Attachments
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the statement of the President of the Security Council dated 1 November 2024 (S/PRST/2024/7), in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to keep it informed about the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) every six months. It provides an assessment of the major political and security trends in Central Africa since the report dated 30 May 2024 (S/2024/420). It also provides an update on the situation in the Lake Chad basin region, pursuant to Council resolution 2349 (2017).
II. Major developments in the Central Africa subregion
A. Political, peace and security developments and trends
2. During the reporting period, significant steps were taken towards the completion of the political transitions in Chad and Gabon. Concurrently, 7 of the 11 Central African countries entered a pre-electoral period, with preparations for polls in 2025 and 2026.
Political development and trends
3. In Angola, on 6 August, the parliament approved a bill on the political administrative division of the country, with the ruling party, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, voting in favour, and the key opposition party, União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, voting against. The Government argued that the law, which is expected to enter into force in 2025, would help to address territorial disparities and improve State presence and services, while the opposition criticized it as a method to further delay the holding of local elections.
4. In Burundi, on 27 June, the Supreme Court upheld the life sentence against the former Prime Minister, Alain Guillaume Bunyoni, which had been issued by the Court on 8 December 2023, adding a fine of 22.7 billion Burundi francs (approximately US$ 7.8 million) and ordering the immediate confiscation of his undeclared assets. The Court had convicted Mr. Bunyoni of illegal possession of weapons and plotting against the Head of State to overthrow the constitutional regime, among other charges. On 15 October, the Independent National Electoral Commission published the calendar for the legislative, district and village-based elections.
5. In Cameroon, on 10 July, members of the National Assembly voted to extend their term by one year, thereby postponing legislative elections until after the 2025 presidential election, citing a need to “lighten the electoral calendar”, a decision that was criticized by the opposition. On 16 July, the Senior Divisional Officer of the Department of Mfoundi, where Yaoundé is located, issued a decree allowing authorities to ban individuals from staying in the Department of Mfoundi if they were found to be inciting an uprising or insulting State institutions or their representatives. Media professionals and some members of the opposition perceived the decree as an attempt to suppress dissent before the elections. On 31 August, Elections Cameroon, the national electoral management body, concluded its annual voter registration exercise. Meanwhile, a prolonged absence from the country by the President of Cameroon, Paul Biya, had led to speculations in the media about his health. On 11 October, the Ministry of Territorial Administration banned all media from discussing the health of the President through a ministerial note addressed to regional governors. On 21 October, Mr. Biya returned to Cameroon.
6. In Chad, on 19 July, Succès Masra, the former Transition Prime Minister, former presidential candidate and leader of the opposition party Les Transformateurs, reiterated his contestation of the results of the presidential election. Mr. Masra called for a complete overhaul of electoral institutions, a revision of the electoral code and a halt to the new delineation of electoral districts, alleging manipulation. In a statement on 22 July, the opposition coalition Groupe de concertation des acteurs politiques called for the withdrawal of the texts for the new delineation of administrative and electoral districts to be considered by the transition legislature in the following days. Some opposition figures argued that the new electoral and administrative divisions favoured northern communities to the detriment of the south. On 29 and 31 July, the National Transitional Council adopted the organic laws on the composition of the parliament, the regime of ineligibilities, incompatibilities and allowances of parliamentarians and on the number, names and territorial limits of the autonomous communities, and required that 30 per cent of candidates in districts with more than two seats be women.
7. On 8 August, in a social media address marking the second anniversary of the Doha Agreement for Peace and the Participation of the Political-Military Movements in the Inclusive National and Sovereign Dialogue, the President of Chad, Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, emphasized the need to accelerate the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and urged non-signatory politico-military groups to join the national reconciliation process. In an address for the country’s sixty-fourth Independence Day on 11 August, Mr. Déby Itno pledged to pursue political outreach, declared a zero-tolerance policy against corruption and announced the strengthening of the Government’s anti-corruption mechanisms.
8. On 21 August, the electoral management body of Chad announced that the legislative, provincial and municipal elections would be held on 29 December 2024. On 13 October, the parties of the opposition platform Groupe de concertation des acteurs politiques that had not participated in the political transition announced their decision to boycott the upcoming elections, citing inadequate conditions for credible elections. On 16 October, Mr. Déby Itno convened political party leaders to inform them that the elections would be held as scheduled. On 20 October, Les Transformateurs also announced its boycott of the elections, questioning the fairness of the electoral process and citing recent floods as a reason to boycott. On 22 October, the Minister of Regional Integration of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Didier Mazenga Mukanzu, in his capacity as Special Envoy of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) facilitator for Chad, Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, visited N’Djamena, calling for an inclusive and peaceful electoral process.
9. On 22 September, the opposition party Parti socialiste sans frontières reported that its Secretary General had been missing since 20 September and alleged that the National State Security Agency had abducted him, noting that he had previously been subjected to harassment and intimidation by the security services. According to the party, the abduction took place after a press conference denouncing the detention in the Koro Toro high-security prison of certain party members since the events of February 2024 that had led to the killing of the party president, Yaya Dillo Djérou Bétchi.
10. In Gabon, one year after the military coup d’état, the transitional authorities took steps to advance the political transition. On 10 June, a parliamentary subcommission was established to review the draft electoral code and propose revisions within 10 days. On 19 June, the National Assembly adopted the electoral law, followed by the Senate on 15 July. Several parliamentarians criticized the adoption of the law before the revision of the Constitution and called for its subsequent review, in line with the transition timeline. They also opposed the powers granted to the Ministry of the Interior and lamented the law’s disregard for key recommendations from the national dialogue held in April 2024, such as stronger regulation of the electoral process, limits on campaign financing and gender quotas. On 30 May, the former Prime Minister, Alain Claude Bilie By Nze, said that the national dialogue had not addressed national reconciliation, warning against xenophobia and ethnic divisions. He also criticized the age and nationality eligibility criteria for the presidential election that were outlined in the draft constitution, which he said would exclude key political actors.
11. On 31 August, the Transitional Minister for Institutional Reform and head of the National Constitutional Committee of Gabon transmitted the draft constitution to the Transition President. On 8 October, the Constituting Assembly submitted its report on the draft constitution to the Transition President. On 17 October, the Council of Ministers adopted the final draft constitution and announced the constitutional referendum for 16 November. The final version relaxed the controversial eligibility criteria for the presidency and government members, requiring candidates to have one Gabonese parent, as opposed to two. While the presidential nature of the political system was maintained, one of the two positions of Vice-President was eliminated. The constitutional referendum was held on 16 November. According to preliminary results announced by the Ministry of the Interior on 17 November, 91.8 per cent voted in favour, with a voter turnout of 53.5 per cent.
12. From 12 to 13 September, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union visited Gabon, followed on 14 September by a visit from the Chairperson of the African Union Commission. The meetings focused on progress made in the political transition and discussed the eventual reintegration of Gabon into the African Union. In a communiqué, the Presidency of Gabon expressed optimism about the latter, while in a press brief, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission welcomed progress towards constitutional order, stating that the African Union was “eagerly awaiting the return of Gabon”.
13. In Rwanda, general elections took place on 15 July. On 22 July, the national electoral commission announced that the incumbent President, Paul Kagame, had won 99.18 per cent of the votes. The ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front won 37 of 53 parliamentary seats, while 27 seats that were reserved for women, youth and persons with disabilities were filled through indirect elections. That included 24 women elected by electoral colleges from each province and Kigali, two members, including one woman, elected by the National Youth Council and one member, a woman, elected by the Federation of the Association of the Disabled. The proportion of women in the Chamber of Deputies increased from 61 to 63.75 per cent. On 11 August, Mr. Kagame was sworn in as President for a fourth term. On 16 August, one week after Édouard Ngirente was reappointed as Prime Minister, his Office announced the appointment of 21 Ministers and nine Ministers of State. Almost 30 per cent of Cabinet positions were allocated to women.
14. In Sao Tome and Principe, a national commission of experts presented a draft electoral code on 5 July, which elicited negative reactions from opposition parties. On 15 August, the Prime Minister, Patrice Trovoada, dismissed the opposition’s concerns, noting that the drafting of the code was being monitored by regional and international partners. On 27 August, the Government established a technical committee on security sector reform to help guide the reform process. On 25 September, the Prime Minister suggested a revision of the Constitution. In a subsequent media interview, the President, Carlos Manuel Vila Nova, agreed, while underscoring the importance of dialogue. On 10 October, the President vetoed five justice reform bills adopted by Parliament. In response, the Prime Minister suggested that the bills be referred to the Constitutional Court for further review.
15. In the Congo, sensitivities around an alleged concession of land to Rwanda signed through partnership agreements in Brazzaville in April 2022 continued to fuel both popular and political discontent. Congolese and Rwandan officials issued several statements in which they noted that the bilateral agreements related to economic and agricultural cooperation.
16. In Equatorial Guinea, on 26 July, the Prime Minister, Manuela Roka Botey, together with her Cabinet, resigned after the President, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, criticized their management of the economy and inability to contain corruption. On 16 August, the President appointed the Director General of the National Bank of Equatorial Guinea, Manuel Osa Nsue Nsuga, as the new Prime Minister. On 19 August, a Government of 60 members was appointed, 10 per cent of whom were women, down from 16 per cent in the previous Government. In parallel, developments pertaining to the President’s family drew attention, with one of his sons, Ruslan Obiang Nsue, who is a former managing director of the national airline company, facing national legal proceedings related to alleged corruption charges.
17. From 26 to 27 June, representatives of Cameroon and the Central African Republic met in Bangui for the sixth session of the ad hoc border commission and the third session of the Permanent Joint Commission on Cross-Border Security. The parties agreed on joint efforts to formally demarcate the border and to hold regular meetings between respective local authorities to address transborder challenges. On 18 October, the Ministers of Defence of the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo signed a cooperation agreement providing for intelligence-sharing and joint training of their armed forces. On 21 and 22 October, the joint bilateral commission between Chad and the Central African Republic met in Bangui for the first time since 2019. The countries agreed to establish a joint force along their border to improve security and decided to hold more regular political consultations. They also signed a tripartite agreement with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees concerning the voluntary repatriation of Central African refugees living in Chad.
Security development and trends
18. A general decline in the number of violent incidents was noted in the Lake Chad basin; however, Boko Haram-affiliated and splinter groups continued to pose a security threat. Armed separatist groups pursued their attacks against defence and security forces and civilians in the North-West and South-West Regions of Cameroon. In addition, the effects of climate change increasingly influenced local conflicts and amplified competition over natural resources and instability across the subregion.
19. Violence persisted in the North-West and South-West Regions of Cameroon. On 24 June, a Cameroonian lawyer filed a complaint in Los Angeles, United States of America, against Norway and the United Kingdom, alleging that they supported terrorism by harbouring Lucas Ayaba Cho, a German national and leader of the separatist group “Ambazonia Governing Council”. On 25 September, the Norwegian police arrested Mr. Ayaba Cho on charges of inciting crimes against humanity in connection with the crisis in the two regions. The Cameroonian authorities expressed their willingness to assist in the investigation by the Norwegian police.
20. On 19 June, two civilians were killed by an improvised explosive device in Melim, North-West Region of Cameroon. The civilians were reportedly instructed by security forces to investigate the device when it was remotely detonated, leading to tensions between the community and security forces. On 25 August, alleged armed separatist fighters attacked a police station in Buea, South-West Region, killing three officers. The incident was part of a series of attacks that had resulted in the killing of eight officers over a period of three weeks around Bamenda, North-West Region. On 9 September, the All Anglophone Teachers Trade Unions called for an end to school attacks in the North-West and South-West Regions and urged the resumption of classes; however, by 10 September, most public schools in the North-West Region remained closed owing to a separatist-imposed lockdown, with only boarding schools operating.
21. Local authorities announced that, on 12 June, unidentified armed individuals had attacked the village of Toumbao in Logone Oriental Province of Chad, resulting in five people killed and seven injured, the theft of more than 500 cattle and the looting of businesses.
Boko Haram/Lake Chad Basin crisis
22. The reporting period was marked by numerous surrenders and arrests of elements of Boko Haram-affiliated and splinter groups, and the destruction of camps and ammunition. Although the Multinational Joint Task Force intensified its military operations against those groups, on 3 November, Chad announced that it was considering withdrawing its forces from the Task Force owing to the lack of coordination.
23. In Cameroon, between 1 June and 15 November, 20 Boko Haram-related security incidents resulting in 48 civilian fatalities were confirmed and reported by the United Nations, compared with 23 incidents resulting in 81 civilian fatalities for the same period in 2023. In Chad, also between 1 June and 15 November, 56 Boko Haram-related security incidents resulting in 99 civilian fatalities were confirmed and reported by the United Nations, compared with 67 incidents resulting in 117 civilian fatalities for the same period in 2023.
24. On 2 July, the Chadian army reported killing 70 alleged terrorists, destroying five camps and a base in Lac Province. On the same day, Cameroonian security forces issued a “maximum alert” owing to the alleged deployment of 23 women suicide bombers by Boko Haram-affiliated and splinter groups along the Cameroon-Nigeria border. On 8 September, alleged elements of Boko Haram-affiliated and splinter groups attacked a health centre in Liwa, Lac Province of Chad, killing the head of the health centre and abducting two women personnel. On 27 October, an attack by Boko Haram-affiliated and splinter groups on a military base near Ngouboua, Lac Province, killed around 40 soldiers, according to the Government. The President of Chad, Mr. Déby Itno, visited the scene of the attack and launched a military operation to pursue the attackers. On 30 October, Chadian security sources reported killing at least 65 alleged terrorists. On 31 October, the President of the Borno Fishermen’s Association claimed that Chadian airstrikes targeting suspected jihadists had killed numerous fishermen along the Chad-Nigeria border. On 1 November, the Government of Chad denied those allegations.
Lord’s Resistance Army
25. On 25 October, the International Crimes Division of the High Court of Uganda sentenced the former “commander” of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Thomas Kwoyelo, to 40 years in prison for war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, slavery, pillage, kidnapping, rape and torture.
26. On 15 October, the International Criminal Court postponed the hearing in the case of the founder of LRA, Joseph Kony, who has been on the run for nearly 20 years. Mr. Kony is charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, cruel treatment, enslavement, rape and attacks against the civilian population in 2003 and 2004 in northern Uganda.
Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea
27. During the reporting period, one security incident was reported across the ECCAS maritime zone in the Gulf of Guinea, down from the three incidents recorded during the same period in 2023. According to the Interregional Coordination Centre for the Implementation of the Regional Strategy for Maritime Safety and Security in Central and West Africa, in the evening of 29 May, a Ghana-flagged cargo vessel, which had left Douala, Cameroon, and was travelling towards the port of Koko, Nigeria, was boarded by nine suspected pirates, near the island of Bioko, Equatorial Guinea. Of the seven crew members, one Ghanaian captain and one Nigerian engineer were abducted. After the incident, the vessel returned to Douala.
Effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters on regional stability, including farmer-herder and intercommunal conflict dynamics in Central Africa
28. The subregion continued to face growing vulnerability to the accelerating impacts of climate change, with extreme weather events, such as intense rainfalls that cause widespread flooding, becoming more frequent and severe. Climate-induced natural disasters disrupted food security, displaced populations, hindered economic development and strained the fragile social fabric of communities in several areas across the subregion, with a particular impact on women and marginalized groups.
29. In Chad, on 27 June, a land dispute between farmers and herders in Logone Occidental Province led to one death, several injuries and the displacement of several people. Civil and military authorities intervened to restore order. On 27 August, a clash between farmers and herders in Molori, Kanem Province, resulted in one death and six injuries. On 31 August, a violent land dispute between farmers and herders in Palakoundja, Logone Occidental Province, resulted in five deaths and seven injuries. External sources reported that farmer-herder conflicts intensified to unprecedented levels over the past three years, resulting in over 1,000 deaths and 2,000 injuries.
30. In Cameroon, reports indicated that the Far North Region continued to experience recurrent intercommunal tensions over water reserves that displaced tens of thousands of people.