Democratic Republic of the Congo: Briefing

This afternoon (19 February), the Security Council will hold a briefing and consultations on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). France, the penholder on the file, requested the meeting to discuss the latest developments in eastern DRC, including the capture of Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu province, by the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebel group. The anticipated briefers are Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the DRC and Head of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) Bintou Keita and Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region Huang Xia. The DRC and several regional countries—including Angola, Burundi, and Rwanda—are expected to participate in the meeting under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.

Keita may describe the evolving security situation in eastern DRC, which has escalated since the postponement of face-to-face talks between DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame on 15 December 2024. Angola, the facilitator of a regional mediation initiative known as the Luanda process, had convened the talks with the aim of finding a lasting solution to the crisis in eastern DRC. However, the issue of the M23 created serious disagreement between the two countries, resulting in the postponement of the talks. (For more information, see our 15 January What’s In Blue story.) This led to the deterioration of the security situation in eastern DRC, with the M23 making significant military advances in North Kivu province, including by capturing its provincial capital, Goma, by the end of January.

Security Council members met three times in January to discuss the rapidly unfolding situation, once in closed consultations and twice in open briefings followed by closed consultations. On 26 January, Council members issued a press statement condemning the military advances of the M23 and urging the group to reverse its territorial expansion. Members also expressed support for ongoing regional mediation efforts—such as the Luanda process and the Nairobi process—and called for the resumption of dialogue within these frameworks. The Nairobi process is an initiative under the auspices of the East African Community (EAC) which focuses on facilitating dialogue between the DRC and armed groups operating in eastern DRC, including the M23

Xia is likely to speak about the series of continental and regional emergency meetings triggered by the latest escalation in eastern DRC. The African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), the EAC, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) have held emergency meetings in the last few weeks. Additionally, on 8 February, the EAC and SADC held a joint summit in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, aimed at charting a way to resolve the crisis. The joint summit decided to merge the Nairobi and Luanda processes and called for the appointment of additional facilitators from other African regions to support the joint process. It also called for the resumption of direct dialogue with all armed groups, including the M23, and urged the implementation of the harmonised plan for the neutralisation of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR)—an ethnic Hutu armed group implicated in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide against the Tutsis—and the lifting of Rwanda’s defensive measures as agreed within the framework of the Luanda process.

The communiqué adopted at the end of the joint summit called for:

• the cessation of hostilities in eastern DRC and an immediate ceasefire;
• the restoration of essential utilities and supply lines for food and other essential commodities to ensure humanitarian support; and
• a peaceful resolution of the conflict through the Luanda/Nairobi process.

On 14 February, the AUPSC held its second emergency meeting on the situation in the DRC on the margins of the AU summit in Addis Ababa at the level of Heads of State and Government. The communiqué adopted at the end of the meeting endorsed the outcomes of the previous regional summits, including the joint EAC/SADC summit. It also supported the decision to merge the Luanda and Nairobi processes. Additionally, the communiqué called for:

• the development of a framework to facilitate enhanced coordination and complementarity of these processes;
• the establishment of a joint AU/EAC/SADC coordination mechanism to provide technical support in this regard, in close coordination with other regional mechanisms, such as ECCAS and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR); and
• the establishment of a funding mechanism to support these mediation processes and a reporting mechanism to harmonise decision-making.

It seems that the flurry of diplomatic activities has had little impact on the situation on the ground, as the M23 continued to make military advances and captured Bukavu this past weekend. MONUSCO had withdrawn from South Kivu in June 2024, following the disengagement plan agreed with the Congolese government in 2023. The Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) and allied militias reportedly retreated from the area. Burundian forces, initially deployed in eastern DRC under a bilateral agreement with Kinshasa to target Burundian dissident groups, later joined the fight against the M23 alongside the FARDC but are now reportedly withdrawing from South Kivu. Meanwhile, media reports indicate that Ugandan forces have entered Bunia, the capital of Ituri province. Uganda has forces deployed in eastern DRC under a separate bilateral agreement with Kinshasa to combat the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an armed group affiliated with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh). These developments have raised concerns that the situation could escalate into a regional conflict.

At today’s meeting, Keita may update Council members on the impact of the current situation on MONUSCO and the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC). She may outline the challenges that MONUSCO is facing, particularly regarding its freedom of movement. Additionally, Keita may address the mission’s coordination efforts with SAMIDRC in accordance with resolution 2746 of 6 August 2023, which mandated MONUSCO to provide support to SAMIDRC. South Africa, a key troop-contributing country (TCC) to SAMIDRC, has reportedly sent reinforcements after 14 of its soldiers were killed in North Kivu but has hinted at a potential drawdown, depending on the implementation of the joint EAC/SADC summit communiqué. Malawi, another SAMIDRC TCC, has already decided to withdraw its troops from eastern DRC.

Since early February, Council members have been negotiating a French-proposed draft resolution, which, among other things, apparently condemns the ongoing offensive by the M23 and demands that the group halt further territorial expansion and withdraw from all controlled areas. It seems that the draft text also calls on the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) to cease support for the M23 and withdraw from Congolese territory. Additionally, it apparently expresses the Council’s intention to consider imposing further targeted sanctions on the leadership of the M23 and its external supporters. It seems that the penholder had intended to table the draft resolution for a vote ahead of the 14 February AUPSC meeting. UN Secretary-General António Guterres also apparently supported this approach during his monthly luncheon with Council members on 7 February, expressing hope that the resolution would send the right signal to the AUPSC.

Nonetheless, the “A3 plus” grouping (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) preferred to await the outcome of the AUPSC meeting. During the Munich Security Conference last week, Tshisekedi voiced frustration over the Security Council’s inaction, specifically criticising the “A3 plus” members for “blocking” a resolution condemning Rwanda. In a 17 February letter to the Security Council (S/2025/102), the DRC’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Zénon Ngay Mukongo, echoed his government’s frustration over the matter.

It seems that a new dynamic has emerged within the “A3 plus” grouping, with Guyana now adopting a different stance from the other group members. Following the 14 February AUPSC meeting, the A3 (Algeria, Sierra Leone, and Somalia) apparently sent comments on the draft text, aligning the language with the AUPSC’s communiqué, which does not reference Rwanda explicitly. It seems that Guyana sent a separate comment expressing support for the draft text but conveying a preference to address the sanctions issue under the 1533 DRC sanctions regime and its designation criteria. At the time of writing, Council members were discussing a second revised draft of the resolution, which is under silence until this afternoon. It appears that several members—including Denmark, Greece, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Slovenia, the UK, and the US—have expressed strong support for the draft resolution, emphasising the urgency of the situation given the evolving security dynamics on the ground.