Attachments
Demonstrations surged in Cuba and Venezuela, and Ecuadorian authorities stepped up operations against armed groups as tensions with Colombia increased.
Authors
Laura Calderón Fuentes
South America Assistant Research Manager
Tiziano Breda
Senior Analyst, Latin America & the Caribbean
Sandra Pellegrini
Senior Analyst, Latin America & the Caribbean
María Fernanda Arocha
Central America Research Manager
Tatjana von Peter
South America Researcher
Colombia: The government steps up military operations against the FARC’s General Central Staff dissident faction
In March, Colombian authorities ramped up their efforts to weaken the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissidents’ General Central General Staff (EMC), which is led by Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández, known as “Iván Mordisco.” The military carried out airstrikes and ground operations in at least six departments. The strikes killed the leader of the 18th FARC dissidents — a close ally of Mordisco — in Ituango, Antioquia, and six members of Mordisco’s security ring in Vaupés. Authorities also arrested two of Mordisco’s brothers in Falán, Tolima.1
In response, the EMC launched a series of attacks against police and military targets, particularly in Cauca, a key EMC stronghold, where these clashes drove a 35% increase in violent incidents compared to February. Overall, around half of the 78 violent confrontations between security forces and non-state armed groups recorded nationwide in March involved the EMC.
The government offensive follows President Gustavo Petro’s meeting with United States President Donald Trump in February, where the two leaders identified Mordisco to be among the drug trafficking figures to be prioritized and targeted.2 Colombia’s Minister of Defense, Pedro Sánchez, said the recent blows against the EMC had left Mordisco increasingly isolated and urged him to demobilize.3 While Mordisco managed to evade capture, elevated pressure against him will likely continue to boost violence levels in key EMC strongholds such as Cauca.
See more of ACLED’s coverage on Colombia.
Cuba: Power shortages trigger a spike in demonstrations as US pressure intensifies
Demonstrations against the government and socioeconomic hardship spiked in March as Cuba’s energy crisis continued to deepen as a result of a US oil blockade. Throughout the month, Cuba experienced three nationwide total blackouts,4 coupled with a severe fuel shortage, as well as food and medicine scarcity. The dire living conditions prompted more than 100 demonstrations in March, the highest number since ACLED started covering the country in 2018. Although most demonstrations were peaceful, there were some cases of violence, including the Communist Party’s office being set on fire in Morón on 13 March, prompting authorities to arrest at least five people. In response to the unrest, President Díaz-Canel declared that there would be no impunity for violence,5 while residents and members of civil society have denounced an increase in arrests of those vocal against the government.6
Under mounting pressure from the US — including threats of an imminent intervention7 — Díaz-Canel has shown signs of openness. He announced plans to allow the Cuban diaspora to return and invest in the country’s private sector8 and released 51 political prisoners as part of Vatican-led mediation efforts.9 Authorities also released another 2,000 prisoners in early April, in what they described as a “humanitarian and sovereign gesture”.10 On 30 March, a Russian tanker — which the US refrained from intercepting — unloaded 700,000 barrels of oil at the Matanzas port,11 temporarily alleviating the fuel shortage. In the absence of a lasting settlement between Havana and Washington, however, the crisis is far from over.
Ecuador: Authorities step up operations against armed groups amid tensions with Colombia
On 6 March, Ecuadorian forces conducted an airstrike with US logistical and intelligence support, targeting what authorities said was a training camp of the Colombian armed group Frontier Command in San Martín — a canton close to the border with Colombia.12 However, locals say that the site was a dairy farm, and that the strike was preceded by a military raid on 3 March, in which military officers set the property on fire and assaulted civilians.13
Amid reciprocal tariffs and accusations of lack of cooperation on security issues since January,14 these operations sparked yet another episode in the diplomatic rift between Ecuador and Colombia. On 16 March, Petro accused Ecuador of carrying out cross-border bombings that left 27 charred bodies in the border department of Nariño, likely in reference to the supposed bombing of drug laboratories that some media reported in early February.15 He also claimed that an unexploded bomb dropped from an aircraft had been found on Colombian territory.16 Tensions subsided after Colombia’s forensics institute suggested that the deaths in Nariño were caused by an accidental fire in a cocaine processing laboratory,17 while a binational technical assessment concluded that the Ecuadorian military dropped the bomb in Ecuador, but it likely bounced into Colombian territory when it did not detonate.18
Though the crisis has eased, it highlights how security has become a contentious issue between these neighboring countries. It also shows how it can be instrumentalized politically, particularly as Ecuador’s President Daniel Noboa doubles down on a militarized approach to security — increasing risks of escalation and civilian harm in border regions.
Haiti: The Gran Grif gang kills dozens amid the worsening conflict with the Jean Denis coalition
On 29 March, the Gran Grif gang stormed Petite-Rivière de l'Artibonite’s Jean-Denis neighborhood, killing residents and setting houses on fire. Authorities, who claimed they retook control of the neighborhood on 30 March, confirmed 16 people were killed, but local civil society organizations place the death toll at over 70.19 Roadblocks set by gangs delayed the deployment of security forces to the scene.20
While the motivation behind the attack remains unknown, early reports suggest it might have been related to tensions with the Jean Denis coalition,21 a self-defense group that has repelled gang incursions in the surrounding communities. In October 2024, Gran Grif carried out a similar massacre in Pont-Sondé, killing at least 115 people in retaliation for the community’s support of the local Jean Denis coalition, further illustrating how vigilante activity often prompts violent retaliation by the gangs against local communities.
The Gran Grif gang, which originated in Artibonite, has expanded across several communes in the department since 2022 as part of its efforts to dominate key logistic corridors connecting Artibonite with the Dominican border and Port-au-Prince to Haiti's north.22 Its territorial expansion has made the Gran Grif gang one of the most powerful armed groups in the department: Events involving Gran Grif account for 45% of reported fatalities from armed violence in Artibonite in 2025.
Recent changes from the Artibonite police directorate aimed at addressing worsening insecurity23 and the upcoming deployment of the Gang Suppression Force in April, now limited to the head of the force and a Chadian advance team,24 have raised citizens’ expectations of security improvements. Yet, the attack highlights persisting weaknesses in anti-gang response, particularly outside Port-au-Prince, where security operations have thus far been concentrated.
See more of ACLED’s coverage on Haiti.
Mexico: Conflict between self-defense and criminal groups intensifies in Guerrero
Guerrero state experienced an increase in armed violence in March, during which ACLED records 33 events — up from just 11 in February. Clashes between self-defense and criminal groups contributed to this escalation. On 1 March, members of the Union of People and Organizations of Guerrero (UPOEG) self-defense group clashed with suspected members of Los Ardillos gang in three communities of the Juan R. Escudero and Tecoanapa municipalities located in the Centro region. Following the clash, on 3 March, suspected members of Los Ardillos killed two government officials of the Indigenous municipality of Ayutla de los Libres who, according to some sources, were UPOEG members.25 Los Ardillos gang is involved in drug trafficking and extortions, particularly in the central and mountain regions of Guerrero.
The March violence is part of a broader cycle of escalation that involves the UPOEG and Los Ardillos.26 An earlier attempt by the UPOEG to re-take control of communities in Juan R. Escudero led to a clash with Los Ardillos in late January. Amid the expansion of this and other local criminal groups, members of the UPOEG and other communal militias have called on state and federal authorities to take action against organized crime.27 However, residents from these communities have also objected to vigilante activities. In February, demonstrating residents called on authorities to prevent self-defense groups from entering their communities and denounced ties between UPOEG and Los Rusos gang, one of Los Ardillos’ rivals in the department.28
See more of ACLED’s coverage on Mexico.
Venezuela: As the country opens up for investment, work-related demands drive a nationwide spread of demonstrations
On 25 March, Venezuela’s acting President Delcy Rodríguez remotely attended a Saudi-backed investment summit held in Miami to promote investment in the country following the approval of energy sector reforms. Following the reform to the hydrocarbon law, the National Assembly started discussing changes to the country’s mining law on 9 March, just a few days after the visit of the US interior secretary on 4 March.29 The US later issued a license for investment in critical minerals in Venezuela, reopened its embassy in Caracas, and lifted individual sanctions on Delcy Rodríguez.30
Despite the thaw in relations with the US and the country’s opening to foreign investment, the economic situation remains precarious. In March, teachers, health care workers, public employees, and pensioners took part in over 110 protests across 37 cities, demanding wage and pension rises, contributing to a 23% increase in demonstrations compared with the previous month. Amid growing discontent with the country’s socio-economic conditions, demonstrations linked to the release of political prisoners decreased after the Amnesty Law passed in February led to the release of over 8,000 people, according to the government.31 However, at least 503 political prisoners remain imprisoned, and courts refuse to provide written proof of rejection for amnesty to process appeals.32
In response to the increasing dissent, the government has mobilized its supporters. More than a dozen demonstrations backing the Chavista government took place in March, including a parade in Caracas to demand an end to the economic sanctions imposed by the US and the European Union. At the same time, reports have emerged of pro-government militias, known as colectivos, intimidating demonstrators and impeding protest marches on multiple occasions. This confirms that, despite the leadership change, the repressive apparatus is still intact.33
See more of ACLED’s coverage on Venezuela.