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OVERVIEW
In early 2025, Afghanistan continues to grapple with widespread poverty, a stagnant economy, and likely drops in assistance funding. An estimated 12.4 million Afghans are projected to be food-insecure, and 48% of the population lives below the poverty line (OCHA 28/07/2024). Based on the trend since 2023, reductions in Western humanitarian assistance funding for Afghanistan can be expected (CSIS 13/06/2024; VOA 20/06/2023 and 03/04/2024). This will aggravate hardships for the Afghan population.
Uzbekistan could play an important role at this juncture. Since 2016, Uzbekistan has continued to strengthen ties with its southern neighbour, even after the August 2021 regime change in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan’s engagement with Afghanistan navigates the pursuit of its own national economic and security interests, a historically complex relationship with the Taliban, and international concerns over the human and women‘s rights records of the Interim Taliban Authority (ITA). Uzbekistan is not a major financial donor for bilateral and multilateral humanitarian assistance; it provides emergency relief in response to disasters and supports UN missions in Afghanistan through logistics hubs. Uzbekistan favours trade and business promotion and infrastructure investments in Afghanistan to address poverty and improve livelihoods on both sides of the border. A substantial number of Afghan citizens live in Uzbekistan and transfer large sums of remittances to Afghanistan.
The ITA has welcomed engagement with Uzbekistan, whose preference for facilitating trade and business promotion to alleviate poverty is in line with ITA interests (ORF 12/08/2024). Like the Republic Government under Ashraf Ghani, the ITA sees improved ties to its Central Asian neighbours as a way to ensure energy supplies to Afghanistan and diversify the country’s economic dependence beyond Pakistan (RFE/RL 05/03/2019).
That said, different obstacles and challenges in improving the countries’ bilateral relations persist. The ITA has not taken any decisive actions against members of the Afghanistan-based Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which Uzbekistan considers a threat to its national security. Afghan Uzbeks, like other non-Pashtun ethnic groups, are severely underrepresented in ITA structures, and Uzbekistan considers the lack of representation for non-Pashtuns a risk for Afghanistan’s stability (GJIA 17/04/2024). At the same time, the ITA demands the return of 50 combat aircraft that remain in Uzbekistan after the Afghan Air Force flew them there in August 2021 (KUN.UZ 27/08/2024). There are also concerns and tensions over the transboundary water management of the Amu Darya River, which could escalate once construction on the Qosh Tepa Canal in Afghanistan is completed. Finally, Uzbekistan does not agree with the ITA’s human and women’s rights policies; it pursues its engagement with the ITA while attempting not to alienate Western powers and others concerned over these policies (VOA 04/05/2022).
ABOUT THIS REPORT
This paper examines Uzbekistan’s engagement in Afghanistan, focusing on the period since August 2021. It first describes Uzbekistan’s foreign policy perspective on Afghanistan, including humanitarian assistance and economic investments and cooperation. Second, the report discusses obstacles, primarily violent extremism and transboundary water management, in the bilateral relations between the two countries, before finishing with an outlook.
This research provides relevant contextual information on an important neighbouring country that shares a 144km border with Afghanistan. Uzbekistan’s engagement directly affects the humanitarian response in Afghanistan, and its roads and railway infrastructure are critical enablers of the UN mission in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan’s engagement with Afghanistan combines emergency relief for disasters, support of UN missions to Afghanistan, trade and business promotion, maintenance of diplomatic ties, and dialogue with the ITA. Coordinating with Uzbekistan can enhance aid efficacy.