Attachments
Scenario analysis
When and where is the hazard expected to happen?
According to information provided by the Government of the United States and various open sources, during the early morning hours of Saturday, 3 January 2026, the U.S. Government carried out a military incursion in Caracas, Venezuela, during which Nicolás Maduro and his wife were captured on the territory of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. As a consequence of these events, on Monday, 5 January, the Venezuelan Government declared a state of internal emergency, in response to a situation that has had a signicant impact on the international community due to its implications for regional stability. The State of Emergency establishes: a) the mobilization of the National Armed Forces throughout the entire national territory; b) the militarization of public service infrastructure, the oil industry, and other basic state industries; c) the reinforcement of patrols and security at land, air, and maritime borders; d) the restriction of entry into the national territory/national border; e) the restriction of movement of people or vehicles within the national territory; and f) the suspension of public assembly and demonstrations.
In light of this situation and its potential repercussions for Colombia—a country that hosts approximately 2.8 million Venezuelan nationals and whose border areas are characterized by the presence of non-state armed groups and heightened security and humanitarian risks—the Colombian Government decided to militarize the main border crossings with Venezuela. In response to recent events, specic restrictions, and public order situations, a pattern of pendular mobility has emerged in border areas, along with movements toward these areas to access basic goods. Currently, border crossings are open, and according to Venezuelan migrant organizations, Colombia continues to be the main destination country for migrants, considering that a signicant number of people still plan to leave the country following the political and social events there.
According to Migración Colombia, between January 1 and January 4, 2026; 6,117 entries into Colombia from Venezuela and 5,390 exits from Colombia to the neighboring country were recorded. This reects the continuation of an outbound dynamic from Venezuela, which could intensify in the coming weeks, based on trends observed in previous years that show an increase in mixed migration ows between the second and third weeks of January, particularly at the border crossings of Norte de Santander, La Guajira, and Arauca. In addition, restrictions on air mobility have made the connection between both countries mainly by land, and taking into account the recent political changes in the neighboring country, some return ows could increase, motivated by the expectation of change, as expressed in some media by citizens of Venezuelan nationality in Colombia and other countries in the region. The military intervention, social unrest, and the current volatility of the situation increase the likelihood of an intensication of mixed migration ows and humanitarian needs in the border region. This mobility, characterized by the use of irregular crossings, is affected on the Venezuelan side by restrictions on institutional mobility and limitations on media access, which has reduced the availability of services, being mainly limited to guidance for the local population.
Based on the above, two main scenarios are anticipated: on one hand, the massive arrival of Venezuelan migrants to Colombian border cities; on the other, an increase in returns to Venezuela due to changes in the political and security context. In addition, there may be greater pendular movement of people traveling between both countries. Arauca, La Guajira, Norte de Santander