Amidst an array of domestic challenges, Bangladesh’s interim government faces conflict at its Myanmar border and an ongoing refugee crisis.
By Steve Ross
Asia & Indo-Pacific
- October 25, 2024
For the last 15 years – and for all my prior visits to the country over the last six years – Bangladesh was led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Throughout her rule, Hasina’s image and that of her independence hero father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, were omnipresent, hanging prominently in government offices and plastered across billboards and monuments.
No longer.
In August, Hasina was forced to resign and flee the country amidst a popular uprising that she tried to violently suppress. When I visited Dhaka and Cox’s Bazar in September and October, her likeness and that of Mujib had been all but erased from public view, replaced by a cacophony of revolutionary protest art.
Bangladesh’s interim government, formed shortly after Hasina’s resignation and led by Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus, faces enormous expectations and a daunting array of challenges. While the interim government’s main focus is understandably Bangladesh’s domestic political and economic challenges, it must also reckon with escalating conflict between the Arakan Army (AA) and the Myanmar military and over one million Rohingya that have sought refuge in Bangladesh since fleeing atrocities perpetrated by the Myanmar military in 2016 and 2017.
Mounting Frustrations Over Rakhine Crisis
Despite the change in government in Dhaka, there is continuity in both Bangladesh’s desire for Rohingya to return to Rakhine State (a desire shared by most Rohingya) and in the frustration that so little progress has been made in achieving this goal.
In many ways, Bangladesh’s interim government inherits a vastly more complex set of challenges than its predecessor in enabling Rohingya to return home.
A tenuous ceasefire between the Myanmar military and the AA, a predominantly Buddhist Rakhine ethnic armed group, broke down in November 2023, leading to a major escalation of conflict in Rakhine. Since fighting resumed, the AA has made rapid territorial gains, claiming full control of 10 of 17 townships in Rakhine (plus Paletwa in neighboring Chin State) and partial control of several others. It now controls more territory and a larger population than any other non-state armed group in Myanmar.
To slow the AA’s advance, the Myanmar military has turned to classic divide-and-rule tactics, stoking tension between Muslim Rohingya and Rakhine and forcibly conscripting Rohingya still in Myanmar. Counterintuitively, Rohingya armed groups have supported the Myanmar military’s efforts since early this year, including by coercively recruiting at least 2,000 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to fight alongside the military and against the AA. Both the AA and the Rohingya have played into the military’s divide-and-rule tactics through inflammatory rhetoric and the spread of mis- and disinformation, now rife amidst a communication blackout that covers almost all of Rakhine. While Rohingya downplay the role of Rohingya armed groups as active combatants, the AA stands accused of a raft of abuses against Rohingya civilians, which it denies with a certainty that defies credibility. Relations between Rakhine and Rohingya are at their lowest point since at least 2012, when nearly 200 were killed and 150,000 were displaced by communal violence. And while the AA may yet offer a more viable pathway to repatriation than the Myanmar military, both Bangladesh and the Rohingya are increasingly pessimistic about prospects for returns to an AA-controlled Rakhine.
Major Humanitarian Challenges
Compounding the political situation, the humanitarian challenges in both Rakhine and in Bangladesh continue to metastasize. According to the AA’s humanitarian wing, there are now more than 600,000 newly displaced across Rakhine, a figure that does not include those displaced prior to 2020 or in regime-controlled areas. The challenges are exacerbated further by the near total blockade the military has imposed on Rakhine for two years and which remained in place through a major cyclone last May that killed hundreds in Rakhine. The on-going blockade has stoked a shortage of goods – particularly medicine, food, and fuel – as well as a spike in prices for basic commodities. Only limited amounts of aid and trade have reached communities in need in Rakhine from across the border in Bangladesh. The conflict plus the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine have pushed over 40,000 more Rohingya into Bangladesh since the beginning of the year according to a recently conducted headcount by the UN refugee agency and Bangladesh.
While in many ways more stable (and more accessible) than Rakhine, the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar are also fraught with peril. Security threats are rising, with near daily clashes between competing Rohingya armed groups, primarily the Rohingya Solidarity Organization and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army; extortion, abductions, and gender-based violence are rampant. There is limited space for Rohingya civil society, few legal work opportunities, and fewer opportunities to access formal education. Two annual cyclone seasons and a months-long monsoon bring risks of flooding and landslides. Rohingya subsist on rations of little more than US$12 per person per month and the quality and accessibility of healthcare is uneven at best. Moreover, the challenges look set to grow more acute: While donors have bankrolled the humanitarian response in Cox’s Bazar to the tune of nearly US$650 million per year since 2017, funding has dipped to $420 million so far this year and further declines are likely as the Rakhine crisis competes for attention and resources with the on-going war in Ukraine, violence in the Middle East, and other conflicts.
Looking Ahead
These significant headwinds notwithstanding, I came away from my travel to Bangladesh with a belief that the challenges are not insurmountable and that a few key steps could move the Rakhine crisis back from the brink.
First, while Bangladesh and its interim government are in the international spotlight, there is an opportunity to ensure the issue stays on the global agenda and donors should ensure that the situation is resourced commensurate to the scale of the challenge. Mohammad Yunus’ visit to New York for the UN General Assembly was a promising start in this regard, though Bangladesh could also press international actors (and Myanmar’s resistance movement) to do more to address the root causes the Rakhine crisis now, rather than waiting to do so until the broader Myanmar crisis is resolved, which could take years.
Second, greater urgency is needed to deal with the growing humanitarian crisis in Rakhine, including through cross-border support. Discussions surrounding formal channels of cross-border aid from Bangladesh into Myanmar will likely take time to bear fruit given the differing interests of the stakeholders involved. But tangible, incremental measures could help to build confidence on all sides. In parallel, informal channels of aid and trade should be expanded.
Third, Bangladesh, with international support, should make a concerted effort to address the security situation in the camps, with a particular focus on Rohingya armed groups. The vast majority of Rohingya do not support these groups, viewing them as predatory and as neither legitimate nor representative of their interests. Insecurity in the camps, driven by these groups is impacting humanitarian operations and impeding the emergence of Rohingya civil society groups that could serve as a partner to Bangladesh in the pursuit of repatriation.
Finally, Bangladesh – and other international actors – should engage directly with the AA at a political level, even if discreetly. The AA is close to controlling the entirety of the Bangladesh-Myanmar border and though there is significant mutual mistrust, Bangladesh and the AA are going to have to deal with one another for the foreseeable future, ideally in a constructive manner. To begin the process of trust-building, the AA should, both through its rhetoric and its actions, send positive signals to Bangladesh about its intentions towards the Rohingya, and Bangladesh should make clear that it will not allow Rohingya armed groups to operate in Bangladesh.
Too much is at stake to risk the crisis spiraling further out of control.