The nature of the current drought in Afghanistan and the response of the assistance community

Introduction
Afghanistan has been hit by a serious drought as a consequence of low rainfall and snow melt over the winter of 1999/2000. The impact of this has been well documented by the WFP/FAO crop assessment of June 2000 and ongoing monitoring mechanisms have been established by WFP VAM, ECHO-funded NGOs and others to assess the situation as it evolves. The purpose of this paper is to present an overview of the drought situation and the responses of humanitarian agencies to it as at the beginning of November 2000, based on interviews with key informants within the UN and amongst NGOs engaged in interventions relating to the drought.

The impact of the drought

WFP VAM has identified certain areas of Afghanistan as of concern based on three types of classification: Crisis Areas, Most Severely Affected and Severely Affected.

The parts of the country identified as Crisis Areas include most of Ghor, Badghis, Faryab and Sari Pul, the southern districts of Balkh (Cimtal, Solgara, Kisindih and Cahar Kint) and Samangan ( Darayi Suf and Ruyi Duab) and the northern districts of Uruzgan ( Dai Kundi and Shahristan).

The zones designated as Most Severely Affected are the remaining areas of Faryab, Ghor and Sari Pul, additional areas of Balkh and Samangan, southern Bamyan, Central Uruzgan, most of Ghazni and Zabul, the southern two thirds of Paktika, north-eastern Qandahar, the rangeland area of north-western Helmand, eastern Farah, eastern Herat, Central Nangarhar and northern Takhar.

The zones denoted as Severely Affected are the remaining areas of Bamyan, all of Parwan, central Kapisa, northern Balkh and most of Jawzjan.

In general terms we can therefore say that the central highlands and the rain-fed belt of northern Afghanistan have been the worst affected, together with the south-east of the country and pockets in Nangarhar and Takhar.

Within these zones, the impact of the drought has been felt differentially from district to district, from valley to valley, from village to village and from family to family. Among the factors that have influenced this variable impact, we can identify the following:

• The particular characteristics of a given local economy will have had a determining influence on its ability to withstand the drought: the degree of access to water, the availability of irrigated land, dependence on livestock, ease of access to markets and control of the marketing process.
• There will have been pre-existent differences in poverty levels within given communities depending on the access of breadwinners within households to land, sharecropping arrangements, livestock ownership and additional sources of income and on their age, gender and disability. The varying levels of economic vulnerability will have had an inevitable impact on the ability to withstand the impact of the drought.
• Some areas had suffered from drought and other economic shocks over a period prior to the 2000 drought and their populations had, as a consequence, already been selling assets and incurring debts. Some will also have been facing destitution or varying levels of malnutrition. ACF estimated malnutrition at around 10% in Shahrestan in southern Hazarajat.
• Rain fed areas have been worse affected than irrigated areas and areas which are exclusively dependent on rain-fed wheat are more vulnerable than those which have access to some irrigated land.
• Areas that are relatively far from water sources have suffered more than those that can continue to access the reduced water available from rivers, canals, karezes, springs and reservoirs.
• Some areas are particularly vulnerable during the winter months, especially those that are inaccessible because of snow.
• There has been a large variation from one district to another in the rate at which the water table has fallen, although there has been an overall average of one metre per month across the country.
• The ability of a given community to retain sufficient livestock to ensure access to milk products for the population and to provide a foundation for a natural process of rebuilding stocks is important to its survival, even if it has had to sell more livestock than usual.
• The ability of a given community to have access to sufficient seed, whether from the harvest or from external sources, to enable it to plant at a reasonable level will determine its ability to achieve early self-sufficiency, ideally through the 2001 harvest.
• Areas where farmers have lost or sold their oxen and other forms of farm power, or have sold their farm tools, will be at a disadvantage in seeking to restore agricultural production.
• Areas that are at some distance from roads have proved to be particularly vulnerable. Deaths have been reported, for example, from very isolated areas in eastern Badghis.
• Areas such as Darayi Souf in Samangan have faced additional vulnerability because of ongoing conflict between the Taliban and the opposition and consequent blockades and displacement. Deaths have also been reported from here.
• Ease of access to Pakistan, Iran and areas of Afghanistan where labouring opportunities exist has reduced the economic pressure on certain zones. It has been a common pattern for parts of communities to leave for Pakistan, in particular, in order to increase the economic options available to them. The pre-existing trend for young men to seek work in Iran and Pakistan has continued, in spite of the pressures on Afghans in Iran to return. There have also been migrations within Afghanistan, either to the cities or to neighbouring districts or provinces, in search of better conditions or work opportunities. Significant variations have been reported from one area to another in the proportion of households and communities that have migrated, depending on the relative potential for survival. It should nonetheless be noted that there have been some migrations to Pakistan from isolated areas, in spite of the difficulties involved in making the journey, because of the acute economic conditions. Particular migrations have been noted from Ghor to Herat, from Dai Kundi and Shahristan to Quetta and from northern Afghanistan to Peshawar. Dai Kundi and Shahrestan are heavily dependent on karezes to support the production of winter wheat, maize, almonds and apricots and have suffered particularly from the failure of these systems as a result of low snow melt. The area also has no pasture land and the option of drawing on livestock as an alternative source of food and income has therefore not been available. It is difficult to estimate the overall scale of migration, with so many people disappearing into scattered rural and urban communities in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran.
• Some areas have benefited from remittances. It should be stressed, however, that, although remittances represent potentially significant supplements to income, wage levels are extremely low in both Iran and Pakistan, as well as in Afghanistan, and labouring opportunities are intermittent and unpredictable. We are, therefore, talking about, for the most part, minimal supplements to minimal levels of income. Female labour is particularly badly remunerated in Iran and Pakistan and is unlikely to make a contribution to family income in Afghanistan. Similarly, although there are indications that children are employed in increasing numbers, and at decreasing ages, in the cities of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, some under potentially exploitative conditions, we cannot realistically expect that they will be in a position to contribute to family incomes in their villages of origin. At best, they will represent fewer mouths to feed, as will some of their older siblings working away from home.
• NGO interventions have been important in encouraging significant numbers of people to remain who might otherwise have migrated. There were particular pressures to migrate on people living in areas in the central highlands that are normally cut off by snow from November to May and NGO programmes have played an important role in countering these pressures.
• The availability of private sector resources such as the low quality but cheap Kazakh wheat which appeared in markets throughout Afghanistan in the spring of 2000 has been enormously important in increasing food stocks and keeping prices down. Similarly, the emergence of private contractors to dig wells in southern Afghanistan has provided an important supplement to the work of NGOs.
• The efffectiveness of NGOs in responding to local drought conditions has been a determining factor in mitigating the impact of the drought.

NGO responses to the drought

The ability of humanitarian agencies to respond to the drought has been enhanced by a number of factors:

• The statistical work undertaken by WFP VAM over several years has provided a solid foundation for the identification of priority areas. Similarly, the ongoing monitoring that they are undertaking of coping strategies, prices and other indicators in sample population centres will be potentially important in helping agencies and donors assess the severity of the drought at any given time.
• The joint working arrangement agreed between WFP and ECHO has made for a more effective allocation of resources to humanitarian agencies in response to the drought.
• International NGOs operating under contract to WFP and ECHO in the Hazarajat have established monitoring systems to identify dependency levels and coping strategies on a regular basis.
• It could be argued that the pre-existence of NGOs, and agencies such as UNCHS, with a long-term developmental approach in some areas has both mitigated the effects of the drought and facilitated an appropriate and effective response to it. To the extent that NGOs have been able to strengthen local economies before the drought, beneficiary populations will have been able to build up their asset base and also their nutritional status and so will have been in a better position to withstand the drought, both economically and nutritionally. In responding to the drought, NGOs have been in a position to build on relationships with communities to identify suitable projects to facilitate the appropriate distribution of food assistance and avoid free distribution programmes.
• Local coordination mechanisms in Afghanistan, some linked to the Afghanistan Programming Board, have, to a greater or lesser extent, been effective in facilitating an appropriate use of resources and in avoiding duplication. NGOs, UN agencies and ICRC appear to have worked reasonably effectively together.
• The early response of humanitarian agencies to the drought conditions in southern Afghanistan has mitigated against a more serious situation. Similarly, the determined efforts of agencies to get food to eastern Badghis and central Ghor before the onset of winter rendered them inaccessible has made it possible for communities to remain in their homes and avoid displacement.

The assistance community nonetheless faces a number of constraints in responding to the drought:

• Many NGOs are already operating at full capacity and, even among those that are willing to consider an expansion, the difficulties which they would face in setting up programmes in new areas, arising from the conditions and constraints associated with their funding contracts, the costs involved and the time taken to build up an information base and develop relationships with beneficiary communities and the authorities, militates against an easy response to drought conditions. However, there are a few NGOs which are already exploring new areas as a response to the drought and some others have indicated that, if the situation significantly worsened, they would consider scaling up. Whether these potential initiatives, combined with existing programmes, would have sufficient capacity to avert significant migration or mitigate a serious nutrition situation if the drought worsened is difficult to determine. While there is, at least, a skeleton presence of NGOs in most areas of the country, there are inevitably areas that they do not reach. A key area of concern is the relatively limited NGO presence in the northern provinces of Faryab, Jozjan, Sari Pul, Balkh and Samangan. It is also proving difficult for NGOs to recruit experienced expatriate staff to work in Afghanistan and, with the continued exodus of Afghan professionals, recruitment of suitable Afghan managers is also problematic. Thus, even if some NGOs have the organisational capacity to expand, and can secure the necessary resources, they may be constrained by recruitment difficulties.
• WFP has already identified a possible shortfall in its requirement for 2001 and it also cannot always ensure that wheat reaches partner NGOs to coincide with FOODAC and FFW project implementation. The timely supply of wheat is particularly important. If NGOs are not in a position to provide wheat reasonably quickly to participants in FOODAC programmes, the security of NGO staff can be put at risk, as well as the continued operations of the NGO, as the affected communities may both threaten staff members and also complain to the authorities about their failure to deliver.
• FAO's current seed programme can only provide for 1.5% of the overall need.
• Delays in decision-making by funders can significantly reduce the response time of humanitarian agencies, particularly in areas such as the central highlands where it is only possible to work for six months of the year and where one month's delay in the decision-making process is therefore equivalent to the loss of two months in the implementation process. It is particularly difficult for humanitarian agencies if they have to wait for an average of nine months, for example, in the case of OFDA funding and it is only the larger NGOs with multiple funding sources that can afford to take the risk of embarking on programmes without being sure that they have the funding to support them. Small agencies are therefore at a disadvantage and many of the smallest agencies are depending on UN contracts and on subcontracting arrangements with international NGOs.
• NGOs that are currently operating long term programmes under DG Relex funding of the European Commission may have difficulty making changes to their programmes in response to the drought because of the restructuring planned within DG Relex over the early months of 2001 which will create considerable delays in decision making. Already the lengthy response time to requests for adjustments or riders to planned programmes, averaging around 9 months, is requiring agencies to either take risks with funding or substantially delay programming.
• Donors tend to set financial ceilings on their grants without automatic regard to the level of need and these provide the parameters for the allocation of food assistance rather than dependency levels. While such a process may be appropriate in relation to communities that are able to maintain a reasonable degree of self-sufficiency if their own resources are supplemented, it can be problematic where whole communities are facing destitution.
• Although WFP and ECHO have worked closely together, there have been situations in which the budget ceilings set by ECHO for FOODAC projects have acted as a greater constraint than the availability of wheat from WFP.

NGO methodologies

A long-term development approach is accepted by very many agencies and donors as the only feasible response to the drought, given that it will take some years for the agricultural sector to recover.

NGOs have tended to build on existing long-term programmes through the use of FOODAC, which provides a flexible framework to allow agencies to improve the local infrastructure on the basis of food for work programmes, through payment to individual families, or provide wheat to communities in return for collective work undertaken on a voluntary basis. Agencies have worked through community structures to select appropriate families to participate in such projects. Ceilings on participation in food for work programmes are based partly on an agreed norm of 26 days per participant family for ECHO-funded agencies and partly on other criteria such as specified stretches of road per group of villages.

There has been a resistance amongst many agencies to free food distribution, except in crisis conditions, arising from lessons learned from such distributions in 1999 in the Hazarajat, because this can potentially undermine local initiative, create local conflict and make it difficult for agencies to establish or re-establish long-term approaches based on community contributions to programmes. However, short term food aid as a precursor to long term programmes may be relatively risk free in terms of undermining local initiative.

Technical responses to the drought

In responding to the drought, NGOs have made various types of technical intervention. These include:

• Construction of shallow wells to provide drinking water and to meet the needs of domestic livestock
• Construction of deep wells or deepening of existing wells to provide what is termed "lift irrigation". There is the inevitable risk that, if this process does not have regard to the hydro-geological conditions of each area and is not controlled on the basis of the expertise available, underground water sources could be drawn on too rapidly, with potentially disastrous results.
• Improvements in existing wells.
• Rehabilitation of karezes
• Distribution of drills to enable people to deepen shallow wells.
• Further distribution of handpumps at a subsidised rate, or free in seriously affected areas.
• Training of hand-pump mechanics.
• Improvement or creation of water conservation structures.
• Road construction or improvement. These programmes are targeted primarily at feeder roads but one programme will improve much of the road to Chaghcharan in Ghor and substantially improve access over the winter months.
• Improvements in irrigation and flood protection systems.
• Seed multiplication
• Provision of feed for livestock
• Income generation

Risk areas

We can identify certain key areas of risk in predicting the evolution of the drought:

• The poor harvest of 2000, combined with the inadequate level of moisture in the soil, has meant that the autumn planting has been much reduced. There may also not be enough seed for the spring or autumn plantings of 2001, with the ability of farmers, NGOs and seed providing agencies such as FAO and ISRA, together with the private sector, to procure sufficient seed of appropriate varieties a determining factor. It will also take time to rebuild livestock stocks. We have, therefore, to plan for food aid to be provided in many areas until the summer of 2001, at the very least.
• If there is insufficient rain or snow over the coming winter, this would seriously exacerbate the situation. A total failure of the winter rain and snowfall could be catastrophic.
• The calculations of NGOs and WFP as to whether they have provided sufficient food to last until the next harvest may not have been sufficiently accurate and shortages may nonetheless result.
• Areas that have hitherto not shown signs of economic distress may begin to do so over the months to come.
• Water tables may reach dangerously low levels.

Engagement with the authorities

The authorities are clearly very worried about the drought and their anxiety has led them to put considerable pressure on agencies and to be, at times, impatient that things are not moving fast enough. Agencies have generally found the authorities to be helpful and cooperative, particularly at the local level, although there have been the inevitable variations, with officials in some areas creating difficulties. Such difficulties have not, however, represented a major constraint on programming although agencies have needed to operate with considerable care in managing their relationship with the authorities.

In some areas, the authorities have participated in inter-agency meetings to discuss the drought situation and such participation may be regarded as indicative of a willingness to engage more constructively on public welfare issues.

Free food distributions have proved to be problematic in relation to the authorities because of anxieties and suspicions on their part that food might be diverted and also because of pressures placed on agencies to allocate some food to the local leadership. Agencies undertaking food for work programmes have not experienced the same difficulties.

Coordination

Coordination of the response to the drought has been undertaken through a combination of mechanisms. The Principled Common Programming structure, with Regional Coordination Bodies bringing agencies together in Kabul, Herat, Kandahar. Mazar-i-Sharif and Jalalabad, in particular, through the facilitation process undertaken by Regional Coordination Officers, combined with the policy formulation role of the Afghanistan Programming Board in Islamabad, has been reasonably effective. A sub-group of the APB, the Water and Sanitation Working Group, has been productive in orchestrating policy and responses to shortages of water for drinking and irrigation purposes. ACBAR was helpful in the early stages of the drought in bringing NGOs together to discuss appropriate responses.

There have, however, been differences of view as to the appropriate balance to be given within the coordination process to efforts to support survival strategies in drought-affected areas as opposed to the organisation of emergency response mechanisms for those who have migrated as a consequence of the drought. The Drought Task Force, meeting under the UNOCHA umbrella in Islamabad, together with the RCB in Herat, was said to be primarily focused on the needs of displaced people. In contrast, the RCO in Kandahar was reported to have taken an outreach approach, visiting NGOs in their programme areas in the drought-affected zones and facilitating informal coordination.

The coordination process in the Hazarajat was felt to have been affected by the sensitivities that exist between the UN and NGOs, with NGOs feeling, in this case, that the UN was seeking to exert too much control over the planning process and over the allocation of resources. Pre-existing informal coordination mechanisms among certain international NGOs, combined with the important role of WFP and ECHO in allocating resources and determining priorities and the enormous logistical constraints involved in bringing agencies together in the central highlands, have further undermined the RCB process.

The World Bank has also been brought into the coordination process, at the request of the Afghanistan Support Group's Food Security Group established by Switzerland, Sweden and the USA, to help with the development of appropriate strategies. A workshop has been planned for 22nd November, with the intention of preparing a paper for the ASG meeting in December, in which strategies will be identified regarding food security and the promotion of long term funding.

Conclusions

The drought may be regarded as severe in its impact but does not yet represent a disaster except in certain localities. Agencies have been able to respond in those localities identified.

The impact of the drought is felt differentially from area to area and from family to family.

There needs to be a long term approach to the response to the drought, based on a recognition that, even if the rainfall and snow is at a reasonable level over this winter, agricultural production during 2001 will suffer from the low level of the autumn 2000 planting and possible seed shortages for the spring 2001 planting. Food aid will therefore be required, possibly on a significant scale, for at least 2 years and perhaps 3-4.

Very many agencies are already operating at full capacity and there are relatively few agencies which are in a position to move to new areas.

Although there is a skeleton presence of humanitarian agencies in most parts of the country, and systems exist to monitor the evolution of the drought in many of these, there is a risk that agencies will not be able to adequately monitor the situation or respond adequately to needs and that an increased migratory flow will result. Similarly, while agencies will do what they can to identify localities which are particularly at risk, areas where nutrition levels are dangerously low may nonetheless emerge in the months and years to come.

There are potentially serious reductions in livestock numbers and seed availability, with varying levels of capacity of the agricultural economy to restore itself from area to area. Priority needs to be given to seed provision and support to the livestock sector, potentially on a large scale.

The existence of long-term development programmes in a given locality can both cushion communities against the drought because of the consequent improvement in asset creation and nutritional status during the preceding period and also aid an appropriate response which avoids the pitfalls of free food distribution.

There are potential gaps in certain areas of north-central Afghanistan, in particular, because of the relative paucity of NGOs with long term programmes in these areas.

There is scope for improving the mechanisms whereby the donor community is kept abreast of the drought situation as it evolves at the country level, with more effective use perhaps made of the data produced by WFP VAM and the weekly UN updates to this end.

Recommendations

1) That a substantial allocation of food is made available by the donor community to WFP for 2001 to enable it to support the efforts of NGOs to strengthen coping strategies in drought-affected areas and to also meet the food security needs of those migrating as a consequence of the drought or otherwise displaced.

2) That donors ensure that the NGOs that are in a position to support local economies through their long-term programmes have access to the funds that they need to operate at full capacity.

3) That the assistance community seeks to establish, through the various information sources available, the extent to which there is sufficient seed available to farmers for the 2001 planting and also the potential for livestock numbers to be rebuilt within a reasonable period.

4) Depending on the outcome of these investigations, there should be a preparedness to invest in improved seed on a large scale and also in the purchase of livestock for distribution to farmers. In any event, it is important that resources are provided for veterinary care at a reasonable level, to protect existing livestock.

5) That additional resources be allocated to the collection and analysis of information on the evolving impact of the drought so that donors can be a stronger position to decide on the nature and scale of the resources required to respond to the drought.

4) That NGOs which are not already implementing monitoring systems of the type adopted by ECHO-funded agencies should consider doing so in order to help build up a comprehensive picture of the evolving drought situation across the country.

5) That NGOs give priority to the regular processing of the data on which potential funders will base their funding decisions.

6) That donors review their current administrative and financial procedures to see whether there is the potential to speed up the decision-making process and to also allow for greater flexibility in the implementation of programmes in response to changing conditions on the ground.

7) There needs to be a research process into more effective water management and water conservation techniques, involving the authorities and agencies with a specialist knowledge, with discussion on options and priorities taking place, to the extent possible, at the regional level within Afghanistan.

8) The opportunity created by the drought to establish public works programmes could be effectively used to improve roads in remote areas so as to strengthen local economies and increase access to health and other services.

STRATEGIC ISSUES

Engagement with the authorities

The conflict in Afghanistan has substantially weakened the governmental bureaucracy at both the national and local levels and it has been necessary for humanitarian agencies to provide some of the functions of government such as health care, education, provision of clean water, public health and support to the agriculture sector.

Notwithstanding the inevitable problems of coordination, which are to be found even within a governmental system, it could be argued that humanitarian agencies have been effective in ensuring a basic minimum level of service provision for much of the country and in strengthening the coping strategies of the population, a significant proportion of whom have been living at a very marginal level of survival.

Agencies have moved forward in their thinking over the years and there has been a pronounced shift in favour of a long-term community-based approach to aid in spite of the short term nature of some of the funding sources. Thus, in the rural areas, NGOs, in particular, have worked to support communities in strengthening the agricultural base through relatively intensive programmes in which community structures and NGOs work together, both providing resources, to achieve medium to long-term improvements in agricultural production.

This developmental approach is a consequence of discussions with Afghans within the aid community and outside it as to the most appropriate mechanisms for the delivery of aid. These discussions have resulted in certain basic principles being identified:

• that beneficiary communities should have a substantial involvement in the planning and implementation of programmes.
• that communities should make a contribution to the total resources allocated to such programmes.
• that free distribution of aid inputs should be avoided to the extent possible because of the risk of creating dependency states and also of generating conflict amongst potential beneficiaries.
• that large-scale distributions of aid in the rural areas should be kept to the absolute minimum consistent with the level of destitution because of the potential risk that these will generate or fuel conflict.

It is likely that such developmental programmes have served to mitigate the effects of the drought but, although one can identify a reasonable distribution of these programmes in many parts of the country, there are significant areas of the country, such as parts of the north, where the presence of humanitarian agencies is extremely limited. Similarly, even within the districts where NGOs work, there are many villages that they do not reach.

The present drought crisis has both demonstrated that a long term developmental approach has been effective in helping communities throughout the country to survive and also highlighted the fact that the scale of humanitarian operations is inadequate to the task of providing support to the entire population. The continuing emergence of isolated parts of the country, where people are surviving on grasses and roots and even on poisonous plants, serves to underline this very graphically.

We have, therefore, to think of a more appropriate way forward. If the rain or snow falls this winter are adequate we may be able to maintain some degree of control of the situation, while recognising that large numbers of people will continue to migrate within Afghanistan, or to Pakistan or Iran, to eke out a marginal existence.

However, if the drought worsens, we may be faced with a difficult choice between a large-scale free food distribution and a recognition of our own powerlessness to avert a major humanitarian crisis.

The continued ambivalence in the relationship between humanitarian agencies and the authorities in Afghanistan is not helping the situation and there is a strong case for further strengthening the process of engagement with the authorities.

Clearly, this will have to be an incremental process. The governmental administrative structure is barely functioning and there are serious risks in seeking to build its capacity too fast. Further, with so many professionals having the left the country and a risk that more may yet do so, it is difficult to plan on the basis that the governmental system could make a major contribution in the short to medium term. There are also the legitimate concerns of the donor community regarding the involvement of the authorities in Afghanistan in ongoing hostilities and this militates against any significant investment in the governmental structure in the short term in case resources are diverted to military use. Other concerns relating to female access to health care, education and employment are, to some degree, being addressed through a gradual process of engagement at the local level.

The authorities do, however, have some resources which can be used to tackle the drought and they also, to the extent that particular professionals and documents remain in the governmental bureaucracy, have historical knowledge and expertise on, for example, the hydro geology of Afghanistan. It may, therefore, be a constructive way forward for the authorities to be more actively involved in the planning and implementation process, as is already happening in some areas.

It may be hoped that the authorities will be willing to contribute additional resources to the process, given that the scale of resources currently available from the international community is far from adequate. The authorities in Kandahar responded quickly to a crisis in the Registan Desert in the early part of 2000 and provided transportation to Kandahar for nomads facing destitution. Similarly, the authorities in Kabul have supplied materials and equipment in support of an NGO programme to improve water supply and sanitation in one part of the city.

It may nonetheless be appropriate to inject small-scale resources into the governmental administration to strengthen certain functions of direct relevance to the drought response.

The authorities can also play an important role, in conjunction with the assistance community, in rationing the use of water, particularly for irrigation purposes, in order to prevent an undue lowering of the water table in the various areas and the possible use of brackish water for drinking purposes.

They can also seek to contain possible tensions between competing groups. In the Hazarajat, for example, the authorities intervened in response to competition between Hazaras and Kuchi nomads and set limits to the areas where Kuchis could graze their animals and to the periods of time that they could remain in a given area.

The authorities have, in addition, been helpful in ensuring the security of assistance programmes and have, in many areas, taken the security of humanitarian agencies very seriously.

The identification of needs

The WFP VAM studies, combined with the surveys and reports of ICRC and NGOs, provide good data on the level of poverty and coping strategies of the population in many areas, and on the extent to which water sources are becoming depleted. NGOs are, in addition, in a position to provide detailed information on the particular characteristics of the specific areas in which they are working and to identify, in conjunction with community structures, appropriate interventions to support the local economy. However, NGOs are not present in all areas and are not, therefore, in a position to provide a comprehensive picture of the agricultural economy in all parts of the districts or provinces where they are working. The present system of needs identification thus makes it possible for areas of extreme vulnerability to remain unknown. Several such areas have been identified as a result of the drought and there be many more where people are barely surviving.

There is therefore a strong case for a system, based on PRA or similar techniques, to be established through which Regional Coordination Bodies and Regional Coordination Officers could build a more comprehensive picture of the complexities of the local economy and produce regular analyses of relative vulnerability within the region. This would clearly have resource implications and would need to feed into a central unit linked with the Afghanistan Programming Board, for which additional resources would also be required. The central unit would have the additional responsibility of presenting the information on a regular basis in a form which would enable donors to assess the situation and consider funding requirements.

Such a system would require the cooperation of all assistance actors and it is important that, if it is to work effectively, the Regional Coordination Officers restrict themselves to a facilitation role and resist the temptation to have a controlling function over NGOs in their efforts to match potential interventions with needs identified through the information system. Although the Principled Common Programming structure has proved to be a useful mechanism in the present crisis, an important weakness is that the UN has had difficulty in accepting itself as an equal partner along with NGOs and NGOs remain unequally represented on the Afghanistan Programming Board. It is particularly important in a crisis such as the present one that all the assistance actors work as a team in seeking to identify needs and agree on a prioritisation process. With NGOs playing the major role in the implementation process, often in partnership with WFP and ECHO, it is not helpful if they continue to be regarded by the UN system, if not necessarily by individuals within it, as less than equal and that NGOs do not feel that their contribution is adequately respected.

Scaling up

It is clear that there has to be a long-term approach to the drought and it has been helpful that a significant number of NGOs have been able to build on existing long-term community-based programmes through FOODAC and Food for Work Programmes. However, most of these NGOs do not feel able to further scale up their programmes because of constraints relating to organisational capacity and there are relatively few NGOs that are in a position to consider expansion into new areas. Some of these are in receipt of funding from the U.S. Government, through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance or the Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration. These funds are short term and place a heavy responsibility on funded NGOs to establish offices, identify needs, engage with beneficiaries and local authorities and implement programmes within a limited time period.

Such a funding arrangement is inconsistent with the needs identification process outlined above and lends itself to an over hasty identification of needs which has only limited regard to the long term priorities of the beneficiary communities. It would, therefore, be helpful if the U.S. Government was to link its funding to a long-term planning process drawn up through the relevant Regional Coordination Bodies and seek to target the areas of greatest vulnerability identified through that process. Funded NGOs should, if at all possible, be given grants over a two year period even if contracts have to be issued in, for example, six month tranches.

Another option is for NGOs moving into new areas to enter into partnership arrangements with some of the smaller local Afghan NGOs, many of which have spare capacity. Such an approach would have to build on the lessons learned from similar arrangements over the years and should draw on the capacity building models of organisations such as Norwegian Church Aid, NOVIB and International Rescue Committee.

A further option is for such new organisations in a region to link up with one of the larger well-established NGOs in order to draw on their expertise and local knowledge in deciding how best to move forward. Such a close partnership arrangement could provide a useful supplement to the Regional Coordination Body process.

However, there are a number of major NGOs which are in a position to scale up and which already have a reasonable knowledge of many areas of the country. It is important that, in a situation of insufficient capacity, funding applications by such NGOs are considered positively.

Resourcing of the drought response

It would seem to be important to build on the capacity of NGOs, together with ICRC and the Afghan Red Crescent Society, to the extent possible, in order to strengthen the coping mechanisms of rural communities. To this end, it is essential that NGOs are adequately supported by WFP in seeking to operate FOODAC or emergency food programmes and that WFP therefore has a sufficiently large allocation of wheat to support NGO programmes in the drought-affected areas.

However, given the constraints on NGO capacity and the probability that, if there is a major failure of the winter rains and snowfall, many areas will be very severely hit by the continuing drought, we have to expect major migrations to the cities or to Pakistan and Iran. With Pakistan recently closing its border in response to the growing influx of Afghan refugees as a result of the drought and fighting in the north, we cannot be sure that Pakistan will continue to provide refuge. Similarly, while Iran is not entirely closed to Afghans at the present time, the popular pressures on the Iranian Government to repatriate Afghan refugees as soon as possible mean that Iran cannot be regarded as a potential haven in the event of a mass migration. The pressure on the cities of Afghanistan could, therefore, be enormous but the populations of Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif are already in a chronically impoverished state, with very many people in a state of destitution, and would not be able to absorb further influxes without a proportionate increase in food assistance from WFP. Poverty levels in Herat are also of concern to WFP, with the recent arrivals of displaced people from Ghor and the wider region saturating the labour market. The construction industry, which could serve to provide an additional source of income for those affected by the drought, is itself constrained by the shortage of water for building purposes.

There is, therefore, a potential need for a very substantial allocation of wheat to WFP to both support people to remain in their villages and to feed large influxes of displaced people into the cities.

ECHO funding may also be needed on a significant scale, to provide the cash component of FOODAC and emergency programmes. It is positive that ECHO has increased its allocation this year through two further funding commitments but the allocation may have to be greatly enhanced next year, particularly if the drought worsens.

The additional funding provided by the European Commission through the budget line for refugees and displaced persons has been very important in laying strong foundations, through development programmes in specific areas, on to which it has been possible to build FOODAC projects. This budget line is currently under review and it is important that any new policy supports the developmental character of existing programmes as an appropriate methodology to stengthen the coping mechanisms of returnees and prevent outward migration.

It appears that DGVIII, within the European Commission, has not included Afghanistan among its list of high priority countries in relation to food security. Discussions are ongoing between NGOs and DGVIII on this.

It may be that a significant level of resources could be required for large-scale seed and livestock purchases to strengthen the coping strategies of affected farmers. There are conflicting views, based on inadequate information, as to the extent to which farmers will have enough seed for the 2001 planting season if there is adequate rain and snow this winter. Particular attention needs to be given to potential seed shortages in the northern rainfed belt, although the private sector may play an important role here, given the similar growing condition in Uzbekistan to the north. Elsewhere, any efforts to provide additonal seed will be constrained by the difficulties involved in selecting and testing appropriate varieties for local growing conditons. Similarly, while we are very aware that livestock have been sold in huge numbers, we do not have sufficient information to enable us to assess the extent to which livelihoods are threatened by livestock shortages and on the potential ability of affected communities to restore stocks quickly through natural processes. If new livestock are purchased in order to speed up the process of recovery, this would be a potentially costly operation and distribution would be highly problematic. However, it might be an appropriate intervention in some areas as an alternative to food programmes.

Consideration could be given to the creation of a reserve fund so that, if the situation suddenly worsens, money could be allocated quickly and flexibly, in response to need. This fund should, ideally, be generously resourced.

The creation of a reserve fund and its flexible use to meet urgent needs is only feasible if good information systems exist which donors can have confidence in. Reference has already been made above to the desirability of an enhanced system of needs identification through the RCBs and APB. However, there also has to be a greater commitment on the part of both UN agencies and NGOs to the provision of information on local conditions so that donors can have a much clearer picture of the overall situation as it evolves.

Orchestration of the response

There would appear to be a consensus that needs identification and the planning and implementation of responses should be based primarily at the regional level, with local authorities working alongside humanitarian agencies.

The resource allocation process at the macro level may be most appropriately handled by the donor group, through the regular meetings in Islamabad, drawing on policy determined by the Afghanistan Programming Board. However, donor representatives in Islamabad operate in accordance with policies and procedures determined in Europe, North America, Japan and Australia, in particular, and there needs to be a process whereby the relevant government and European Commission departments can more closely relate their policies, procedures and resource allocation to the reality of the drought situation. It is important, for example, that all funders accept the long-term nature of the response needed and that a developmental community-based approach continues to be the most appropriate mechanism to keep farmers on their land and minimise outward migration.

This report is published by the British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) Project, based at the Refugee Council, London. The Project is funded by the British Department for International Development. However, the views expressed are those of the BAAG Project and do not represent any official view of DFID or of the member agencies.