Executive Summary
Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, and the illicit economy and trafficking it facilitates, is recognised as one of the primary interlinked challenges to the long-term security, sustainable economic development and well-functioning governance of Afghanistan. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has said, “Poppy, its cultivation and drugs are Afghanistan’s major enemy,” with narcotics threatening “the very existence of the Afghan state”. Security has been singled out as the essential prerequisite for success in Afghanistan. Research suggests that corruption at all levels of government enables narcotics trafficking while rendering counter-narcotics efforts ineffective or even counterproductive. Balancing counterterrorism and counterinsurgency with counter-narcotics efforts has posed a challenge.
The US Congressional Committee report “Warlords, Inc.” says the Taliban’s principal source of income is its control of the opium trade, as well related sources, such as farming and transportation. Since figures are not officially reported, the estimates of funding the insurgents derive from the drug trade vary widely.
Strategies designed to address Afghanistan’s narcotics problem have reflected lessons learnt from previous counter-narcotics efforts. In 2003, the Afghan government introduced a National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) with the objective of eliminating production, consumption and trafficking of opium. Eradication became the core of the counter-narcotics policy until 2009. Aware that eradication alienated rural Afghans who depend on opium as the main source of income, the American military distanced itself from eradication, and instead supported provincial governors to conduct operations. In 2009, a new US strategy placed primary focus on interdiction of the nexus between narco-trafficking and the insurgency, and emphasized agricultural assistance to farmers and rural development. The new US counter-narcotics strategy was developed from lessons learnt in counter-drug campaigns in Colombia, Peru and Thailand.
The Afghan government is in charge of all counter-narcotics operations, and the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics (MCN) coordinates the efforts of the forces under the control of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Ministry of the Interior (MoI). MoI has the preponderance of forces with the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) and the British-trained Afghan Special Narcotics Force (ASNF).The effectiveness of counter-narcotics operations has been mixed. For instance, in Helmand, Afghanistan’s largest poppy-growing province, cultivation has been declining for three consecutive years. This may be the result of increased eradication efforts, but a fungus has also ravaged the poppies. The same DoD reports says counter-narcotics efforts are hampered by corruption and poor security, and that “greater political will, increased institutional capacity, and more robust efforts at all levels of government are required to decrease cultivation and combat trafficking”.
The experts predict that poppy cultivation will increase after international combat forces withdraw, and that it will not severely affect the insurgents’ ability to fund themselves, nor will it have an effect on the powerful “patrons” in the country. The Afghan government’s efforts to control the poppy culture are interlinked with the other problems of security and corruption. Good governance and an effective program to solve the problems at the same time is essential, according to President Karzai, to solving all of them together.