Attachments
Cambodia: Crackdown on opposition before July elections
Ahead of the general election on 23 July, the Cambodian government has cracked down on the political opposition, independent media, and civil society in the country. While this has triggered some demonstration activity, repression under Prime Minister Hun Sen has limited people’s ability to protest. This repression can be seen in Hun Sen’s recent threats of violence on Facebook against those who question his party’s vote-buying in recent local elections; the threats led the social media company to recommend the suspension of his account in June.1 In May, the main opposition party, the Candlelight Party, was disqualified from running in the upcoming elections for ostensibly failing to submit a verified copy of its original party registration document to the Ministry of Interior. However, the motivation for the disqualification has been widely seen as political. In February, the operating license of Voice of Democracy (VOD), a media outlet providing coverage of protests and human rights issues, was revoked. The media outlet sparked Hun Sen’s ire after publishing a report critical of his eldest son, Hun Manet.2 The closure of VOD led to a series of protests by those concerned with the ongoing restrictions on freedom of expression.3 Hun Sen’s crackdown has also extended to those advocating for labor rights, as seen by union leader Chhim Sithar’s conviction in May on charges of “incitement.”4 Sithar and other employees of NagaWorld, a casino in Phnom Penh, have been protesting since 2021, demanding to be reinstated and fairly compensated following mass layoffs.5 The NagaWorld protests drove a spike in demonstrations in the country in 2022, with such demonstrations accounting for over 64% of total demonstrations. Nearly half of the NagaWorld demonstrations in 2022 were met with state intervention.
Bangladesh: Elevated Kuki-Chin National Army violence
Violence in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts region has been at elevated levels since March this year, with over 10 events involving the group reported in the last four months. This violence – concentrated in Bandarban district – is driven in part by events involving the Kuki-Chin National Army (KNA), an armed group demanding the creation of an autonomous state for the Kuki-Chin people within Bangladesh. In June, two military personnel were reportedly killed by IEDs set off by the KNA in Bandarban. The Bangladesh government has cracked down on the KNA since late 2022 amid reports of links between the KNA and the Islamist militant group, Jamatul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya (JAFHS). Authorities allege that the KNA provided arms, training, and shelter to JAFHS in exchange for funding.6 The KNA has denied the allegations.7 On 23 June, police arrested the founder of JAFHS when he was in Dhaka.8 The military crackdown against the KNA has led to an influx of Kuki-Chin refugees into India.9
Myanmar: Border Guard Force defections amid increased fighting in Kayah state
Political violence increased by over 50% in Kayah state in June relative to May as fighting between the military and resistance forces intensified, augmented by the defection of formerly military-aligned fighters. Fighting was concentrated in Hpasawng and Mese townships. The military increased its use of airstrikes in the state, targeting both resistance groups and civilians alike. Significantly, two previously military-aligned Border Guard Force (BGF) battalions joined resistance forces,10 carrying out attacks and capturing a police station and three military outposts in Mese township on 13 June.11 The two battalions are part of the Karenni National People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF), which split from the Karenni National Progressive Party/Karenni Army (KNPP/KA) in 1978. It later agreed to a ceasefire with the military in 1994. The group then transformed two of its five battalions into BGF battalions under the military’s scheme in 2009.12 The KNPLF has now joined with the KNPP/KA, the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), and the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) in what has been reportedly called the 4K Alliance.13 The military carried out an airstrike on the KNPLF headquarters four days after the initial clash,14 followed by additional airstrikes on KNPLF bases. On 23 June, the joint forces captured No.13 Border Point, the last strategic hill camp of the military in the area. This reportedly led to the surrender of dozens of military soldiers.15 Towards the end of the month, the military recaptured two BGF outposts that had been seized by resistance forces in the state.16
Pakistan: TTP increases activity in Balochistan
While violence in Balochistan continued in June at lower levels than in May, instability in Balochistan has enabled non-state actors other than Baloch separatists to make inroads into the province. Notably, events involving the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Balochistan this year already exceed the seven events recorded for all of 2022. During the first six months of 2023, ACLED records nine political violence events involving the TTP in Balochistan, including the TTP targeting a police vehicle in Dera Murad Jamali town on 9 June.17 Since July 2022, four Baloch groups have joined the TTP, thus allowing it to strengthen its presence in the region.18 Notably, in addition to the wilaya (administrative region) formed in Zhob in 2022, the TTP recently reportedly formed a new wilaya in the Kalat and Makran regions.19 The Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP), a militant group that emerged in February this year, has also become active in Balochistan. During an operation in Chaman tehsil (district subdivision) on 14 June, four TJP militants were reportedly killed in a clash with police.20 While little is known about the group, there is indication they share similar goals with the TTP.21
Philippines: Two DI-Maute Group leaders killed
Two high-ranking leaders of the Dawlah Islamiyah (DI)-Maute Group, an Islamic State (IS)-inspired group in the Philippines best known for leading a siege on the city of Marawi in 2017,22 were killed in June. Faharudin Hadji Benito Satar, better known as Abu Zachariah, was killed in a military operation in Marawi on 14 June.23 Zachariah had been the emir or highest-ranked leader of IS in Southeast Asia since 202224 and was reportedly among the leaders of the 2017 Marawi siege, a five-month offensive by IS-inspired militants seeking to establish the city as the capital of an IS wilaya in Southeast Asia.25 Another senior DI-Maute Group leader handling finance and logistics was killed in a follow-up operation by state forces a few hours later. The commander of the Philippine military’s Western Mindanao Command said that the killing of the two IS-inspired leaders was a “significant breakthrough” against DI.26 The United States State Department also commented on the news, saying it was the result of the Philippines’ “persistent and years-long effort to rid the country of ISIS.”27 DI-Maute Group activity has declined significantly since the 2017 Marawi siege. Thus far in 2023, ACLED records four political violence events involving the DI-Maute Group, compared to 182 in 2017.
Vietnam: Rare violence in the Central Highlands
On 14 June, armed assailants attacked the headquarters of the People’s Committees of Ea Tieu and Ea Ktur communes in Dak Lak province, located in the Central Highlands of Vietnam.28 A total of nine people were reportedly killed, including four police officers, two commune officials, and three villagers, while two other police officers sustained serious injuries. Three civilians who had been taken hostage were eventually released unharmed. The authorities seized a significant cache of weapons, including guns, grenades, bullets, and detonators.29 In the aftermath of the incident, dozens of suspects were charged for their alleged involvement in the attack. The Central Highlands are home to the Montagnard ethnic minority, who have faced restrictions and land confiscations by the government.30 The motive behind the attack remains unclear, though police have attempted to link the assailants to the defunct separatist group United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races, saying that flags of the group were found among the attackers’ belongings. Montagnard organizations have denied any association with the violence.31