The Global IDP Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council has updated the country profile on internal displacement in Somalia. A brief summary of the update is presented below. The complete profile can be accessed at http://www.idpproject.org
Context
The sheer magnitude of internal displacement in Angola is numbing. The figures are staggering and the conditions that surround them nearly unimaginable. At the end of 2000, the UN put the total number of persons displaced since the beginning of the decades-long conflict at 3.8 million - nearly 25% of the country's 12 million inhabitants (CHR 25 January 2001, para. 8; UN November 2000, p. 10). Working estimates in 2001 cited the figure of three million IDPs since 1998 (OCHA 31 August 2001, Population movements).
The only thing more alarming than the figures themselves is the context in which they exist. The statistics are disturbing:
- Angola is the most heavily mined country in the world with an estimated eight to ten million landmines (UNICEF 2001, Country background);
- nearly half of the Angolan population is under-nourished (Marc Dubois September 2001);
- infant mortality is the second highest in the world with one in three children dead before the age of five (OCHA 2000 p. 24);
- Only 30% of the population has access to safe water (Oxfam September 2001)
- Four-fifths of the population do not have access to essential drugs (Dubois September 2001)
- Life expectancy is 44 years (Dubois September 2001)
It is in this extremely precarious environment that at least three million people - among them young families, unaccompanied children, and the elderly - are on the move.
Background
Since the country's independence in 1963, Angolans have seen little peace. A protracted conflict between the Government of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has ravaged the country for the better part of forty years. The worst of the fighting in Angola broke out in 1992 following the electoral victory of the government ruling party, MPLA, and its subsequent rejection by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). From 1992 to 1994, between 1.3 and 2 million persons were forced to flee their homes (Deng 10 November 2000, sect. II). By 1994, it was hoped that the Lusaka Peace Protocol might end the violence, but this did not prove to be the case. The demobilization of UNITA troops envisaged by the peace process was never completed and sporadic fighting continued throughout the country (USCR 1998). All-out war resumed by the end of 1998.
Since the resurgence of violence in late 1998, hostilities between government troops and UNITA rebels have continued unabated. In 2000, the government succeeded in regaining control of several traditional UNITA strongholds, but these military feats failed to combat the chronic insecurity that plagues the country. In response to the strengthening state response, UNITA resorted more readily to guerrilla tactics in order to meet its military aims. As a result, rapid infiltration attacks as well as hit-and-run ambushes became more commonplace during 2000 and early 2001 (OCHA 20 April 2001; UN November 2000).
By mid-2001, UNITA seemed to have moved away from guerrilla tactics in favour of terrorist warfare. Over the last months, UNITA forces have become increasingly involved in kidnappings and the deliberate targeting of civilians. On 5 May, UNITA soldiers attacked the city of Caxito, murdering civilians and kidnapping 60 orphans (Action for Southern Africa 7 June 2001). On 10 August, UNITA was responsible for the attack of a civilian train in Cuanza Norte province resulting in the death of over 400 persons. Witnesses report that the train was derailed by an anti-tank mine, and that passengers attempting to escape the accident were killed by UNITA soldiers laying in wait (Action for Southern Africa 5 September 2001, 5 October 2001).
Figures
Given the length and pervasiveness of the conflict in Angola, there has been a near-continuous mass movement of people in the county for years (Oxfam September 2001). OCHA reports that an average of 30,000 persons has been displaced each month in 2001. The 2001 total is now well over 300,000 (OCHA 31 August 2001, Population movements). Of the three million IDPs in Angola, only 1.21 million are confirmed by humanitarian organisations, leading to major gaps in assistance. A relatively insignificant 257,000 IDPS live in camps and transit centres. Another 393,000 are temporarily resettled in peri-urban areas and are receiving assistance. Over 560,000 others are reportedly integrated into peri-urban areas without regular aid. A remaining 525,000 are said to be out of the reach of international relief (OCHA 31 August 2001; UN November 2000, p. 10).
It is difficult to say which regions of the country are hardest hit by the conflict in Angola, so widespread is the violence that affects its inhabitants. New displacements in 2001 have been highest in Bengo, Bie, Huambo and Uige provinces (OCHA 31 August, 31 July, 30 June 2001). Bie has been particularly affected this year with large numbers of new IDPs arriving in the municipal centres of Camacupa, Kuito and Cuemba, resulting in a humanitarian crisis in Camacupa and Kuito in June and July (IRIN-SA 4 June 2001; SCF 13 August 2001). Many of the new IDPs in the Municipality of Cuemba remain unreachable as they are on the other side of the Kuanza River and cannot cross over to find food and safety in Camacupa and Kuito (OCHA 13 July 2001).
Conditions of displacement
The traditional movement of displaced populations has been from rural areas to state-controlled provincial capitals. These, individuals seek some protection from the war's violence. However, recent reports indicate that increasingly large numbers of persons are hiding in the bush for weeks and months before they are able to make it to the safety of larger cities (IRIN-SA 27 July 2001). During flight, communities and families are often separated from each other. The most recent wave of IDPs in Bie Province revealed that many women are left to flee on their own with their children since their husbands are fighting for government or UNITA forces (WFP 12 July 2001). As has been the case throughout the conflict in Angola, a significant number of IDPs are persons who have been forced to flee several times during the course of the conflict.
Though IDPs find some protection in provincial capitals, persons in all areas are vulnerable to attack, rape, kidnapping and forced conscription by UNITA and government forces (OCHA 22 May 2001; CHR 25 January 2001). With the latest terrorist attacks by UNITA as well as "cleansing" exercises by the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) that are meant to "starve out" UNITA rebels, it is increasingly difficult to guarantee the security of civilians nearly anywhere in the country (Action for Southern Africa 5 October 2001; Mail and Guardian 20 August 2001). Women and children are naturally the most vulnerable populations. Women are subject to sexual harassnment and forced into marriage and prostitution; children - of which one million are internally displaced - are forcibly recruited and victim to kidnappings and sexual assault (UNICEF 2001, Country background; IRIN-SA 14 June 2001; CHR 25 January 2001; NRC September 2000).
Though the situation of health and nutrition is extremely poor countrywide, it would appear to be still worse in displaced persons camps and transit centres. In Camacupa in June 2001, malnutrition was estimated at 46% among the IDPs, and it was thought that the situation was still more precarious in inaccessible locations (Oxfam September 2001, Humanitarian situation). At the end of 2000, the UN reported overall malnutrition among IDP populations to be somewhere near 60% (UN November 2000, Humanitarian context). Mortality and morbidity rates are high among displaced populations with malaria, respiratory infections and diarrhoeic diseases the leading causes of death and disease (OCHA 31 August 2001). It is estimated that in 90% of areas with concentrations of displaced persons, water sources are contaminated or inaccessible (UN November 2000). The continual influx of displaced persons to provincial capitals has placed a heavy burden on state health and sanitation systems as well as the limited resources of resident populations.
Return and resettlement
Following the adoption of the Norms for the Resettlement of Displaced Persons by the Government of Angola in October 2000, humanitarian agencies hoped that resettlement to safe areas would continue and even accelerate in 2001. Following the publication of the Norms, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS) formed a technical working group to develop a set of legally binding operating procedures for the implementation of the Norms at the provincial level (OCHA 28 February 2001). However, an intensification of fighting in the central highlands in 2001 has constrained return and resettlement movements, and compliance with the Norms has been uneven at best (OCHA 22 May 2001). As of August 2001, only 73,000 persons had resettled to temporary locations, a figure far short of the 500,000 IDPs expected to relocate at the beginning of the year (OCHA 31 August 2001; OCHA 22 May 2001). Still, efforts to close inadequate transit centres continue. OCHA indicated in August that in the provinces of Benguela, Bie, Huambo, Huila, Luanda and Malanje only 21,000 IDPs remained in sub-standard transit centres (OCHA 31 August 2001, Resettlement, Return Movements).
Access
Access to war-affected populations has remained problematic in 2001. Widespread insecurity, airstrips in poor condition and dangerous roads continue to hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid. At the same time, the deliberate targeting of aid organisations has not helped matters. In May, sixteen World Vision staff members went missing following the UNITA attack of Golongo Alto in Kwanza Norte province (WV 21 May 2001). In June, two WFP food aid aircraft came under missle-fire attack near Kuito (WFP 15 June 2001). In the context of these insecure conditions, 60% of humanitarian relief continues to be transported by air (OCHA 22 May 2001).
National and international response
While the Government of Angola provides some minimal assistance to displaced populations, observers consider its efforts far below what they should be, its attitude as one of "neglect" (CHR 25 January 2001, para. 35). At the end of 2000, several humanitarian NGOs, among them MSF, released reports pointing the finger at the Government of Angola, arguing that it had the resources to look after its people if only it cared to do so (The Economist 11 January 2001). Indeed, the Government of Angola would seem to be in a much better position to aid its citizens than most other African countries. The country is extremely rich in resources: it is the second largest sub-Saharan oil producer and the fourth largest producer of diamonds in the world. However, revenues from these industries would appear to benefit only a very select few (Oxfam September 2001).
The UN appealed for US$ 225,846,859 for emergency and emergency recovery programmes in 2001. By mid-year, only 15% of the UN Consolidated Appeal had been funded, and many agencies were operating on the basis of carry-over funds (OCHA 22 May 2001). In May, UNHCR reported that it had received only 35% of its requested funding (UNHCR 31 May 2001). UNICEF had received some 22% of funding requests (UNICEF 21 June 2001). The UN linked the slow response to humanitarian appeals for Angola to the expectation by some donors that the Government of Angola would allocate additional resources from oil revenues to social sectors (OCHA 22 May 2001). Thus far, this government allocation has not been forthcoming.