Attachments
Bolivia: President Arce survives a failed coup attempt amid economic downturn
On 26 June, a group of soldiers led by General Juan José Zúñiga broke into the government palace in La Paz. This action came after President Luis Arce dismissed Zuñiga from his position as chief of the army for his public declarations rejecting former President Evo Morales’ intention to seek a new presidential term in the upcoming 2025 elections.1 Arce denounced Zúñiga’s action as an attempted coup and called for public mobilization “to defend democracy.”2 Demonstrators tried to enter the square in front of the presidential palace but were repelled by the military police.3 However, the rebellion lasted only a few hours, as Arce appointed as commander-in-chief José Wilson Sánchez Velázquez, who ordered the troops to withdraw. Zúñiga, who was arrested along with 16 other people, accused Arce of orchestrating the incident to boost his popularity.4
This incident occurred amid a severe economic downturn that has sparked demonstrations nationwide. In June, various sectors mobilized across the country to protest inconsistent fuel prices, higher cost of living, and a weak currency. At the beginning of the month, international cargo drivers carried out road blockades and demonstrations in at least 18 municipalities in seven departments and called for a 48-hour strike,5 demanding a greater flow of fuel and US dollars into Bolivia.6 Such mobilizations have also caused political pushback. On 18 June, several civil society sectors held demonstrations in La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz in support of Arce and against his political opposition, including supporters of Morales, for causing what they called a speculation crisis in their support of economically disruptive labor mobilizations.7 More demonstrations in support of Arce took place in the aftermath of the failed coup, condemning the military action and demanding legal action against Zúñiga.
Colombia: Violence by FARC-EMC dissident groups increases in Valle del Cauca
Significant developments over the past month highlight the deteriorating situation and the stalled peace negotiations with the Central General Staff (EMC), a federation of dissident fronts of the now-defunct Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). On 16 June, armed men on motorcycles shot at Vice President Francia Márquez’s father, Sigifredo Márquez, and her nephew while they were traveling by car near Jamundí, Valle del Cauca. Police believe the Jaime Martínez Front, a subgroup of the EMC, is responsible for the attack.8
The Colombian government temporarily suspended a ceasefire with the EMC in Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño in March 2024, after the group murdered an Indigenous leader. The ceasefire agreement was established in January and initially set to last until 15 July.9 With the ceasefire suspended, violent interactions between the EMC-affiliated fronts and state forces have significantly increased since March and remained at high levels during June. In a development that may further escalate violence, the Carlos Patiño Front has begun using drones in its attacks on military forces. On 12 June, a drone attack was launched against a military patrol in El Plateado in Argelia, Cauca, injuring three officers. Later, on 17 June, during an armed clash with state forces, members of the Carlos Patiño Front launched a drone strike on soldiers in a residential area of El Plateado that injured two civilians.
Haiti: Violence decreases in Ouest department ahead of Kenyan police officers’ arrival
Although gangs continued to focus their violence in Ouest department in June, violence decreased by 72% in the department compared to the month prior. According to local experts, this reduction is related to gangs’ efforts to prepare for the deployment of the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission by saving ammunition and strengthening their control in strategic areas of the capital.10 Nevertheless, in Port-au-Prince, members of the Viv Ansanm gang alliance ambushed police in Delmas commune on 9 June, killing three officers. This attack triggered a three-day demonstration by residents who rejected the gangs’ attack and barricaded roads with burning tires while police carried out anti-gang operations in the area. Meanwhile, gang members carried out deadly attacks in Delmas, killing at least 10 residents being escorted by armored police vehicles on 11 June, as well as four members of a family who were killed on 16 June after they had escaped from the neighborhoods affected by the clashes.
Meanwhile, the new transitional government led by Prime Minister Garry Conille also continued preparations for the Kenya-led mission. On 19 June, Conille announced the replacement of the head of police, appointing Rameau Normil as the new general director. Conille said the appointment, which followed calls for the dismissal of former director Frantz Elbé, aimed to improve trust between police and the population.11 On 25 June — just a few days after Kenya and Haiti signed an agreement on the status of the MSS12 — the first 200 Kenyan police officers arrived in Haiti.13 Kenyan police face criticism for their involvement in human rights abuses and the use of lethal violence against anti-tax protesters in June.14
Honduras: President Castro announces new measures to fight insecurity
On 14 June, President Castro announced 14 components of the National Security Plan known as the ‘Plan de solución contra el Crimen’ (or Plan to Solve Criminality). These measures include reforms to the penal code that will allow changes to the definition of ‘acts of terrorism’ to include drug trafficking, extortion, and other actions committed by gang members, and will permit courts to hold collective trials.15 The government also ordered the construction of a new prison for 20,000 inmates between the departments of Olancho and Gracias a Dios, as well as new anti-extortion regulations on online transfers.16
In December 2022, President Castro introduced a state of exception, which has since been imposed in over 200 of the country’s 298 municipalities. On 4 July, the authorities announced a new 45-day extension of the measure.17 This status gives security forces more power to target criminal groups18 and has contributed to the militarization of prisons. Despite the government’s claims that violence has subsided under the state of exception, surveys suggest that extortions have increased, showing how gangs have maintained their actions.19 Moreover, critics of the government’s security plan have pointed to a lack of investment in addressing impunity, as 81% of the suspects that have been arrested under the state of exception have been released for a lack of evidence.20 Despite the state of exception, ACLED records a 10% increase in political violence in the first half of 2024 compared to the second half of 2023.
Mexico: Targeted attacks against political figures continue after elections
On 2 June, Mexico elected candidates to 20,708 federal and local posts, including the country’s presidency, which was won by Claudia Sheinbaum of the ruling National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) with almost 60% of the votes.21 On voting day, ACLED records at least 56 violent incidents, including direct attacks against political figures and electoral officials and destruction of electoral material and polling stations, that resulted in 11 reported deaths. Most of the incidents were recorded in Chiapas state, where the National Electoral Institute canceled the installation of 108 of the 519 polling stations due to insecurity and ongoing land and communal conflicts.22 ACLED records more violent incidents on the 2024 voting day than any other voting day since it began its coverage of Mexico in 2018. Moreover, the number of targeted attacks against political figures and the violence recorded during the campaign period — from 1 March to 2 June — made the June 2024 elections the most violent electoral process since 2018.
Violence targeting political figures continued after the election, with at least 25 incidents recorded after 2 June, including attacks against former candidates who have contested the results and elected officials. In Michoacán, members of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) killed the mayor of Cotija, and the former mayoral candidate for Zamora municipality withdrew her request for a vote recount after armed suspects shot at her house.23 CJNC also sent threats to the mayor-elect of Cotija24 and both members of the National Action Party (PAN). Similarly, in Guerrero, armed men killed the elected mayor of Copala, whose election was being contested by the MORENA party.25 In these two states, ongoing disputes between criminal groups are one of the main drivers of targeted attacks against political figures during electoral periods as criminal groups seek to secure control over officials to favor their interests.
Venezuela: Prisoners launch a nationwide wave of hunger strikes
On 9 June, inmates from prisons in Miranda, Falcón, and Carabobo states began a hunger strike, demanding humane treatment and to be transferred to facilities where they were previously held, or to ones nearer to their relatives.26 They were joined by inmates from around 20 of the country’s 30 prisons and across 17 states who protested prison conditions and delays in the judicial process. The government responded by replacing the minister for penitentiary services on 11 June,27 but tensions remained as inmates demanded additional quality-of-life reforms. According to the human rights organization Venezuelan Prisons Observatory, hunger, poor hygiene, and overcrowding are problems in several prisons.28 The inmates gradually ended their hunger strike between 13 and 14 June after reaching an agreement with the Ministry for Penitentiary Services.29 Technical teams were set up in some prisons to review the inmates’ cases and the conditions in the prison.