Cross-Border Militancy Threatens Great Lakes - 4 Sept 2007

EVENT: The Rwandan foreign minister visited Kinshasa on September 2 for talks on cross-border militancy.

SIGNIFICANCE: Following transitional elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), regional governments have turned their attention to the last remaining major security challenge in the Great Lakes: those militias which, based mainly in the eastern DRC, continue to launch raids into neighbouring countries. Such groups represent a significant -- perhaps even growing -- problem along a significant part of DRC's eastern border.

ANALYSIS: In April, military commanders from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Uganda met in Bujumbura to adopt a joint military plan aimed at stemming cross-border militancy throughout the Great Lakes region. The plan was the outcome of a series of initiatives -- most of them carried out under the auspices of the US-sponsored Tripartite Plus Joint Commission (TPJC) -- aimed at improving regional cooperation on security issues, which has long been regarded as vital for achieving lasting peace in Burundi, the DRC and elsewhere.

The adoption of the plan was of huge symbolic importance, given the recent history of political violence in the region. However, it has so far achieved little in practical terms, either by stemming the activities of those insurgent groups capable of mounting cross-border incursions, or by checking the potential for such groups to inflame regional tensions.

Militant threat. Events since April have demonstrated the continued challenges posed by these groups:

- Northern Uganda. In May, elements within the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), launched a series of cross-border attacks into northern Uganda, including one in which seven civilians were killed. Kampala strongly criticised the government of Southern Sudan, which had agreed -- as part of its sponsorship of the August 2006 truce agreement between the Ugandan Army (UPDF) and the LRA -- to guarantee that LRA attacks would no longer be launched from its territory.

- Burundi. Since July, insurgents connected with the rebel National Forces of Liberation (FNL) have been held responsible for a series of violent attacks, including one incident in which a grenade was thrown into a crowd of people. The government of Burundi believes that some of these attacks were launched from outside its territory, and at a recent meeting of the TPJC asked for greater regional cooperation in countering the FNL threat.

- DRC/Uganda. Throughout August, Rwandan rebels and rogue elements from the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) launched a number of attacks from the DRC into Uganda. The upsurge in the number of these incidents resulted in the recent decision by the UPDF to increase deployments in border areas. It has also contributed to heightened tensions between Kampala and Kinshasa, whose relationship has already been strained in recent months by arguments concerning oil drilling rights on Lake Albert.

The significance of these attacks lies not only in the fact that they demonstrate the capacity -- and desire -- of a range of groups to engage in cross-border incursions but that such groups will turn increasingly to these tactics during times of hardship:

- The raids come at a time when all of these groups have become severely weakened -- in terms both of personnel and equipment -- compared with the past.

- Thus, they may be seen as a means of 'maximising disruption' -- with limited resources, and barely a handful of fighters -- on the part of by insurgent groups who are otherwise on the wane.

FDLR challenge. In contrast, the rebel Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) poses a serious military challenge. With its 6,000 or so well-armed fighters, the FDLR continues to threaten the security of the eastern DRC -- where it is based -- but also that of neighbouring states, notably Rwanda, Uganda and, to a lesser extent, Burundi. The original FDLR cadres were drawn from Hutu extremists ('Interahamwe') who had been involved in the 1994 Rwanda genocide, and from elements of the former Rwandan Armed Forces.

In the past, the FDLR has launched large scale, well-organised attacks into both Rwanda and Uganda. It seeks the overthrow of the sitting government in Kigali and as such, the group continues to be regarded as a serious threat by the DRC's eastern neighbours. The continued destabilising presence of the FDLR in North Kivu provided much of the impetus for the signing of the joint military plan in the first place, and much of the subsequent rhetoric surrounding the plan has focused on the FDLR threat.

Military operations. In May, under pressure from its regional partners -- in particular Rwanda -- the FARDC began military operations against the FDLR, and initially scored some successes. However, the operation was halted in early August under criticism, most vociferously from Kigali. Disapproval also came from the UN peace-keeping mission (MONUC), which protested about the displacement of civilians and other human rights abuses caused by the operation.

The Rwandan government resented the involvement in the operation of the renegade Congolese General Laurent Nkunda, whose men were briefly incorporated into the FARDC ahead of the action. Although Kigali had facilitated Nkunda's rapprochement with the FARDC, the general's relationship with Rwanda has varied considerably since the mid-1990s, and the effectiveness with which his troops combated the FDLR raised concerns that he could threaten Rwandan interests. Nkunda's forces have since clashed with FARDC troops.

The decision to call off the offensive only heightened tensions between Kinshasa and Kigali, with several senior Rwandan officials publicly questioning the capacity, and the desire, of the FARDC to deal with the FDLR at all. In response, in late August, the DRC's chief of general staff announced to the TPJC that the army would begin a new offensive against the FDLR in September, which would not end until the group had been entirely eradicated.

FDLR fragmentation. However, the FDLR may itself be fragmenting. As such, the nature of the threat it poses may be changing. Following the previous offensive by the FARDC, some units became separated from the main body of the FDLR, and began engaging in violent activities of their own:

- Lacking coherence or purpose, the activities of these groups -- almost all of which have targeted civilians -- are little more than banditry.

- In recent months, the ranks of these breakaway groups -- some of whom have called themselves 'The Rasta' -- have been swelled by criminals from both sides of the border.

Yet the danger is that such groups again seem more likely to carry out cross-border raids, knowing that troops in Uganda, for example, are not allowed to pursue them back into the DRC (under the terms of the DRC peace deal). A number of cross-border incursions have so far been credited to the Rasta, and it is likely that more will follow. Thus, military victories against the FDLR might only lead to an increase in cross-border militancy, just as former gains against the LRA, FNL and Interahamwe seem to have had the same effect.

CONCLUSION: Cross-border militancy, historically a major threat to security and stability in the Great Lakes region, continues to be so. Although its scale has been reduced it still has the potential to inflame regional tensions. The signing of the joint military plan is a positive step, but regional governments will need to acknowledge the changing nature of cross-border insurgency, if they are to address the problem effectively.