Attachments
ISBN: 978-91-86910-96-9
1. Introduction and Methodology
Since the Taliban’s 2021 takeover of Afghanistan, its approach towards education has drawn global and local condemnation, mostly for restrictions on girls’ schooling, along with widespread concern about the administration’s relationship with madrasas. But limits on both international and local media coverage and policy research, along with the sharp politicisation of discourse on education under the Taliban, have led to conspiratorial rumours and some mischaracterisations.
This report draws on limited primary data to explore the Taliban’s efforts to integrate and regulate religious education institutions, or madrasas, as part of its broader “State-building” and socialengineering endeavours in Afghanistan. The available data suggests that the Taliban is pursuing an ambitious re-imagining of the role of madrasas in the country. However, the extent to which it can successfully implement this vision – and the potential intended and unintended consequences for its State-building efforts and the Afghan people – remains uncertain. Here, we offer preliminary reflections on the Taliban’s actions and motivations, as well as insights into how madrasa insiders perceive these efforts.
Different data sources were used for this research. The existing academic, media and other sources of literature on madrasas in Afghanistan and Pakistan were surveyed. To collect primary data, the policies, rules, curriculums and statements of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s (IEA) ministries of Education, Higher Education, and Guidance, Hajj and Endowments were closely studied.
In addition to these primary texts, 35 key informant interviews (KII) were conducted with students, graduates, teachers and administrators of madrasas in seven provinces of Afghanistan: Kabul, Herat, Nangarhar, Balkh, Kandahar, Khost and Paktia during December of 2023 and January of 2024.
Almost one third of interviewees (11/35) were female, and roughly half (18/35) were from rural areas. Almost half the interviewees (16/35) were either teachers or head teachers, while the rest were 2 students. Three interviewees were younger than 20, and 13 were between 20 and 30 years old; the remainder were 40 or older. Two interviewees were from the jihadi madrasas in Nangarhar and Paktia, and two are from public madrasas in Balkh.
In addition to these KIIs, 13 interviewees were conducted with expert researchers and journalists whose work focuses on madrasas in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most experts interviewed were from Pakistan and all but one were male. Another set of interviews were conducted from August-October 2023. These took place both in Kabul and at the provincial level in Balkh, Badakhshan and Bamyan, with the de facto authorities’ (DFA) officials assigned to education-related ministries or with affiliated portfolios, as well as with non-profit and private-education professionals.
The expert interviews were conducted by the authors; the field interviews were conducted by a team of local researchers. The interviewers took extensive notes during each interview, which were then analysed to identify common themes and sub-themes. The analysed notes and the primary texts form the foundation of this report.
This research faced several major challenges. First, due to the lack of explicit authorisation from the DFA, the research team in Afghanistan had to be extremely careful in the selection of interviewees. As a mitigating strategy, the research team used convenience sampling while making every attempt to ensure diversity within the sample. Secondly, due to the sensitivity of the topic, it was not possible to interview more than two or three officials from the DFA directly. However, the research team was able to locate and examine written policies, rules, curriculums and statements of formal officials within the relevant ministries, and to interview experts close to the DFA. Finally, due to there being fewer female students and teachers, as well as the difficulty getting access to female interviewees, as previously noted, less than one-third of the interviewees are female.
A note on terminology: in many places, this report refers to the Taliban’s national administration as the “de facto authorities” (DFA), especially in the context of its regulatory authority over the education sector. This term is employed by many UN entities and humanitarian organisations operating inside Afghanistan, and has been adopted to account for the internationally unrecognised diplomatic status of the Taliban. However, other aspects of this report covering the Taliban’s political and intellectual leadership, beyond the confines of bureaucratic responsibility or official office, are best served by referring directly to the Taliban movement that underpins the State administration.
This report opens with general context and analysis of the madrasa environment in Afghanistan’s recent past, then examines the regulatory frameworks and measures the Taliban inherited, and what it has implemented since its takeover. It explores the phenomenon of jihadi madrasas and their significance for the Taliban at length. The latter sections of the report provide synthesis and detailed excerpts of interviewees’ views on critical topics and questions, before offering policy-relevant conclusions for donor States.