Attachments
1 Executive Summary
Hurricane Dorian was a category 5 cyclone, and considered the most destructive hurricane ever to make landfall in the Caribbean, in the history of recorded hurricanes. It directly hit the Bahamas and unleashed its full wrath on the island of Abaco, with the island of Grand Bahama also extensively impacted. The Abaco Islands were the hardest hit, suffering 87% of the damage, with approximately 75% of homes either damaged or destroyed, according to the assessment of damages and losses conducted by the Intern-American Development bank (IDB) and the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UNECLAC). The Bahamas Red Cross Society (BRCS) and IFRC moved swiftly to support the affected populations with field-tested response and recovery activities, as well as innovative approaches. It must be noted that this operation was undertaken at a very difficult time, with the unforeseen irruption of the COVID-19 pandemic a few months into the operation, imposing movement restrictions and requiring an overhaul of methods.
To assess this operation, from 1-30 July 2021 the evaluation team consulted with 9 IFRC staff, 2 staff from other Red Cross National Societies (Canada and United States), 6 BRCS staff and executives, 6 partners, 45 BRCS volunteers and 49 beneficiaries (full details are in Annexes 1 and 2). Given that the number of beneficiaries was not large, a random sampling method was applied, to obtain results that could be generalized. Information was also gleaned from a range of relevant internal and public documents (details in Section 5 of this report). The lead evaluator travelled to Bahamas from July 18 to 26, to conduct focus group discussions and several in-person interviews.
A workshop with key stakeholders from IFRC and BRCS was held via Zoom on 3 August 2021. The consultant team presented their initial findings by PowerPoint, and discussion ensued regarding concerns and questions. This workshop was recorded with the consent of all present.
The team found that overall, the recovery operation was well designed and effectively implemented, as summarized in Figure 3 below. All information and opinions gathered indicated that the operation was comprehensive, integrated, and adapted well to the unforeseen COVID-19 realities. The national and international Red Cross (RC) staff and volunteers were perceived as competent, compassionate, reliable and clear communicators. The operation’s effectiveness was apparent in the site visits undertaken by the lead evaluator to a number of small businesses, which were operating and receiving clients, and visits to the damaged homes supported by Red Cross, which were found to be largely repaired and all liveable. The vast majority of beneficiaries consulted expressed their gratitude and appreciation for timely support from the Red Cross, which had significantly enabled their families’ return to normalcy.
The approaches taken by IFRC and BRCS in this operation proved to be appropriate and well chosen. Owner-driven home repair empowered the homeowners to determine the best way to use the limited resources allocated, and they assumed the accountability for the quality of the repairs. This is turn minimized the administrative workload for IFRC. Selection criteria and vetting processes for applicants for the home repair and small business support were transparent and agreed on collaboratively with partners. Rental assistance provided a necessary bridge into recovery, alleviating the post-disaster hardship in particular for the lower income population.
When the pandemic arrived, IFRC showed its adaptability by switching to socially-distanced communications methods, and transferring savings from curtailed planned travel to increase funds allocated to beneficiaries.
At the same time, while the Dorian recovery operation was assessed as generally highly relevant, effective and efficient, there were also aspects of concern found, and areas requiring improvement. Aspects of concern included data management systems, coverage and social inclusion, and overly centralized bureaucratic processes. Also, the capacity building dimension was unfortunately undermined by frequent turnover and rotation of staff, both in IFRC and BRCS. These concerns are outlined and analyzed in the full report, with recommendations for improvement offered.