Attachments
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the statement of the President of the Security Council dated 10 August 2018 ( S/PRST/2018/17 ), in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to keep it informed about the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) every six months. It provides an assessment of the major political and security trends in Central Africa since the report dated 30 November 2023 ( S/2023/934 ). It also provides an update on the situation in the Lake Chad basin region, pursuant to Council resolution 2349 (2017) .
II. Major developments in the Central Africa subregion
A. Political, peace and security developments and trends
Political developments and trends
2. During the reporting period, the political transitions in Gabon and Chad reached significant milestones, namely, the holding of an inclusive national dialogue and a presidential election, respectively. Throughout the subregion, the political landscape remained relatively stable, despite restrictions on civic space in some countries.
3. In Angola, on 29 February, a bill proposing a redrawing of administrative boundaries and expanding the number of municipalities from 164 to 325 passed the first stage of approval in the National Assembly. The Government explained the restructuring as a measure to address territorial disparities and improve state presence and services. The opposition argued that priority should be given to holding local elections. In April, the Government and the main opposition party, União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) presented to the National Assembly competing draft bills on the institutionalization of local authorities. The UNITA bill and the Government bill each passed the first stage of approval of the National Assembly on 23 and 24 May, respectively. At the regional level, the President of Angola, João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, continued engaging on peace and stability in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo through the Luanda process.
4. In Burundi, on 8 December, the Supreme Court convicted the former Prime Minister, Alain Guillaume Bunyoni, among other charges, of illegal possession of weapons and plotting against the Head of State to overthrow the constitutional regime. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. On 10 March, members of the political bureau of the main opposition party, Conseil national pour la liberté (CNL), removed the founder and president of the party, Agathon Rwasa, from his position. Among other things, they had accused Mr. Rwasa of a misappropriation of party funds and a breach of the party’s legal instruments. He was replaced by Nestor Girukwishaka. In an official letter dated 18 March and addressed to CNL, the Ministry of the Interior of Burundi formally recognized Mr. Girukwishaka as the elected president and legal representative of CNL. Supporters of Mr. Rwasa accused the Government of influencing the change in the party’s leadership and attempting to destabilize the party ahead of the 2025 elections.
5. As indicated in the most recent report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region ( S/2024/278 ), during the reporting period, the armed group Résistance pour un État de droit au Burundi (RED-Tabara) launched attacks in Burundi. Following these attacks, Burundian authorities alleged that Rwanda was supporting the armed group, an allegation which has been denied by Rwanda. Tensions between the two countries escalated, leading Burundi to close its land border with Rwanda on 12 January.
6. In Cameroon, the Government continued to implement the conclusions of the 2019 Major National Dialogue, though violence continued in the North-West and South-West Regions. Two opposition coalitions were established in January ahead of the scheduled 2025 presidential election: the Political Alliance for Change and the Alliance for a Political Transition. On 13 March, the Government declared that neither coalition met the legal criteria to be recognized as a political party and that they were clandestine movements prohibited from engaging in political activities. Activists and opposition members stated that the decision by the Government violated the rights to freedom of expression, association, peaceful assembly and political participation. On 22 March, at the start of the ordinary session of the Parliament, Marcel Niat Njifenji and Cavayé Yéguié Djibril of the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement were re-elected unopposed as President of the Senate and Speaker of the National Assembly, respectively.
7. In Chad, the political transition advanced with the adoption and promulgation of a new Constitution, the establishment of a new, permanent electoral management body and Constitutional Council, and the holding of the presidential election. On 17 December, a constitutional referendum was held and on 24 December, the National Committee for the Organization of the Constitutional Referendum announced that the new Constitution had been approved with 86 per cent of votes and a participation rate of 63.75 per cent in the referendum. These figures were disputed by several opposition coalitions and civil society groupings. On 29 December, the new Constitution was promulgated. On 1 January, the President of the Transition of Chad, Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, appointed prominent opposition figure Succès Masra as Transition Prime Minister. In line with the new Constitution, a Constitutional Council and a permanent electoral management body, the Agence nationale de gestion des élections, were established. On 27 February, the latter announced the timetable for the presidential election.
8. Political and security challenges emerged on 28 February, when gunfire erupted in N’Djamena, involving members of the Parti socialiste sans frontières (PSF) led by a prominent political opponent, Yaya Dillo Djérou Bétchi. This followed the arrest of the party’s finance secretary by the Agence nationale de sécurité de l’État on the grounds of his alleged involvement in an assassination attempt against the President of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, PSF members were accused of assaulting the premises of the Agence nationale de sécurité de l’État to free their colleague. Exchanges of gunfire with security forces ensued and later extended to PSF headquarters, where Mr. Dillo and his supporters had sought refuge to evade capture. On 29 February, the Transitional Government announced the death of Mr. Dillo at his party’s headquarters, which several opposition members declared to be an extrajudicial killing.
9. On 29 February, the public prosecutor at the High Court in N’Djamena announced the arrest of 26 people and the opening of an investigation into the events of 27 and 28 February. On 1 March, the PSF headquarters were demolished by security forces, and several PSF members claimed that the latter were hunting them down. On 4 March, the Transition Prime Minister, Mr. Masra, pledged that the Transitional Government would launch an investigation into these events in line with international norms and standards. On 13 March, the transitional authorities declared PSF dissolved.
10. On 2 March, the President of the Transition of Chad formally accepted a nomination to be the presidential candidate of a new platform, Coalition pour un Tchad uni, established by the former ruling party and comprising the vast majority of the legally registered political parties in Chad. On 10 March, the Transition Prime Minister, Mr. Masra, also declared his candidacy for the presidential election. On 24 March, the Constitutional Council validated 10 out of 20 presidential candidates, including the Transition President, the Transition Prime Minister, Mr. Masra, and the former Transition Prime Minister, Albert Pahimi Padacké. The group also included one female candidate, Lydie Beassemda of Parti pour la démocratie et l’indépendance intégrales. That same day, a coalition of opposition parties and civil society organizations, Wakit Tama, announced a boycott of the election. In a joint press conference on 27 March, the presidential candidates not validated by the Constitutional Council called for “a relaunch of the electoral process to ensure a minimum of credibility”. The electoral campaign was launched on 14 April and ended on 4 May. Some national and international observers, such as the International Organization of la Francophonie (OIF) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), were accredited.
11. The first round of the presidential election took place on 6 May in an atmosphere of relative calm. On 9 May, the Agence nationale de gestion des élections announced the provisional results, with Mr. Déby Itno winning 61 per cent of the vote, followed by Mr. Masra with 18.5 per cent. Prior to the announcement, Mr. Masra took to social media to denounce the results to be proclaimed and called upon his supporters to protest peacefully and on law enforcement and military forces to refuse to obey unlawful orders. Upon the announcement of the provisional results, security and defence forces deployed throughout N’Djamena. According to reports, the publication of results was followed by extensive celebratory gunfire, which resulted in at least 10 fatalities and injuries. While most candidates conceded and congratulated the incumbent, on 12 May, Mr. Masra announced that his party had filed an appeal with the Constitutional Council to challenge the provisional results. Mr. Pahimi Padacké, who came third with 16.9 per cent of the vote and had previously congratulated the incumbent, also lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Council calling for the cancellation of the results in some provinces. On 16 May, the Constitutional Council rejected the appeals and confirmed the results, with minor adjustments. On 24 May, Mr. Déby Itno was sworn in as President.
12. In the Congo, leadership disputes persisted within the main opposition parties. In his New Year’s speech, the President of the Congo, Denis Sassou Nguesso, designated 2024 as the “Year of Youth”, acknowledging youth unemployment as a critical concern and proposing strategies centred on education, training and job creation.
13. In Equatorial Guinea, on 10 January, the Vice-President, Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, unveiled plans to expand the country’s military force from approximately 3,500 to over 100,000 personnel by 2034, citing an imperative to safeguard the population and deter any attempts at unconstitutional changes of government. On 21 March, he requested State-owned enterprises to submit financial reports for the fiscal year 2023 and instructed the Prime Minister, Manuela Roka Botey, to implement a travel authorization system for leaders of those enterprises, citing a need to address irregularities related to travel expenses. On 14 May, an order by the Ministry of Defence put the armed forces on maximum alert and closed all borders for undisclosed reasons.
14. In Gabon, the transitional authorities made advances in the political transition, in line with the defined timeline. On 17 January, the Transitional Government was reshuffled, with notable appointments including Alexandre Barro Chambrier, an opposition candidate in the 2023 presidential election, assuming the role of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Planning and Economic Prospects. The MinistersDelegate for Defence and for the Interior were promoted to the positions of Minister for Defence and Minister for the Interior and Security, positions previously held by the Transition President, Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema. On 9 February, an extraordinary parliamentary session amended the Transition Charter to remove the function of Minister for Defence and Security from the Transition President. On 7 March, the former ruling Parti démocratique gabonais announced the expulsi on of the former President, Ali Bongo Ondimba, along with his mother, from the party. Effective 2 May, the transitional authorities announced an adjustment to the curfew that had been in place since the military takeover on 30 August 2023, shortening it to three hours.
15. From 2 to 30 April, an inclusive national dialogue took place in Libreville. Attended by 600 participants from various segments of society, including 125 women, the dialogue was chaired by the Archbishop of Libreville. A final report cont aining recommendations from the 12 subcommissions, was submitted to the Transition President on 30 April. Among the recommendations was a recommendation to maintain the 24-month timeframe for the transition, while providing for a prolongation of the transition by one year if necessary. Another recommendation was that all political parties be suspended pending the introduction of new rules governing their establishment and functioning. The dialogue called for greater national sovereignty, strong restrictions on immigration and restrictive rules for obtaining nationality. Throughout March, several political parties and civil society organizations had expressed concern about the format of the dialogue and requested its postponement.
16. At the twenty-fourth ordinary session of the Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), held in Malabo on 9 March, Central African leaders reinstated the full membership of Gabon in ECCAS and rescinded an earlier decision to temporarily move the ECCAS headquarters from Libreville to Malabo.
17. In Rwanda, on 9 March, the Rwandan Patriotic Front ruling party endorsed the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, as its candidate in the presidential election scheduled for July 2024. On 13 March, a court in Kigali ruled that the opposition leader, Victoire Ingabire, was ineligible to participate in the election owing to previous convictions related to “terrorism and genocide denial”. On 7 April, Rwanda commemorated the thirtieth anniversary of the genocide against the Tutsis.
18. Sao Tome and Principe continued to implement recommendations proposed by the United Nations concerning the reform of the justice and security sectors. On 25 November 2023, the Government had initiated the establishment of a military tribunal aimed at addressing criminal cases and allegations of human rights violations involving military personnel, particularly those related to the alleged attempted coup of 25 November 2022; however, inadequate resources and the appointment of judges without formal legal training on military justice rendered the tribunal non-functional. Nine legislative measures to modernize the judicial framework passed the first stage of approval in the National Assembly. The Government launched efforts to digitalize the justice system, alongside legislative revisions aimed at combating gender-based violence and expediting the adjudication of sexual offences. In addition, the country initiated the establishment of a national human rights commission and ratified the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, the Convention relating to the Status of Statel ess Persons, the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
19. On 8 January, the President of Sao Tome and Principe, Carlos Manuel Vila Nova, expanded the Government with the addition of three new ministers, bringing the total to 13 ministers. The new Government includes five women, or 38 per cent of the ministerial positions, slightly below the 40 per cent threshold mandated by the Parity Law enacted in November 2022.