, the CHF leadership in place (Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), Head of OCHA, Head of Joint Pooled Funding Unit (JPFU). The CHF mechanism in DRC has above all strengthened the leadership of the HC by providing him with means to respond to specific crises, provide support to partners and hold the latter to account for the assistance they are to provide. In DRC, the HC has used the Emergency Reserve more widely and also used its funding to cover what are considered strategic projects1 :
    UNICEF Rapid Response to Population Movements (RRMP) and United Nations Humanitarian Air service (UNHAS) flights. Overall the process was found to be inclusive and largely transparent although many felt that transparency could still improve.

  4. Despite being one of the two first CHFs established, it was considered to be “in transition” at the time of the evaluation mission when its new Monitoring, Reporting and Evaluation (M/R&E) system was rolling out and a risk management framework was at the inception stage. The Fund’s Terms of Reference (TOR) were under revision because they no longer reflected present practice, particularly in light of a changed allocation strategy.2 The mechanism’s allocation approach was revised in 2013 when the CHF experienced a decline in funding. Perceptions on the appropriateness of the changes are inevitably mixed with the Fund’s decreased funding and diminished reach.3 5. Funding to the CHF has declined in recent years and has significantly reduced its ability to support the scale and range of projects seen in earlier years. This is largely due to other global priorities for humanitarian funding and/or declining aid budgets, as well as recent concerns related to the CHF’s allocation strategy and the Fund’s management.

  5. Within the current context of continued underfunding coupled with protracted need and sudden crises, the CHF is attempting to now both (i) build resilience and (ii) reduce aid dependency through the new standard allocation that now focuses on resilience and responding to crises through specific/special emergency reserve allocations. While resilience building is an important goal in DRC, the CHF is also prioritizing this approach in a time of underfunding which makes it all the more challenging.

  6. The performance of a fund greatly depends on the quality of its allocation decisions. The focus of allocations in DRC now further deviates from the two annual standard allocation approach (closely aligned with priority needs identified in a Strategic Response Plan/Humanitarian Action Plan). In this sense it can be argued that the CHF is less capable of filling critical gaps and underfinanced priorities to ensure a coherent response in line with a strategic framework. The SRP (or HAP in DRC) however is not considered strategic enough for the purposes of the CHF because it is too broad and does not establish more specific priorities. The wide-ranging objectives and competing pressures that are placed on the Fund warrant a better theory of change and overall logical framework delineating what the CHF aims to achieve more specifically through its revised allocation strategy and the issues and concepts it is prioritizing in the process. This will also enable the CHF to provide clearer direction and be perceived as more transparent.

  7. The DRC CHF prioritizes “Do No Harm” and gender as cross-cutting approaches that should be mainstreamed. The evaluation found that Accountability to Affected Populations should be further integrated into the CHF’s processes and that overall formal beneficiary feedback mechanisms as well as general complaints mechanisms were lacking.

  8. Partners consider lack of timeliness the main weakness of the fund. A main concern is that by the time partners have received disbursements, the assessments and needs identified months ago are no longer valid. CHF funding decisions are always drafted on the basis of information provided by the provincial committees (CPIA) expanded to the clusters. The amount of time that it takes for information to flow from the provincial levels to the national level results in a considerable delay. The CHF in DRC needs to further review and decide how to strike the right balance in its processes, given the context and considering different variables (including realistic levels of funding over time). Less funding would usually warrant a narrower and lighter process. In addition, other means that can prove more effective in early response such as prepositioning capacity or expanding ongoing projects to cover new needs should be considered.

  9. CHF management has a strong vision for the CHF that was often not well conveyed or conceptually unpacked to stakeholders. The participatory “bottom-up” approach in a time of revision coupled with efforts to retain flexibility can be perceived as vague and even lead partners to question the level of transparency. While the CHF has made considerable efforts to boost communication at different levels, including posting documents on the website and visiting the field prior to allocations, these are insufficient. Communication in DRC is challenging for many reasons which include: the complex and diverse coordination structures with varying capacities, the size of the country coupled with weak communications and logistical challenges. Given the Fund’s importance, however, an array of actors needs to be informed of the CHF – beginning with OCHA’s field offices; they can be a large part of communication efforts.

  10. Some donors had concerns with the CHF’s financial management and systems. These were reviewed by a recent Sida-supported assessment that will help strengthen them in the future. A new stronger M/R&E system that has been a priority for the CHF since 2011 and now includes all partners – UN agencies and NGOs – is being fully rolled out. It will be critical to continue to prioritize its implementation and reap benefits from these efforts. A more solid risk management framework is foreseen that should consider a shared and more balanced risk analysis and clearer management of and responses to risks. A Grant Management System is to be rolled out in 2015 to better track the CHF’s performance across different targets.

  11. The CHF in DRC has understandably been protective of its achievements and has sought to ensure that the CHF be a country-directed process. The necessary focus on in-country processes however, results in a general tendency to be inward looking, communicating less with stakeholders outside DRC. This potentially affects its ability to consider alternatives and receive support in specific key areas: resource mobilization, increased accountability through AAP and complaints mechanisms for the Fund.

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