Attachments
In this Regional Overview
- Cameroon: Islamist abductions escalate in the Extreme North
- Democratic Republic of Congo: Rwandan military re-engages in violence in North Kivu
- Nigeria: Targeted military offensives fail to curtail violence in Katsina and Zamfara
- Sahel: Regional security challenges grow after ECOWAS approves the withdrawal of Sahelian states
- Somalia: Clashes in Jubaland signal a deepening constitutional crisis
- Sudan: SAF and RSF struggle over al-Jazirah state
Cameroon: Islamist abductions escalate in the Extreme North
Islamist militants in northern Cameroon carried out a series of abductions in December, highlighting a concerning trend for civilians, as insurgents increasingly used kidnapping for ransom to generate revenue and resources for their operations in 2024. The specific use of kidnapping by Boko Haram Jama’atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) in Cameroon more than doubled in 2024 compared to 2023. While fitting within a wider increase in 2024, the events in December came after the Chadian military’s Operation Haskanite forced many Boko Haram militants over the border into Cameroon in November, likely driving insurgents to further rely on kidnapping and theft from Cameroonian civilians. International military collaboration in the Lake Chad region under the Multinational Joint Task Force has faced scrutiny from the Chadian government due to perceived unequal contributions, a failure to secure borders, and unwillingness to combat insurgents,1 and civilians face increasing danger without coordinated military operations. Abductions in December targeted numerous farmers and pastoralists, often coinciding with displacement and the looting of food and livestock. While often using forms of violence to generate funding and collect resources, some actions in December also show efforts by insurgents to cooperate with local communities. For example, in Gore Talgutum, Hilé Alifa district, ISWAP militants collected watermelons from a farm but paid the owner of the field for the goods.2
Democratic Republic of Congo: Rwandan military re-engages in violence in North Kivu
In December, the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) re-initiated direct operations in North Kivu alongside M23 rebels, bringing an end to five months of reduced violence involving the RDF. Despite ACLED data recording only three violent events related to the RDF between June and the end of November, over a dozen battles involving the RDF broke out in the first seven days of December. These began on 1 December when the RDF provided direct support for M23 rebels during clashes with the Congolese military (FARDC) and allied fighters under the Wazalendo coalition in several areas of Lubero, North Kivu. Subsequently, Angolan-mediated peace negotiations fell apart on 15 December after Rwanda demanded that the Congolese government negotiate directly with M23 rebels. So far, Kinshasa has been unwilling to negotiate directly with the M23.3 Battles involving the RDF continued throughout late December and early January, including the takeover of the administrative capital of Masisi territory by M23 and RDF. As discussed in ACLED’s Conflict Watchlist, the ongoing proxy fighting after the Kinshasa and Kigali governments signed peace agreements and ceasefire deals in mid-2024 increased the likelihood that the RDF would directly re-engage in the DRC. A similar situation took place in 2023, when peace agreements broke down due to continued clashes between the M23 and Wazalendo, prompting a previous surge of RDF violence.
Nigeria: Targeted military offensives fail to curtail violence in Katsina and Zamfara
Nigerian military forces under Operation Fansan Yamma targeted several bandit leaders in the northwestern Zamfara and Katsina states in December. This included the killing of bandit leader Alhaji Ma’oli, who had imposed widespread illegal taxes on civilians in Zamfara’s Tsafe Local Government Area.4 Military operations carried out in December utilized several joint air and ground operations, often in collaboration with local defense militias, to combat bandits and dismantle their camps. While military forces and allied groups killed several heads of bandit groups in Katsina and Zamfara in 2024, this has done little to stem violence in these states: Violence escalated in Katsina and Zamfara in 2024 compared to 2023 as groups increasingly targeted civilians, fought against state forces and allied groups, and competed for power amongst themselves. Armed banditry in Katsina and Zamfara contributed to a 29% increase in violence in North West region from 2023, making it the most violent zone in 2024.
Sahel: Regional security challenges grow after ECOWAS approves the withdrawal of Sahelian states
On 15 December, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) approved the withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger from the regional bloc.5 ECOWAS introduced a six-month grace period in the hope that these countries, now cooperating separately through the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), will reverse their decision.6 The withdrawal is expected to have economic and diplomatic consequences as the central Sahel grapples with ongoing instability that has spread to coastal West Africa. A spate of events in each of the central Sahel countries in December paints a worrying picture of the security situation in the region. In Mali, military troops (FAMa) and Wagner forces reportedly killed 14 civilians in the commune of Gargando, Tombouctou region. In Niger, Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) militants likely shot dead 21 passengers on a bus in Arboudji and clashed with military forces in nearby Petelkole, Tillaberi region, resulting in dozens of reported fatalities. These events highlight a broader trend observed in 2024 toward increasingly deadly attacks, including on civilians, by key actors on all sides.
Further south, al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM militants are believed to have carried out deadly attacks in December on the Beninese military in the northern regions of Alibori and Atacora, reportedly killing six soldiers and wounding several others. Deadly attacks by insurgents continued on 8 January, striking a large military base in Karimama commune near the border. JNIM claimed more than 30 soldiers were killed. These attacks underscore JNIM’s growing presence in coastal West Africa. In one of the attacks, militants attacked soldiers guarding the Benin-Niger pipeline on the outskirts of Malanville, which also points to the growing trend of conflict increasingly affecting more urban areas.
Somalia: Clashes in Jubaland signal a deepening constitutional crisis
Since November, armed clashes between state troops and federal soldiers have rocked the southern state of Jubaland, after the state government established an election commission and severed ties with Mogadishu’s federal government. The Jubaland government held regional elections on 25 November, won by incumbent President Ahmed Mohamed Islam who is also known as ‘Madobe.’7 Tensions escalated into violent confrontations in Ras Kamboni, before spreading in December to Afmadow, Badhaadhe, and Doolow districts. After the SNA suffered a series of defeats to Jubaland forces, the federal government retaliated by suspending air traffic to and from Jubaland.8 Regional governments in Jubaland and Puntland have expressed opposition to the federal government’s plan to replace the indirect clan-based voting system with universal suffrage and the one-year term extension for all state presidents.
Sudan: SAF and RSF struggle over al-Jazirah state
Sudan’s al-Jazirah state was the site of heavy clashes in December, with both Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) claiming territorial advances in the agriculturally significant region. Contestation over al-Jazirah initially rose one year ago in December 2023, with severe implications for many internally displaced people and humanitarian aid in the capital of Wad Madani. The SAF have made a renewed push to regain control of al-Jazirah state since the desertion in October of senior RSF Al Jazirah commander, Abu Aqla Keikel, to the SAF. The state capital eventually fell to the SAF in early January. In 2024, territorial exchanges between conflict parties increased by a third compared to 2023, pointing to the relative mobility of the conflict. These violent exchanges of control were highest in Khartoum in 2024, followed by Sennar and al-Jazirah states.