Attachments
by Marcus Cox
Executive summary
This paper examines the record of the international community in constructing a State of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It finds that, among the many goals of the peace mission, creating a self-sustaining constitutional order has not always been the highest priority. Only recently has the international community begun to focus explicitly on creating the domestic institutions necessary for Bosnia to become a sustainable entity.
The paper identifies three principal obstacles to the state-building mission. First, the Dayton Agreement created a highly dispersed constitutional structure, with weak central authority. Second, wartime conditions in Bosnia gave rise to local power structures with a vested interest in preserving the weak state. Third, weak governance capacity in the Bosnian state is itself a threat to the peace process, fostering conditions of economic and social insecurity.
Examining the record of the mission to date, the paper finds that here have been three phases to the international mission in Bosnia. The first focused on military stabilisation and reconstruction, and was characterised by the willingness of the international community to work directly with local power structures, often at the expense of the constitutional order. The second phase saw a dramatic evolution in the powers of the High Representative, allowing some important breakthroughs. However, the quasi-protectorate has tended to inhibit the development of domestic political processes, particularly where the international community has tried to influence electoral outcomes. The third phase, which is just getting underway, consists of a more systematic approach to state building.
The paper recommends a number of steps which will assist in the transition from an international protectorate to a sustainable Bosnian state.
i) The international community should limit its role in the electoral process to strengthening and enforcing the rules, rather than attempting to control the outcomes. Overtly partisan action by the international community weakens its legitimacy, and undermines the constitutional order.
ii) The High Representative should explicitly limit the use of his authority to subject matters which are essential to the peace process. This will create more political space for domestic institutions to take on governance responsibilities.
iii) The international community should articulate a constitutional vision for the development of the Bosnian state. There should be a process of evolution, which focuses on building key economic functions at state level, rather than a re-negotiation of the Dayton Agreement.
iv) All international dealings with Bosnia should be consistent with this constitutional vision, including directing international aid through the state to strengthen its authority.
v) The international community should begin to articulate a vision of 'three peoples in Bosnia', reassuring the Croat and Serb public that the development of the Bosnian state does not represent a threat.
vi) The international community should give careful attention to improving its institution-building techniques, developing mechanisms which will allow it to mobilise political pressure, economic conditionality, donor support and technical expertise in a strategic fashion.
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