Attachments
By: Kobra Moradi
ISBN: 978-91-90084-00-7
Executive summary
The ongoing land conflict between the sedentary Hazara and nomadic Kuchi populations in Afghanistan’s central highlands, known as ‘Hazarajat,’ has a long and complex history, typically underpinned by competing historical narratives and skewed state interventions. Since the return of the Taliban, this conflict has intensified–marked by increasing land ownership claims from nomadic pastoralists, escalating tensions over access to pasturelands, and instances of forced eviction and displacement of settled Hazara communities. This report examines the dynamics of this conflict under the Taliban, providing historical context, exploring the communities' relationships with land, and highlighting the human rights impacts and the Taliban's approach to resolving these disputes.
The research reveals increased tensions over land and water in Hazarajat under the Taliban. Since 2021, nomads have gained greater access to Hazarajat, resulting in overgrazing and destruction of local people’s property, including crops. There has also been a rise in property ownership claims by nomads. In some provinces, nomads have asserted territorial claims over entire villages. These claims often rely on historical farmans (royal decrees), which the Hazaras do not recognize as legitimate. The rise in nomadic presence in the region has increased tensions with sedentary populations that are concerned about overgrazing of pastures that they depend upon, damages to pastural and agricultural resources, the loss of their ancestral homes and land, and their general security. The historical memory of past atrocities and ongoing displacement have deepened Hazara fears of continued dispossession and further territorial loss. From the perspective of nomads, they are reclaiming grazing lands that they believe are rightfully theirs based on historical decrees, arguing they have been unjustly denied access in the past few decades.
The report highlights that the Taliban's approach to this conflict has worsened the situation. The Taliban has adopted several methods. First, establishing three dispute resolution commissions in Bamiyan, Maidan Wardak, and Ghazni. Second, handling some cases with ad hoc bodies, often referred to as commissions, presenting this as a traditional musaliha process. Third, imposing decisions by local authorities, including district and provincial governors. Fourth, referring certain cases to local courts.
The interviews with impacted populations and secondary data reveal that decisions made by these mechanisms often lack impartiality, transparency, and due process. For instance, interviewees reported that Taliban local authorities frequently detained local elders and leaders to coerce villagers into decision-making processes under the guise of musaliha, exerting undue influence, rather than allowing both parties to participate willingly with equal standing and a fair procedure. This created an environment of fear, where villagers felt unsafe and lacked the autonomy to speak up and protect their rights. Additionally, local governors imposed decisions on villagers without providing any clarity on how those decisions were reached. Furthermore, in the Bamiyan commission, Hazara members were reportedly threatened to sign decisions made by other commission members that resulted in the loss of land for villagers, ultimately leading to their resignation in protest of the commission's biased decision-making.
This research finds that the Taliban response to the conflict is therefore characterised by coercive measures, undue influence, and lack impartiality, transparency, and due process. This contravenes the right to access to justice, which is protected under international law. This right ensures the determination of rights and obligations in a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by law, as well as the right to equality before such a tribunal.
The situation has resulted in human rights violations, disproportionately affecting villagers, this report finds. These include arbitrary deprivation of land, instances of forced eviction and displacement, extortion, killings, and arbitrary detention, with the involvement or support of the Taliban. In many instances, the Taliban forcibly evicted local villagers from their homes and land, leading to their displacement. Majority of the reported cases of arbitrary detention involved local Taliban authorities using detention to coerce villagers into 'negotiations' and enforce compliance. Hazara interviewees also highlighted lack of trust towards the Taliban, noting that their complaints are often dismissed and ignored. Some complainants faced detention, leading villagers to avoid approaching the Taliban with their issues fearing further repercussions. While, as de facto authorities, the Taliban are obligated under international law to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights, their approach to land disputes—characterized by discriminatory practices and extrajudicial actions—is inconsistent with their obligations under international law, particularly concerning the right to access to justice and effective remedy, as well as other fundamental rights.
Nomads described experiencing state violence during the Republic period, along with persistent social discrimination. They reported improvements in their situation under the current regime, particularly expressing gratitude for gaining access to pastures in Hazarajat. However, they continue to face significant challenges, including limited access to basic necessities such as healthcare, clean water, education, and even mosques for prayer. They also complained about new restrictions on their annual migration, noting that the Taliban now require them to obtain a permission letter to travel to Pakistan. Some noted that their problems could be addressed through resettlement and access to land.
The unfolding land conflict in Hazarajat threatens further displacement, economic exploitation, and land loss for sedentary communities. This situation may shift demographics and undermine Hazara access to and control over their ancestral lands, as villagers continue to lose their property and migrate internally or to neighbouring Iran and Pakistan—a prospect feared by many Hazara interviewees. Moreover, the Taliban's approach to the issue, marked by bias, coercion, and a lack of due process, may further exacerbate the divide, mistrust, and a sense of insecurity between villagers and nomads. Interviewees from both sides associated regime changes with their relative power imbalances and overall situation concerning access to land and land resources. For instance, nomads believe that Hazaras received government support during the previous regime, while Hazaras point to the influence of powerful nomads in the former governments of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani and their current belief that these nomads are now backed by the Taliban regime. Furthermore, the Taliban's subversion of the musaliha process—transforming it into a tool of coercion that is institutionalized and applied discriminatorily—risks eroding trust in a mechanism that could be adapted to a localized and accessible conflict resolution process.
To prevent further escalation of this long-standing conflict, any future responses must ensure due process, guaranteeing that decision-making is conducted impartially, fairly, and transparently. A thorough understanding of the historical context that has shaped the conflict is essential. Continued research is also crucial for grasping the evolving dynamics of intercommunal land disputes in Afghanistan and developing solutions that look beyond top-down interventions, which have often exacerbated rather than resolved the conflict. This research underscores the need for further inquiry into the perceptions and experiences of both sedentary and nomadic populations. Future studies could explore how these communities envision potential resolutions, including how the State might improve its responses but also the possibilities for bottom-up reconciliation approaches.