1. The current situation
In the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu:
Following violent fighting during the second half of 2008 between the Congolese armed forces (Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo - FARDC) and the Congolese armed group known as the National People's Congress (Congrès national du peuple - CNDP), Presidents Joseph Kabila (DRC) and Paul Kagame (Rwanda) found themselves under strong domestic and international pressure to put an end to the latest chapter of a long-lasting conflict in the Congolese Kivu provinces.
On 5 December 2008, the two heads of state took everybody by surprise when their respective governments jointly announced the launch of "Umoja Wetu" (Our Unity), a joint military operation against the Rwandan rebels of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR - Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda), and the opening of direct negotiations between the CNDP and the Kinshasa government.
On 20 January 2009, the Rwandan army entered Congo and, in collaboration with the FARDC, neutralized the main elements of the CNDP who had been opposed to integrating their forces into the Congolese army. CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda was arrested by the Rwandan security forces in the night of 22-23 January, and replaced with another senior CNDP figure, Bosco Ntaganda, the subject of an ICC arrest warrant for war crimes since 2006. The coalition also launched a 35-day military offensive against the 6,500 strong FDLR in North Kivu.
The decisions taken by Presidents Kabila and Kagame to bring their two countries closer together represented a political shift that raised new hopes for regional stabilisation. The restoration of diplomatic relations, the relaunch of the Communauté économique des pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL - Great Lakes Countries Economic Community), and the concrete implementation of the commitments made in the Nairobi Communiqué of 9 November 2007 - an agreement over a joint strategy for dismantling armed groups - laid the formal foundations for a new bilateral relationship.
However, this rapprochement was only made possible by a secret political deal under which the two heads of state agreed on the possibility of neutralising their respective enemies, Laurent Nkunda and the FDLR. The integration of the combatants of the former Congolese armed groups into the FARDC did not provide for establishing state authority over Eastern Congo, as the CNDP maintained a parallel administration and a military chain of command in large parts of North Kivu.
During Umoja Wetu, the FDLR avoided direct confrontation and dispersed in the Kivu forests. After 35 days, the results of the operation were much more modest than officially celebrated. The FDLR was only marginally and temporarily weakened in North Kivu and remained intact in South Kivu. Barely a month after the end of the operation, the rebels had regrouped and started to retaliate against civilians.
On 4 March 2009, Kinshasa launched a new anti-FDLR offensive, operation "Kimia II" (Quiet) that was to be conducted by the FARDC with logistical support from the UN peacekeeping force, MONUC. Kimia II ended on 31 December 2009 under heavy critics for causing civilian suffering, failure to neutralize FDLR and delaying long-awaited security sector reform (SSR). MONUC was criticized for failing to protect civilians from human rights violations committed by both FDLR and FARDC.
In fact, the military approach to neutralize the FDLR only led to modest achievements against the Rwandan rebellion, including increasing the disarmament rate of FDLR combatants. As a result of the two military offensives, MONUC reported that it had demobilized close to 2,000 Rwandan and Congolese FDLR combatants during the year 2009. On 17 November 2009 German police arrested two top FDLR political leaders, Ignace Murwanashyaka and Deputy Straton Musoni; both were part of an international FDLR support network that continues to operate.
Human Rights Watch recorded that 1,400 civilians were killed from January to September 2009, either by FDLR combatants or rogue FARDC units; 7,500 rapes, 9,000 burned buildings and 900,000 new IDPs reported in North and South Kivu due to the military offensives. FDLR has maintained majority of its combatants and ability to retaliate against civilians. In December 2009, a UN report concluded that Kimia II had failed to dismantle the organisation's political and military structures on the ground in eastern DRC.
On 1 January 2010, "Amani Leo", a third military operation was launched by FARDC still with MONUC logistical support, aiming to eradicate FDLR rebels within 3 months. Amani Leo puts strong emphasis on civilian protection, joint planning and conditionality of MONUC support linked to FARDC's respect for human rights. Amani Leo was eventually extended to date as the FDLR command and control has still not been disrupted. As an unexpected result of MONUC's conditionally policy, most recent military offensives have been conducted in North Kivu and South Kivu on a unilateral basis by the FARDC.
Inter-community tension in North Kivu has been fuelled by claims related to the return of Congolese refugees from Rwanda and Uganda. Indeed, following a meeting held on 15 - 17 February 2010 between Rwandan and Congolese authorities and UNHCR, preparations for the return of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda have been underway with the aim to begin repatriation before the end of 2010. Traditional, religious and military leaders of the Hunde and Nande communities are denouncing the return of up to 200,000 Tutsi refugees from Rwanda. A massive and rapid repatriation of refugees, as envisaged by the CNDP, would consolidate the control of Tutsi and Hutu communities over land under the aegis of units of the FARDC led by former CNDP officers.