Appeals & Response Plans
- South Sudan: Floods - Sep 2017
- East Africa: Armyworm Infestation - Mar 2017
- South Sudan: Cholera Outbreak - Jul 2016
- South Sudan: Food Insecurity - 2015-2018
- South Sudan: Cholera Outbreak - Jun 2015
- Sudan/South Sudan: Measles Outbreak - Mar 2015
- South Sudan: Kala-azar Outbreak - Sep 2014
- South Sudan: Floods - Aug 2014
- South Sudan: Cholera Outbreak - May 2014
- South Sudan: Measles Outbreak - Sep 2013
Most read (last 30 days)
- UN SRSG for Sexual Violence in Conflict condemns use of rape as a tactic of war in South Sudan
- 3 in 4 children born in South Sudan since independence have known nothing but war – UNICEF
- UNMISS supports training for a child-free SPLA
- South Sudan: 7 years after independence, humanitarian needs are unprecedented
- Two Years After Crisis Erupts, Over 31,500 People Remain Displaced in Wau, South Sudan
By Luka Kuol
Rule of Law in a Weak State
By Lauren Hutton
By Kuol Deim Kuol
By Remember Miamingi
Decades of conflicts in South Sudan have eroded the separation of roles and mandates between the political class and security actors, leading to a deliberate and disastrous convergence. One of the results of this entanglement is that security agencies have become central to politics, as have politicians in military and security matters. As a result, the successful courting and building of patronage-based relationships with the security agencies are crucial to surviving and thriving as a politician in South Sudan.
By Phillip Kasaija Apuuli
By Majak D’Agoôt
A “Gun Class”—the fusion of security leaders with political power, class, and ethnicity—is at the heart of the predatory governance system that has taken root in South Sudan. Changing this trajectory will require redefining the roles of political and security actors.
Stunted Political Development
By Laura Hutton
By Luka Kuol
South Sudan is arguably the most fragile state in the world. Lacking an institutional legacy at its creation in 2011, political, security, economic, and social indicators have all deteriorated with the ongoing civil conflict.1 As state legitimacy has eroded, the number of armed factions and tribal militias has increased rapidly, now exceeding 40 such groups.
Africa’s humanitarian crises have continued to worsen in 2017. Twenty million Africans have been displaced from their homes and 44 million are acutely food insecure
By Kate Almquist Knopf
Proposed justice measures in South Sudan—including the Hybrid Court—can be pursued despite disruptions in the implementation of the peace agreement.
Plus de 50 opérations de paix ont été déployées dans 18 pays d’Afrique depuis 2000.
Le « maintien de la paix en partenariat », qui implique une coopération entre divers acteurs et institutions multilatérales et bilatérales, est devenu de plus en plus commun.
Les efforts de génération des forces devraient porter sur le déploiement des capacités requises en vue de la réalisation des objectifs de la mission et pas seulement sur le nombre de soldats de la paix.
Over 50 peace operations have been deployed to 18 African countries since 2000.
“Partnership peacekeeping,” which involves collaboration between various multilateral and bilateral actors and institutions, has become increasingly common.
Force generation efforts should focus on deploying the capabilities needed to realize mission objectives and not solely on numbers of peacekeepers.
Par Prosper Nzekani Zena
Malgré des succès louables, quelques initiatives de désarmement, de démobilisation et de réintégration (DDR) incomplètes ou mal conçues ont été les facteurs clés du phénomène fréquent de la reprise des conflits en Afrique.
La réintégration est la composante la plus complexe et la plus critique du DDR, mais celle à laquelle est accordée néanmoins la priorité la plus basse.
By Prosper Nzekani Zena
Notwithstanding laudable successes, incomplete or poorly conceived disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) initiatives have been key factors to high rates of conflict relapse in Africa.
Reintegration is the most complex and critical yet least prioritized facet of DDR.
The decision to integrate former militias into the national army is typically a political expediency that impedes military professionalism and increases the likelihood of human rights abuses and instability.