Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia (S/2001/1015)

S/2001/1015
Letter dated 26 October 2001 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia, and in accordance with paragraph 19 of section B of resolution 1343 (2001), I have the honour to submit, as agreed upon at the 7th meeting of the Committee, held on 25 October 2001, the report of the Panel of Experts (see annex).

In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if this letter, together with its annex, were to be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Kishore Mahbubani
Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia

Annex. Letter dated 17 October 2001 from the Chairman of the Panel of Experts on Liberia addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia

On behalf of the members of the Panel of Experts on Liberia, I have the honour to enclose the report of the Panel, in accordance with paragraph 19 of Security Council resolution 1343 (2001).

(Signed) Martin Chungong Ayafor
Chairman
Panel of Experts on Liberia

(Signed) Atabou Bodian

(Signed) Johan Peleman

(Signed) Harjit Singh Sandhu

(Signed) Alex Vines

Enclosure. Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council resolution 1343 (2001), paragraph 19, concerning Liberia

Abbreviations

Executive summary

1. In mid-April when the Panel embarked upon its mandate there were active hostilities in the three Mano River Union countries (Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia). Six months on, there are significant signs of improvement in the region. Welcome regional diplomatic efforts are under way to further improve bilateral relations between the three members of the Mano River Union although there is still active conflict in Lofa County in Liberia and the possibility of Sierra Leone gravitating back into the conflict if RUF does not want to release its hold on some of the best diamond areas.

2. There has been a proliferation of the use of non-state actors in these conflicts in the Mano River Union. These groups obtain weapons from state supporters, from their trade in diamonds, alluvial gold, cocoa and coffee or from their military action. Their actions have had and can again destabilize the region. The junction of the borders of Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone has been the fault zone where these groups have thrived.

3. The Revolutionary United Front’s (RUF) relationship with Liberia was described in detail in the Panel of Experts report on Sierra Leone (S/2000/1195). In 2001 this relationship has continued, although a split is reported among RUF units that are willing to disarm in Sierra Leone and others that continue to fight in the war that has shifted to the Liberian and Guinean borders. Throughout 2001, RUF units have been fighting with Liberian units in Lofa County.

Transportation and weapons

Lifting of the sanctions on Liberian registered aircraft

4. Irregularities with respect to Liberian registered aircraft were directly related to violations of the arms embargo. This is why the Security Council decided to ground all Liberian registered aircraft until a new and proper registration process, in compliance with international civil aviation regulations, would be put in place. The Panel has closely monitored the progress made in this field and has worked consistently with the new Director of Civil Aviation in Liberia in order to find a way out of the disorderly situation the registry was in. Bits and pieces of documentation on the ownership of many aircraft were gradually found in Liberia and through communication with other civil aviation authorities. By the time the Panel last visited Liberia in the first week of October 2001, 117 planes had been identified on the basis of this information.

5. The problem of Liberian registered aircraft is not yet fully solved because some aircraft may still be operating abroad with an EL-prefix painted on the tail, despite the revocation by Liberia. But this is a matter that is beyond the control of the Liberian Civil Aviation Authority and should be dealt with on the level of the airports where these planes are seen and can be grounded.

Recommendation on Liberian registry

6. The Panel considers that the measures taken so far by the Liberian Civil Aviation Authority are adequate and that the Security Council may consider lifting the grounding order imposed by resolution 1343 (2001) and allow Liberia to reopen an aircraft register in coordination with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Those individual aircraft that were effectively grounded and have provided ICAO and the Security Council Committee on Liberia with the documentation showing their registration in Liberia was done in accordance with international regulations, should be given permission to restart their operations.

7. The Liberian Civil Aviation Authority should keep the Security Council Committee on Liberia and the ICAO informed on the follow-up of the investigation and on the registration of every new aircraft on the new Liberian register.

Role of transportation in arms trafficking

8. In most of the arms trafficking cases the Panel investigated, the transport factor seemed once again a crucial element and in all of these cases the planes that were used, had in one way or another been subject to document fraud, forgery of flight plans and irregularities with respect to the registration of aircraft. The Panel found evidence of fraudulent registrations, not only in Liberia, but also in the Central African Republic and to a certain extent in Equatorial Guinea too. The registrations of the aircraft from Centrafrican Airlines in the Central African Republic are of particular importance because these planes were used for arms transportation in violation of the sanctions on Liberia.

Recommendations on illegal aircraft registrations

9. In view of the aircraft registration fraud committed in the Central African Republic, the Panel recommends that the Civil Aviation Authorities there:

• Transmit to Interpol the Court documents about Centrafrican Airlines;
• Publish these Court documents on the Government’s web site;
• Coordinate urgently with Equatorial Guinea and the United Arab Emirates over the use by Centrafrican Airlines of forged documents.

10. To other States, the Panel recommends that the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea and other African States affected by this type of fraud coordinate with the African Civil Aviation Commission to put the issue of false registrations as an agenda item for its future meetings.

11. During its investigations the Panel found illegally registered aircraft an endemic problem. The Panel travelled to Montreal to discuss the problem with ICAO’s Air Navigation Bureau Director. He informed the Panel that countries with an illegal registration problem could cancel or ground aircraft, and that ICAO advised in such circumstances new registration. The Panel felt that ICAO’s response was inadequate to deal with this growing problem.

12. To ICAO, the Panel recommends that:

• ICAO proactively educates its members on the dangers of illegal registrations;
• ICAO's member States computerize their registration lists and centralize them on the ICAO web site so that users could check the situation and status of each aircraft;
• ICAO's Safety Oversight programme should place greater emphasis on aircraft registration.

13. To the United Nations Security Council, the Panel recommends that all the aircraft owned, operated or insured by San Air, Centrafrican Airlines and West Africa Air Services should be grounded immediately. The grounding order could then be lifted gradually for each individual aircraft, provided all the records (ownership of the plane, operator, operating licence, insurance, airworthiness certificate, certificate of registration and the location of the aircraft) are inspected by both the Civil Aviation Authority in the country of registration and in the country where the aircraft has its maintenance base.

14. The companies concerned should inform the Council, through the Security Council Committee on Liberia, on the exact status and location of each aircraft. A list of those planes is found in annex 3 to the report.

Weapons

15. The Liberian Government's public commitments to comply with the embargo notwithstanding, a steady flow of new weapons continues to enter into the country. The Panel documents in this report five detailed case studies on sanctions violations.

16. Case study one describes how thousands of machine-guns found their way to Liberia in November 2000. The weapons were supposed to be sent back from Uganda to Slovakia but the Egyptian arms broker sold them to a company in Guinea that turned out to be a front for a Liberian smuggling network. The End-User Certificate for Guinea was forged and the plane used for the transport of the guns was chartered by Centrafrican Airlines.

17. In case study two it is shown how Liberia set up a ghost airline West Africa Air Services to transport several arms cargoes. A first flight in July 2000 shipped spare parts for military helicopters from Kyrgyzstan to Liberia. A forged End-User Certificate for a company in Guinea was again used to buy the military equipment. Directly after that the plane shuttled between Monrovia and Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire) to bring over 100 tons of ammunition to Liberia. This deal was organized and financed by Leonid Minin and a partner in Russia, Valery Cherny of the company Aviatrend. Minin was later found in possession of forged duplicates of an End-User Certificate that had been signed by General Robert Gueï, the former head of State of Côte d'Ivoire.

18. In a third case study the Panel describes Liberia's recent quest to obtain additional military helicopters. The Panel was informed that a military helicopter had been seized in the Slovak Republic in February 2001. The Slovak authorities wanted to ship the helicopter back to Kyrgyzstan after repairs had been done.

19. However, in Kyrgyzstan the authorities were not aware of any repair contract for helicopters in the Slovak Republic. According to the broker Kyrgyzstan had dealt with, the helicopters were to go to Guinea. According to the contract signed in Slovakia they were supposed to go back to Kyrgyzstan. Again a false End-User Certificate for Guinea showed up in this case. Had the helicopter not been stopped by customs, it would have gone to Liberia. A second consignment of helicopters was, right after the debacle in Slovakia, seized in Moldova. There two military helicopters were about to be exported to Guinea for repairs.

20. However, Guinea has no repair plant for helicopters and the companies, brokers and transport agents involved in this case were those that were involved in the previous case of sanctions-busting to Liberia. The contract with the Guinean brokering company Pecos was finally cancelled after the intervention of the authorities in Moldova and after a visit of the Panel to that country.

21. In another case study false End-User Certificates used by the company Pecos in Guinea is analysed. The individuals involved were operating in Central and Eastern Europe but had set up an off-the-shelf company, Pecos, in Guinea. End-User Certificates for this company were found in Kyrgyzstan, in Moldova, the Slovak Republic and Uganda. In all the cases, arms were bought for Liberia and the Panel verified that Guinea had never ordered any weapons through Pecos. Pecos was a follow-up to another company Joy Slovakia that had stopped operating after several law enforcement agencies had started investigating possible arms trafficking and money-laundering cases. The Panel found that the scheme set up with End-User certificates fabricated by the individuals involved with these companies, had been used to supply weapons to Liberia for years.

22. Finally, an analysis is made of the aviation network involved in these arms supplies to Liberia. The evidence on the involvement of Serguei Denissenko, Alexander Islamov, Pavel Popov and Sanjivan Ruprah is overwhelming. All these individuals are directly connected to Victor Bout and the operations of his aircraft. The Panel has investigated the corporate relationships between the companies San Air, Centrafrican Airlines, MoldTransavia and West Africa Air Services, all related to this network of arms dealers. In the course of the investigation different forms of fraud were found, including fraud with the registration of aircraft and with flight plans. The main company behind many of the arms shipments was San Air, in the United Arab Emirates. San Air is an agent for Centrafrican Airlines, the main company of Victor Bout, and the owner of many of the arms trafficking planes involved. San Air's bank accounts were used for many payments for arms deliveries to Liberia and the money trail is described in the section on government expenditures.

23. The Panel also documents in this report, how the Singapore-based mother company of the Oriental Timber Company, a company with significant timber operations in Liberia, arranged a US$ 500,000 payment for an arms shipment in August 1999; how the Bureau of Maritime Affairs in Liberia assisted violations of the arms embargo and paid directly to Victor Bout's San Air bank accounts and how Sanjivan Ruprah, a diamond dealer and partner of Victor Bout had taken residence in Liberia, at the end of the arms pipeline.

Recommendations on weapons

24. The Panel recommends that:

• The arms embargo on Liberia be extended;
• All United Nations Member States abstain from supplying weapons to the Mano River Union countries;
• An arms embargo be imposed on the armed non-state actors in the three Mano River Union countries (namely the LURD and Ulimo-factions, the RUF and the Guinean armed dissident groups).

25. The Panel also recommends that, for reasons of transparency and confidence-building, the ECOWAS moratorium on small arms should be broadened to an information exchange mechanism for all weapons types procured by the ECOWAS member States. The existing Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) could be further developed to improve the information exchange on current holdings and future arms procurement of West African States. The Panel recommends that this information exchange would be binding and that both supplier States and the receiving countries would be obliged to report each individual arms transaction to the newly established mechanism and include data on all the parties to the arms transactions, including the names and companies of the brokers and the transport agents.

Recommendation on End-User Certificates

26. The Panel recommends that each Member State that has ever procured or supplied arms on the basis of an End-User Certificate mentioning the companies Pecos, Joy Slovakia and/or Morse or the individuals Peter Jusko, Alexander Islamov, Jacob Berger, Andreï Izdebski or Serguei Schwabenland, conduct a thorough investigation on the actual delivery and end-use of the arms. The Panel recommends that the member States involved in any such transactions inform the other State party to these transactions and inform the Security Council Committees on Sierra Leone and Liberia on the findings of their investigation.

27. The Panel urgently recommends the establishment of a United Nations working group to develop the modalities for a standardized End-User Certificate that would include the name, address and telephone number of the signing authority for the Certificate, and name, address, telephone number and arms trading licence of the broker(s) involved.

Liberian Government use of revenue

28. The Panel examined the sources and management of government funds in an effort to establish the financing for sanctions-busting. The principal source of revenue for these activities between 1999 and 2001 was off-budget spending that was not part of regular government expenditures.

29. These expenditures occurred outside the budget process through the allocation of revenue at the source rather than through the central bank. According to IMF "certain timber concessions, government parastatals, and revenue collection agencies undertook expenditure on behalf of government, that was later recorded as "non-cash" revenue with an offsetting outlay on goods and services". This appears to be how sanctions-busting, namely for procurement of weapons and ammunition, was financed as this report will demonstrate below.

Recommendations on Liberian Government expenditure

30. The Panel recommends that the practice of allocating revenues at source for priority expenditure should be eliminated. All revenues should be consolidated in a central government account at the Central Bank of Liberia before being allocated to authorized agencies for approved expenditures.

Logging and wood processing

31. Between January and June 2001 round log production produced 679,253 cubic metres (valued at US$ 46.2 million). These figures are a likely underestimate of real exports by 50 to 200 per cent because of tax evasion by companies and widespread corruption.

32. Logging has long been one of the prime sources of government revenue. Logging is still today a mainstay of export earnings for the Government. President Taylor has also taken a personal interest in the allocation of timber concessions. In January 2000 a new National Forestry Law declared that all forest resources are the property of the Government except for communal and privately owned forest resources that have been developed through artificial regeneration.

33. New concessions require final approval by the President of the Republic. During the 1999-2000 season, many authorized concessionaires continued logging but without assurances that they would be allowed to retain their concessions. This uncertainty encouraged rapid cutting and profiteering, without concern for sustainable forestry practices in order to maximize profits in anticipation of losing concessions.

34. Several Spanish and French enterprises lost their concessions to the United Logging Company, managed by Fawaz and President Taylor's son as chairman. President Taylor has also revoked concessions of the VH Timber Companies giving them to the United Logging Company and to the Mohammed Group. President Taylor is seeking to have the timber industry dominated by a few mega-concessions like the Oriental Timber Company.

35. A number of the timber companies complained to the Panel that making a profit currently in Liberia is difficult, except for the mega-concessions that are engaged in non-selective felling and processing massive volumes of round logs. Limited wood-processing capacity, log jams in France at saw mills because of large volumes of round logs and the difficulty in attracting new investors to Liberia were all blamed for these difficulties. They complain of excessive taxation and difficult operating conditions, making it impossible even to fell and sell timber up to their Forestry Development Agency 4 per cent quota. Presidential favour is an important ingredient in cutting operational costs. A number of logging firms obtained tax waivers for fuel purchases as a result of their close connections to the President.

36. According to FDA rules, 25 per cent of the volume of logs felled should be sawn in the country. This rule is not respected because of the volume of round logs exported by the Oriental Timber Company to China and because of the limited number of saw mills in Liberia.

37. Prior to the 1989-1996 war there were 18 saw mills, three veneering and plywood factories, six dry kilns and three wood-processing factories and domestic timber production surpassed log exports in timber volume. Today there are only 12 operational saw mills and these do not have the capacity to process the volume of logs felled.

38. The World Trade Organization (WTO) currently advises all countries to ban unprocessed log exportation beyond the end of 2000. Liberia urgently needs to phase out this trade and invest in wood-processing facilities. This would enhance the value of timber exported from Liberia, slow felling down and provide additional employment. It would also make production and exporting easier to monitor. The Taylor government has announced a gradual prohibition on the export of round logs as a policy guideline since 1998, but no legislation on the issue has been enacted yet.

39. Some of the timber companies are directly involved in violations of the sanctions against Liberia. One prominent example of this was Exotic Tropical and Timber Enterprises (ETTE). The Panel has received a certain document, which indicates that a payment for a weapons delivery was made directly from the Singapore accounts of the company Borneo Jaya Pte Ltd, a mother company of OTC.

Recommendations on logging and wood processing

40. Timber production is an important source of revenue for the Government and a source of employment in Liberia. It is also a source of revenue for sanctions-busting. The Panel found it difficult to obtain real figures on the current volume of timber production and how much revenue is generated. Without a sound assessment of the timber-generated revenue base, the Panel could not assess how much revenue could have been used from this industry for assisting sanctions-busting. Therefore the Panel recommends that:

• The Government should reach agreement with the International Monetary Fund over the commissioning of an independent detailed report on revenue from the timber concessions for the January 2001-July 2002 period, including exemptions and tax offsets for government-related expenditures during this period;
  
  
• That the United Nations should impose a ban on all round log exports from Liberia from July 2002 and strongly encourage local operators to diversify into wood processing before that date.

Diamonds

41. The Panel examined Liberia's diamond industry because it is another crucial source of natural resource revenue for the Government. Liberia's own official diamond exports were said to be only 8,500 carats in 1999, valued at US$ 900,000. Liberia's Minister of Lands, Mines and Energy estimates that this represents only 10 to 15 per cent of what is actually leaving the country.

42. Sanctions were imposed on the export of Liberian rough diamonds following the conclusions of the December 2000 report (S/2000/1195). This report illustrated how diamonds far in excess of the quality or quantity available in Liberia had been imported in provenance and origin. The larger illicit trade provided Liberia with a convenient cover for the export of conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone although many of the so-called "Liberian" production emanated from other sources (most notably Russia), and was falsely declared "Liberian" for tax purposes.

43. With the entry into force of Security Council resolution 1343 (2001) the Government of Liberia indicated that it would comply with the ban. The imposition of an embargo on the export of Liberian rough, coupled with progress in the peace process in Sierra Leone, has resulted in a marked decline of diamonds labelled as "Liberian" reaching international markets. There have been no imports from Liberia recorded in Antwerp since the imposition of the sanctions.

44. The embargo has created a different problem. Since it is impossible to sell Liberian rough officially, dealers and brokers are seeking to camouflage their Liberian diamonds as those from neighbouring countries markets. The Panel itself verified ongoing smuggling of Liberian rough to Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire.

45. The Panel also observed a steep increase in trade of diamonds mined by the RUF through Freetown. Many of these stones passed through Makeni from the Kono fields but lesser numbers reached dealers in Kenama and Bo before entering the official system. Approximately half of Sierra Leone's total production comes from the Kono/Koidu district. Following the imposition of a diamond embargo on Liberia, the closure of the border till September 2001 and the war in Lofa County, little diamond trade now passes through to Liberia from Sierra Leone. This shift in trade pattern is reflected also in the dramatic decline in so-called "Liberian" rough entering markets like Antwerp and a steep decline in the number of diamonds passing through Monrovia. The pressures on other revenue sources in Liberia for Executive Mansion extrabudgetary expenditure demonstrates once again the importance that diamonds had played over the last few years for President Taylor. Because of the loosening of President Taylor's grip on the Kono/Koidu diamond trade, the RUF axis has switched to increasing trade through Sierra Leone.

Recommendations on diamonds

46. The experiences of Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire discussed below show how difficult it actually is to separate out conflict diamonds from other alluvials. Better monitoring, increasing the cost of getting caught and the requirement to state the source of a stone (origin) rather than just the provenance could help this process. But as with the case of Sierra Leone, without steady progress in the internal peace process it is difficult to see how the distinction between government and RUF diamonds can be maintained effectively.

47. The diamond embargo on Liberia has contributed to the dramatic decline in the misuse of the Liberian label for diamond smuggling. The embargo has, however, reversed the problem in effect with encouraging an increase in the smuggling of Liberian rough out of the country and into neighbouring certification systems. If these certification schemes are to be credible, this situation needs to be dealt with urgently. Better policing of dealers can help, but ensuring that Liberia has its own credible certification scheme will ensure that less Liberian rough are deliberately mixed with rough of neighbouring countries.

48. The annual artisanal production of Liberia is low, approximately US$ 1.5 million per year in total production. Any dramatic increase in exports could act as an early warning system for the Liberian label being once more used to launder non-Liberian diamonds. The Panel encourages the Liberian Government to put in place a credible and transparent certification scheme which is independently audited by an internationally recognized audit company. This scheme should be independently assessed as credible and effective in order to facilitate the consideration of a temporary suspension of the diamond ban by the Security Council. This would also alleviate the genuine hardship that artisanal miners, brokers and dealers are currently experiencing.

Other measures

49. Regular and accurate publication of official annual rough diamond import/export statistics is crucial. Currently only Belgium publishes a detailed list. A better international library of each diamond type, from each region and detailed records of run-of-mine alluvial samples in conflict zones would also be an important step forward in this region. It is also important that countries issue their own Certificates of Origin that are consistent with a fully integrated certification system. But in the end, the only guaranteed way to resolve the conflict diamond issue is to create conditions in a country that result in the label "conflict" being made redundant. Under such conditions, the principal challenge of the alluvial diamond trade in West Africa would be to curtail endemic smuggling for tax evasion purposes. Sierra Leone's attempt to redistribute diamond revenues back into the community is part of a solution.

The maritime and corporate registry

50. With 1,734 vessels registered under its flag, Liberia is the second largest maritime fleet in the world. The register has traditionally had a high proportion of tanker tonnage. In January 2001, Liberia accounted in tonnage for 35 per cent of all the world's oil tankers. The register is generally regarded as one of the quality open registries (called by some, flag of convenience). The registry also provides some 25 per cent of government revenue. In 2000, the Liberian registry and corporate fee programme generated some US$ 25.72 million officially which netted according to the Bureau of Maritime Affairs some US$ 18 million for the Government.

51. LISCR, the registry agent has ring-fenced the revenue it generates from the maritime and corporate registries. Their accounts are audited annually by Arthur Andersen LLP, an auditing firm of international repute, and these were open to inspection by the Panel. The collection of registry revenues and government taxes and fees, and any subsequent distribution of funds due to the Government, is accomplished in accordance with the agreement between LISCR and the Liberian Government.

52. Collections are initially deposited into one of several registry bank accounts, dependent upon the nature of the collection, and as specified in an agreement between LISCR and the Liberian Government. This is routine procedure. However, the Panel obtained bank transfer details for two LISCR transfers to San Air General Trading at Standard Chartered Bank, Sharjah, the United Arab Emirates, for US$ 525,000 on 21 June 2000 and US$ 400,000 on 7 July 2000. These two payments were for arms and transportation in violation of the sanctions. The sanctions-busting activities of San Air General Trading are documented in the Arms and Transportation Section below.

53. LISCR admitted to the Panel that it had made four payments to non-government accounts in 2000. The disbursements were made following four separate written requests instructing LISCR, from the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs. LISCR became increasingly uncomfortable at the growing regularity of requests for divergence from standard procedure in late 2000. Following a new request for disbursement on 17 August 2000, LISCR informed the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs that it would no longer honour such requests.

54. Having found resistance from LISCR, Liberia's Bureau of Maritime Affairs changed strategy, and directed four payments from their part of the maritime revenue directly to San Air via arms dealer Sanjivan Ruprah.

55. The Commissioner of Maritime Affairs and his Maritime Affairs Bureau are little more than a cash extraction operation and cover from which to fund and organize opaque off-budget expenditures including for sanctions-busting. For as long as there is an arms embargo on Liberia the funds from the registry will need to be protected from Bureau misuse.

Recommendations on the Liberian corporate and maritime registry

56. The Liberian corporate and maritime registries provide an important source of revenue to a poor country. The maritime registry is of international repute but it is vulnerable because of the use of the funds it generates for opaque off-budget expenditure including for sanctions-busting.

57. The Panel recognizes that the open registry business is very competitive, that any sanction on the registry would see client flight, and that these clients would be unlikely to return. The Panel would not wish to see an exodus to other open registries of ship owners currently with LISCR.

58. LISCR should not have made those four payments to non-government accounts in 2000. The payments were contrary to their agreement with the Liberian Government and showed a complete lack of due diligence. LISCR seems to have learned from its mistake and took action to stop this practice. In 2001 there has been no further pressure of this type from Monrovia and no evidence of further payments to non-governmental accounts.

59. The Panel recommends that:

• An escrow account should be set up by the Security Council Committee as the ultimate destination for all revenues generated from the shipping and corporate registry. The Panel believes that the Government of Liberia and IMF should reach an agreement to audit this account in order to determine all revenues generated by the shipping and corporate registry and to determine the use of the revenue in this account;
  
  
• The funds in this account should be designated for development purposes.

The travel ban

60. The travel ban has generally worked successfully. The Panel actively sought to monitor compliance with the travel ban. It verified 27 violations of the travel ban, the majority through Abidjan.

Recommendations on the travel ban

61. The travel ban has been the source of the greatest number of complaints received by the Panel. Individuals on the list requested to know on what grounds their names had been placed on the list and how to appeal. In each case the Panel referred them to the Security Council Committee as the appropriate body responsible for drawing up the list.

62. The Panel encourages the Security Council Committee to reply to individual requests about the ban promptly and expeditiously. The Panel also recommends that the Committee set up a Liberia travel ban web page where the Committee's criteria on how names have been put on the list is described. The web page should also provide information on how to apply for travel exemptions and have a section on who currently has an exemption to travel. This web site should be publicized as a resource for immigration and law enforcement agencies to keep track of who is on the travel ban list, and who has exemptions.

63. The Security Council Sanctions Branch in consultation with the Committee should also compile a photographic database of key individuals on the ban list to counter attempts by a number of individuals on the list to travel under a different name. These photographs could be put on the web site.

64. The Panel does not believe that the list should be set in stone. For humanitarian reasons a few names should be dropped; the Committee should also consider new names too.

To the Côte d'Ivoire Government

65. A loophole at Abidjan airport needs urgent attention. The Council should strongly encourage the Ivorian authorities to adopt a less passive attitude towards the implementation of the travel ban. A verifiable system should be set up at Abidjan airport to check that arriving passengers from Monrovia are not on the list or if they are, they have obtained a United Nations travel exemption.

Recommendations for the continued monitoring of Security Council resolution 1343 (2001)

66. The United Nations Secretariat should appoint a Liberian officer within the Sanctions Department of the Department of Political Affairs. This person should conduct ongoing monitoring of compliance of resolution 1343 (2001) from New York, develop databases of violation reports and write request letters and make telephone enquiries about such reports. This person should also act as an in-house researcher for the Security Council Committee, able to assist in monitoring compliance of the travel ban and requests for travel exemptions. A motivated United Nations Secretariat staff member, with administrative support from the assistants to the Committee, could fill this requirement efficiently and cost-effectively. The Angolan Monitoring Mechanism already has attached to it a political officer who has efficiently conducted a number of these tasks. Individual consultants could be hired for a short period of time to investigate a specific case of violation of the sanctions whenever the need arises, in order to keep pressure on Liberia.

67. There should be an ongoing assessment of Liberia's compliance to resolution 1343 (2001) on the ground, too. A way to achieve this in a targeted and cost-effective manner is to renew the mandate for this Panel of Experts for two short periods in 2002 for missions to visit West Africa with the Liberian officer appointed by the Secretariat. These missions should be:

• An assessment mission by the Panel to Liberia and neighbouring States for a period of four weeks starting in April 2002 to investigate and compile a short report on compliance. This report, an independent audit of compliance with recommendations, would then be submitted through the Committee to the Council for consideration in May 2002;
  
  
• A second six-week mission to Liberia in September 2002 resulting in a final submission to the Committee in November 2002. This report would also be an independent assessment of total progress of the sanctions regime and the Government of Liberia's compliance over the year.

68. The advantages of this system are that it will over 2002 strengthen internal United Nations capacity to monitor Liberia and other States' compliance of resolution 1343 (2001). It also uses the expertise of the Panel in a targeted and cost-effective manner and ensures that the momentum created by the Panel's work in 2001 is not lost.

Introduction

A. General

69. Pursuant to paragraph 19 of Security Council resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia, adopted on 7 March 2001, the Secretary-General appointed a Panel of Experts on 29 March 2001 (S/2001/268), with the mandate to:

• Investigate violations of the new tightened arms embargo, the ban on export of Liberian diamonds and the travel ban on senior officials of the Liberian Government;
  
  
• Collect information on the compliance by the Government of Liberia with the demands to expel all members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from Liberia, cease all financial and military support to RUF, cease all direct or indirect import of Sierra Leone rough diamonds, freeze funds or financial resources or assets controlled by RUF in Liberia and ground all Liberian-registered aircraft;
  
  
• Further investigate possible links between the exploitation of natural resources and other forms of economic activity in Liberia, and the fuelling of the conflict in Sierra Leone and neighbouring countries, in particular those areas highlighted by the report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1306 (2000);
  
  
• Collect information linked to the illegal activities of the individuals referred to in the report of Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1306 (2000) concerning the situation in Sierra Leone;
  
  
• Collect information concerning any other alleged violations of resolution 1343 (2001).

70. The Panel took note of the report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1306 (2000) concerning the situation in Sierra Leone (S/2000/1195) of 19 December 2000 and the responses received from countries and individuals mentioned in the report. The corrective actions taken by such countries have been duly noted by the Panel.

71. The Panel recognized that the demands made to the Government of Liberia under paragraph 2 of resolution 1343 (2001) to immediately cease its support for RUF in Sierra Leone and for other armed rebel groups in the region were intended to further the peace process in Sierra Leone.

72. The Panel took particular note of paragraph 4 of this resolution, which demands that all States in the region take action to prevent armed individuals and groups from using their territory to prepare and commit attacks on neighbouring countries and refrain from any action that might contribute to further destabilization of the situation on the borders between Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

73. On 22 March 2001, the Permanent Representative of Liberia to the United Nations transmitted the text of a letter addressed to the Secretary-General from Charles Ghankay Taylor, President of Liberia. This letter delineated the measures the Government of Liberia has taken in compliance with the resolution (S/2001/264). The Panel remained cognizant of the contents of the letter and all such subsequent correspondence from the Government of Liberia, made available to it by the Security Council Committee on Liberia and the Task Force of the Government of Liberia.

74. The Panel of Experts (The Panel was assisted on the Timber Section of the report by Mr. Didier Boudineau (France).) consisted of Mr. Martin Chungong Ayafor, (Cameroon - Chairman), Mr. Atabou Bodian (Senegal - Expert from the International Civil Aviation Organization), Mr. Johan Peleman (Belgium - Arms and Transportation Expert), Mr. Harjit S. Sandhu (India - Expert from Interpol), and Mr. Alex Vines (United Kingdom - Diamond Expert) (S/2001/268, annex 1).

75. The Panel had its first organizational meeting at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 16 to 27 April 2001, and it was agreed with the Security Council Committee on Liberia that the Panel's report would be submitted on 15 October 2001. It was subsequently submitted on 17 October 2001.

76. The Panel committed itself to holding regular consultations with Panels of Experts/Monitoring Mechanisms and other Security Council Committees working on similar issues. The Panel also kept the Security Council Committee on Liberia informed of the progress of its work, as and when necessary, as per paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1343 (2001).

77. The Panel received a great deal of logistical and moral support from the Security Council Committee on Liberia, the United Nations Secretariat, the United Nations Resident Coordinators and UNDP officials in almost every country it visited. Many Governments helped with detailed information and advice, and many individuals provided helpful information.

B. A reminder to the background of the mandate

78. The Panel's mandate is described in section A above. The Panel was reminded of the background to its mandate, however, during its field visits in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea. In Sierra Leone, thousands of civilians, many of them women and children, victims of unspeakable brutality, face a future without hands or feet. The Amputees Camp in Freetown is a cruel testimony to the havoc created by the forces that supplied arms to rebels. In addition to the amputees who have been condemned to a life without hands or feet, tens of thousands of Sierra Leoneans, Guineans and Liberians have lost their lives, half a million have become refugees and three or four times that number has been displaced in the subregion. The Panel visited the Amputees Camp in Freetown, refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in all the three bordering countries of Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone.

79. As the Panel concluded its report, the situation on the borders between Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea remained volatile and the best diamond-producing areas in Sierra Leone still remained in rebel hands. In several border areas of Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, people lived without access to medical assistance, education or the means to a secure livelihood. The Panel remained cognizant, throughout its work, of its role and its responsibility in helping to end the suffering of the people of the subregion.

Methodology of investigation

80. Questionnaires: The Panel requested specific information from the relevant countries, through their Permanent Missions to the United Nations, regarding certain arms shipments and the movement of suspicious aircraft used for illegal transportation of arms and ammunition. The Panel also requested statistics dating back to 1987 on diamond exports from major producing countries, and imports to countries with significant trading, cutting and polishing industries. The reason for going back to 1987 was to determine what trends might have prevailed before the wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In September 2001, the Panel sent reminder letters to all Governments, through their Permanent Missions to the United Nations, which had not yet provided the requested statistics. The Panel would like to record special appreciation for Cyprus, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Slovak Republic, United Arab Emirates and Uganda for their detailed replies and additional information that proved very useful for investigation.

81. Interviews: In each country, Panel members interviewed government authorities, and where relevant, diplomatic missions, civil society organizations, aid agencies, private sector firms and journalists. The Panel also contacted a number of key individuals whose names have been a subject of interest and controversy in recent months in connection with the crisis in the subregion (annex 2). Given the sensitive nature of the subjects investigated by the Panel, however, it should be noted that many individuals spoke under conditions of confidentiality. Several meetings held in various countries have therefore not been listed.

82. Visits to countries: The Panel travelled extensively to countries involved, or believed to be involved, in the trafficking of weapons and related materiel to Liberia in violation of Security Council embargoes and to countries involved in the diamond trade. The entire Panel visited Liberia twice, and some Panel members visited three times. The entire Panel also visited Belgium, Côte d'Ivoire, Czech Republic, the Gambia, Guinea, Moldova, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates. Travel was undertaken by one or several of the Panel members to Austria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, France, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Niger, Norway, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, Uganda, the United Kingdom, Washington, D.C. (USA).

83. Field trips: There had been a lot of mystique attached to several places in the subregion of Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. The Panel decided to visit all such areas. In Liberia, the entire Panel visited Gbatala training centre for anti-terrorist unit (ATU) and the Buchanan Port where most of the activities of Oriental Timber Company (OTC) are concentrated. Three members of the Panel visited Lofa and Bong Counties. In Sierra Leone, two members of the Panel visited Bo, Kenema, Koidu, Yengema, Moyamba, Bauya, Waterloo and Daru. In Guinea, two members went all the way by road from Conakry to Kissidougou to Guéckédou to Macenta to Kuankan and Kola, to Nzérékoré and onwards to Côte d'Ivoire. In Côte d'Ivoire, two members visited Man, Biankouma, Guiglo, Danane, Nicla and Guessessou.

84. During these field visits, the Panel spoke to various factions involved in the conflict in the subregion. The prominent ones being RUF, CDF, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The Panel also interviewed a large number of IDPs spread over all the four countries of the subregion. The Panel witnessed the disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation (DDR) programme in Sierra Leone, spoke to combatants and picked up certain leads on the origin of arms and ammunition.

85. Assistance from international and regional organizations: The Panel received useful cooperation and assistance from several international organizations such as Interpol, ICAO, IMO, etc. and made proper use of their expertise.

86. Police and judicial records: The Panel was able to access police and judicial records of several under-investigation and under-trial cases linked to trafficking of arms and ammunition in the West African subregion. The Panel scrutinized interrogation statements of several former RUF cadres and the documents recovered from the premises of suspects.

Standards of verification

87. The Panel agreed at the outset of its work to use high evidentiary standards in its investigations. This required at least two credible and independent sources of information to substantiate a finding. Wherever possible, the Panel also agreed to put allegations to those concerned in order to allow them the right of reply. However, certain individuals whose role is highlighted in the report did not make themselves available to the Panel despite serious attempts by the Panel to give them a chance to explain their conduct.

88. During the investigation, where possible, the Panel shared the relevant information and cooperated with the States concerned for further thorough investigation at their level. Where appropriate, the Panel also brought the information collected during the course of investigation to the attention of authorities to allow them the right of reply as stated in paragraph 20 of Security Council resolution 1343 (2001). A significant number of countries came forward with useful information on individuals behind certain shady companies and their financial transactions.

89. In the past, allegations against various parties to the conflict in the subregion have always been denied with the question, "Where is the evidence?". An example of this is the standard response to charges that weapons have been channelled to RUF through Liberia and that President Taylor continues to support RUF. In the report that follows, we have dealt in great detail with this particular allegation and several cases of arms shipments having reached Liberia in violation of Security Council arms embargoes.

90. Following the paper trail and the chain of events: To satisfy the oft-repeated rhetoric "Where is the evidence?", "If you have evidence, show it", the Panel has traced the entire sequence of events starting from the origin of weapons to the end-destination using documentary evidence and direct eyewitness accounts of the persons involved. The Panel has in its possession the following documents concerning the planes involved in illegal arms supply to Liberia:

• Copies of contracts signed by the contracting parties;
• Requests and permissions for overflight and landing;
• Flight plans;
• Cargo manifests;
• Airway bills;
• Documents showing owners or operating agency of the aircraft involved;
• Pilots logbooks;
• Payments made;
• Insurance documents for the cargo and the planes involved.

91. Analysing these documents, the Panel traced the entire flight route taken by the aircraft bringing weapons to Liberia. In addition to this, the Panel spoke to pilots and the other crew members who were on board the aircraft in question. Practically in all listed cases, the aircraft involved were physically located by the Panel and their photographs were taken. Some of the arms traffickers involved tried to hide but the Panel succeeded in locating them and confronting them with the details. In one such case, the Panel visited a prison and interviewed the suspect in the jail premises, after obtaining permission from the concerned judicial authorities.

92. In addition to its own detailed verification, the Panel also received corroborating information from international law enforcement agencies. The assistance of Interpol specialists was also taken as and when required. In all the cases delineated in the report that follows, the Panel did not rely solely on oral testimonies. Corroborative documentary and circumstantial evidence was always insisted on. The evidence, therefore, is incontrovertible and irrefutable.

Part I. Liberia and the region

Regional security in the Mano River Union

93. In mid-April when the Panel embarked upon its mandate, there were active hostilities in the three Mano River Union countries (Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia). By mid-May according to United Nations figures, there were 2.3 million internally displaced people in Guinea along with 110,000 Sierra Leonean refugees and 81,000 Liberian refugees. In Sierra Leone, there were 400,000 internally displaced people and 6,000 Liberian refugees, and in Liberia there were 60,000 internally displaced people. There were also 120,000 Liberian refugees in Côte d'Ivoire and 2,000 Sierra Leonean refugees.

94. Six months on, there are significant signs of improvement in the region. Welcome regional diplomatic efforts are under way to further improve bilateral relations between the three members of the Mano River Union, although there is still active conflict in Lofa County in Liberia and there is the risk of Sierra Leone gravitating back into the conflict if RUF does not want to release its hold on some of the best diamond-producing areas.

Sierra Leone

95. At the time the Panel first visited Sierra Leone in April 2001, fighting was under way in the Kambia area and the regionalization of the conflict was very visible. Guinea was engaged in military operations against RUF, with the tacit agreement of the Government of Sierra Leone. Persistent force was used by Guinea in action aimed at punishing RUF for its raids into Guinea from September 2000. Guinean troops entered deep in Sierra Leone in Northern Kambia District and created a "sanitized zone" on the north bank of the Great Scaries River to prevent further RUF activity.

96. The Government-sponsored militia Civil Defence Force also attacked RUF positions in the east of Sierra Leone during that month but eventually a ceasefire was restored. Guinea also stopped its raids against RUF in Kambia by May although there was Guinean shelling and helicopter raids against several RUF targets in July.

97. On 2 May, the major parties to the conflict reaffirmed their commitment to the peace process in Abuja. There followed talks in Freetown and on 18 May 2001, both sides entered the DDR programme in large-scale numbers. Since early July the security situation in Sierra Leone has remained stable, closely monitored by UNAMSIL.

98. In early September 2001, Sierra Leonean President Ahmed Kabbah and RUF leader Issa Sessay met in Koidu and shook hands, declaring the war over. The peace process, however, remains fragile in the run-up to multiparty elections in 2002 but outright hostilities appear to have ceased for the time being.

Liberia

99. Following Security Council resolution 1343 (2001) and the entry into force of sanctions on Liberia on 7 May 2001, President Taylor and his government increasingly signalled a desire to restore avenues of dialogue with their neighbours in the Mano River Union. The war in Lofa County continued to be a primary concern for the government and humanitarian agencies.

100. The first incident of armed conflict was in Voinjama on 21 April 1999. Rebels with semi-automatic rifles, a few mortars and shotguns attacked the town. They were a rag-tag group, some uniformed and some smoking marijuana. While looting the town, they claimed they were tired of the Sierra Leone war and wanted to overthrow the government of Charles Taylor. After the brief rebel attack the Liberian security forces entered Voinjama and also looted.

101. There was a further wave of insurgent attacks in Lofa County between July and October 2000, succeeding in widening their front to attacking the Douley region of Nimba County by late November 2000. The Liberian Government blamed Guinea and filed a formal diplomatic complaint to the then Organization of African Unity, ECOWAS, and the Guinean Government.

102. In mid-January 2001, the Government deployed more troops along the north-eastern border with Guinea. This move followed shortly after the defence heads of Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal met in Abuja, Nigeria to discuss the deployment of a force of 1,700 troops along Liberia's borders with Guinea and Sierra Leone. But the deployment of the ECOWAS force at the border confluence of Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia in the Mano River region did not occur for two reasons: firstly, ECOWAS waited for a strong mandate from the United Nations for its contingents and, secondly, Status-of-Forces Agreements with Guinea and Liberia were never agreed upon.

103. Liberia's relations with Guinea deteriorated further in 2001, with the Government accusing the Guinean military of shelling the town of Foya in January and claiming two of its diplomats had been arrested and tortured in Conakry in September 2000. In February 2001, the rebels crossed again from Guinea and attacked villages in Lofa. The Government claimed that the villages of Boiwamei, Masizu and Turaszued, were razed to the ground during two days of fighting.

104. In April 2001, the Liberian Minister of Defence, Daniel Chea announced heavy fighting between government forces and rebels in upper Lofa county near the border with Guinea. The brunt of the fighting was near the towns of Foya and Kolahun. However, he denied claims by the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), that they had seized control of large parts of Lofa County and the Government began mobilizing and retraining former fighters of the now defunct NPFL. By late April fighting had spread south into Salayea district, 80 km north of Gbarnga in Bong County. The battle for control of Zorzor in Lofa County was reported to be intense.

105. Liberia closed its borders with Sierra Leone and Guinea in mid-March and gave the ambassadors of Sierra Leone and Guinea three days to leave the country. The ambassadors were expelled for activities incompatible with their status and their embassies were informed that they needed to vacate their current premises. This Liberian action was at a time of increased regional tension because of the intense fighting in Lofa County and because one of the two diplomats had been well located to witness some sanctions-busting in progress.

106. In late July, continued fighting in Lofa forced a new wave of refugees to flee across the border to Côte d'Ivoire. The Lofa rebellion, part of a subregional dispute, had resulted in Liberia to accuse Guinea and Sierra Leone of harbouring dissidents. With an intensification of the conflict in April 2001, over 4,000 refugees fled to Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone in May and June. The United Nations reported that in a year the conflict has created more than 40,000 refugees.

107. By August, fighting continued between rebels and government troops, especially around the towns of Kolahun and Voinjama. Not all the fighting was by rebels. There were also incidents where different Liberian government armed groups fought each other for loot and control of resources. On 29 August 2001, the Liberian rebels attacked a lumber camp at Gbopolu in the west, showing that they could make attacks beyond upper Lofa County.

108. Between March and October 2001, independent observers were not allowed by the Liberian Government to visit Lofa County. This restriction was lifted in October, and the Panel visited Lofa in the first week of October. The situation there was visibly tense. In the area around Zorzor, the town that was completely destroyed during an incursion by rebels from Guinea, the Panel observed many soldiers and armed young boys carrying new weapons and driving around in newly acquired Isuzu pick-up trucks. The pattern of destruction of the houses showed that the rebels from Guinea resort to hit-and-run tactics and do not occupy the territory.

Guinea

109. From September 2000, there were rebel incursions into Guinea supported by RUF. Guéckédou (a town with around 30,000 inhabitants) was badly damaged in late January when it was seized by rebels, who Guinean sources claimed belonged to Ulimo-K and RUF. The town was recaptured by the Guinean army in February. Ulimo-K had been a Guinean ally in its campaign against RUF but there had been some sort of dispute about recent Ulimo-K recruits in the Guinean military. There was more fighting along the border and a six-hour artillery battle in mid-March south of Guéckédou with rebels who had originated from Liberia.

110. The reduction in hostilities between RUF and the Sierra Leone Government by May 2001 has resulted in RUF abandoning its support for Guinean rebels, who were seeking to overthrow President Conté and his government. Following the major onslaught by the Guinean military in May, these rebels have realized they cannot fight alone and have become dormant.

Armed non-state actors in the Mano River Union

111. There has been a proliferation of the use of non-state actors in these conflicts in the Mano River Union. These groups obtain weapons from State supporters, from their trade in diamonds, alluvial gold, cocoa and coffee, or from their military action. Their actions have had and can again destabilize the region. The junction of the borders of Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone has been the fault zone where these groups have thrived. This Kailahun Salient is a very volatile area with notoriously difficult terrain, a highly permeable border and belligerents in close proximity to each other; it is an area that lends itself to the attacker - not the defender.

RUF and Liberia

112. RUF's relationship with Liberia was described in detail in the Panel of Experts report on Sierra Leone. In 2001 this relationship has continued, although a split is reported among RUF units that are willing to disarm in Sierra Leone and others that continue to fight in the war that has shifted to the Liberian and Guinean borders. Throughout this year RUF units have been fighting with Liberian units in Lofa County. In March, a RUF unit fought at Voinjama.

113. On 1 April 2001, General Sessay arrived in a camp at Vahun for discussions with Liberian commanders about additional RUF military assistance. The Liberian commanders came in a helicopter and Sessay arrived by vehicle and accompanied by General Dennis Mingo (alias Superman). Following the meeting, there was a public address to RUF fighters which was not well received; they grumbled about having to fight in a foreign war.

114. In mid-April, the Liberian Government refused to allow RUF to travel through Liberia to attend an ECOWAS meeting in Bamako, Mali. Liberia claimed it had severed its links with RUF. However, on 18 April the United Nations Security Council published a list of RUF members residing in Liberia and asking the Government to expel them.

115. The RUF-Liberian relationship is important for President Taylor, but it is also strategic for RUF. The Kailahun region in Sierra Leone constitutes RUF's strategic lifeline into Liberia without which its source of resupply is seriously affected. Liberia offers sanctuary and a location to store weapons and keep armed units active and trained. An area of particular concern is the concession of the Liberian logging company SLC, along the border with Sierra Leone. The area comprises a road into Sierra Leone and an old military base of the Liberian Armed Forces, Camp Alfa. It is, since early 2001, controlled by the son of President Taylor and the Lebanese businessman Abbas Fawaz. Several sources indicated to the Panel that this is an area where weapons for RUF are stockpiled and where RUF can freely enter Liberian territory.

116. In June, President Taylor met with RUF representatives in Folima and offered them additional funding for their further assistance in the Lofa war. According to several RUF officials a number of them said they were tired of combat and were worried that the conflict might spill over into Sierra Leone and undermine the peace process. They also complained that the Guineans were providing better support to the Liberian dissidents than what they received from Taylor. This was followed by a second meeting of Guinean dissidents and RUF at the Executive Mansion in Monrovia. Taylor once more offered funds in return for their services to fight the Liberian dissidents in Lofa.

117. The Panel has interviewed many RUF members about their Liberian connections. Since August, RUF has moved weapons to Liberia via Kailahun, then caching them in the "Kuya area". Before disarmament in Kono district, RUF used to maintain its main ammunition dump in Kono. They have since also moved many of these arms and ammunition to Vahun in Liberia.

118. Eyewitnesses told the Panel of RUF combatants in Kono District and Kabala loading their infantry support weapons to Kailahun to avoid surrendering them for the DDR. The Panel has inspected the weapons handed in for destruction by RUF in Kono. They have been submitting .50 mm (12.7 mm) mortar and artillery bombs for the DDR process but not the guns to fire/launch them.

119. RUF units have on several occasions confronted Liberian government troops that have entered into Sierra Leone. Following fighting in July in Vahun between the Liberian army and dissidents, some AFL soldiers fled into Sierra Leone. RUF detained 17 private AFL soldiers overnight at Senga and then escorted them back to the border the next day.

120. In April, RUF had asked a group of AFL to disarm after they fled into Liberia following an earlier dissident attack on Vahun but the Liberians had refused on that occasion to leave their weapons because they out numbered the RUF unit.

121. The recent killing of General Dennis Mingo (alias Superman) was in all probability because of an internal squabble about the distribution of money from Charles Taylor for RUF's assistance in clearing Lofa County of dissidents. Mingo was murdered just across the Sierra Leonean border in Liberia close to the United Logging Company compound on the road from Vahun to Monrovia. Superman had been on his way to attend a meeting at the Executive Mansion in Monrovia.

122. The RUF structure in Liberia is difficult to determine. The RUF have probably around 600 men, consisting of four companies and a support element in Liberia right now. They are being primarily used as a counter-insurgency force in the bush against the dissident activity in Lofa County. Their main base is Camp Najma, a camp where Liberian RUF are trained. The Commander at the camp is Liberian Special Security Service Kissi Captain Tamaba Malin. Recruitment is mainly from refugee camps where men are offered US$ 300 as an incentive to join.

123. Liberian liaison officers continue to be stationed in Sierra Leone with RUF. Names the Panel heard were Colonel Shenkoleh, Colonel Lion, Colonel Monica, Colonel Base Mingo. The Panel also noted that in Yengema in Sierra Leone a number of Liberian RUF members had successfully entered the DDR process.

Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)

124. A group of rebels attacked Liberia from Guinea in April 1999. It was difficult to initially establish who these dissidents were, but a number of former members of the ethnic Mandingo wing of ULIMO (called Ulimo-K after its civil war leader Alhaji GV Kromah) seemed to be among them.

125. More attacks occurred in late 1999 and since the beginning of the latest round of incursions in July 2000, attacks on Liberian territory have been claimed by a group called the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). The LURD is composed of former fighters from the civil war of 1989 to 1996, many of whom became refugees in Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire after the end of the war.

126. LURD claims to have been formed in 2000 and not to be associated with any former warlord. Its supporters told the Panel that it is a resistance force dedicated to building democracy in Liberia through a political and military campaign.

127. The reality is more complex. LURD has enjoyed its main support from Guinea where it has a foothold in towns like Kissidougou, Macenta and Nzérékoré. Like the Sierra Leone Donzos were used against RUF, LURD was encouraged by Guinea to keep Charles Taylor tied up militarily in Lofa County. Guinea has supported LURD with cross-border artillery fire from time to time in 2001 and Guinean liaison officers have crossed into Lofa County to assess LURD's progress. Guinea has only given limited ammunition and weapons support to the Liberian rebels. One LURD official complained to the Panel that he had had to trade coffee, cocoa and diamonds to a Guinean commander to supply his men with shotgun cartridges (Guinea produces these in Conakry). Other weapons have been captured in hit-and-run operations in Lofa.

128. The leadership of LURD is opaque. Conakry-based Sekou Kone is a Provisional Chairman of the Executive Committee - his prime role is to liaise with President Conte of Guinea. Self-styled Gen. Joe Wylie is a key military adviser, also based in Conakry. In September there were some changes; Prince Seo was appointed the new Chief of Staff. Seo was a Krahn fighter who fought with Roosevelt Johnson, one of the former warlords in Liberia. He recently joined LURD with some 100 Ulimo-K fighters loyal to him. Seo replaced Charles Dent, a former Ulimo-K chief-of-staff in August. This reshuffle has caused discontent among LURD fighters.

129. There also is a strong rift between the Krahn and Mandingo elements of LURD. The military wing wants Guinea to stop dealing with Sekou Kone, who is a Liberian Mandingo. There appear to be three ULIMO units, a group of some 230 fighters stationed in the forest region along the Guinea/Liberia border. A second group of several thousand in Sierra Leone (many may be Kamajors) and a third group of ex-Lofa Defence Force fighters based in the Lofa currently.

130. The rebels do seek supporters in refugee camps. In April, the Ivorian security forces arrested six suspected Liberian dissidents in Danane, who they said were trying to recruit refugees to join their operations in Guinea. The Panel also interviewed refugees who had declined such advances by dissident supporters. Indeed, a significant number of newly arrived refugees had fled Lofa County because of dissident activity. The rebels attacked villages, looted and sought to forcibly recruit their young men.

131. In October 2001, LURD appears factionalized and Guinean support declining. If the August agreement by the foreign ministers of the Mano River Union to take steps to round up armed groups waging a messy war in the junction of the borders of Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone is real, the activities of LURD may have peaked.

Guinean dissident groups

132. From September 2000 there were rebel incursions into Guinea supported by RUF. RUF ex-combatants told the Panel how some of them had been forced to board trucks at gunpoint by their leaders and escorted to Foya to fight in the offensive. Others were paid a US$ 200 retainer and given the understanding that they could freely loot. Guéckédou was badly damaged in late January when it was seized by the rebels.

133. N'Faly Kaba, has called himself the leader of Guinean rebels based in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Kaba is a former adviser to Diarra Traoré (executed by President Conté after a purported coup in 1985). Kaba claimed to head an organization called the "Union des forces pour une Guinée nouvelle" (UGFN), and that they had been behind rebel attacks against Macenta, Ourekaba, Korecariah and Guéckédou since September 2000.

134. UFGN is the third group claiming responsibility for cross-border raids into Guinea. The "Rassemblement de forces démocratiques de Guinée" in December 2000 and the "Union de forces démocratique de Guinée" have also claimed responsibility.

Mano River Union dialogue

135. Following months of hostility between Liberia and Guinea, dialogue began with telephone contact between President Taylor and his Guinean counterpart, President Lansana Conté on peace in the subregion in early June.

136. There had been a number of phone calls between President Taylor and his Sierra Leone counterpart, President Kabbah, too. The release of two Sierra Leonean captives by Liberia and six Liberians by Sierra Leone in early June also helped in the confidence-building process among the three heads of State.

137. The Sierra Leone Foreign Minister visited Monrovia in July for a day on his way to the OAU summit in Zambia. The initial contacts helped prepare the foreign ministers of Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia to hold a ground-breaking meeting in Monrovia on 14 and 15 August to discuss a summit between their presidents, aimed at ending the conflict in their border regions. At this meeting they decided to reactivate the Joint Security Committee Established by the 15th Protocol on Defence and Security in May 2000.

138. A meeting of the Joint Security Committee was held in Freetown on 22 and 23 August and on 8 to 10 September in Conakry. At the end of these meetings they agreed to "apprehend and turn over to their country of origin, individuals, armed groups and other para-military forces involved in the destabilization of member States". They also agreed to a series of other recommendations, including on the implementation and deployment of joint border security and confidence-building units along common borders.

139. Following the Joint Security Committee meeting in Conakry the Statutory Meeting of the Foreign Ministers met on 10 September. The Ministers accepted the Joint Security Committee's recommendations and proposed a further Joint Security Committee meeting to be convened in Monrovia from 25 to 28 September to work out and finalize the work plan and timetable for implementation of the recommendations.

140. The Joint Security Committee reconvened in Monrovia between 25 and 28 September to further work on implementation of the recommendations. A review meeting of the Foreign Ministers and Chairmen of the Joint Security Committees of each member State is to be convened in Freetown on 10 December 2001. A Summit of Heads of State of the Mano River Union will follow in early 2002.

Part II - Transportation and weapons

A. Background to the grounding of Liberian registered aircraft

141. The report (S/2000/1195), in its section on arms and transportation, described how irregularities of Liberian registered aircraft contributed to violations of the arms embargo. The Security Council, in resolution 1343 (2001), therefore decided to ground all Liberian-registered aircraft.

142. In the case studies that follow this is again illustrated. In most of the arms trafficking cases the Panel investigated, the planes that were used had in one way or another been subject to document fraud, forgery of flight plans and other irregularities. The Panel found evidence of fraudulent registration, not only in Liberia, but also in the Central African Republic and to a certain extent in Equatorial Guinea. Liberia, in a response to the Panel on Sierra Leone's request, had produced a registry consisting of 11 aircraft only. The Panel had knowledge of many more aircraft flying the Liberian flag and suspected that some of those had been used for violations of the arms embargo.

143. The problem turned out to be a complex one. Years of civil war and the difficult transitional process had created opportunities for aircraft owners and civil servants to exploit the registry, for instance to avoid costly safety inspections and requirements for old aircraft. This resulted in the Civil Aviation Authorities in Liberia having lost control and oversight of the planes flying on its registry. It also created a situation that enabled arms trafficking networks to camouflage their operations through fake registrations, document fraud and - as the case studies show - the setting up of a mystery airline, with the full knowledge of the Liberian authorities in order to avoid detection. The violations of the arms embargo and the problem with the registry were therefore directly linked.

Civil aviation in Liberia

144. The Liberian civil aviation authorities reacted to the publication of the report (S/2000/1195) by:

• Appointing a new Director of Civil Aviation and revoking, on 12 April 2001, the registration of 11 aircraft on the Liberian registry, which bear the prefix EL- and notifying all Directors of Civil Aviation of ICAO member States of the action;
  
  
• Informing the Directors of Civil Aviation of ICAO member States, on 13 April 2001, of this revocation and of the ban on flights by such aircraft and on the closure of the Liberian register;
  
  
• Asking the Directors of Civil Aviation, on 18 April 2001, to provide information on any Liberian aircraft grounded pursuant to the grounding order from Liberia.

145. Since the beginning of its mandate, the Panel has closely monitored the progress made in this field and has worked with the new Director of Civil Aviation in Liberia to find a way out of the disorderly situation the registry was in. Bits and pieces of documentation on the ownership of many aircraft were gradually found in Liberia and through communication with other civil aviation authorities. By the time the Panel last visited Liberia in the first week of October 2001, 117 planes had been identified on the basis of this information. These were aircraft that had been registered in Liberia since 1985 but a great number had obtained registration in the last five years (annex 12). The documentation showed that fraud had been committed under different ministers of transport. Sometimes, documents had just been forged or foreign businessmen had been given authorization to register planes in Liberia from offices abroad.

146. Identification and locating these aircraft is still ongoing and the newly appointed Director of Civil Aviation expressed his determination to the Panel to investigate the full extent of the problem of false registrations before proceeding to open a new registration list. The problem of Liberian registered aircraft is not yet fully solved because some aircraft may still be operating abroad with an EL-prefix painted on the tail, despite the revocation by Liberia. This is beyond the control of the Liberian Civil Aviation Authority and should be dealt with by the airports where these planes are seen and can be grounded.

147. The Panel considers that the measures taken so far by the Liberian Civil Aviation Authority are adequate and that the Security Council may consider lifting the grounding order imposed by resolution 1343 (2001) and allow Liberia to reopen an aircraft register. Those individual aircraft that were effectively grounded and have provided ICAO and the Security Council Committee with the documentation showing their registration in Liberia done in accordance with international regulations, should be given permission to restart their operations. The Liberian Civil Aviation Authority should however keep the Security Council Committee and ICAO informed on the follow-up of the investigation and on the registration of every new aircraft on the new Liberian register.

148. A second measure taken by Liberia was a decision to take over operation of their own airspace, which had been controlled from Conakry (Guinea), where the Flight Information Centre (FIC) of the Flight Information Region (ROBERTS FIR) is located. This airspace will be controlled exclusively by Liberian nationals.

149. In its discussions with the Panel, the Liberian Government argued that increased national security concerns were the reason for this decision. As per Article 1 of the Chicago Convention regulating international civil aviation, every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory, so Liberia has the right to manage flight movements in its own airspace.

150. At a meeting in Dakar, on 26 and 27 March 2001, under the auspices of ICAO, it was agreed that, prior to any takeover of responsibility for Liberian airspace by Monrovia, a number of measures would have to be taken. These measures would include providing a minimum of communications equipment necessary for the safety of air traffic and the signing of letters of agreement among all parties for the coordination and transfer of air traffic.

151. The Panel relied for its investigation on information from different Flight Information Regions in West Africa, to get a good picture of all non-scheduled aircraft that had landed in Liberia in 2000 and 2001. Liberia did not supply such a list. Although information on landings and departures of every aircraft is information that is kept at every airport in the world, the airport authority in Liberia had consistently claimed that such a list was only kept for a short while and then destroyed.

152. Liberia can, in agreement with its partners in the Roberts Flight Information Region and in accordance with ICAO regulations, start to manage its own airspace. The Panel wants to express its concern, however, that Liberia's plans to renationalize its airspace, as opposed to the global trend of ever more integrated and regional airspaces, and to man its control centre with Liberians only, seem to suggest a desire to keep certain flight movements and landings secret. The Panel does not think that the issue should be subject to any sanctions, but would advise the Liberian Government to reconsider its decision as a matter of goodwill.

B. Arming and disarming in the region: an overview

Liberian arms embargo

153. The United Nations Security Council imposed through resolution 788 (17 November 1992) a "general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia", citing the need to establish peace and stability. In March 2001, this embargo was replaced by a renewed and tightened weapons and military equipment embargo as part of a wider package of sanctions mandated by United Nations Security Council resolution 1343 (2001).

154. In 1999, Liberia conducted a weapons destruction programme. The exercise, which began on 25 July, involved the destruction of 19,000 small and heavy-calibre weapons and more than three million rounds of ammunition collected by the United Nations and ECOMOG during the disarmament exercise in 1996-1997. A symbolic arms-burning act took place in Monrovia but the real weapons destruction occurred at an abandoned iron ore mine northwest of the capital. About 40 per cent of these weapons were rusted or unusable but others were in good working order. The weapons and ammunition were of both small and large calibre, including 900 hand and smoke grenades (from China, Britain and the former Czechoslovakia), two 120 mm rockets, rocket launchers, thousands of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), recoilless weapons, and machine guns, old M-1 rifles, AK-47 assault rifles, PBK light machine guns and around 12 million rounds of small-calibre and 12,000 rounds of large-calibre ammunition.

155. Despite the Government's public effort to demonstrate its commitment to disarmament, it was consistently procuring new supplies of weapons for itself and assisting RUF to procure weapons via Liberia.

156. Following the first dissident incursions in April and August 1999 in Lofa County, the Government launched a campaign to get the arms embargo lifted, claiming that in the face of external attacks the country was unable to defend its citizens. The then Deputy Information Minister claimed that the rebels could only be crushed if the embargo was lifted, but added that Liberia "could easily bypass the ban, but we don't want to do that".

157. Public commitments to comply with the embargo notwithstanding, a steady flow of new weapons continued to enter into the country. The Panel documents in this report how the Singapore-based mother company of the Oriental Timber Company arranged a US$ 500,000 payment for an arms shipment in August 1999; how the Bureau of Maritime Affairs assisted violations of the arms embargo in 1999 and 2000 and how Leonid Minin provided weapons in July 2000. In 2001 Liberia continues to try and violate the embargo.

158. Yet Liberia, in a letter dated 23 February 2001 from President Taylor to the United Nations Secretary-General, claimed that "As you are aware, Liberia destroyed all her arms and ammunition several years ago and currently remains disarmed. Accordingly, it would seem only fair, in the light of threats from Guinea, that this country be allowed to secure equipment for its legitimate defence needs". A second letter by Liberia in May asked the United Nations Security Council to temporarily lift the arms embargo so it could "import essential military supplies for the sole purpose of its self-defence".

159. Despite nine years of an embargo on arms and military equipment to Liberia, a steady supply of weapons have reached the country. Indeed, the Liberian authorities in their conversations with the Panel appeared not bothered about the embargo, and never complained about it. In contrast, they regularly complained about the United Nations travel ban on key individuals associated with the Government.

Security situation in neighbouring countries

Sierra Leone

160. The Government in Sierra Leone have had Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters since 1996 and the procurement of these or of spare parts and engines for these helicopters was always compromised by the involvement of controversial brokers and shadowy procedures. The Republic of Kazakhstan provided the Panel details of its export of two helicopters to Russia. The export licence was given against an end-user certificate for the helicopters, for their end-use in Russia. The helicopters were later detained by Russian customs, on their way to Freetown in Sierra Leone, without a valid export licence. The transaction was organized by Boris Fedoulov, a Russian national who is the owner of the commercial helicopter company Paramount Airlines in Freetown. The Panel interviewed Fedoulov in Moscow, where he confirmed the seizure of the helicopters. Fedoulov showed the Panel documentation on the case and explained that the helicopters had meanwhile been exported for use in Sierra Leone. In Kazakhstan, however, the authorities told the Panel that they believe that a crime has been committed under the Criminal Code of Kazakhstan by the procurer of the helicopters, Boris Fedoulov. In his testimony, Yaïr Klein, who was arrested in Sierra Leone in January 1999 on suspicion of supplying and training the rebels of RUF, admitted the forgery of certain documents in his deal of supplying helicopter engines to the Government of Sierra Leone. The Sierra Leone Government is currently also involved in court disputes with several other suppliers of helicopters and helicopter spare parts. In some cases these had been supplied during the rule of Valentine Strasser. The Panel does not suggest that these arms transactions were violations of the arms embargoes, but wishes to draw international attention to the lack of transparency and inadequate control systems in the procurement procedures for sophisticated weaponry and related materiel to Sierra Leone.

Disarmament in Sierra Leone

161. With the signing of the Abuja agreement on 2 May 2001 and the signing of a new agreement on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) between the warring parties in May 2001, cautious optimism is warranted. At the time of writing of this report, around 21,000 ex-combatants had been disarmed (the break-up being RUF - 7,000; CDF - 13,200 and AFRC - 260). It is still unclear what the total number of combatants in Sierra Leone was before the disarmament and demobilization process started. A majority of RUF and CDF are yet to join the DDR programme.

162. The ex-combatants have so far handed in around 8,200 weapons, 500 of which were group weapons such as mortars and heavy machine guns. The rest are various types of assault rifles, submachine guns and machine guns for individual use. The Panel was able to inspect many of the weapons in several of the DDR-weapons stores. Detailed lists are kept with the serial numbers and year of production of the weapons and the date and location where they were handed over. This data is not sufficient to trace the suppliers of the weapons. A breakdown of the types of weapons handed in shows that approximately 60 per cent of the individual assault rifles are AK-47 and AK-58 Kalashnikov types, 10 per cent are FN-FALs and around 6 per cent are G3s. All these commonly used rifles are produced under licence in many different countries. They are some of the most widely used weapons in the history of conflict.

163. Hardly any of the weapons bear sequenced serial numbers that would suggest its origin from a specific producer or from a particular stockpile. Most of the weapons handed in under DDR are of very poor quality. The harsh weather conditions in West Africa, especially the high humidity and the jungle terrain, the type of warfare the different factions have been engaged in and the complete lack of discipline of the rebels, affect the condition of the weapons adversely. The Panel gave some old listing of weapons handed in to several United Nations Member States to check on possible matches in their database systems. No results have come out of this so far.

164. It is hard to estimate the number of combatants remaining in Sierra Leone. It would be even harder to estimate the number of weapons that are still in the hands of the different warring factions. The poor quality of the weapons handed in and observations in the field suggest that most of the ex-combatants have turned in weapons that were no longer of use to them and that the bulk of functional weaponry has been stockpiled elsewhere. Further success of the peace process in Sierra Leone and specifically the success of the disarmament programme will have a bearing on the availability of weapons in the hands of private groups and individuals in Sierra Leone and the wider subregion, a situation that may undermine the security situation in the countries concerned over a longer period of time.

165. At a subregional level, the ongoing war in Lofa County in Liberia, which is bordering Guinea and Sierra Leone, certainly has negative side-effects on the disarmament situation in Sierra Leone. The demand for weapons and ammunition in Lofa creates a market, both for the individual combatants who can bring their personal weapons and ammunition to the border and sell it and for RUF as a rebel movement. The hardcore RUF-fighters may, in coordination with their former sponsor President Taylor, stockpile weapons on Liberian territory or just hand over their weapons to the Liberian side before they can be disarmed in Sierra Leone. The Panel examined a sizeable number of RUF cadres who joined DDR. According to most of them, the better condition and heavy calibre weapons have been sent to Liberia and not handed in to DDR.

Guinea

166. A good mechanism is in place to deprive non-governmental forces in Sierra Leone of getting arms and ammunition and for monitoring the arms procurement by the Government of Sierra Leone under resolution 1171 of the United Nations Security Council. No such restrictions, however, exist for Guinea. The country is known to have purchased a significant amount of arms and ammunition in the past few years in order to cope with the incursions along its borders with Sierra Leone and Liberia. Such weapons have been supplied from Eastern Europe and from Western countries alike.

167. The Panel witnessed during its visits to the war zone on the Guinean side of the border with Liberia, the presence of great numbers of non-state armed groups in different towns and villages in the provinces bordering Liberia. Those armed men are called "volunteers" by the local administrators but it is clear that towns like Macenta, Guéckédou and Nzérékoré are harbouring hundreds of fighters of the LURD. Guinea has also acquired new heavy artillery transport and combat helicopters. The Panel members during their visit to the border towns saw that two new Mi-24s were based in that region. Guinea also has a small number of fighter aircraft. Two of those were recently displayed in the airspace above the capital.

168. The Guinean authorities told the Panel that many forged Guinean end-user certificates were circulating in Eastern Europe. During the course of its investigation, the Panel obtained several copies of orders and end-user certificates for small arms, missiles, helicopters and cargo aircraft, apparently all with the Guinean armed forces as the end-user. The Panel during its visit to Guinea in August 2001, showed these copies to the acting Chief of Staff of the Guinean armed forces and the officer in charge of procurement; they identified six different end-user certificates for Guinea as forgeries. All these had been used by a network of brokers to obtain weapons for export to Liberia as shown in the case studies covered in this report.

Côte d'Ivoire

169. Côte d'Ivoire is also affected by a volatile internal situation between the contenders of the last elections and the current government. The presence of General Gueï, who was leading a military junta in the country until the elections, has also created unease over the loyalties of some units of the armed forces. This element, and the fact that countries such as Guinea and Sierra Leone have acquired helicopter gunships, has incited the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to engage in negotiations about the procurement of helicopter gunships.

170. During discussion with the authorities in Côte d'Ivoire, the Panel learned that the Defence Ministry had been approached by a broker representing the company Pecos who was involved in some of the violations of the embargo on Liberia. This report describes the fraudulent activities of this company, Pecos Compagnie SA, in the case study on End-User Certificates. The Panel has also described how weapons that were imported legally in Côte d'Ivoire ended up in Liberia in July 2000. The transaction was financed and set up by Leonid Minin. After his arrest in Italy, copies of the End-User Certificate for these weapons, signed by General Gueï, were found in Minin's possession. Minin also had several forged copies of the End-User Certificate for Côte d'Ivoire.

171. As shown in the case study on helicopters, Liberia has tried to match the build-up of weapons systems, despite the arms embargo. The most recent cases in Liberia's persistent hunt for combat helicopters on the international black market are dated February and March of 2001. Thanks to the intervention of the arms export controlling authorities in Moldova and the Slovak Republic, the helicopters were intercepted before departure.

172. The Panel is concerned that the procurement of weapons in the Mano River Union, especially in view of the embargo against Liberia, should be better regulated. The easy availability of small arms and ammunition to volatile areas like the Mano River Union countries is a regional and internal security threat to the three Union members. The use of unscrupulous arms dealers, even for the legal importation of arms by the non-embargoed neighbouring countries of Liberia itself encourages and provides opportunities for violations of the Liberia embargo.

173. In the case studies that follow, the Panel has painstakingly gone into details, followed various paper trails and put together pieces of the jigsaw puzzle to complete a picture of how Liberia has managed to get a regular supply of arms and ammunition despite an embargo on it since 1992.

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