Appeals & Response Plans
- Chad: Measles Outbreak - May 2018
- Chad: Cholera Outbreak - Aug 2017
- Chad: Hepatitis E Outbreak - Sep 2016
- Nigeria: Polio Outbreak - Aug 2016
- Chad: Floods - Aug 2012
- West/Central Africa: Meningitis Outbreak - Jan 2012
- Sahel Crisis: 2011-2017
- Chad: Polio Outbreak - Jun 2011
- Chad: Cholera/Measles/Meningitis Outbreak - Mar 2011
- Chad: Cholera Outbreak - Aug 2010
Most read reports
- Tchad : Aperçu de la situation humanitaire au Sud (septembre 2018)
- Tchad : Aperçu de la situation humanitaire à l’Est (septembre 2018)
- Joint Communique of the First Meeting of the Sudan-Chad-UNHCR Tripartite Commission on Voluntary Repatriation of Sudanese Refugees Living in Chad
- Chad – Measles Outbreak (DG ECHO, World Health Organisation, Ministry of Health) (ECHO Daily Flash of 29 August 2018)
- Urgent action needed to respond to acute malnutrition crisis in Chad
In this issue:
How the latest AU decision on Western Sahara could affect other crises
The African Union and the question of LGBTI-rights
The AU will have to do more to convince SADC
Helping those affected by Boko Haram to get back on their feet
Interview with Nicholas Haysom, UN Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan
Countries in the Lake Chad basin have come together to fight Boko Haram through joint military operations. However, there is a growing realisation that non-military strategies are needed to make sure these areas do not remain at the mercy of violent extremism. The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), with the support of the African Union (AU), is in the process of developing such a regional stabilisation strategy. Its success depends on closer cooperation between affected member states and their willingness to bring government services to peripheral communities.
Restrictions aimed at stopping extremism shouldn’t deny the people of the Lake Chad Basin their livelihoods.
By Omar S Mahmood
The ongoing terror threat in Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon has led the governments of the Lake Chad region to enact numerous security restrictions in affected areas. While these restrictions are meant to improve security for all, some affect civilians negatively – particularly regarding livelihoods.
The first in a two-part study examining current dynamics in violent extremist organisations.
This report is the first in a two-part study examining current dynamics with regards to violent extremist organisations (VEOs) operating in the Lake Chad region (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger). This report examines factionalism within the Boko Haram movement, while the second report profiles current responses and challenges.
About the authors
The second in a two-part study examining current dynamics in violent extremist organisations.
06 JUL 2018 / BY OMAR S MAHMOOD AND NDUBUISI CHRISTIAN ANI
This report is the second in a two-part study examining current dynamics with regards to violent extremist organisations (VEOs) operating in the Lake Chad region (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger). The first report examined factionalism within the Boko Haram movement, while this second report profiles current responses and challenges.
Interconnected policies provide the best opportunity for peace and prosperity in the region.
In this issue
The PSC and the terrorist threat: beyond meetings
The impact of new funding uncertainties on AMISOM
The AU and the constitutional review process in Burundi
Central Africa’s gathering storm
Challenges facing the PSC’s Committee of Experts
PSC interview: Political will is needed for equitable transitional justice
Legalising migrants can boost economic growth, improve international relations and prevent radicalisation.
Algeria and Morocco have for the past decade been important transit and stopover countries for migrants moving to Europe. Many also stop to seek informal work in Algeria’s $548.3 billion hydrocarbon economy and Morocco’s $257.3 billion diversified economy.
Since 2009, Boko Haram has proven to be a highly adaptable foe, routinely realigning its tactics to suit changing circumstances. In recent years, this has increasingly involved focusing on soft targets, including displaced people (both refugees and internally displaced people). Understanding how Boko Haram has targeted displaced people and what some of its specific objectives might be is key to understanding their true threat.
In this issue
On the Agenda
Donald Trump’s insistence on reducing US aid to peacekeeping missions will affect US-Africa relations.
Should the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic be allowed to attend crucial AU partnership summits?
In its worst political crisis in over a decade, is a divided Kenya the answer?
After placing Burundi at the top of its agenda in 2015 and 2016, so far this year the PSC has failed to address the situation in the country.
Dans ce numéro
- A l’ordre du jour : le 29e sommet de l’UA
Lors du récent sommet de l’Union africaine, quelques pays se sont plaints du processus décisionnel des réformes de l’organisation.
Les dirigeants ont par ailleurs décidé que septembre serait un « mois d’amnistie » pour les individus détenant des armes illégales.
In this issue
On the Agenda: 29th AU summit At the recent African Union (AU) summit in Addis Ababa some countries complained about the way decisions on AU reforms had been made.
Leaders decided, among other measures, that September would be amnesty month for those possessing illegal weapons.
Agir à l’échelle régionale dans le Sahel jusqu’en avril 2016 demeurait encore une exception, la majorité des projets continuant jusque-là à être mise en œuvre sur le plan national. En outre, le Mali demeure le point focal des initiatives de coopération en matière de gouvernance et de sécurité. Les projets ciblant les institutions étatiques sont deux fois plus nombreux que ceux destinés à la société civile. Enfin, les projets relatifs à la gouvernance tendent à avoir des budgets plus élevés que ceux qui concernent les domaines de la sécurité.
On 2 July 2017 leaders of the G5 Sahel, which consists of Chad, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Mali and Niger, officially launched the new G5 Sahel force, in the presence of French President Emmanuel Macron. This followed a meeting in February 2017 in which the G5 Sahel heads of state announced that a new force would be set up to fight terrorism in the sub-region. This announcement followed the creation of the Liptako Gourma securitisation force by Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in late January to combat instability in this border region.
The AU should encourage regional efforts to prevent violent extremism in the Lake Chad Basin.
The 29th African Union (AU) summit that starts this week will no doubt consider the threat of terrorism and how member states, supported by the AU, can respond. In the Lake Chad Basin – now a major conflict zone – the battle against Boko Haram is progressing, albeit at an unsteady pace.
The African Union and its partners are a vital part in combating the continent’s crises.
Now more than ever, Africa needs the help of the African Union (AU) and its partners in tackling security threats and other ongoing crises – particularly in the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa.
It’s these and other issues that are going to keep Africa’s leaders busy at the 29th AU summit in Addis Ababa from 27 June to 4 July, and more specifically the AU Assembly meeting of heads of state on 3 and 4 July.
Civilians have been caught between unresponsive governments and the violence of Boko Haram. This must change.
While the Boko Haram-sparked humanitarian crisis raging in the Lake Chad Basin has largely been overlooked outside of the region, recent high-level efforts have sought to change that.
With its mandate up for renewal, there’s work to be done to ensure the MNJTF stays relevant.
13 Jan 2017 / by Wendyam Aristide Sawadogo
William Assanvo, Jeannine Ella A Abatan and Wendyam Aristide Sawadogo
The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), established by the Lake Chad Basin countries to combat Boko Haram, still struggles to demonstrate its effectiveness. Observers also continue to question to what extent it is operational. Yet despite the numerous political, logistical, technical and financial challenges it has been facing, the MNJTF is gradually gaining ground.
In July 2016 the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the United Nations (UN) sent a technical team to assess the situation in Mali and the Sahel. This was in response to the continued instability in the country, despite efforts by Malian and international forces. Plans for more offensive action against armed jihadist groups have been afoot for quite some time, but can they work?