United Nations report exposes arms-for-diamonds scandal
A damning United Nations report has exposed how individuals and governments helped UNITA build a formidable arsenal in return for rough diamonds (http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/angolareport_eng.htm).
The report of the Panel of Experts on violations of UN Security Council sanctions on UNITA was made public on 15 March, following a six month investigation by nine international experts in fields including banking, petroleum, diamonds, and arms.
This extraordinary report reflects the huge shift in perception by many in the international community of the UNITA rebel movement of Jonas Savimbi. The organisation was once held up as being the standard bearer for democracy. Now it is almost universally held to be primarily responsible for the war in Angola which has come close to destroying the social, political and economic life of the country.
It also reflects a significant shift in thinking of policy makers, towards "smart sanctions" that target specific groups, as opposed to the blanket sanctions that have been applied on Libya and Iraq.
The report has taken the brave step of naming and shaming acting Presidents for breaking embargoes on third countries, and has urged the international community to take action against these Presidents, which could result in Togo's Gnassingbe Eyadema being prevented from taking up the Chairmanship of the Organisation of African Unity in June this year. Also, Bulgarian membership of NATO may be put at risk if the report is taken to its logical conclusion. It remains to be seen whether the important recommendations will be accepted, or whether they are swept under the carpet.
In September 1993 the UN made it illegal to provide arms, military equipment and fuel to UNITA, following Jonas Savimbi's rejection of the results of the multi-party elections in Angola the previous year and UNITA's return to war. In October 1997, following UNITA's refusal to abide by the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, additional sanctions were imposed, including banning foreign travel by senior UNITA officials, and closing UNITA offices abroad. As the Lusaka peace process continued to disintegrate due to UNITA's escalating military actions, further sanctions were imposed in July 1998, banning the purchase of diamonds from UNITA and the sale of mining equipment to UNITA, and freezing UNITA's bank accounts.
However, the three sets of sanctions were openly flouted, and this led the United Nations to belatedly set up the Expert Panels to investigate violations and violators, and to put forward recommendations on how to stop sanctions busting. The UN Security Council is due to meet on 18 April to draw up a resolution on the findings of the Expert Panel report.
UNITA received arms through brokers and friendly countries
The panel found that UNITA bought its arms through brokers, who often received rough diamonds in payment. In general, the brokers were responsible for arranging transport and delivery, training, maintenance and spare parts.
The panel claimed that from 1993 to 1994 much of UNITA's military equipment was procured by a man known as Watson, and that the payment was in the form of rough diamonds to the De Beers sight holder Joe De Decker. The panel stated that Watson continued to supply lethal and non-lethal military equipment until at least 1997.
From 1994 to 1997 UNITA used Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) as a conduit for weapons, with Zaire providing end-user certificates. Among the arms dealers used in Zaire was Imad Kabir (also known as Emad/Emat Bakir). Kabir is thought to have been UNITA's primary broker for importing arms and military equipment until October 1999.
Weapons were flown into Zaire directly from the country of origin, often on aircraft owned by Jacques "Kiki" Lemaire, working together with Manuel Roque.
The Panel suggested that it believed that Burkina Faso currently has stocks of weapons for UNITA, but that the Panel was prevented from visiting a suspected warehouse. It believes that Burkina Faso provided end-user certificates for weapons which were then flown on to UNITA.
It stated that a common interest in overthrowing President Kabila in the Congo led to close cooperation between UNITA and Rwanda. It said that in August 1998 two Rwandan battalions were trapped in western DRC, and in order to move their troops into UNITA-controlled territory in Angola the vice-president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, initiated contact with Savimbi. From Angola some Rwandan troops were flown back to Rwanda, while others stayed with UNITA.
The report also alleged that UNITA dispatched a battery of UNITA anti-aircraft specialists along with SA-16 weapons to support Rwandan-backed rebels in the DRC. The Rwandans are reported to have allowed UNITA to arrange diamond sales and meetings with weapons brokers in Kigali.
Rwanda is also said to have introduced UNITA to arms brokers, including Victor Bout, and UNITA's main diamond seller/ arms buyer, Marcelo Moises Dachala (Ambassador Karrica), operates in Rwanda with official protection.
The report highlighted the significant support to UNITA from individuals operating from South Africa, but makes the point that action by the South African government has resulted in some of the individuals taking their operations to other countries. The report does not make any direct link between those supporting UNITA and the apartheid state security apparatus.
Another named individual was the South Africa Johannes Parfirio Parreira, who is said to be currently in South Africa after being forced to leave Namibia where he had been operating an air cargo company called Northern Namibian Distributors. Parreira is accused of having supplied military and mining equipment, in exchange for diamonds, using his air charter company Interstate Airways. INTERPOL has uncovered many connections between people associated with Parreira and UNITA smuggling operations, and the panel considers further investigations and exposure of these connections to be a high priority for future sanctions enforcement. Parreira escaped from custody in Angola in 1998, and also jumped bail in Zambia.
According to the report, Lanseria airport, near Johannesburg, continues to be associated with smuggling to UNITA. Air Cess and Air Pass are named as having smuggled goods from South Africa to UNITA controlled areas. Air Cess and Air Pass are controlled by Victor Bout, whose operations are now based in the United Arab Emirates.
The Expert Panel believes that UNITA's vice-president, Antonio Dembo, visited South Africa in August 1999, during which UNITA purchased a 35mm anti-aircraft battery. The weapon was not delivered to UNITA because the Angolan army retook UNITA's headquarters in Andulo. The South African government has denied that the weapon was sold to UNITA.
The Panel also stated that President Eyadema of Togo allowed military equipment to come through Togo in return for either cash or a share in the military hardware. It reported that as President Mobutu lost his stranglehold on Zaire in 1997, UNITA shipped some of its weapons to Togo, including some SA-6 anti-aircraft missiles. Following the overthrow of Mobutu, Eyadema became the primary supplier of end-user certificates for arms and military equipment for UNITA.
It found that false end-user certificates from Zambia were used in 1995 and 1996, although the Panel has no hard evidence of any link between these forged certificates and Zambia or any Zambian national. It revealed that these false certificates had been presented to the Ukrainian authorities in 1996 by East-West Metals Ltd, and that the sale had been stopped by Ukraine. The Russian Federation had also been suspicious of the certificates presented on behalf of East-West Metals Ltd seeking to procure IGLA (SA-16) surface to air missiles, and the Russian authorities cancelled the order.
The Panel raised the possibility that ammunition from Bulgaria was delivered to UNITA through a US company, Milteks, using false end-user certificates. The experts believe that since 1997 the majority of arms purchased by UNITA came from Bulgaria. They also received evidence that UNITA personnel had been trained in Bulgaria, including training on the SA-6 anti-aircraft system. They did not have proof for the significant role attributed to the Ukraine by other reports.
The report stated that UNITA has imported tanks and armoured personnel carriers, mines and explosives, a variety of small arms and light weapons, anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft weapons, and a variety of artillery pieces.
The report suggested that UNITA imported only five T-64 tanks, and infers that other tanks used by UNITA were captured from the government. The Panel heard evidence that between 1995 and 1998 UNITA purchased a quantity of tank accessories, which enabled them to rehabilitate captured tanks.
Panel's recommendations
* The UN should apply sanctions against leaders and governments who have deliberately broken sanctions relating to the supply of military equipment. Possible sanctions might include an embargo on arms sales to named countries for three years, followed by three years of international probation.
* Governments should agree to register, licence and monitor arms brokers, and that information be made available to other governments as well as regional and international organisations.
* Governments should make available records of arms production and surplus armaments, and give preference to the destruction of such arms, and that this be funded by international organisations and governments. The supplier of arms is responsible for checking on actual end-users. The sale of excess arms to arms dealers as final sales should be forbidden.
* With all arms transfers by governments, end-user certificates should be authenticated and reconciled.
* Compliance with UN sanctions should be among the criteria considered by NATO and the European Union when considering candidates for new membership.
* Support should be given to the Ukrainian idea of bringing together Eastern European arms suppliers to formulate proposals on how to stem the illicit flow of arms into Angola, and the Panel suggested that SADC representatives be included.
Petroleum - the lifeblood of UNITA
For UNITA to maintain its existence as a semi-conventional force, it requires a huge amount of petroleum products, for generators, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, self propelled guns, towed artillery, self propelled anti-aircraft weapons, trucks and other vehicles.
According to information provided to the Expert Panel, between January 1996 and December 1998 UNITA was able to acquire 2.3 million litres of fuel. The Panel was informed that by the time heavy fighting resumed in December 1998, only 500,000 litres of fuel remained in UNITA's stockpiles (roughly 25 tanker trucks worth).
During this period the main supplies of fuel came from Zaire, Congo-Brazzaville, and from within Angola. The Panel stated that the contact people for oil transactions were Manuel Roque in Kinshasa and the then Prime Minister, General Joachim Yhombi Opango in Brazzaville.
In addition, it is reported that 150,000 litres were flown in from Libreville in 1998, and that some fuel was bought in Zambia.
By January 1999 UNITA is reported to have used all but 100,000 litres of fuel. In response to this crisis, contacts were made at the highest level in Burkina Faso, Zambia and Togo. It is reported that President Compaore of Burkina Faso sent three flights of 18,000 to 20,000 litres of diesel each. Fuel was also bought in Zambia, and may also have been bought in Botswana and flown to Andulo in April 1999. Fuel is also reported to be driven across the borders with Zambia and the DRC.
The Panel also reported that refueling facilities were made available in Gabon, Togo, Uganda and Rwanda.
Three Presidents were named in the report as having helped UNITA obtain fuel: former President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire; former President Pascal Lissouba of the Republic of Congo; and President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso. The panel was unable to say with certainty if petroleum sanctions were violated with the knowledge of senior Zambian government officials, as other reports have stated.
The Panel also stated that there had been significant acquisitions of fuel from within Angola, resulting both from inadequate controls and from corruption.
Panel's recommendations
* Fuel stocks should be closely monitored in border areas adjacent to UNITA held territory. SADC could take the lead and, if it did, it should receive support from the international community.
* In the SADC region an ad hoc committee should be established consisting of oil industry and government representatives to create a database with details of fuel sales. A DNA-type analysis should be conducted of fuel samples obtained from petroleum industry suppliers in the SADC region and that a database be created to help evaluate fuel obtained or captured from UNITA to find its origin.
* Tighter control over fuel sales is needed in Angola, and corrupt officials should be punished. Air safety regulations internationally should be subject to tighter implementation.
Diamond smuggling tarnishes entire industry
The Panel found that diamonds have a uniquely important role within UNITA, enabling UNITA to buy weapons and international friends and support, and that they are the preferred means of stockpiling wealth.
UNITA gains diamonds in three ways: mining, taxing diggers, and through granting licences to diamond buyers to operate within its areas of control. In the past UNITA has sold mining licences to international mining companies.
The Panel found that some diamonds were traded in Andulo, some were sold in a third country such as Burkina Faso, Zaire (during the Mobutu era), Cote d'Ivoire and Rwanda, and some were taken directly to Antwerp, Belgium. Significant quantities were also found to have been smuggled through Namibia to Antwerp, and David Zollman was named in particular in this regard.
The Panel also criticised the Angolan authorities for a laxity of controls within Angola, which has greatly facilitated the smuggling of rough diamonds. The Panel stated that "although Savimbi himself apparently preferred to avoid the internal market within Angola, it was clear to the Panel that the wide open nature of the market within Angola would have made it relatively easy for UNITA to "launder" its diamonds through official channels. It stated that a quantity of diamonds had undoubtedly been sold through official channels.
The Panel accused a South African, Piet Hand, of helping to launder UNITA diamonds through South Africa, mixing UNITA diamonds with legitimate South African diamonds before exporting them. It is also suggested that he has been involved in half-polishing UNITA diamonds in order to hide their true identity.
It also has information on smuggling through Zambia, but stated that the information was received too late to be corroborated.
According to the report, in tandem with access to safe locations, UNITA also depends on the ease with which it can sell its diamonds in Antwerp, which accounts for nearly 80 per cent of the world's rough diamond trade. The Panel stated that "the extremely lax controls and regulations governing the Antwerp market facilitate, and perhaps even encourage, illegal trading activity".
The report stated that the Belgian authorities have failed to establish an effective import identification regime with respect to diamonds. It continued that "nor has any effective effort been made to monitor the activities of suspect brokers, dealers and traders".
The Panel stated that persons known within the diamond industry to deal in UNITA diamonds include Jean "Johnny" Seber, and David Zollman, Imad Kabir (Emad Bakir) and Jacobus Witteveen - who is involved in arms trafficking for UNITA, and who owns a diamond firm in Antwerp "Afridiam".
The report found that steps by De Beers not to purchase UNITA diamonds directly or from third parties, and its subsequent withdrawal from most of the diamond market in Angola have made it more difficult for UNITA to sell its diamonds; a clear inference that De Beers were buying diamond of UNITA origin.
The Panel noted lax controls inside Angola, and has welcomed the steps being taken by the Angolan government to restructure the industry, including the introduction of unforgable certificates of origin. However, it urges that close attention be paid to the implementation of these measures.
Panel's recommendations
* In cases where the legal origin of rough diamonds cannot be established, the diamonds should be forfeited. Forfeiture penalties should include any collateral assets associated with the suspect diamonds.
* Traders and other individuals or companies found to be breaking the sanctions should lose their registration, be placed on an industry blacklist and barred from any involvement in the diamond industry worldwide, and be made subject to criminal sanctions in Member States. Additional measures might include denying entry to such individuals in countries hosting important diamond marketing centres.
* The Belgian government should be invited to work with industry authorities and the UN Sanctions Committee to devise practical measures to limit UNITA's access to the diamond markets. Spot checks should also be made in India, Israel, Britain and the United States.
* Dealing in undeclared rough diamonds should be declared a criminal offence in countries hosting important diamond marketing centres.
* A conference of experts should be convened to work on a system of controls to increase transparency and accountability in the control of diamonds from source to the bourses. This includes the need to develop mechanisms for identifying within the diamond market, those diamonds that may have been brought into diamond centres without a customs declaration, including the establishment of a comprehensive database on diamond characteristics and trends.
* The diamond industry should develop and implement more effective arrangements to ensure that its members worldwide abide by sanctions against UNITA.
UNITA finances and assets
The Panel found that UNITA keeps its assets primarily in the form of rough diamonds, controlled by Jonas Savimbi personally. There is substantial evidence of UNITA's general aversion for banks and normal banking channels
It received credible direct evidence that $5 million in cash was given by Savimbi to President Eyadema of Togo to look after. It also received evidence that money was also deposited with the then President of Cote d'lvoire, Henry Konan BediT. However, the panel pointed out that in both the above cases, Savimbi subsequently accused the two presidents of having stolen the money.
The Panel also stated that in 1995 Savimbi gave $250,000 to Carlos Furtado, UNITA's representative in Morocco, to safeguard, and that this amount had been increased by subsequent payments.
Panel's recommendations
* UNITA-controlled assets whose provenance cannot be traced to a lawful source should be forfeited, and used to benefit the people of Angola. A substantial bounty or "finders' fee percentage" could be given to those who trace, track down and identify UNITA assets that are subject to sanction.
* Banking procedures should be developed to facilitate the identification of individuals covered by sanctions, and the freezing of assets.
Representation and travel abroad
The Panel found that UNITA conducts most of its business through direct personal contacts, and that the ability of senior officials to travel greatly aided the organisation's work.
It highlighted the facts that: the UNITA office in Belgium is connected with its diamond interests; the office in Portugal acts as a link with various Angolan and Portuguese interests in the country; the office in New York lobbies on behalf of UNITA and monitors developments at the United Nations; the office in France sustains important commercial links for UNITA; and the office in Switzerland has in the past been an important source of medical supplies for UNITA.
UNITA leaders still travel internationally on passports issued by Togo, Cote d'lvoire and Burkina Faso. In some cases diplomatic and official or special passports were issued by these three countries. In some cases, particularly with respect to travel to South Africa, due to the large number of airfields, UNITA officials often do not go through normal immigration channels.
The Panel concluded that a number of countries provided actual support and protection for UNITA representatives and easy access for senior UNITA officials wishing to travel there. These countries were identified as Burkina Faso, Togo, Cote d'lvoire, Zambia and Rwanda. In a number of other countries UNITA is able to maintain an "unofficial" representative presence with the knowledge, but without the direct support, of the host government. These countries include the United States, France, Belgium, Portugal, Switzerland and South Africa.
Panel's recommendations
* Sanctions should be applied against those countries which have intentionally broken sanctions relating to UNITA representation and travel abroad. These might include requesting all Member States to revoke any special travel, diplomatic or passport recognition privileges accorded to countries found to have issued passports to senior UNITA officials. Member States could also be asked to impose visa requirements on nationals of the countries concerned.
* Governments who have issued passports to UNITA officials and members of their families should be reminded of their obligation to revoke these passports.
* In view of the key role in UNITA's illegal diamond trading and arms negotiating activities played by Marcelo Moises Dachala (Ambassador Karrica), a warrant for his arrest should be issued by the Government of Angola and other Member States having jurisdiction, and INTERPOL should be asked to co-ordinate an international response. This action should be accompanied by the maximum possible publicity, and Karrica's apprehension should be a top international law enforcement priority.
* UNITA officials actively involved in military or political affairs should be immediately expelled, and the UN's list of senior officials and their immediate family should be updated urgently.
Related matters, including evidence that UNITA shot down UN aircraft
The Panel informed the Security Council that it had received evidence from senior UNITA defectors that UNITA was responsible for shooting down two United Nations aircraft - in December 1998 and January 1999.
Panel's recommendations
* SADC consider the introduction of mobile radar systems that can be rapidly deployed in the sub region to detect illegal flights, and that this should receive all possible support and assistance from the international community.
* SADC should give consideration to the establishment of a regional air traffic control, and that the project should receive international support, including technical assistance from ICAO and/or IATA.
* Evidence relating to the shooting down of the two UN aircraft be brought to the attention of the judicial authorities in countries whose nationals were killed in the crash.
* Member States close to Angola should enforce, strengthen or enact legislation making it a criminal offence under domestic law to violate sanctions imposed by the Security Council against UNITA. The Panel also recommends that Member States involved in the supply of arms to African countries should also enforce such measures. Any pilots prosecuted for sanctions busting should face permanent loss of certification, as well as incarceration.
* Formal links and regular collaboration should be established between the United Nations and regional or other organisations (such as INTERPOL) that may be involved in sanctions monitoring or enforcement activities.
* The Security Council should develop a "Sanctions Information Package", including a website. Greater public awareness of sanctions and their purpose would result in more information on sanctions busting activities being provided to national and international bodies by members of the public and others with relevant information.
* The Security Council should compile and distribute a "Blacklist" or "Watchlist' of individuals and commercial entities involved in UNITA sanctions busting.
* The Security Council should apply appropriate sanctions against Governments found to have been intentionally breaking the sanctions, including: formally declaring the offending countries to be sanctions breakers; discouraging Member States from supporting the candidacies of nationals from listed countries for senior positions within the UN system; a ban on holding UN conferences or meetings in the listed countries; and discouraging other international organisations from holding conferences or meetings in the listed countries, or electing the country concerned as Chairman in office of any organisation.
* The Chairman of the Sanctions Committee should report to the Security Council on actions taken to follow up on the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report. The Security Council should ensure that it is able to monitor closely the further implementation of sanctions as well as follow up information collected by the Panel where it was unable to complete its investigations. If necessary, a monitoring mechanism - in addition to the Sanctions Committee - should be established.
The panel warned that unless the Security Council and the international community remain engaged in this effort, there is a very real risk that when the focus has been turned off, UNITA and its partners will go back to doing business as usual.
The Panel's report concluded that it hopes that "the Council will now seize this opportunity to demonstrate that international sanctions can be made to work effectively, that Member States and others will be held accountable to the international community for their actions, and that the Council means what it says when it passes resolutions and takes action in support of peace. The message would be heard not just in Angola, but in many other current and potential areas of conflict as well. The long suffering people of Angola need and deserve the support of the international community in the search to bring peace and political reconciliation to that country."
Main accused deny charges
In a glimpse of the coming UN Security Council debate scheduled for 18 April, countries named in the report as having broken the UN sanctions have been quick to deny the charges, and to question the use of UNITA defectors for evidence.
A Rwandan official statement said that "the government of Rwanda categorically denies these allegations and reserves the right to address them squarely when the report is officially presented to the Security Council". Togo and Burkina Faso have also rejected the allegations.
Bulgaria has stated that all arms sales are carefully scrutinised and none have gone to embargoed countries.
Belgium has stated that despite diamonds being very difficult to identify, concrete measures have been taken to stamp out smuggling. A Foreign Ministry spokesperson told Reuters on 11 March that "Belgium has appointed a task force to tackle the issue, and we have a very credible certification system with the Luanda authorities, with whom we are allowed to trade in diamonds". On 15 March Belgium's Foreign Minister visited Angola where he held discussions with senior government officials. Louis Michel, who is also the vice Prime Minister of Belgium, pointed out that an interministerial task force was already operating, and that other steps were being taken to stop diamond smuggling.
Canada has announced that it will be reviewing its bilateral ties with countries blamed in the report for sanction busting. However, some countries named as sanctions busting have led a smear campaign against the Expert Panels report, insinuating that there is a link between Ambassador Robert Fowler, the Canadian Ambassador to the UN, and Canadian diamond mining interests.
Other criticisms have been raised about the use of testimony from UNITA defectors. Togo's representative at the UN, Roland Kpotsra, criticised the report as "rumour, hearsay, and scraps that are considered verified because they are confirmed by UNITA defectors".
However, Ambassador Fowler stated that the standards of evidence used by the Panel were more stringent than would be required in a court of law. Authors of the report have pointed out that the testimony of UNITA defectors only confirmed information already obtained, and that a great deal of information was left out of the report because it was scrupulous in ensuring that all allegations were backed up by concrete evidence or testimony from several sources.
According to Reuters on 16 March, French officials have complained about the emphasis being on the Francophone countries. Sources in Angola have suggested that the lack of criticism against high ranking state officials in Zambia may be related to a current warming of relations between Zambia and Angola - the implication being that the Angolan government has withheld information relating to Zambian official complicity.
Although South African individuals were named, and the lax controls of South African airports was mentioned, some sources also argue that South Africa seems to have been let off lightly by the report.
However, South Africa's Deputy Foreign Minister, Aziz Pahad, said on 15 March that "sanctions are a very important mechanism to bring about a negotiated solution and therefore we will do everything possible to ensure that they are effectively implemented. If evidence enables us to prosecute the sanctions busters, they must and will be prosecuted".
When the UN Security Council met to open the discussion on the report, on 15 March, the strongest support for the document came from Britain's Foreign Office Minister, Peter Hain.
Hain stated that "the time has come for the international community to face up to its obligations. It is no good putting our hands up in the UN for sanctions against UNITA and then taking no action while citizens in our countries make money out of misery. That is simply hypocrisy. We must all rigorously implement and enforce sanctions. The time has come to stamp on the sanctions busters. That is why the report of the Expert Panel is so vital".
He continued that "the full force of law must be brought to bear on those responsible ...we have to cut off Savimbi's means to wage war".
However, Hain warned that "we need to do more than naming and shaming to break UNITA's ability to re-arm: as the Report makes clear, public censure must now be followed by decisive action in the Sanctions Committee, in the Security Council, in the States concerned and by their neighbours. Britain looks forward to a series of mandatory UN resolutions to implement the Report's key recommendations. The Security Council meeting next month must take decisive action. There must be no delay and no equivocation. The credibility of the Security Council is at stake. The Security Council commissioned this Report. We have a duty to act on it".
Ambassador Cunningham of the United States spoke on behalf of the Troika of Observer States to the Lusaka Protocol (US, Russian Federation and Portugal). He welcomed the Report, which has "focused new attention on the link between the illegal exploitation of Angola's natural resources and the continuation of its conflict", and has "highlighted, in stark and dramatic fashion, a systematic pattern of violations by the UNITA leadership and with the collusion of foreign actors".
He stressed that the key elements of the Report are its recommendations for future action, although he added the rider that they require careful consideration. The ambassador confirmed that the report's findings are "largely corroborated by our own findings, of continued international support for UNITA's military leadership".
All fifteen members of the Security Council spoke at the meeting, as well as representatives of Angola, Burkina Faso, Belgium, Togo, Rwanda, South Africa, Bulgaria and Zambia.
The Security Council is due to meet on 18 April to discuss a resolution to carry forward the recommendations of the Expert Panel's report. There are strong indications that not all the recommendations will be accepted, with France in particular hoping to avoid mandatory sanctions being imposed against named sanction-busting countries.
ACTSA sanctions busting report
On 8 March Action for Southern Africa released a major report "Waiting on empty promises: The human cost of international inaction on Angolan sanctions", which documents the role of individuals and governments in maintaining UNITA's war machine. It also puts UNITA's return to war in the context of the United Nations failure to take action against UNITA as it flouted international efforts to support peace building in Angola.