A bleak narrative of 16 million plus people on the brink of starvation in West Africa’s Sahel region has captured headlines. But the brewing food crisis, spanning Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad, has been overstated, and the headlines fail to identify the core causes of food insecurity and malnutrition in the region.
The Need for Strategic Focus, Transparency and Credibility
By Anthony H. Cordesman
Military Progress is only one of the tests that the US and ISAF must meet to accomplish a successful transition in Afghanistan – even on the basis of minimal security and stability or Afghan “good enough:”
The Afghan civil government must have enough public support and provide enough services to win popular support once outside military and aid programs largely depart.
Every day seems to widen the gap between the goals the United States is seeking to achieve in Afghanistan and its ability to achieve them. Even apparent progress, like the Strategic Framework Agreement between the United States and Afghanistan, seems more a warning on the inability to define specific goals, milestones, and resources—coupled with growing restraints on U.S. military action—than an accomplishment.
Afghanistan’s de facto system of governance is a politically driven “hybrid” order made up of shifting links among many different formal, informal, and illicit actors, networks, and institutions. Because its central government does not have the capacity to govern through its extremely centralized system and will not have that capacity for at least a generation, it will need to share the burden of stabilizing and governing the country with other governance and political actors. Alone, those other actors will not have the capacity to keep Afghanistan together either.
The economics of Afghanistan are only one aspect of the challenges posed by US, allied, and Afghan efforts to accomplish a successful transition. There are many reasons that transition will either fail or be determined by Afghanistan’s internal dynamics and the role of regional states regardless of what the US, Europe, and other aid donors do:
The weakness and corruption of Afghan governance mixed with growing de facto power of regional and ethnic power brokers.
Fuadi Pitsuwan (pitsuwan2@gmail.com) is a graduate student at Harvard’s Kennedy School and a WSD-Handa Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS in Hawaii. The views expressed in this article are the author's, not those of his affiliations.
Situated astride one of the world’s key strategic crossroads, the “Big Caucasus” is increasingly a region in flux. The August 2008 war among Georgia, Russia, and the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia emphasized the fragility of the territorial status quo that took hold in the years immediately following the collapse of the USSR, but which has failed to establish legitimacy among either local populations or the international community.
The withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq at the end of 2011 did not leave that country with a functioning democracy or effective governance; nor has it put an end to high levels of local violence, or ethnic and sectarian tension. In the wake of the developing leadership crisis between Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki and Vice President Hashimi which began on December 17, 2011, the decreased U.S. presence in Iraq seems to guarantee future sectarian violence and instability.