I. Introduction
1. In his letter dated 26 May 2006 (S/2006/341),
the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that
a mission of the Council would visit the Sudan and Chad from 4 to 10 June
2006. Its terms of reference and composition are set out in the annex to
the present report. The Mission was led by the Permanent Representative
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United
Nations, Sir Emyr Jones Parry.
2. The mission left New York on 4 June 2006. It visited Khartoum, Juba and El Fasher in the Sudan; the African Union (AU) headquarters in Addis Ababa; and N'djamena and Goz Beida in Chad.
3. In Khartoum, the mission met with President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, Minister for Foreign Affairs Lam Akol, Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) Cabinet Affairs Minister Deng Alor, members of the National Assembly, representatives of the Sudanese opposition parties and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the leadership of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS).
4. In Juba, the mission met with First Vice-President Salva Kiir, senior officials of the Government of Southern Sudan, the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee, members of the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, members of the United Nations country team and NGOs.
5. In El Fasher (Darfur), the Mission met with Force Commander Major General Ihekire and the wider leadership of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), the Wali of Northern Darfur, internally displaced persons (IDPs), NGOs, representatives of civil society, tribal leaders, diplomatic representatives and members of the United Nations country team. Due to security concerns, the Council was advised not to visit an IDP camp.
6. The Council was accompanied in its meetings in the Sudan by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Jan Pronk.
7. During its visit to the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, the mission met with Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konaré and other members of the AU Commission (including Commissioner for Peace and Security Said Djinnit), the Peace and Security Council and AMIS troop-contributing countries. The Council also briefly met with Under-Secretary Guéhenno, who was visiting with the technical assessment mission.
8. In Chad, the mission met with President Idriss Déby and his cabinet, diplomatic representatives and members of the United Nations country team, as well as Sudanese refugees and Chadian internally displaced persons in Goz Beida.
II. Overview
9. The Council had long planned a visit to the Sudan further to the Security Council meeting held in Nairobi in November 2004 and the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The mission visit to the Sudan in June also followed the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006.
10. During its visit, the mission found the Darfur conflict to be complex and not easily understood by the international community.
Darfur
11. With interlocutors from the Government of the Sudan, the mission stressed the following points: its respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Sudan; its welcome of the decision of the Government of the Sudan to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement; the need to exert pressure on the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)/Abdul Wahid al-Nur and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM); the AU recommendation that AMIS be transferred to a United Nations mission in Darfur; that such a force would require a robust mandate in order to protect citizens and itself; the Council's desire to work in cooperation and partnership with the Government of the Sudan; and its hope to see the Government of the Sudan agree to the exact nature of a United Nations operation during the forthcoming visit of the joint technical assessment mission to the Sudan.
12. President Al-Bashir made clear to the mission that a United Nations force in Darfur with a mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations was unacceptable to the Government of the Sudan. He stressed that it was for the Government of the Sudan to disarm the various militias, including the Janjaweed, by itself. Tribal leaders in Darfur also spoke out strongly against such a United Nations force, claiming that the United Nations was a front for colonialism and/or United States interventionism. However, SPLM and AMIS contacts expressed their doubts that the Government of the Sudan was capable of carrying out disarmament of the militias by itself. The IDPs that the mission met in the Sudan and Chad all called for United Nations protection.
13. In its discussions in Addis Ababa, the mission agreed with the AU that AMIS should be urgently strengthened and a tougher mandate be adopted, including the protection of civilians, ahead of the deployment of a United Nations mission. AU Commission Chairperson Konaré underlined his support for United Nations transition. He also said that he had written to NATO to request further logistical support (but not troops). A revised concept of operations was being drawn up to enable AMIS to fulfil its tasks under the Darfur Peace Agreement, including an increase in troop numbers from 6,100 to 10,500. AMIS Force Commanders warned that, without such reinforcements, Darfur risked becoming another Rwanda.
14. The mission congratulated the Government of the Sudan on signing, and the AU on securing, the Darfur Peace Agreement. Special Representative Pronk stressed to the mission the importance of also getting the signature of Abdul Wahid given that he appeared to have the support of a majority of the IDPs of Darfur. AU Commissioner Djinnit informed the mission that some SLM and JEM commanders were now seeking to associate themselves with the Darfur Peace Agreement. President Déby stressed that he had supported the Darfur Peace Agreement and encouraged others to sign it.
15. The mission concluded that the humanitarian and security situation in Darfur remained dire and expressed concern at the deterioration of the humanitarian and security situation in camps in Chad. In particular, it urged greater action to stop the prevalence of gender-based violence. The mission stressed the importance of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000).
Southern Sudan
16. The mission was encouraged by the number of key steps that had been taken on implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. However, its interlocutors also voiced a number of challenges that were undermining implementation. These included the future status of the Abyei region, the slow speed in setting up Comprehensive Peace Agreement commissions and the lack of a peace dividend for the population owing to the failure of international donors to live up to their pledges. The mission was told that if southern Sudan were an independent state, it would rank as the poorest in the world. Given the continuing insecurity in the region, the humanitarian community urged the Council not to consider cannibalizing UNMIS for any future operation in Darfur.
17. Among the various challenges facing the new Government of Southern Sudan, the mission considered addressing the presence of Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) a priority. The group, responsible for the death, abduction and displacement of thousands of innocent civilians in Uganda, the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and whose leaders have been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC), has said that it wants to make peace with the Government of Uganda, with mediation assistance from the Government of Southern Sudan. While expressing determination to see the threat from LRA eliminated, the mission advised caution in dealing politically with LRA leaders wanted for trial in The Hague.
Regional dimension
18. Both President Al-Bashir and President Déby urged the Council to condemn the actions of the other. The AU said both were acting in an underhand manner. The mission urged dialogue between the two countries, as well as the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement.
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