Attachments
CRISIS IMPACT OVERVIEW
• In January 2025, violence in northern Benin continued to escalate, with recent attacks by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in the border area between Benin, Burkina Faso, and Niger underscoring persistent insecurity. Violence in Alibori and Atacora continues to displace families, with many moving to urban centres, such as Malanville (Alibori), near the border with Niger (France 24 10/01/2025; BBC 10/01/2025; ACLED 14/01/2025).
The number of violent incidents has increased dramatically in these departments, rising from 22 in 2021 to 176 in 2024. Attacks targeting civilians, particularly by non-state and unidentified armed groups, have grown significantly during this period, doubling from 52 to 131 between 2022–2024 (ACLED accessed 28/01/2025).
• Since 2021, non-state armed groups (NSAGs) – including JNIM, which is affiliated with Al Qaeda – have expanded their activities into the coastal Gulf of Guinea countries, including northern Benin, targeting both military and civilian populations. Regular armed clashes between NSAGs and the Beninese army have since persisted. Casualties from clashes and targeted attacks against civilians, kidnappings, and displacement triggered by growing insecurity have significantly heightened protection risks in northern Benin (IFRC 04/12/2024;
GRANIT 31/07/2024). As they push further southward, NSAGs view the lush forests bordering Burkina Faso as secure areas for conducting their activities. For NSAGs, coastal countries like Benin are also sources of equipment, food, and financing, particularly through the sale of stolen livestock (TV5MONDE 16/08/2022; IFRI 11/02/2022).
• Most violent incidents involving NSAGs in northern Benin are attributed to JNIM, even if some rare incidents are also attributed to Islamic State – Sahel Province and community militias (CESA 26/08/2024). The intensification of JNIM attacks since 2021, with a significant escalation from 2023–2024, also reflects their strategic objectives to expand their control and weaken state authority. According to available analysis, these attacks aim to consolidate territory, deter state intervention, and gain community support or compliance through fear (ACLED 12/12/2024; Clingendael 05/06/2024).
• The conflict has resulted in the displacement of populations. By February 2024, over 12,500 IDPs were recorded in Alibori and Atacora departments, an increase of 24% compared to June 2023. By January 2025, these two departments continued to be affected by the spillover of NSAGs from the Sahel countries. Displacement in these departments is primarily driven by insecurity and community-based conflicts (IOM 27/12/2024 and 29/01/2025).
• The Government of Benin has responded to the crisis through military operations such as Mirador and Araignée, deploying 450 personnel to secure key areas (GRANIT 31/07/2024).
That said, these efforts have been unable to prevent NSAG incursions or mitigate protection risks.
• Host communities continue to offer critical support to displaced populations, often sharing already limited resources. With the lack of IDP camps, displaced people are predominantly living with host communities. This puts additional strain on their capacity, increasing the vulnerability of both displaced and host populations (IOM 27/12/2024). Humanitarian needs continue to grow, particularly for food, shelter, health, and WASH (GRANIT 31/07/2024; ISS 28/11/2024).