("Meaningful reform" must take place within North Korea) (2380)
Washington -- There are no linkages between humanitarian aid to North Korea and political progress at the Four Party talks, according to Brian Atwood, administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
In a September 19 address to a forum sponsored by the Korea Society and the Congressional Hunger Center, Atwood said: "Let me be clear on this point: We have been careful to maintain a strict separation between our response to an immediate humanitarian crisis and our desire for political progress at the Four Party talks. The North Koreans themselves have pressed for such a linkage, but we have stuck to basic humanitarian precepts."
"North Korea is still far from embarking on a transition to open government and an open market," Atwood said. "Moreover, we must recognize that in the medium term, our concerns with regard to North Korea -- humanitarian, diplomatic, and yes, even military -- are all interrelated," he said.
According to Atwood, decades of militaristic Communist rule have left North Korea extremely isolated, and have resulted in economic and agricultural mismanagement. Natural disasters, he said, have aggravated the current food crisis, but are not the root cause of it.
"Unquestionably food aid, notably through the efforts of the World Food Program, has saved lives," Atwood said. "The U.S. this year has contributed 177,000 tons, most of it arriving during the leanest period before this year's harvest. In 1995, severe flooding, caused by torrential rains from July to August, swept through the western and northern regions of North Korea. More than 1 million acres of arable land were damaged just before harvest time and 500,000 people were left homeless," he said.
"The humanitarian needs of North Korea will not be solved with short term food aid," Atwood said. "The underlying causes of the decline in agricultural production in North Korea must change if the current cycle of hunger and malnutrition is to be broken. Here again, if North Korea demonstrates it is willing to deal effectively with the causes of its crisis, the U.S. will be willing to help, as will other countries."
Following is the text of Atwood's remarks, as prepared for delivery:
Remarks by J. Brian Atwood
Korea Society/Congressional Hunger Center
Forum on North Korea
September 19, 1997
Washington, D.C.
I'd like to thank Tony Hall for making this event possible. As always Tony, you are at the forefront when ordinary people are in dire need. You have shown real leadership, not only on North Korea, but on a range of humanitarian and development issues. You have been an important voice for compassion, understanding and for showing average Americans the importance of dealing with the world around them.
It is a tribute to you that we have such a diverse group here today to consider North Korea -- the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the World Food Program, private voluntary organizations and Congressional representatives. This diverse gathering is also a reflection of the complexity of the policy issues we confront in North Korea.
North Korea's complexity is compounded by its isolation. North Korea has been sharply cut off from most of the world for 50 years under an autocratic communist regime. This experience has left North Korea with a deep suspicion and hostility to the west and democratic values. The fact that the North Koreans continue to see themselves as "at war" even in 1997, and that they publicly describe themselves in this optic, should greatly concern us all. These tensions are reflected in the treatment of visitors and humanitarian organizations as well as in the realm of diplomacy.
One thing seems clear: North Korea is still far from embarking on a transition to open government and an open market. Moreover, we must recognize that in the medium term, our concerns with regard to North Korea -- humanitarian, diplomatic, and yes, even military -- are all interrelated.
But let me be clear on this point: We have been careful to maintain a strict separation between our response to an immediate humanitarian crisis and our desire for political progress at the Four Party talks. The North Koreans themselves have pressed for such a linkage, but we have stuck to basic humanitarian precepts.
However, we have also recognized for some time that the food crisis in North Korea is not the simple result of natural disasters such as floods or drought. It has long been said that no democracy has ever suffered a famine, and North Korea offers a vivid example of why totalitarian regimes and centrally planned economies have always been vulnerable to food shortages. There is an inexorable decline in North Korea's agricultural production which is being driven by shortages of inputs, inefficient technologies and counterproductive policies. North Korea's industrial production has contracted by some 80 percent -- 80 percent -- since the late 1980s.
Past failure to honor international financial commitments means that few institutions are willing to extend new credit to a country that has willfully abrogated repayment. Association with terrorism, the transfer of weapons to rogue states, the continuation of a technical state of war with South Korea and the United States, have resulted in trade sanctions and international condemnation. While barter continues at minimal levels with some countries, and while China provides North Korea with much of its imports, a downward economic spiral continues.
The only hope for reversing this decline lies with meaningful reform. Such reform will require policy changes by the North Koreans. There is a clear need to adopt the new practices -- technological and economic -- necessary for efficient food production. In the long term, participation in the international community is the only way that North Korea can independently feed, clothe and advance the well-being of its 23 million people.
The current progress in the Four Party talks is an encouraging sign the North Koreans can be flexible and can see the benefits of change. The international community has said it is ready to support the adoption of agricultural reforms, and when the time comes, we will raise this with the North Koreans directly.
However, in the short term, we face a major humanitarian crisis. Clearly the people of North Korea are in severe distress. There have been numerous reports of widespread malnutrition, especially among children and the elderly. There have also been credible reports of deaths. The Government, essentially the party, runs the country's "Public Distribution System," or food dispensary. Floods, and now drought, caused the government to reduce its cereal rationing, which they announce regularly: from 350 grams to 300; from 300 to 250. Now, the average official ration is 100 grams of grains per day, less than a cupful. The average North Korean must augment this ration as best they can.
Yet, the nature of the North Korean regime makes a reasoned response difficult. We know that there is a severe food shortage in North Korea. We know that a portion of the population suffers from malnutrition. We know that livestock has been depleted in order to conserve grains. But aside from anecdotal reports, we do not know the magnitude of this man-made humanitarian crisis which could help us better ease their pain and suffering. North Korea restricts movement of foreigners. A nutritional assessment, under negotiation since early 1996 between the UN and North Korea, was finally begun a month ago. Even then, the terms and scope were unilaterally modified to preclude statistically valid sampling in the northern sections of the country. Results are just becoming available.
North Korea has been flexible enough to encourage a wide range of "coping mechanisms." They have concentrated on feeding all of their people at least a little, refusing to write off any group. They have developed alternative foods, encouraged more open markets and barter with China, permitted more small private agricultural plots, and encouraged multiple crops of summer vegetables. In the absence of reliable data, it remains difficult to tell how successful these efforts have been.
Unquestionably food aid, notably through the efforts of the World Food Program, has saved lives. The U.S. this year has contributed 177,000 tons, most of it arriving during the leanest period before this year's harvest. In Unquestionably food aid, notably through the efforts of the World Food Program, has saved lives. The U.S. this year has contributed 177,000 tons, most of it arriving during the leanest period before this year's harvest. In 1995, severe flooding, caused by torrential rains from July to August, swept through the western and northern regions of North Korea. More than 1 million acres of arable land were damaged just before harvest time and 500,000 people were left homeless.
Between September 1995 and February 1996, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) released $2.25 million in International Disaster Assistance funds to UNICEF and the WFP for emergency health and food assistance. This funding also supported an independent Food Program Observer from our Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance who assessed the food distribution process.
The humanitarian crisis continued in North Korea throughout 1996 and was aggravated by additional floods in late July that ravaged areas that were struck by the 1995 floods. At least 117 people were reportedly killed, 30,000 left homeless and nearly 2.5 million women and children in the north were placed at serious risk of starvation.
In all, North Korea estimated that at least 5.2 million people have been affected by the floods and ensuing food shortages. In response, USAID's contributed over 13,000 metric tons of rice, corn meal, and corn soya blend valued at nearly $6.3 million. These commodities went to nurseries and kindergartens, clinics and hospitals. They also went to those farming communities where crops had been wiped out, so that the farmers themselves had food to eat until the new harvest could come in.
On April 15, 1997 we announced we would provide an additional 50,000 metric tons of corn through the Office of Food For Peace valued at nearly $15 million, to assist the roughly 2.6 million children under the age of six in North Korea. This food aid also assisted in the recovery of flood- affected arable land, as well as provided food to hospital patients. On July 15 we announced the provision of an additional 100,000 metric tons of food aid, in response to the country's food crisis due to the chronic food production shortfalls, exacerbated by the 1995 and 1996 floods. This brings total USG humanitarian assistance to North Korea to date, to roughly $60.5 million.
The use of these commodities are being monitored by U.S. Private Voluntary Organizations to ensure that our food reaches additional vulnerable groups in the society. The World Food program will oversee logistics related to the actual distribution of food and will provide support for the PVO monitors.Our hope was that approximately 10 to 15 PVO staff would arrive in country in mid-August and would stay through mid-November, when distribution of U.S. food will be completed and food from the next harvest will be available. Unfortunately, the North Korean government did not permit a presence of this size by our PVO community. Five staff are in Pyongyang, and they have managed to negotiate distribution monitoring in three key agricultural provinces. We believe that full and free access to areas in which our assistance is going is a minimal condition for humanitarian assistance, a practice that is followed throughout the world.
We have always insisted in providing aid that no U.S. food must go to the North Korean military. North Korea provides for an active military in excess of 2 million people, as well as what we would consider national guard units and militia. North Korea is a heavily armed country which spends a great deal of its resources fueling its military preparedness. This in itself creates issues related to humanitarian assistance which our panelists will address.
We have no evidence U.S. food has been diverted to the military. In fact, we need to be realistic about this regime and recognize there is little need for the North Korean military to take food aid. We must assume they are fully provisioned from domestic stocks. Also, Chinese food aid is provided without strings, and to the limited extent additional food is necessary, the Chinese food can be a source.
Assuming we can assure adequate monitoring, the U.S. will provide additional humanitarian food aid to North Korea. We will await a final assessment of need and we will want to review WFP's appeal for assistance before deciding specific amounts. We also need to stress an integrated relief response including food and health care is critical to the ability to maintain the overall health of vulnerable populations.
Most deaths in countries experiencing major food shortages result from diseases that are exacerbated by malnutrition, rather than from starvation. A substantial lack of critical assistance within the health care sector may significantly undermine large-scale food distribution efforts, by failing to prevent infectious disease and critical micronutrient deficiencies in relief assistance beneficiary groups. As such, attention to health care remains critical in North Korea, as it does in other countries experiencing critical food shortages.
The humanitarian needs of North Korea will not be solved with short term food aid. The underlying causes of the decline in agricultural production in North Korea must change if the current cycle of hunger and malnutrition is to be broken. Here again, if North Korea demonstrates it is willing to deal effectively with the causes of its crisis, the U.S. will be willing to help, as will other countries.
Recent progress toward Four Party talks is perhaps a positive sign. However, we are experienced enough to know change is difficult and will be especially so in North Korea. We should not indulge in wishful thinking about this regime or false optimism. Nor will we compromise basic precepts that our food will not go to the military and that it will be adequately monitored to assure it reaches intended beneficiaries. Thank you.