Sukanya Mohan Das
This brief paper was written following reflections on "Planning Considerations for International Involvement in Post-Taliban Afghanistan", by Jarat Chopra et al and published in the JHA in December 2001. Whilst the author agreed in principle with the recommendations made in the article, it was felt that there was a need to highlight the importance of process issues and societal inclusion, as they relate to the civilian tasks of re-establishing a system of governance and public administration in Afghanistan. This, however, in no way downplays the extreme importance of the military aspects of the transition, as security is a pre-requisite to peaceful and normal functioning of society.
Process in the context of this paper, concerns the manner or means by which a particular goal is accomplished. In the case of post-Taliban Afghanistan, the "mission" for the Afghan peoples and the international community is the creation of a sustainable peace, and an environment which will allow much needed emergency humanitarian assistance and development initiatives to take place. By speaking of process issues, the focus is on how such a transformation is brought about. Process issues are what ultimately determine the legitimacy of systems, institutions and mechanisms of governance and administration established in the course of the mission, as well as the levels of popularly felt ownership in the transitional process.
This paper examines some of the ways in which the quality of processes, related to re-establishing systems and institutions of governance in Afghanistan, can be improved by greater inclusion and/or participation of local communities from the very start of the transition. It also discusses some of the current practices of international donors/financiers, and illustrates ways in which their interventions can be improved through better processes/procedures; and by acting in the best interests of "beneficiary" countries, as opposed to institutional interests. In so doing, the author draws largely from the recent experience of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The paper begins with the matter of "priorities", time frames and budgets - in an effort to illustrate the importance of process, in some of the drier but critical aspects of formulating the task that lies ahead. It then elaborates on the case for broader inclusion and participation of grass-roots communities, before concluding with a possible model which would allow such communities greater "inclusion" - if not participation - in the processes which shape their country's future.
Priorities, time frames, turf and budgets
In light of the scale of physical destruction and societal fragmentation, displacement, trauma from years of prolonged conflict and human rights abuses in Afghanistan, there is a need for objectivity and honesty both in assessing what needs to be done and setting time frames for doing so. In the haste to be seen as "doing" something, it would indeed be a pity if the international community - specifically the UN - international financial institutions, donors and bilateral development agencies were to inadvertently miss the wood for the trees. The following examples from East Timor illustrate some of the problems faced early on in the transitional period
Insufficient consideration of psycho-social recovery of communities
Even during the emergency/rehabilitation phase of UNTAET, trauma and mental health issues did not receive the attention they were due from the Transitional Administration and international donors/financiers supporting emergency interventions. Although awareness of this deficiency increased over the course of the transitional period, it was mostly within non-governmental organisation (NGO) circles - and no allocation for mental health was made in the East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA) 2001-2002 budget [1] . This failing is perhaps even more glaring given the "reconciliation" rhetoric heard from the very outset of UNTAET, which continued in later phases of the transition; and the references made in UN Security Council Resolution 1272 to gross human rights violations. [2]
In the planning of emergency assistance, rehabilitation and development initiatives for Afghanistan, it is therefore recommended that some thought be given at the very outset, as to how support could be given to average Afghan citizens for the recovery and rebuilding of their communities in psychological as well as in physical terms. In so doing, a more stable foundation for sustainable reconciliation, peace building, reconstruction and development would be laid. One possible way of structuring some sort of support to communities at the grass-roots level, even where mental health care and trauma counselling are not available, is presented subsequently in this paper.
Inability to recognise the inherent limitations of a transitional government
In the limelight and glare of publicity which accompany the start of a mission, national and international actors tend to make statements as to what they expect to accomplish in the course of the transitional period and subsequent years. In the case of UN-managed interventions, these objectives are usually laid out in Security Council Resolutions. In East Timor, Resolution 1272 set out the mandate for UNTAET, which included the "establishment of an effective administration". Whilst such aims are both noble and necessary for the future well-being of countries such as East Timor and Afghanistan, it would be fair to ask whether the establishment of an "effective administration" can be accomplished in the relatively short life-span of a transitional administration - whether nationally-led or UN-administered. For this reason, it is recommended that national and international actors set objectives that are more realistic and attainable. Thus, although it may not, in the space of 2 to 3 years, be possible to establish an "effective administration" on par with other, (post) modern day democratic states, it would be feasible to commit to laying the foundations for an effective system of governance and public administration. Such a commitment could place emphasis on re-establishing the rule of law and administration of justice, security, delivery of essential services (health, education etc.) and other important areas of governance, including civic education and other steps towards developing a broadly accepted constitution.
There seems little point in having the mere appearance or facade of institutions and systems of governance and administration, where there is little real substance - or foundation beneath them. One classic example is the haste with which UNTAET sought to create a civil service in East Timor. As the imperative to have an East Timorese civil service became increasingly urgent, [3] the attention initially given to ensuring meaningful processes/consultation with East Timorese interlocutors was abandoned. As a result, recruitment into the service proceeded unchecked, driven almost entirely by foreign "experts", resulting in severe complications - which the East Timorese will inherit, post-independence. [4]
Attempting complex tasks without regard to time frames
The hubris of seeking to perform Herculean tasks within impossibly short time frames is mirrored in well-intentioned projects or programmes that seek to effect profound social change in societies emerging from conflict. These include projects or programmes that focus on empowerment/participation, gender, and conservation, all of which entail shifting mind sets, behaviour patterns and possibly challenging traditional/cultural norms and practices. Whilst hardly anyone will question the rationale or raison d'être for such projects/programmes, it would be incumbent on transitional authorities to question prospective donors/financiers of such projects/programmes to provide realistic time frames for their implementation. In this connection, it is critical that Transitional Administrations try to secure the following commitments from donors/financiers:
- Concrete commitments which extend the life-spans for these types of development interventions (or increase flexibility of the project/programme life-cycle), reflected in project/programme budgets; and,
- Formal agreements to the effect that project/programme implementation will prioritise achievement of qualitative milestones and not disbursement schedules. [5]
Unclear budgets and tussles over institutional responsibilities/turf or "territory"
Another critical matter that can be overlooked in the early stages of a mission is the shape of the transitional authority's budget. In the early days of UNTAET, the budget put forward by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) advisors was made up of specific projects/programmes in the different sectors of the economy, which had been formulated primarily by international financial institutions and bilateral development agencies. As a result, the budget had a "project/programme" structure - with the attendant limitations - and did not reflect or resemble anything like a "normal" governmental budget. [6] Whilst this lapse is somewhat understandable given the far from normal circumstances in East Timor post-September 1999, it is hoped that future undertakings of a similar nature can avoid such predictable teething problems.
Yet another issue, which warrants timely consideration by all parties involved in re-building Afghanistan, is the delineation of responsibilities between the different institutions - the United Nations agencies, World Bank, IMF and bilateral financiers. It is essential that institutional agreements on roles and responsibilities of the different institutions, and the means by which these roles and operational procedures will be harmonised, are worked out as expeditiously as possible. This would help to ensure that these actors remain focused on what is in the best interest (or priorities) of the country, as opposed to safeguarding individual institutional interests, or "territory". In this regard, one cannot agree more with the recommendation in the article by Chopra et al, on the importance for strong Afghan leadership that is capable of negotiating institutional arrangements that are in the best interests of the country [7] . It is therefore recommended that the different parties designate specific representatives to jointly work out the fine details of institutional roles and responsibilities. Harmonisation of institutional rules, regulations and procedures are also critical - particularly in ensuring the smooth flow of funds from donors, to the designated trustee(s) and implementation agencies on the ground.
The central argument in this section has been that the quality of processes determines the quality of interventions/assistance rendered in the establishment of transitional administrations. The illustrations provided, support the contention that if process issues are to be taken seriously in the creation of transitional administrations, there needs to be a comprehensive review of current practices of key institutional players. Why? For the simple reason that current practices simply do not cater for the exceptional circumstances of countries emerging from conflicts - often lacking "legitimate" governments, a functioning civil administration and stable civil society.
The case for engagement with the grass roots
Importance of inclusion
The article by Chopra et al quite rightly stresses the importance of creating "political space" within Afghanistan, in order to provide an environment conducive to free political and social interaction. However, once this space is created, the transitional authority may still face the challenge of having to coax or draw out individual members of communities, to witness - if not directly to participate - in the shaping of their country's future. Given the brutal social and political controls exercised under the Taliban regime, and the years of marginalisation and intense conflict, it may take considerable time before the average Afghan - female, male, adult or child - may feel secure enough to engage in open discussions/debates on the their collective future. [8]
The combined effects of such arbitrary exclusion, the prolonged conflicts and devastation from recent bombings and the entry of foreign troops may make it even harder to draw people back into "normal/democratic" social, political and economic life. With all the international media attention focussing on Osama bin Laden/the war against terrorism and plans afoot for the re-building of Afghanistan, the majority of Afghans, living in areas far removed from the media spotlight, may in all likelihood be extremely isolated and unaware of these developments.
In this context, the urgency and importance of "engaging" or building a relationship with communities at the very "lowest"/grass roots level, and including them as partners in the transition, cannot be dismissed. And the first step towards such engagement would be the timely dissemination of information together with delivery of emergency assistance. In its initial stages, the information could include the following:
- The transitional arrangements: including leadership/authorities at national level and their relationship to foreign civilian and military actors;
- Who are legitimate local holders of "power", responsible for linkages with regional and national authorities;
- What laws are in operation in Afghanistan. This would be of profound significance to women and other persons excluded from social, economic and political spheres under the Taliban; and
- What forms of assistance they can expect to get in the immediate/short term.
As the situation becomes clearer, up-dated information can be channelled to communities. Immense benefits would accrue from engaging with communities at the very outset of the transitional period, for instance:
- Lowering levels of mistrust/suspicion within fragmented communities
In a situation in which communities may be very isolated and/or under the control of feudal warlords, whoever possesses information possesses power. Equal and open access to information would undoubtedly curb unscrupulous opportunists or heavy-handed warlords from exploiting/manipulating the insecurities or tensions within a population that is unsure of what the future holds. Where information is openly known within a community, the risk of misunderstandings and proliferation of rumours would be lowered [9] . This approach could also be a less threatening and subtler means of "de-legitimising" warlords who are feared and/or have no support of communities.
- Increasing the credibility of the transitional administration in the eyes of average Afghans
By increased transparency of process and through timely dissemination of current information to the local population, the transitional administration would also give its popularity a boost. However, for these benefits to be maximised, the flow of information should be two-way - that is, communities are not merely on the receiving end but have some opportunity for giving feedback to authorities. Providing communities an opportunity to give feedback on issues during the transition could further legitimise the transitional administration in the eyes of the broader public.
A simple way of delivering emergency assistance jointly with dissemination of information is by equipping relief workers with loudspeakers. At each drop off point, it may be possible to spare 30 - 45 minutes to make public announcements. [10] Proponents of "hit and run" aid delivery may object to the delays/inefficiencies of an extra 45 minutes, but the extra time may just as well improve distribution of humanitarian aid through better interaction with communities/targeted beneficiaries. [11] Extra time with local communities may also enable qualitative evaluation of aid delivery.
A "new deal" or social contract model for participation
In this model of participation, contact is established by local level transitional authorities with local communities at the soonest possible opportunity. This could be done through periodic meetings with communities and representatives from the local level transitional authority. Given the likelihood that staffing budgets for local authorities will be fairly tight/restrictive, these meetings could be facilitated by local NGOs, sub-contracted for this purpose.
Initial meetings with communities would establish the schedule, frequency and issues for discussion in subsequent meetings. The key is to stress flexibility, and what is most convenient for the communities. However, to build up rapport with the communities, the facilitators for the meetings can take as their starting point provision of information to communities on the transitional arrangements, including a "who's who" in the transitional administration and the roles of the different international actors.
It is envisaged that the very first few interactions with communities would include the following:
- Priorities for emergency aid, rehabilitation and development;
- Maintenance of peace and stability within the community and local areas;
- Restoration of social, political and economic activities, including local/community forms of governance, dispute resolution and local markets; and
- Delineation of roles and responsibilities of local communities and local transitional authorities.
The above are merely starting points for the discussions with (and within) communities and would not pre-empt more in-depth discussions as to the nature of community participation in economic/development initiatives, [12] the nature of community participation in shaping local level transitional authorities, or on the future constitution of Afghanistan. The Transitional Administration may also choose to involve representatives from the various emergency rehabilitation and development actors to participate in these meetings [13] .
These participatory discussions will essentially set the framework for relations between communities and their local transitional authorities and, by extension, their linkage to national level authorities and their foreign/international partners. A transparent and collectively agreed upon "social contract" could enumerate the expectations, roles, rights and responsibilities of local communities and of local level authorities in the transitional period and prior to the adoption of a national constitution. These interactions with local communities could in fact prepare them for in-depth discussions on the formulation of the national constitution, and prepare them for meaningful participation in a truly democratic Afghanistan.
This model could also have positive impacts on:
- Local level stability in the transitional period, due to:
- Local agreements on peace and security
- Good working relations between local communities, local level transitional authorities and aid/development partners (be it UN, bilateral, multilateral and NGO donors or financiers, as well as the multinational military force).
- Defusing the tensions between local warlords and local level authorities, whilst visibly safeguarding the interest of communities.
- Strengthening the legitimacy of the transitional administration, both locally and at the national level.
The transparency and openness of this model could also fortify peace processes and reconciliation initiatives in fragmented communities. This is due to the fact that interactions in the "political space" of community meetings would be premised on the equality of all persons who choose to participate - regardless of traditional, social or other hierarchies. [14]
Moreover, this model for participatory and open discussions with/within communities could be instrumental in ensuring that present day references to Afghan history, culture and tradition serve to increase humane and pragmatic treatment of contemporary issues facing the country and not shackle the country's future to the past.
The model described may be labour intensive and involve a commitment of time on the part of communities and transitional authorities - but would yield positive results, as:
- communities would be more stable;
- the participation of women and other vulnerable segments of the population can be monitored and improved;
- the quality of aid and development interventions would be improved; and most importantly,
- communities would have better faith in the transitional administration and greater confidence in the country's future.
Other spin-offs from this exercise would be employment creation and capacity building of local transitional authorities, local NGOs, and other Afghans involved in facilitating these community meetings (if not the communities themselves). Ultimately this commitment of time, and simple interaction with communities would be the most visible sign that the transitional administration and their international partners actually care about their well being. And, this impression that they are not going to be isolated or alone in facing the hardships of re-building their lives, livelihoods and communities, would certainly have a profound effect on the still traumatised/shell-shocked population. It may not be mental health care or trauma counselling, but it would at least be the means through which local communities can communicate to the transitional administration on their immediate priorities, as well as facilitate/support their interactions as a "community" in the broader political space that is created.
Lastly, this model of participation, suggests there is a "middle way", or balance, that can allow greater inclusion and participation of communities in the transitional period, without compromising the capacity of transitional authorities to take necessary decisions. The onus that is placed on the transitional administration, is to be transparent in its operations and provide timely information to the grass roots. In so doing, the expectations of average Afghan citizens at the grass roots level can be matched (lowered or raised, as appropriate) or better managed by the transitional administration.
Conclusion - Ends are defined by Quality of means
Process issues - that is, the quality of processes, determine the success or failure of emergency aid and development initiatives aimed at supporting the establishment of systems of governance and public administration in countries newly emerging from conflict. The two central thrusts of this paper are that:
- Current practice of international aid and development institutions needs to be improved in terms of the processes, procedures and frameworks they utilise in providing technical advice and emergency aid or development resources; and by remaining focussed on the priorities - what is in the best interest of the "beneficiary" country as a whole [15] ; and
- That inclusion of grass roots level communities in the transitional period - through transparency and timely provision of information, if not through their actual participation - is essential to the overall (good) quality of the transitional process, as illustrated by:
- Increased legitimacy of the system and instruments of governance created in the transitional period;
- A sense of popular "ownership" of the institutions, due to transparency of process and greater accountability towards the grass roots; and
- Greater stability in communities through healthy social, economic and political discourse.
Improved processes and practices of international aid and development actors, coupled with increased inclusion and participation, as described in this paper - would gently prepare grass roots communities and vulnerable groups in Afghan society and national leadership - warlords included - for the challenges of building a new and democratic Afghanistan. In the enlightened times of the 21st century, even the poorest countries and most marginal communities have a right to accountability - not merely from national leadership but also highly-placed international donors/financiers, including UN officials, who are entrusted to serve them. The integrity of national leadership and of the international community depends on the extent to which they acknowledge this duty, are willing to undertake continuous and honest appraisal of institutional practices, processes and interventions initiated during the transition.
Footnotes:
[1] In terms of health care, the key providers of health services were NGOs, including the Church. Some of the gaps, particularly for emergency medical assistance in rural areas were filled by Peace-keepers based in those areas. Unfortunately, some of the international NGOs providing health services have begun to phase down their activities in East Timor - this - together with the painfully limited resources available to the ETTA Health Department, will mean that delivery of health care services shall be further reduced, particularly in more remote/outer-lying areas. In such dire circumstances, mental health care and psychological trauma can easily be forgotten.
[2] The situation was all the more ironic given the hullabaloo over the "success" of emergency humanitarian assistance efforts in East Timor, which featured unevenly distributed food, temporary shelter kits and other non-food items (NFIs) - a "success" that the East Timorese have tried unsuccessfully to challenge.
[3] This haste was apparent as early as December 1999, and in the view of the author, emerged from UN officials possibly under pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), rather than the East Timorese, many whom had yet to return to East Timor. The Conselho Nacional de Resistencia Timorenses (CNRT) leadership, which received widespread support in the period following the referendum, had not had sufficient time to confer with their middle-level cadre, who had been in consultations with mid-level UNTAET officials on the future of East Timorese civil servants who had served under Indonesian rule.
[4] In particular fields, such as education, there were widespread allegations of discrepancies in recruitment processes and running of district-level education departments. In 2001, the East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA) was compelled to take cognizance of these issues and conduct an inquiry under the direction of the Inspector General of ETTA. These widely known maladies within East Timor's education sector also further undermined public confidence in the new administration.
[5] The Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project (CEP) in East Timor is a case in point. The CEP had been formulated by the World Bank on the basis of a similar project (the Kecamatan Development Project/KDP) in Indonesia. Whilst the stated objectives of the project were admirable, the time frames for implementation were entirely unreasonable given the ground level realities in East Timor, e.g. the displaced population, the huge tasks before the sub-contractor charged with project implementation (i.e. recruitment and training of local community facilitators, preparing communities for meaningful participation in project activities, training community leaders) etc. What was even more worrying was the pressure from the World Bank for financial disbursement - at the expense of the positive social objectives (i.e. grass roots empowerment, creation of viable and democratic local institutions, poverty reduction) which were the core objectives of the project.
[6] Perhaps the most glaring flaw was the absence of allocations for recurrent expenditures in critical areas such as maintenance of the country's fragile roads.
[7] It must be acknowledged that the "bargaining" position of national leaders in Afghanistan (as clearly evidenced by the case of East Timor), in relation to the international community is weak. And even though development practice has become more enlightened over the years, there is still some amount of arrogance in the way that powerful international donors/financiers, including UN bureaucrats, interact with "beneficiary" countries. People of such countries are expected to gratefully accept whatever package presented to them - even though what is offered may not be fully understood or suitable to them.
[8] It is, as pointed out by Chopra et al, essential that the multinational military force embark on negotiations with all armed groups in Afghanistan (not merely the Northern Alliance) to surrender or stop bearing their arms in public, as visibility of weapons and/or widespread private possession of arms would constitute a continued threat to free social, political and economic interaction.
[9] In East Timor, this was illustrated by the rampant circulation of rumours which eventually prompted UNTAET to establish an office to monitor and defuse the more outlandish rumours circulating in the country.
[10] There are of course other ways of mass communication, the suggestion here is deliberately kept simple, so as to facilitate dissemination of information as quickly as possible in an environment in which printed, audio, or audio-visual information materials are not feasible.
[11] The experience of emergency assistance delivery in East Timor can certainly be classified as "hit and run". The emphasis on an almost militant style of delivery meant that there was no engagement with local leaders, most of whom were resistance leaders who maintained fairly accurate records of the local population. The excuses for their blanket exclusion were their questionable legitimacy and risk of corruption. Unfortunately a "no middle way" approach was undertaken by Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) officials in East Timor, and due to little understanding of local demography, aid was blindly delivered to designated drop-off points without reference to where exactly people were living. Even as late as the middle of 2001, there were still displaced people and entire villages in the worst affected parts of the country. For example in Covalima District, there were entire villages that were unoccupied, as their former residents did not feel secure enough to return. As a result, "new" villages were created closer to bigger villages or near town centres, but bearing the names of former, more remote villages. To complicate matters further, some villages had two locations, the original site being in the hinterland and usually inhabited by the older generation, with a relatively newer site, closer to an urban centre.
[12] For instance, it could turn out that local communities are recognised as keepers of local knowledge, information that is essential to the planning of emergency, rehabilitation and development initiatives in their areas. This may lead to the application of participatory techniques (e.g. PLA/participatory learning and action) in poverty assessments, planning of emergency humanitarian assistance, development planning, implementation and evaluation of the initiatives. Another positive impact from such open and transparent processes in planning emergency and development assistance for communities - is in terms of equity. Where decisions are taken transparently and with the participation of the community, there are greater opportunities for reconciling different interests within the community and the risks of inequitable distribution are lessened.
[13] One of the most frequent requests from villagers in East Timor were for joint meetings with the various aid/development actors (bilateral, multilateral, NGO etc) operating in their areas. By having joint meetings and the presence of all relevant actors, they felt that they could make better sense of the range of initiatives taking place, ask questions and reconcile the roles/responsibilities of the different actors. The World Bank must be given credit for recognising the need to engage with normal people and initiated half-day "town hall" meetings in each district capital, in the middle of 2000. On the thorny issue of "raising expectations" of communities, the rule is to be entirely honest with communities on what is reasonable for them to expect - however little it is. In East Timor, some communities very candidly expressed the view that it was better to hear bad news "up front" - because at least they would not continue to hope for something better and could then get on to doing what was necessary themselves.
[14] Albeit with commonly agreed upon "rules of order".
[15] It is hoped that the review of institutional practices would also prompt individual development practitioners to reflect on, and where necessary, change their own attitudes or conduct in carrying out their tasks.