A U.S. team recently back from a visit to Afghanistan to assess conditions arising from the country's severe drought concludes that parts of Afghanistan "are on the verge of what could develop into a widespread and precipitous famine," according to a member of the team.
George Havens of the U.S. Public Health Service said at State Department briefing May 4 that based on the findings of the visit, the United States is developing a two-fold strategy of assistance, aimed at meeting the needs both of those who have left the afflicted areas and those who have remained in their villages.
Havens said the U.S. effort is being planned in cooperation with U.N. officials and humanitarian assistance organizations. "We didn't really have discussions with the Taliban on this," he said.
USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Senior Program Manager Peter F. Morris, who also was on the assessment team, said "The answer to Afghanistan's many problems, the beginning of the answer, is peace and stability in Afghanistan. The Taliban continue to believe that they can win a military victory in Afghanistan and impose their will on the country in that way. We think that's not right and it's not the answer."
Following is a transcript of the briefing:
(begin transcript)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
May 4, 2001
On-the-Record Briefing by USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Senior Program Manager Peter F. Morris Senior International Emergency Health Advisor George J. Havens III Deputy Assistant Administrator of USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Response Leonard Rogers and Director for Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh of the Bureau of South Asian Affairs Jeffrey Lundstead on The Humanitarian Situation in Afghanistan
Washington, D.C.
May 4, 2001
MR. HUNTER: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen and welcome, or in a few cases, welcome back to the State Department briefing room for this afternoon's briefing on Afghanistan.
As with so many things in life, it seems that lack of access will add to the mystery of a place, and certainly that is true with Afghanistan, since prior to the visit of a couple of gentlemen you will be hearing from momentarily, no US officials had been into Afghanistan to look at the humanitarian situation in close to three years.
So we are delighted that several officials from the US Agency for International Development are able to be here today to share their findings and impressions of what has been going on recently in Afghanistan.
I am going to begin by introducing Leonard Rogers, who is the Deputy Assistant Administrator of USAID in its Bureau of Humanitarian Response, and let him introduce the two who actually traveled into Afghanistan. I would also note that we have present with us Jeff Lundstead from the Bureau of South Asian Affairs here at the State Department. He is the Director of the Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh Office and can also answer your questions should the need arise.
So with that, I would like to turn things over to Len Rogers and ask him to introduce our lead briefers.
MR. ROGERS: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for coming to this press briefing. We did feel you would be interested in the observations of our team, which was recently inside Afghanistan. This was the -- these people were the first official Americans in Afghanistan since 1998.
I am Len Rogers. I am the Acting Assistant Administrator in AID's Bureau for Humanitarian Response. Our bureau provides disaster relief and food aid, and we have been particularly concerned about Afghanistan for the past several months.
The Afghan humanitarian crisis is the result of 20 years of civil war, now made dramatically worse by Afghanistan's most devastating drought in its history. The UN has estimated that there are 3.8 million people inside of Afghanistan who are at risk from famine and that the food deficit is something over two million tons short of what Afghanistan needs to feed its people. And that deficit is twice last year's level. So the situation is deteriorating rapidly.
There are an estimated 500,000 people who have already left their homes for urban centers, and an additional 200,000 people who have fled to Pakistan and Iran. And those 200,000 people swell the refugee totals in those two countries to over 2.6 million. Last year, the US was the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, providing over $115 million worth of aid, most of that food aid.
We felt that it was important, given the reports we were getting from the United Nations, to have an on-the-ground assessment. So we sent this team in. We have been concerned that the country is on the verge of a widespread and precipitous famine. Our new AID Administrator has described the potential here as apocalyptic, and he is a man with great experience with famines, having worked the Ethiopia famine and being very interested in North Korea. So we have been very concerned about this situation.
So far this year, the United States has provided $78.5 million worth of assistance, and now based on the reports of the team, we are assessing on an urgent basis what additional aid might be necessary, and we do expect we will be making announcements on more assistance shortly.
The team has provided us some important insights, and I would like to introduce them now. George Havens, who is going to handle the brief, is a Commander in the US Public Health Service, working for the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. George is accompanied by Peter Morris, who is a nutritionist and also a nutritionist in the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. They were both in Afghanistan, and they were accompanied by Tom Hushuk, who is a Refugee Coordinator stationed in Islamabad, and he is still in Islamabad now.
But George -- I think we will do a short briefing by George and then allow you to ask questions of both George and Peter.
MR. HAVENS: Thank you, Len. Okay, what I would like to start off with is a brief overview of what the team that went in did, what we saw, and what our feelings were about the situation there, and what sort of recommendations we might be making.
On April 11th, the Humanitarian Assessment Mission, jointly staffed by the US Agency for International Development's Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance, and the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, entered Afghanistan. The purposes of the mission were to firstly conduct a humanitarian assessment of areas affected by the drought and displacement; and secondly, to determine current programming gaps and potential problems looming as a result of the continuing complex emergency.
The mission team consisted of myself, Peter Morris, a nutritionist, both of us from USAID, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in Washington, and Tom Hushuk, Refugee Coordinator based in the Embassy in Islamabad.
The team entered Afghanistan by UN aircraft from Islamabad, landing at Herat. All of you should have a map, and Herat is in the western portion of Afghanistan. Herat was the site for meetings with various UN agencies and humanitarian organizations that were working in that region.
Due to drought and conflict, many family resources have been exhausted. This has forced these people to move to larger population centers in search of income or assistance, and these populations are known as the internally displaced. In the vicinity of Herat, there are currently six camps for the internally displaced. While at Herat, the team visited the largest of those camps, which is (inaudible), which is approximately 16 kilometers north of Herat.
At the time of the visit, the camp population was approximately 90,000 and growing by an estimated 1,500 people daily. This is the only one of the six camps which is currently accepting new displaced population. It is estimated that the population is now over 100,000.
Within that camp, food distributions are taking place, and there are supplementary feedings being provided to all children less than 15 years of age and to mothers. The amount of available shelter for the current population was and continues to be woefully inadequate. Many have to exist without shelter from the elements. Significant amounts of additional shelter are required.
In addition, the water, sanitation and health delivery infrastructures within the camp are inadequate for the camp population. Without improvements in the state of these resources, negative trends in overall public health can be expected.
We left Herat and moved south to the village of Farah, or the town of Farah, down in Farah Province. We traveled to this region to assess the current situation in an area where the crops rely mainly on irrigation for their water source. It was observed that many of the fields had not been planted, and those that were may not be productive.
Water use for crops is not the only concern in that region, though. Also potable water for household use is becoming critical, as villagers have reported dry wells.
Due to recent surveys done by aid agencies in Ghowr Province and Badghis Province, it was reported that malnutrition levels are reaching emergency levels and that there are already unacceptable levels of child mortality.
These areas get their main water for crops from rain. They are very mountainous and isolated. The team had hoped to travel to these regions in order to assess the situation, but security was a concern. In order to get an idea of the situation in those provinces, the team left Farah and traveled northeast of Farsi. This is more in the severe drought area. It is also mountainous. It is rather isolated. And we hope to get some sort of an idea of what the conditions might be in Ghowr.
Here there were reports of springs running dry and crops not being in a healthy state. Many had sold most or all of their livestock in order to make ends meet. There are reports that nationwide 70 percent of the livestock has been sold off at this time.
The team flew from Herat to the city of Mazar-e Sharif in the north to assess a different region. Again, the team met with UN and humanitarian agencies working in the region. In addition, bread bakeries, supported with the use of US-supplied wheat, were visited. Bakeries being operated by women were visited, as well as those being operated by men.
From Mazar, the team traveled east to Samangam Province and the town of Aibek. In Samangam Province, we conducted assessments of both villages and non-camp displaced populations, or those that have left their homes but are not in the large camp setting. Displaced populations were observed to be eating collected grasses, as other resources were not available. In the villages, collected wild plants were also being used to augment food supplies by being baked into their bread.
Besides the drought, locusts also impact areas of Samangam. An overnight trip was made from Mazar to Meymaneh also, and that is to the west, in Faryab Province. We visited villages in that region also, making a run out towards Qeysar, also in the extremely severe drought area, to get an impression of what was going on in that province.
The conditions were essentially the same as they had been in Samangam. Water courses were either dry or had very little water in them. Some communities had to travel great distances at this time to get water, sometimes up to three hours round trip just to collect their daily water ration. The populations are making do with whatever they can borrow, beg or collect, as family resources have been depleted. After that visit, the team returned to Mazar and departed Afghanistan on 19 April for Islamabad.
The ongoing conflict and drought, now being described as the worst in Afghanistan's history, has already resulted in significant displacement from affected areas, as families leave their homes in search of food, water and work opportunities. Elaborate coping mechanisms, including the preferential feeding of children, have helped depress some of the indicators of acute malnutrition that one might expect to see and disguise the severity of the impending disaster. However, there is strong evidence that these coping mechanisms are now being exhausted.
It is the conclusion of the assessment team, based on the visited areas and conversations with relief officials, that portions of Afghanistan are on the verge of what could develop into a widespread and precipitous famine. Based on these findings, we are developing a strategy to assist the Afghan people through a two-fold approach. This strategy will address the needs of those that have already been displaced and those that have not been displaced in order to assist them in staying in their villages.
Thank you.
MR. HUNTER: And now we will open things up for your questions.
Q: What is your strategy? You say you are developing a strategy to assist; what is it?
MR. MORRIS: Like George mentioned, it's really going to be two-fold, and it's in the preparation stage. But it will be two-pronged. It will be initially to help those who are already displaced, help those who are in the camps and in the IDPs, the internally displaced people, just existing in non-camps or just squatting, and also to help those who have not yet moved so to prevent them from moving. So that's really -- what we found is that people prefer to stay at home. And if they had opportunity to, in speaking to farmers, they indicated -- in fact, in a village in Farsi, in a village called (inaudible), we asked a farmer, at one point will you have to move, or at what point will you have to calculate to move? The farmer said, well, the point's already passed, but we know we're going to have food assistance. Because the village actually had food assistance.
So it is to keep people in place.
Q: And is this being done with or without the blessing of the Taliban? Or their cooperation?
MR. MORRIS: This is really being done in cooperation with the UN officials and all the humanitarian aid assistance. We didn't really have discussions with the Taliban on this.
Q: So they didn't oppose it, or they haven't suggested to you that your further strategy will be for --
MR. MORRIS: We didn't discuss any strategy with the Taliban.
Q: That was going to be my question. What is the involvement of the Taliban in any of this? And you said that they haven't really been involved. But -- I mean, they obviously know you're there.
MR. MORRIS: Well, they knew we were there, and we -- this trip was facilitated with the World Food Program, and they got permission, documents for us to travel. And so the Taliban actually knew we were there and we were traveling where we were traveling, et cetera. But we really didn't have any sort of in-depth conversations with them pertaining to our trip. We didn't really see them in any official way.
Q: Is that odd? I mean, isn't that unusual?
MR. MORRIS: Well, we purposely wanted to make this a technical mission and really focus on humanitarian assistance, which is really being carried out with the United Nations and with the non-government organizations. So they facilitated the trip and made it known that we wanted to really focus on those issues, just humanitarian issues.
Q: The Taliban has actually, in the last couple of days, rejected an appeal for a ceasefire so the UN could do its work. How accurate is your assessment, given that you couldn't go into the areas where you had security concerns?
MR. MORRIS: I think it's pretty accurate, and the reason I say that is because, if I could just look at the map, we wanted to approximate the same areas. One of the reasons these areas are hardest hit is because they are inaccessible because of the terrain, and a lot of them are based on rain-fed agriculture.
We were able to go -- if you could look at this dark green as being the most drought-affected -- we were able to get up as close on this side and then over here as close on that side. And we also discussed with non-government organizations who were able to go into Ghowr, and then into southern Faryab, which is right in this area, in those areas. And they -- one of the non-government organizations had performed a nutritional survey in which they -- the results of which they said it was very clear that malnutrition is approaching emergency levels, and the mortality rates are already unacceptable.
So we feel that this was a good approximation.
Q: What is the guarantee that aid will reach to the needy people, because they have reported in the past that aid was used by the Taliban to spread its war against its own people?
MR. MORRIS: Part of that is a -- the partners we work with -- we are working with both the international humanitarian community, who do go in and work with non-government partners to make sure and monitor. And so part of that is assessing and having confidence in the partners you are working with, and right now we are working with the United Nations and non-governmental organizations.
Q: And just to follow, we are talking about war for 20 years, and the Taliban are -- they should be blamed for everything that -- whatever is going on in Afghanistan. At the same time, they are harboring the world's most wanted terrorist, Usama bin Laden. And at the same time now, we are helping the Taliban in a different way by giving aid to people there.
MR. MORRIS: One thing, of the villages we visited, we didn't see any Taliban. They were just farmers who were really destitute. So I believe that the people do need assistance. And of the people we spoke to, they were very basic farmers.
Q: I wonder, of those who were actually on the distribution chain of the supplies and who were actually distributing in the camps, could you identify what percentage were Westerners, what percentage were Pakistanis, what percentage were Afghans? And about how many people we're dealing with?
MR. MORRIS: You mean the aid givers --
Q: Not the donors but the people concerned with the transport and final distribution of the commodities.
MR. MORRIS: That would be hard to really give you a fair estimation. We did speak to the local or the Herat-based representatives of the World Food Program and, of --
Q: Who are -- who are?
MR. MORRIS: Food --
Q: Right. But they were Europeans or Afghans?
MR. MORRIS: They were Europeans plus Afghan staff.
Q: Okay. And did the Afghan Red Crescent -- or they appear as sort of an Afghan partner in any of this?
MR. MORRIS: We didn't really speak with the Afghan Red Crescent. We spoke with the International Committee for the Red Cross, who I believe work in conjunction with the Red Crescent.
Q: Who are basically Europeans.
MR. MORRIS: Right.
Q: Let me rephrase it. At the actual point of distribution where the food and other goods were given out in the camps, were you seeing Afghans or was it entirely a foreign operation?
MR. MORRIS: We were seeing both. We saw Afghans and we saw -- we saw expatriates who were monitoring. So I guess that would be --
Q: Two questions. Can you venture a guess the impact the drought may have had -- might have on Afghanistan's opium cultivation? Did you see any opium fields?
MR. MORRIS: We didn't see any opium fields in our trip.
Q: And also do you have a dollar amount that you're talking about at this point in terms of this supplemental aid that you're considering?
MR. MORRIS: I would really refer to my --
MR. HAVENS: We haven't made the final decisions as yet. We do expect we will make an announcement within the next couple of weeks about additional aid and then we will monitor the situation as it unfolds. We will also work with other donors to try to get them to contribute as well.
Q: Can you give us a range?
MR. HAVENS: I would rather wait until the Secretary decides (inaudible).
Q: -- reports that Pakistan has been stopping the refugees from coming in. And Pakistan says it already has a problem on its hands with the number of refugees it has. So was this particular dilemma or this problem looked at and is there an answer to that?
MR. MORRIS: The focus of our mission really wasn't to -- we weren't focusing on that issue of refugees going into Pakistan. What we were looking at was maybe some of the reasons why people are moving and trying to look at the most affected areas and ways we could help people in place.
Q: What sorts of aid do you think that these people need now?
MR. MORRIS: Two kinds of aid. We are looking at -- there is emergency assistance, which would be food assistance, health assistance, you know, better water. And then there would also be the assistance which would be helping people keep their livelihoods. There would be seeds, livestock, other ways people make money.
Because one of the things we notice, you went to the marketplace in the bazaars, food was available. But since most of the people who live in these areas are farmers and the fields have failed and their livestock have died, they simply don't have any resources or cash to buy food. So it is really a demand failure. And so ways to keep their livelihoods so they can, you know, rehabilitate and keep going on.
Q: But short of having rain doesn't help much if you have seed or cattle.
MR. MORRIS: No, that's true. And I think we have to, you know, obviously look at -- when we're looking at this, we're looking at a long-term -- many of the villages have extremely complex social networks of borrowing and indebtedness and that will take a long time to get out of.
Q: My question is how soon will the program start? Because I have spoken with UN officials and they say that they have underestimated the impact of this drought which is not the first year, this is the third year.
MR. MORRIS: Right.
Q: And initially, even last August, some of the Taliban officials we interviewed, they say that they demanded that the aid be given to the villagers inside their own villages so they wouldn't be forced to either leave their villages or leave the country altogether.
So how soon will all of this start?
MR. MORRIS: We have had ongoing programs already, both our office and our other offices at USAID and at State. I would -- you know, we are working now to work on the strategy, yes, as fast as we can.
Q: You know, because as days go, more people are leaving their villages to those camps, which the situation is horrible there both inside the country and outside the country.
MR. MORRIS: Right.
Q: Do you expect any aid in the future for the Afghan refugees in neighboring countries like Iran or -- Iran or Pakistan you already have said. But they have been fleeing there. And, number two, many Afghan groups have been visiting this building in the past. If any of them have made any effort of this, the program you are announcing today?
MR. MORRIS: I'm sorry, could you repeat your first question?
Q: Any aid in the near future for the Afghan refugees in Pakistan or Iran or elsewhere?
MR. MORRIS: Again, our -- that would be a question which I would hesitate to answer because we really focused on what the humanitarian need was in Afghanistan as it is. On a technical basis, how can we assist? I think that would be more in the realm of policy, which I couldn't answer.
Q: And anybody in the Afghan groups visiting this building, if they have made any efforts on this program you're announcing today, or if they've asked for humanitarian aid in Afghanistan?
MR. MORRIS: No, I haven't. We've spoken to just people on the ground.
Q: Why has no one been there in three years, given that this drought has been brewing for a long time? Why has no one from this government been to Afghanistan for three years?
MR. MORRIS: I would refer to --
MR. LUNDSTEAD: We have security concerns. Afghanistan is an insecure place. In 1998, a UN official, an Italian, was shot and killed. There are threats. They are not only from Afghans, but from many non-Afghans who are there.
That doesn't imply that we haven't been concerned for the last three years. We have a program that has been ongoing all this time. We had to weigh the gravity of the situation now, especially in light of commitment of substantial new resources. And we decided that although there is a security concern, the risk was manageable enough that it was important to send these people in. And I pay tribute to them. This is a risky thing.
We also have another team that, in fact, just came out yesterday that went in with a UN drug control program assessment team to look at the actual situation with the opium poppy crop. Again, we did that because we decided that the situation, the security situation was manageable and that the object of the trip was valuable enough that it was important that these people go in.
Q: Can I just ask you a follow-up on --
Q: Actually, I would like to follow up on my own question, if I may.
Are you going to be -- the additional aid, is that going to involve you having to go to Congress or anything like that? Or is this just money that would be brought from another budget that is already approved?
MR. MORRIS: Len can speak to that.
Q: I'm sorry.
MR. MORRIS: That's all right.
Q: I'm confusing things.
MR. ROGERS: The question is --
Q: Will you have to get approval for this extra aid or is it just going to come out naturally or how does it work?
MR. ROGERS: We will consult with Congress but there is not a legal requirement that we notify them. Most of the resources will be food aid, which will come either from Title II of PL 480 or from USDA Section 416(b) Surplus Agricultural Commodities. And then the non-food aid assistance will come from both the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and State Department's refugee bureau.
And as I said there, there will be consultations in all cases. However, there won't be a legal requirement. And we would expect to resource this out of FY 2001 funding. We do expect that there will be ongoing needs in Afghanistan, so probably the 2002 budget will also be necessary.
Q: I just want to -- this is for any of you, who care to take a crack. I'm sorry if you addressed it earlier; I came in a few minutes late. But just on a general level, obviously the drought is a major reason for the humanitarian situation the way it is. But also a lot of people would argue that the situation with the Taliban contributes to this in a major way.
And my question is, if you were in some way to have better relations with the Taliban, if you were in some way able to get the Taliban to let some of this aid get through, how much do you think would the -- would the humanitarian situation dramatically improve? Or, given the drought and the climate and situation as far as the geography, is it just dire in any event?
MR. MORRIS: I think in the short term, it's dire in any event because of the droughts. And I don't expect the Taliban to change that radically in the short term. But there are things that the Taliban could do to improve access. Obviously, as Jeff has said, security is a major concern. It is a major concern not only for Americans but for all the international humanitarian workers inside Afghanistan.
So if security conditions were to improve so there was ready access to all parts of the country, I think we could quickly make a significant difference.
Q: Would you say that the Taliban in any way, in your limited talks with them, have blackmailed you in any way to say that we'll let some of this aid get through if you'll -- and the security situation could improve if you'll lighten up on the sanctions or something like that?
MR. MORRIS: No. I'm not aware of any such blackmail.
Q: I guess I wouldn't call it blackmail. I mean, just putting pressure on you to say that we could help the situation if you weren't so hard on us.
MR. LUNDSTEAD: You mean they could help feed their own people?
Q: Right. Right.
MR. LUNDSTEAD: Haven't had that discussion.
Q: I have a question about the security. It looks like -- I'm sure once both teams, the narcotics and also the humanitarian ones, once they were inside Afghanistan, they traveled by land, by car. How was the security? Because some of these areas that you traveled to, it looks like they are remote areas and there is no fighting going on there. So it means that the areas are secure, that security is no problem. And the UN actually works in all of those provinces on a continuous basis.
MR. HAVENS: In the provinces that we were in, the security risk was low. I won't say it was absent, but it was low. Certainly we were not in the areas where there was active fighting going on. And at no time during our stay did we feel a situation was unmanageable; we never felt really that there was any risk.
Q: Thank you.
MR. LUNDSTEAD: Well, if I could say on that, the team started in Herat -- well, those of you who have seen the wires today know that in Herat today there was a lot of trouble, because a bomb went off, people were killed, mosques were burned, the Iranian Consulate was burned. So there is always a potential for trouble, and that's what we need to avoid, whether it is a fighting area or not. The team didn't go into Ghowr because the week before, four aid workers -- local aid workers -- were kidnapped. They were released, but they were kidnapped. So there are always security problems.
Q: Isn't it oversimplifying, though, to say that the Taliban could improve the security? Because if they would comply with UN sanctions, there wouldn't be that question anyway, because trade could then open up. I mean, it's just completely different. The sanctions would be lifted and we could trade with them. Doesn't it seem like you are just a drop in the bucket, when --
MR. LUNDSTEAD: The UN sanctions have nothing to do with trade.
Q: No, what I'm saying is --
MR. LUNDSTEAD: Trade continues.
Q: If they would give up bin Laden -- if they would comply and give up bin Laden, we would not consider them -- we would not consider them -- well, not state sponsors, but bad guys, and we would change. I just short-handed it. We would lift our sanctions against them, too. And then the US would be more willing to trade with them and to give them more kinds of aid. They are banned from some of that now by sanctions.
MR. LUNDSTEAD: I don't think they are banned from any aid by sanctions.
Q: Not humanitarian, but we can't do business with them.
MR. LUNDSTEAD: Right, US companies can't do business, and I don't think that's the answer to the current drought situation.
Q: Well, not the drought situation, but you were saying, well, if the Taliban would do more about security, we could get into those areas. Well, if the Taliban would do a lot of things, it wouldn't just be a security problem. I mean, --
MR. LUNDSTEAD: Sure, I'd love that if they'd do those things. No, if they dealt with the terrorism issue, which is not just bin Laden, but with the terrorism issue at large, then that would change the situation drastically.
Q: But why is that not a component of some of the work that you're doing? That's what I'm saying, that it must be frustrating that none of these things are changing, and none of these things are changing, which would improve the situation overall, just drastically. And that's not a component of anything that you're doing, talking to the Taliban or trying to help the people understand that if their government did things differently, things would --
MR. LUNDSTEAD: That's a constant component of what we do. And we talk to the Taliban. I talked to one of them today, in fact. We tell them that they need to find a way to resolve this issue of support for terrorism.
Q: Okay, I just got the impression when you said that talks had been very minimal there that --
MR. LUNDSTEAD: No, no. She asked a specific question of do we talk to them about --
Q: Earlier you said it was very minimal -- very minimal contact with the Taliban while you were there. I just wondered --
MR. LUNDSTEAD: No, the humanitarian team was there to do a technical assessment. We have contacts with the Taliban. The United States Government has contact with the Taliban.
Q: Right. But at the grassroots level, talking to the people that you are seeing, the people that are starving, the people that have no crops, saying if you would talk to your superiors -- to your leaders --
MR. LUNDSTEAD: It's not a democracy.
Q: No, it's not. But there are grassroots movements in countries that don't have a democratic government.
MR. LUNDSTEAD: Well, sure. Well, that's part of our public diplomacy program, and we have VOA broadcasts, we have other ways to try to get that message out.
Q: Okay, one more small question. Can I ask one more thing? If this isn't a famine, what is? You keep saying, we are on the edge of famine, we are on the edge of malnutrition. Is there a specific line that you hit, and then, oh, now it's a famine?
MR. MORRIS: Well, I mean, I'm cautious just purposely because it's definitely a drought, and there are probably areas, like those areas in dark green, where there are pockets of famine. Famine is really a definition where people have what they call emergency levels of malnutrition as a result of not having enough food, which is a result of not having -- the drought certainly has affected -- the malnutrition rates currently are approaching that level. So we were a little bit surprised we didn't see higher rates of malnutrition, and let me just say, malnutrition is measured among children under five.
So that is the most sensitive measurement of a population. I think the reason this is a bit of a paradox for us, the reason was because people are preferentially feeding children.
Q: Right.
MR. MORRIS: And there was a wide prevalence of vitamin deficiencies. There was a team -- the team I mentioned before -- in (inaudible), which is southern Faryab, saw quite a bit of scurvy. So these all compromise the immune system.
So just because malnutrition rates -- they are approaching emergency levels, they aren't at emergency right now, doesn't mean that this drought isn't having a big effect on the health of the population.
Q: What makes it a famine then?
MR. MORRIS: Famine is when we see widespread malnutrition at emergency levels, and death as a result.
Q: Okay. Thank you.
Q: You mentioned 1,500 people a day were coming to (inaudible) camp. Are people actually being turned away from camps at the moment?
MR. HAVENS: The camps -- there were six camps in Herat, and those were the only ones I can really speak to. Five of those camps were shut to new arrivals. (Inaudible) was accepting new arrivals, and actually, the area where this camp is, is a very wide, open area. It could certainly -- they could certainly move in more people. Whether it can sustain more people is the problematic question. At this time, certainly the infrastructure that is in place cannot deal with the population it already has, much less more.
Q: How much difference would it make to your efforts if the Taliban did call a ceasefire? And just so that people can understand the difference, can you give us an idea of how much worse the condition of these people is than, say, the people were when they were coming out of Kosovo, for example, in terms of malnutrition?
MR. LUNDSTEAD: Let me talk about a ceasefire. The team went to places which aren't fighting areas, so --
Q: Yes, but in the long run, do they --
MR. LUNDSTEAD: Well, in the long run peace and stability are necessary to deal with the many, many problems of Afghanistan. In the short run, there are people who are -- people are being displaced for different reasons in Afghanistan. They are being displaced because of drought, because of fighting. So those who are being moved because of fighting, obviously a ceasefire would alleviate that.
The emergency situation across the country is largely due to the drought on top of the 20 years of civil war. A ceasefire, of course, would be good. It wouldn't solve the entire problem by any stretch of the imagination.
Q: The drug team (inaudible) Afghanistan, and they confirmed that there has been no confirmation on -- no poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. What are the prospects now? Could we take that as a positive move by the Taliban and try to work out the other problems, especially the terrorism and Usama bin Laden through them? Because it does have -- no matter how much we say it, the sanctions do have an impact, not only American businesses, but other businesses. Even Afghan-Americans from here, they do not invest in Afghanistan because they think Afghanistan is under sanctions, although we emphasize that it's not Afghanistan, it's the Taliban. But still.
MR. LUNDSTEAD: I think that was about three or four different questions. In terms of the poppy ban, the team has come out. I think they will confirm that poppy planting has been virtually eliminated this year. That's quite an extraordinary fact. We will look at our response to that.
Does it show -- I think your second question -- that the Taliban could deal with other problems? Yes, it probably does. The question then is, why not? Or how can we get them to deal with the other problems. Good question. I don't have an answer.
Q: You know, the security -- I mean, in the past, there was a travel ban for Americans to go to Afghanistan because of security concerns. Couldn't this be a base for the US to start talking to them, dealing with them, not in a sense to recognize them or help them, but just to work out some of the pending problems?
MR. LUNDSTEAD: We have always been ready to work out the problems.
Q: The one thing is that --
MR. MORRIS: I just wanted to follow a second question that you had about comparing the people we saw as opposed to -- I think you used people coming out of Kosovo --
Q: I know that's a bad example, but just to put it in context.
MR. MORRIS: Yes. One of the things that -- the situation is very worrisome, because we would -- there is a tremendous social network of sharing, and so people share food. The villages we visited -- we had the impression that people are -- we saw people -- we saw a grandmother feeding her grandchildren bread with grass, and then she had maybe about four kilograms of wheat in this -- in the corner of her mud house, and she got from a neighbor as a charitable thing. And I think that the situation is that people are in a precipe, in that everyone is more or less at the same level of shared destitution. When the resources finally hit rock bottom, which is very close, then you will see a precipitous rise in -- or a precipitous drop in health and nutrition status. And I think it's just because of the social fabric that we're seeing -- the poverty is shared, let me say it that way.
So to us, that is very worrisome, and we can see that through the vitamin -- the micro-nutrient, the vitamin deficiencies, and the increase in the death rates.
Q: What kind of impacts do you see on the women in particular? Because these are areas that are somewhat remote, have the Taliban policies, which have isolated women so much, have these policies -- are they not being carried out in these areas? Has this famine kind of erased that to some extent?
MR. MORRIS: In the cities, we -- it was more of what your image of -- it was sort of a society with no women, almost, all women in burkas. In the remote villages, we saw -- I mean, women didn't wear burkas; they obviously wore a shawl, put it over their face if we were there. But it seemed to be a different exercise of the use of a burka. We didn't see that. And we were talking to women. It was -- you know, they had things to say. They were concerned about their own food security.
Q: And they were operating bakeries? I mean, they were allowed to participate --
MR. MORRIS: No, that's a different thing. In the village -- now, we're talking about on the village level, in the remote areas. The bakeries were in the cities and that was a very specific program, which is --
Q: But they were allowed to -- to operate in those programs? Because there are times that the Taliban cut them off from --
MR. MORRIS: There were times the Taliban have cut them off. I think that's always a negotiated process in those bakeries, yes.
Q: One thing that is bothering and is not clear yet, that Taliban, they are not the friends of the United States. And, two, they are not the friends of their own people in Afghanistan. And, three, they claim to be government in power. If they don't care for their own people, then why the world should care for them? Let them go down and announce that we do care for our people and now we need help.
MR. MORRIS: You know, again, the people we saw really weren't Taliban people, they were people who were living as farmers and were quite destitute.
Q: But still it's Afghanistan and they are Talibans.
MR. MORRIS: Our assistance is not to the Taliban; it's to the people of Afghanistan. The Taliban are a very small, you might say, a very thin layer on top of a society. That relates to the question of women in villages. There may not even be a Taliban official in a village. They rule through a superstructure, you might say.
Q: Can you talk about your meeting with the Taliban today?
MR. MORRIS: I didn't have a meeting today; I talked to somebody on the phone.
Q: And can you elaborate on what you talked about? Did you initiate the phone call? Did they? Were there specific issues to be discussed?
MR. MORRIS: He was calling me. We were discussing the fact that the Taliban have made persistent efforts to close the offices of the -- what's called UNSMA, which is the political UN office in Afghanistan. And I was telling him I thought that was a bad idea and they should do something else.
Q: In terms of the basic water situation, is there a chance that a change of seasons, some kind of seasonal rain could alleviate the situation? And, second question, is it fair to say that, given the political realities, you are basically reduced to treating the disease, if you like, of malnutrition, famine, but you can't actually cure the situation?
MR. HAVENS: Start with the water question. Certainly, rains would ease some of the problems in the sense that streams where people can collect water, their traditional collection points, may once again start to flow. When you get to items such as wells, aquifers, the things that support those wells, then you're talking that it's going to take a long time. It's going to take more than some seasonal rain; it would probably take many seasonal rains to bring the aquifers up to their original levels.
In the time that we were there, we had discussions with a number of villagers. And, as I had mentioned, some of the wells had gone dry. The wells that they did have, were continuing to decrease as far as the level of water in them. So that is still a downward trend. But certainly, I don't think that one season of rain would certainly make a large difference in the well situation.
As to the political question?
MR. MORRIS: Was that a lead-in question? The answer to Afghanistan's many problems, the beginning of the answer, is peace and stability in Afghanistan. The Taliban continue to believe that they can win a military victory in Afghanistan and impose their will on the country in that way. We think that's not right and it's not the answer.
Q: I think you mentioned earlier that the poppy seed planting had stopped altogether and you had looked at that. Can you expand on that looking?
MR. MORRIS: Well, we've had a team in as part of a UNDCP team, a UN drug control program. This is not a unilateral team. The team, which includes UN officials and officials from other countries was assessing whether the poppy ban is real. I think the general conclusion is that it is quite real and that there is minimal poppy planting this year.
The international community will then have to assess what type of assistance it might provide to farmers, I would say, to the farmers, not to the Taliban, to keep this ban in place and we will be looking at that.
Q: Have we been moving quickly enough on giving them a substitute crop though? I know we've -- this team has already given interviews that came out yesterday and they said that --
MR. MORRIS: They can't plant right now because they're in the middle of a drought. They need something to carry them over, which is where this comes in. And then they will need, assuming that it rains, they will need seeds and tools and credit and I think people will work on that.
Q: Wasn't that something -- was that agreed in advance, that if you stop the cultivation, the international community will come to your aid? Is that something that -- was it a clear bargain that the Taliban chose to take up on?
MR. MORRIS: No, I don't think it was that clear. Frankly, no one believed it when it was announced. That's the way it was.
Q: US State Department reports said that Pakistan authorities agreed in principle to implement the UN resolution. They are not doing it and what are the steps that you are taking to see that Pakistan implements the UN resolution?
MR. MORRIS: Well, the report was a 2000 report, okay? It's not talking about today.
Q: What is the situation now?
MR. MORRIS: The situation now is that Pakistan says that it will abide by the conditions of Security Council Resolution 1333. We expect Pakistan to do so.
MR. HUNTER: All right, we would like to thank our briefers and thank all of you for your attention and hope that in the future we can have another briefing on the results of the steps that we are considering putting in place. Thank you.
(end transcript)
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