


**Review of Irish Aid Support to  
World Vision  
Disaster Preparedness and Local Capacities for Peace  
Programme,  
Southern Sudan**

**May 2009**

MAP

### SOUTHERN SUDAN

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## **Acronyms**

CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DIPLCAP	Disaster Preparedness and Local Capacities for Peace
GoNU	Government of National Unity
OECD – DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
NCP	National Congress Party
SPLM/A	Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement / Army
SSRRC	South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
WVI	World Vision Ireland
WVSS	World Vision South Sudan

## **Acknowledgements**

The team is grateful to WVSS for facilitating their field work and WVI for assisting with logistical support, and to Irish Aid for commissioning the review. The team would especially like to thank Sarah Gerein and Morris Kenyi in Juba and Juliet Lang in Dublin for all their assistance. This work would have been far more challenging without their help and good humour throughout.

## **Executive Summary**

### **Purpose**

The purpose of the review is to provide Irish Aid and World Vision with an assessment of the Disaster Preparedness and Local Capacities for Peace (DIPLCAP) programme. The review assesses the performance and achievements of the DIPLCAP to date, bearing in mind the context in which the programme evolved. The review uses the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency and Sustainability.

### **Background**

World Vision South Sudan developed a project to address needs of remote communities in South Sudan following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that was signed by warring factions in January 2005.

The project set out to address the issues of service delivery, peace building, disaster preparedness and livelihood development. The service delivery element aimed to assist the government to provide health and education in a conflict area in order to both provide these services and enhance peace by enabling the communities to access these services in a neutral place. The peace building aspects of the project were intended to build capacity in the affected communities to facilitate peace between them. The disaster preparedness element of the project was intended to enable the communities to protect themselves from flooding as well as provide early warning of attacks from hostile neighbours. The livelihoods component of the project was intended to enhance food security in the area by facilitating vegetable gardening.

### **Findings**

#### *Relevance*

The project is relevant to the needs of the people it serves. The project addresses the needs of peace building and disaster preparedness, as well as livelihoods. These needs are acute in the communities of Mayendit, Tonj East and Rumbek North where the project operates. World Vision South Sudan has extensive experience in the region, and the project fits neatly into their overall programme.

#### *Efficiency*

The project is managed efficiently given the constraints of working in South Sudan, which are considerable. Costs are high, higher than comparable projects in other areas of the world, but the situation in South Sudan is such that prices for even basic commodities are expensive. Transport costs are higher than elsewhere; roads are impassable for most of the year, where they exist.

It is difficult to hire and retain trained staff in South Sudan. Working conditions are extremely difficult. This has affected the continuity of the project, from one phase to the next. It also is evident in the lack institutional memory around project issues. New management systems in WVSS and relocating the regional office to Juba have resulted in improved efficiency.

### *Effectiveness*

The peace building element of the project has been very successful. It has formed representative peace committees in three communities. The work of these committees has resulted in the calming of conflict between the communities of Mayendit and Tonj East. There are now far fewer cattle raids and violence between these two communities. There has been less success in building peace between Tonj East and Rumbek North, but there are some changes and the work is ongoing.

The project has also had success in enhancing disaster preparedness in Mayendit, reinforcing a dike which has prevented flood damage in the village. The project has benefited from the innovative cooperation of an oil company drilling nearby. New monitoring and evaluation systems were being developed at the time of the review. These should take into consideration the difficulties of working in the field in South Sudan and result in a more effective intervention.

### *Sustainability*

The peace committees are a sustainable element of the project. Many of the members are part of the committee as representatives of their professional roles such as local government officers.

The disaster preparedness element is also sustainable, building on ongoing community activities such as the dike in Mayendit. No technical expertise was used in locating the dike, lessening flood damage in Mayendit, even if it is not yet clear whether the dyke has had an effect on neighbouring villages.

Programme exit strategies should be developed with all the communities the project assists in order to promote sustainability.

## **Overall Conclusion**

This project is well placed to serve the articulated needs of the communities it serves. It has had real success in some elements in a short time. It has difficulties in retaining project staff due to challenges of living and working in remote South Sudan. It fits well into the programme WVSS has in the region, and has good relationships with the communities and local authorities.

## **Recommendations**

1. It is recommended that programme exit strategies should be developed with each community served by DIPLCAP.
2. It is recommended that technical expertise is employed whenever necessary, especially where infrastructure is involved, and that this expertise be planned for in the project documents.
3. It is recommended that WVSS should consider supporting the communities in getting the cooperation and support of oil companies for the implementation of disaster preparedness interventions, such as the dike building and other infrastructure
4. It is recommended that the new monitoring system being developed by WVSS will take into consideration the challenges faced by project staff in the field and work to assist in the projects relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability.
5. It is recommended that the project be staffed appropriately at all times in order to minimise exposure to risk.
6. A standard reporting format should be developed based on project objectives and core deliverables. Financial reporting should also be standardised.
7. It is recommended that joint training sessions on peace issues should be conducted where practical in order to enhance communication and interaction between the communities

## **Introduction**

### **Purpose and Scope**

The purpose of the review is to provide Irish Aid and World Vision with an assessment of the effectiveness of the Disaster Preparedness and Local Capacities for Peace (DIPLCAP) programme. The review assesses the performance and achievements of the DIPLCAP to date, bearing in mind the context in which the programme evolved. The review uses the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency and Sustainability.

### **Context**

#### *Political*

Sudan is the largest country in Africa with an estimated population of 37 million people. The average life expectancy is 39 years. The 2006 Sudan Household Survey found that 17.2% of people do not meet their daily food needs. The under 5 mortality rate is 112 per 1,000 and the maternal mortality rate is 1,107 per 100,000 live births. UNAIDS estimates that Sudan has the highest HIV/AIDS rate in the North Africa / Middle East region, with approx. 1.4% of people between 15 and 49 living with HIV/AIDS. There is great economic prosperity among people involved in extractive industries, and severe poverty coexisting in all regions.

Sudan has a long history of national, North - South conflict and just 11 years of peace since independence in 1956. The conflict has resulted in roughly two million war-related deaths and the displacement of millions of others from their homes. The conflict pitted the mainly Arab people and their government in Khartoum with the non-Arab peoples in the south led by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Civilians died at the hands of both the government and SPLA forces, and both sides recruited child soldiers.

The violence began in the early 1980s, shortly after the Sudanese government redivided the country's southern provinces and instituted Islamic Sharia law. These moves coincided with a serious drought, and the distribution of food relief was stymied by insecurity.

Although ethnic identity and religion were key elements to the conflict, there was an economic dimension as well: control over natural resources, in particular oil which was discovered in the south in 1978. Tensions over land and water resources have also contributed to the conflict. In the 1980s, the government promoted the expansion of cotton and sugar crops, requiring new land and forcibly displacing groups along ethnic lines.

The people of southern Sudan suffered tremendous hardships during the war. The famine of the late 1980s, a humanitarian disaster that put millions of Sudanese at risk of starvation, was caused by a combination of drought, violence, population displacements, and aid blockages and diversions to combatants.

After two years of intensive negotiations, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Khartoum government and the SPLM/A was signed in January 2005. The agreement provided for power sharing, the distribution of oil earnings, and a referendum on national unity to be held in 2011.

A long history of inter-communal conflict in southern Sudan has led to the development of a strong peace building heritage for regulating feuds through customary guidelines and institutions. However, clan rivalry became dangerously assimilated into the north-south war. With a decline in local governance systems, easy access to light weapons, and the use of militias by successive governments as proxy forces against the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), codes of conduct for resolving conflict were undermined and the authority of elders and chiefs to lead peace initiatives diminished. Cattle raids became acts of military assault and women, children and other vulnerable groups were blatantly targeted. The situation became worse after the SPLM/A split in 1991, aggravating existing political divisions and deepening ethnic factional fighting. This was particularly the case between the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups and within Nuer sections and clans.

Since the CPA, the Government in South Sudan has made significant progress on putting in place structures at State level but has had little success so far in putting government structures in place at a county level mostly because of lack of trained personnel in the region, poor logistics and lack of resources. Many local government officials are former SPLM/A members without a background in civil service and in most cases with little or no formal education. This has serious implications for the ability of the Government of South Sudan to carry out its role of providing basic health, education and other services to the people of South Sudan.

After several delays, a population census was undertaken in April 2008, the first census since the end of the war in 2005, and the first in 23 years. There have been many disagreements surrounding the census, which is a crucial element in the elections for president and state governors to be held in 2009. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the preliminary results, stating a population of 3.8 for South Sudan, grossly underestimate the reality, which is nearer 11 million. Though the census claims a coverage rate of 80 – 90%, many say that huge areas of South Sudan were not surveyed at all. The final results have yet to be released. It is widely believed that once the elections are held that many of the current governors will lose their posts and it is not clear if all of them will willingly surrender power. The impact of the referendum on independence for South Sudan to be held in 2011 is also uncertain.

### *Environmental*

Operating conditions in South Sudan are among the most challenging in the world. The rainy season (May – October) effectively cuts off many parts of the country from road access (including some of the DIPLCAP project areas). Those areas that are accessible require considerably longer times to access by road and even then access is not always guaranteed. Equally access to areas by air in the rainy season is often impossible. In effect this means that projects have to be substantially implemented in the six months of the dry season, especially when no project officer lives in the community.

Logistical problems also exist due to the difficulty of securing supplies in South Sudan. The vast majority of supplies (food, seeds, tools, building materials, fuel, etc.) have to be imported from either Kenya or Uganda and this can take considerable time. In addition, the absence of a banking system creates problems with paying staff and suppliers.

### *Security*

Overall the security situation in South Sudan has improved considerably since the signing of the CPA. Incidents of theft from or attacks on humanitarian organisations are relatively low. That said, the nature of the DIPLCAP programme has meant they are operating in areas which are prone to local conflict. The conflict with the north caused a proliferation of small arms, despite many efforts to disarm the population.

### *World Vision South Sudan response*

The Project was developed in 2005 by World Vision South Sudan in response to the changing environment in South Sudan following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA brought thousands of returnees back to South Sudan, while there was severe food insecurity brought on by changing weather patterns and flooding throughout the region. These factors exacerbated an already tense situation, with host communities and returnees learning to live side by side with very limited resources. There is also a long history of inter tribal disputes around access to limited grazing and scarce water during the dry season, and cattle rustling between the Dinka and the Nuer peoples.

The project set out to address the issues of service delivery, peace building, disaster preparedness and livelihood development. The service delivery element aimed to assist the government to provide health and education in a conflict area in order to both provide these services and enhance peace by enabling the communities to access these services in a neutral place. It was hoped that peace building aspects of the project would build capacity in the affected communities to facilitate peace between them. The disaster preparedness element of the project would enable the communities to protect themselves from flooding as well as from attacks from hostile neighbours. The livelihoods component of the project would enhance food security in the area by facilitating and teaching vegetable gardening.

## Report Structure

The report structure is as follows

- *Executive Summary* with a brief overview of the project and the evaluation findings
- *Introduction*, giving a background to the project and the evaluation.
- *Intervention profile* describes the project
- *Review Findings* discusses the general findings over the entire project. It then focuses on each project component in turn.
- *Conclusions* section contains the team's Conclusions, views on Key Challenges, Recommendations, and Lessons Learned. The Conclusions are presented under the DAC OECD evaluation headings of Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability and Impact.

The project has three phases. Each phase was presented to Irish Aid for funding separately, as a new project, though with the understanding that one phase followed directly on another. The phases are known as DIPLCAP I, II and III and will be referred to as such throughout the report.

## **Purpose and Methodology**

The purpose of the review was to provide Irish Aid and World Vision with an assessment of the Disaster Preparedness and Local Capacities for Peace (DIPLCAP) programme.

This review was conducted in two stages by a team of three people. The inception stage reviewed documentation and developed a review matrix (Annex 3). The matrix is based on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development - Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) evaluation criteria of Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness and Sustainability.

The second stage comprised an eight day long field visit to South Sudan (16<sup>th</sup> – 24<sup>th</sup> January 2009). The field visit encompassed extensive interviews with World Vision South Sudan (WVSS) staff in their head office in Juba as well as visits of several days to two of the project areas, Mayendit and Tonj East. The third location in the project, Rumbek North was not visited due to insecurity at the time of the field visit. The interviews were semi structured in depth interviews and included focus groups with staff and community members. The team also undertook qualitative observation of physical infrastructure. Meetings were carried out in as participatory a manner as possible, including feedback and verification of findings. World Vision South Sudan field staff acted as translators. The team also met with local government officials, several other NGOs and UN OCHA.

There were several limitations to this review. The principal one was that most staff members involved at the inception phase and DIPLCAP I were no longer working for World Vision Ireland or World Vision South Sudan. Another limitation was the difficulty in accessing project sites. The team was unable to visit Rumbek North because of insecurity. A further limitation was the short amount of time available for some meetings. Several of the community meetings were fairly large with several groups of participants together. In particular the meeting with the community in Mayendit was cumbersome. It would have been more appropriate to have met with different sections of the community separately, as happened in Tonj East. There was little opportunity to discuss informally with community members.

Despite these limitations, the team feels that it carried out a thorough assessment and gained valuable insights into the project, World Vision South Sudan, and the context and communities where the project operates, during the field visit.

## **Intervention Profile**

### **The Project**

The DIPLCAP project was developed using information from a needs survey. In line with World Vision South Sudan's focus, this project concentrated on peace building and disaster preparedness. The project took a phased approach. It was flexible and adapted to changes and lessons learnt. It was redesigned year on year based on experiences of the earlier phase or phases.

The goals of the project are as follows:

- DIPLCAP I – To assist the most vulnerable populations of post war South Sudan to re-establish their lives and promote just and sustainable peace.
- DIPLCAP II - To reduce vulnerability and foster a peaceful co-existence among populations in post war Sudan
- DIPLCAP III - To contribute to an environment conducive to development with peaceful co-existence and reduced vulnerability among populations in Warrap, Unity and Lake States of Southern Sudan (this phase began in January 2009 and was thus not evaluated).

The first phase hereafter referred to as DIPLCAP I focussed on the provision of basic resources and services to the communities in conflict in order to promote reconciliation and cooperation, and to mitigate disasters, particularly flooding. It focussed on peace building through establishing centres where services could be dispensed, a school, a clinic, a community centre and borehole wells with pumps and in some cases storage tanks. It envisaged these infrastructures being used by several communities and thereby fostering peace.

The specific objectives of DIPLCAP I were:

- To improve access to functional community services
- To strengthen community resilience, disaster preparedness and mitigation capacities
- To promote local capacities for peace and foster inter-community peace discussions

The second phase, referred to here as DIPLCAP II, built on lessons learned from DIPLCAP I. It worked on improving livelihoods through agricultural development in Mayendit and Tonj East by promoting vegetable gardens and providing tools, seeds and training for 60 farmers (58 women). It promoted disaster preparedness in Mayendit, focussing on improving and maintaining a dike the community had constructed to alleviate the effects of flooding. The project also fostered a wider approach to peace building, continuing this work in the counties of Mayendit and Tonj East. It also fostered the development of a new peace committee in Rumbek North County, as this area was also complicit in violence and cattle rustling with the other two communities.

The main component of DIPLCAP II is the Peace Building component. The peace committees represent local government and key stakeholders include women and young men. The project aims to build capacity in these committees to work together towards peace between their communities.

The specific objectives of DIPLCAP II were:

- To strengthen community livelihood systems by improving agriculture production and managing flooding for agriculture production.
- To strengthen disaster preparedness capacities by focussing on community structures and community owned management to improve flood management techniques.
- To strengthen local capacities for conflict transformation by enhancing capacity for peace committees to promote non violent conflict resolution, to prevent inter ethnic violence by promoting cooperation between communities and target these communities with knowledge of human rights and non violent conflict resolution techniques.

DIPLCAP III, to cover the period Sept 2008 – Sept 2009 has been funded by Irish Aid and will build on lessons learned from DIPLCAP I and II. This phase will continue to build on the gains made in peace building and disaster preparedness activities, as well as some of the livelihoods elements of the project. The objectives of DIPLCAP III are:

- Enhanced capacity of civil society, local authorities and youth to prevent, analyse and transform conflict, thereby enabling conflict-sensitive development and promoting unity in the region
- Strengthened community disaster preparedness and resilience through diversified agricultural practices, and community-based mechanisms to reduce vulnerability in face of disasters and resulting tensions and conflict

## **Review Findings**

### **General**

This section deals with the findings of the team. General issues are covered first of all, including the design of the intervention, mainstreaming, management and project coordination, and finances. The second part of this section then deals with each project component separately.


### **Design**

DIPLCAP I and II (and III) share core components: peace and conflict reduction, disaster preparedness and livelihoods security. The most marked difference between the phases of the project is that DIPLCAP I proposed an investment in shared services (health clinic, school, community centre, boreholes); instead the infrastructure was built in one community (Tonj East). DIPLCAP II abandoned this method and focused its peace building activities on committees and meetings and introduced another community (Rumbek North) to the process.

WVSS worked in as participatory a manner as possible to develop each stage of the process. WVSS has had extensive experience in the region and already had a relationship with many of the local stakeholders. Their field studies identified the communities' priorities. The projects' designs were built on information gathered from focus group discussions with community members and local authorities. WVSS also used information from its 2004 Bahr el Ghazal nutrition survey to influence the DIPLCAP I and II designs.

## Management and Reporting

The following organisation chart describes the administrative and programmatic management of DIPLCAP in South Sudan at the time of the review, including lines of reporting. Solid lines represent direct reporting relationships, and broken lines represent technical reporting and support relationships.



The project was initially managed from Nairobi. The transfer of the project management and administration functions to Juba was complete by October 2007. This has resulted in a greater reduction in logistics costs than the increase in salary costs (some formerly 'local' staff in Kenya are now 'international' staff in Sudan). Overall the move represents an efficiency gain as management is closer to the project for less expenditure. In addition, it is very likely to make management of the project more effective as it will enable more frequent and timely site visits by senior officers. It has already provided a more in depth understanding for WVSS of the local situation, and has enabled the organisation to become involved in key areas of networking and coordination with other NGOs as well as with international agencies such as OCHA. The difficulty of finding qualified personnel who are willing to live and work in South Sudan remains an issue.

The current strategy was devised and managed sectorally. However, because of the size of the country and the geographic-specific nature of many of the issues, the new strategy that is being developed will be structured and managed regionally.

During DIPLCAP I, the Humanitarian and Emergency Manager managed the project, administratively and technically. The management structure changed slightly, and during DIPLCAP II, project workers had a technical reporting line to the relevant sector managers (Peace, Food Security and Emergency) and provided monthly narrative reports outlining activities and results to the Project Officer.

The project proposals to Irish Aid included some indicators that were difficult to measure. Some of these indicators were also quite ambitious (e.g. awareness of peace issues measured through pre and post implementation assessments), some were unrealistic given the poor service coverage in the area (quarterly epidemiological reports), and some to be quantified (e.g. the increase in community members equipped with knowledge about human rights). The Project Officer's report to Irish Aid was based on the log frame and provided a narrative of progress against each objective and against as many of the indicators as was practicable.

The final DIPLCAP I report to Irish Aid did not mention or analyse challenges encountered or modifications made in relation to the location of the education, health and water services. The report noted that the school was built in an area accessible by both Mayendit and Tonj East. The report did not outline any of the sustainability issues that led to the project's change in focus away from infrastructure development.

Financial reporting to Irish Aid takes place at the end of each year-long phase of the project (though budget revisions are requested during the project). The DIPLCAP I budget-actual narrative report to Irish Aid provided an explanation of variances from budget. However, the financial report only included summary expenditure figures; detailed expenditure figures (including variances) were not included. The DIPLCAP II financial report included detailed expenditure figures.

## **Finances and Financial Management**

This project expenditure comprises only 1 – 2% of the budget of WVSS. Total project funds are transferred from Irish Aid to WV Ireland, and then on to World Vision International prior to project inception and converted into US dollars.

World Vision obtained permission from Irish Aid for budget revisions in November 2006 (DIPLCAP I), together with a request for a no cost extension to the end of 2006. These were both approved. Exchange rate gains or losses between preparation of budget and transmission of funds are allocated across budget lines and significant shortfalls are made up from other funding sources.

Some project costs were significantly greater than budget in DIPLCAP II. These overspends were offset by savings, which mostly arose from wage savings from staff taking up assignments late or through hiring local staff instead of expatriates.

The Internal Audit Unit of World Vision South Sudan conducts audits based on risk, monetary value and any donor-specific auditing requirements. The Unit performs some financial monitoring, including some review of efficiency. At the time of the review, the Internal Audit Unit was auditing DIPLCAP.

Regional Managers collect projected expenditure (up to \$US300,000 per month) each month in cash for distribution to Project Coordinators. This represents a significant exposure in the event of the loss or misappropriation of a single withdrawal.

The difficulty in recruitment and retention of appropriately qualified staff is particularly acute in relation to finance staff in the field. After numerous attempts, WVSS was unsuccessful in hiring a finance officer for the DIPLCAP project.

## **Project Coordination**

Duplication of services does not appear to be a major concern at this stage in South Sudan as state services are very limited and there are few other NGOs in the region. World Vision staff have good working relationships with (the few) other NGO and donor staff on the ground. Projects are not necessarily coordinated between agencies, though agencies know where others are working and what they are doing.

Coordination with regional government is limited because of the lack of strategic planning at that level. Relationships between WVSS staff and local authorities are open and cordial.

Coordination with the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) appears strong at local level. However, the SSRRC at national level is under resourced and sidelined by Ministries that have greater authority and resources. It can be difficult to ensure that local initiatives have support from the government without formal local plans.

Coordination with other WVSS projects in the area is satisfactory and the same Sector Managers are responsible for the other projects in the area. Information and support seems to flow easily across the organisation leading to stronger interventions. DIPLCAP fits into the WVSS programme very well.

## **Monitoring**

Project monitoring by Sector Managers is based on the monthly narrative report from the Project Officer, which outlines progress against planned activities and key successes, setbacks and challenges during the month. Project monitoring by the Operations Director is based on synopsis reports prepared by Sector Managers. The project tracking tables that are included in project proposals are not often used.

Monthly project monitoring does not consider the ongoing relevance of the project to community needs. Project monitoring by the Design Monitoring and Evaluation Unit in 2006 considered the relevance of the project to community needs in Tonj East in a general sense, but did not look at a deeper level to determine whether project components were appropriate to community needs. The monitoring visit by World Vision Ireland to Mayendit considered the relevance of project components to the needs of the community and built these into project design for DIPLCAP III.

Project monitoring attempts to measure the effectiveness of the project, as evidenced by monthly monitoring reports and the significant changes to project design each year.

The Project Officer and Sector Managers review quarterly financial reports compiled by the Regional Finance Officer. Sector Managers undertake more comprehensive reviews every six months in order to report to donors. Project efficiency is reviewed in terms of justifying budget revisions but does not establish whether the project has delivered value for money. As budgeting is not particularly rigorous, financial monitoring against budget cannot determine whether expenditure represents good value for money. This is an interesting issue in South Sudan, with costs generally higher than other post conflict situations, and the issue of WVSS staff costs, especially the transport costs for staff to and from Kenya.

Ongoing Project Monitoring implicitly considers some sustainability issues but they are not expressly addressed. The Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit visit in 2006 recommended developing exit strategies and discussing them with community leaders. Exit strategies were discussed with the communities though in discussions with the community groups there seemed to be not much realisation that the exit strategies may need to be used.

World Vision Ireland was involved in project design and continues to be involved in project monitoring. This includes a site visit at the end of DIPLCAP I and review of quarterly, six monthly and final project monitoring and financial reports prior to submission to Irish Aid. A representative of World Vision Ireland will participate in the end of project evaluation. This ongoing support and oversight by World Vision Ireland contributed to project efficiency (particularly incorporating lessons learnt into subsequent project phases). World Vision Ireland absorbed these costs without retaining any expenses from the project grant.

At the time of the field visit, WVSS was developing a new monitoring system that is based on the Learning through Evaluation and Planning (LEAP) system that was developed by World Vision International to standardise programmatic functions, including monitoring and evaluation. It is hoped that the team developing the system will take due notice of difficulties in the field, and make visits to more than one project site to gain an insight into the working conditions in Southern Sudan before finalising the M&E system.

## **Planning**

Needs assessments addressed realities on the ground and were driven by community needs expressed. Information from WVSS's 2004 Bahr el Ghazal nutrition survey was also used to target the project. Subsequent phases of the project benefited by World Vision's presence on the ground that allowed the organisation to build a more appropriate and cohesive project and incorporate lessons learnt.

The project was funded by the Emergency and Recovery Unit in Irish Aid, which traditionally has a one year funding mechanism. This is appropriate for emergency situations, but not as useful for longer term interventions which require longer term planning horizons. This has contributed to delays in implementation that were exacerbated by sometimes unrealistic timetabling of activities that could not be implemented on time due to weather or security conditions.

Project planning has also been adversely affected by the difficulty in recruiting and retaining staff in WVSS. This particularly manifests itself in the lack of detailed institutional memory from one phase to the next. It also means that from time to time skilled experienced staff are redeployed elsewhere and their skills are not available in a timely manner to the project.

## **Human Resources**

Staff capacity is a huge challenge in South Sudan and finding suitably qualified individuals willing to live and work in remote areas is particularly difficult. Staff costs have also risen with the movement of management to Juba from Nairobi. However, this has been more than justified by logistics and transportation savings and the benefits accruing to proximity to the project.

The issue of human resource constraints, and staff changes, has affected the project greatly, and is probably its biggest challenge. Staff changes in WVI and in WVSS happened between DIPLCAP I and II, affecting institutional memory. Other staff members were lost between DIPLCAP II and the just beginning DIPLCAP III because of the funding gap.

## **Logistics**

Some logistics costs have decreased as a result of the move from Nairobi to Juba, however overall they remain high because of the costs of operating in South Sudan. These high costs include extremely high prices for rents, food, accommodation and all goods, given the mix of aid workers and oil explorers in the region, pushing up prices in what was, until fairly recently, a small regional town.

The maintenance cost of project vehicles was underestimated, particularly the cost of sourcing spares in the rainy season. Vehicle maintenance and running costs are estimated by the Operations Director as being US\$1,000 per vehicle per month. The team was told

that vehicles used in the WVSS programme do not usually last for more than 8,000 kilometres. Sets of spare parts are not usually bought with the vehicles.

The difficulty in accessing project sites cannot be overestimated. Travel is extremely difficult and time consuming during the dry season and virtually impossible during the wet season. This means that for the areas of the project where no Project Officer is resident (Tonj East and Rumbek) the project has no input from professional staff for several months of the year.

## **Mainstreaming**

World Vision has its own cross cutting issues, which overlap with Irish Aid's Gender, Environment, Governance and HIV/AIDS. World Vision also mainstreams Peace Building, Christian Commitment and Disability.

### *Gender*

Though gender concerns are mentioned in the project documents, in practice there is generally little difference in how men's and women's needs are addressed in the peace building and disaster preparedness elements. However, the livelihoods element of the project addresses women particularly, and fifty eight out of the sixty farmers in the project are women. There is usually one women's representative on the peace building and disaster preparedness committees, though in the peace building committee at Tonj East a woman represented one of the local government institutions. The women speak last at the meetings, and are mostly seen as victims of violence rather than agents of change. In the Disaster Preparedness groups, women are better represented and are vocal on the local committees and there were some very active women in Mayendit who met with the evaluation team. Women do most of the labour of building and repairing the dike, and have information about other villages and how the dike has affected families.

### *Environment*

Environment is a key element of this project. The obvious component dealing directly with environmental issues is disaster preparedness, where dike building and maintenance are a direct response to flooding. There were some (anecdotal) negative consequences of dike building for other villages in the area, making their flooding problem worse as water was redirected. There is no national or regional water or flooding policy which would have assisted in planning this particular part of the intervention. WVSS is well placed to work with regional government on this.

### *Governance*

Peace building has a direct link to governance, and to poverty alleviation. Without peace there is no good governance, and most people remain poor. The peace committees include representatives of local authorities, chiefs, court representatives and youth. The Executive Chief or Paramount Chief sat on the committee usually acting as the Chair.

Members are selected by the community, within the categories, in some cases by voting but mostly by consensus.

### *HIV/AIDS*

HIV/AIDS is a prominent issue in Sudan. According to UNAIDS Sudan has the biggest epidemic in North Africa and the Middle East. It is estimated that 1.7% of the total population of Sudan are living with HIV/AIDS. WVSS has completed a HIV/AIDS situation analysis which will help develop their HIV/AIDS programme. WVSS claims that HIV/AIDS is mainstreamed internally throughout its sector responses, including peace building. The project has taught HIV/AIDS awareness in its disaster preparedness component in both phases so far.

## **Project Components**

DIPLCAP I and II (and III) share core components: peace and conflict reduction, disaster preparedness and livelihoods security. The following sections assess the performance of the core components.

### **Strengthening local capacities for peace**

#### *Background*

Peace building is the overarching and most important element of the project. The key activity of this component was the formation of peace committees in Mayendit and Tonj East in DIPLCAP I. Rumbek North was brought into DIPLCAP II when it became clear, during peace committee meetings between Tonj East and Mayendit, that the ongoing conflict between Tonj East and Rumbek North was detrimental to peace in the region. The peace committees requested the inclusion of the Rumbek North community in the peace building activities.

Formation of these peace committees at local level was a key recommendation of a national peace conference of 1999 and follow up meetings in 2005 which resulted in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA recommended that permanent peace committees should be appointed around border areas and smaller cross-border peace conferences convened.

The key output of this component was a three-way peace conference in Madol, which was organised by committee members of the three counties. The conference was held in February of 2008 and facilitated by the Sudan Council of Churches. Resolutions and recommendations were signed by the 46 participants, including peace committee representatives and other key stakeholders (chiefs, church leaders, women, youth, local authority and state representatives) as well as observers from other neighbouring communities.

#### *Findings*

The intervention fostered the continuing operation of peace committees as recommended in the Wunlit conference<sup>1</sup>. Communities felt that this was a very important part of the support given by WVSS, and that it would have been difficult for them to set up and maintain the committees without this support.

Local communities are very involved in the implementation of the peace building component of the project. Peace Committees are comprised of between 10 and 15 members, including youth, traditional authority, local authority, judicial and women's representatives. Members are elected or chosen by the communities to represent each

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<sup>1</sup> The Wunlit Peace conference was a fairly successful peace building initiative held in 1999 between the Dinka and Nuer to address issues between the two groups, including cattle rustling. The recommendations have been useful in many further peace building initiatives. The Madol conference funded by Irish Aid built on these resolutions.

group. Committee members are responsible for liaising with communities to ensure that community views are incorporated into activities.

Some stakeholders outlined the importance of the inclusion of state representatives in the process; one activity in the DIPLCAP III proposal is to ‘Conduct and disseminate conflict assessments to local and state authorities, government ministries and agencies operating in Lakes, Warrap and Unity States’.

Peace training was provided to some members of Peace Committees and to the Peace Project Worker. Peace training was also provided to youth members of the Peace Committee and other youth from the community. This training was intended to build capacity in the community and local authority around peace issues. Peace Committee members in Tonj East were vague about the training they received. However, the ongoing peace between Tonj East and Mayendit suggests that it has proven helpful. Due to access difficulties, the Peace Committee of Rumbek North only participated in a one day training session. The training was intended to build capacity in the community and the local authority around peace issues.

Meetings between Peace Committees (particularly Tonj East and Rumbek North) have been limited. Peace Committee meetings in June 2007 between Tonj East and Mayendit acknowledged the significant reduction in cross border raids. Trust has increased between Tonj East and Mayendit as a result of the peace committee meetings and there have been fewer cattle raids and thus less violence.

Many community members interviewed corroborated the reduction in conflict. This improvement in relationships between the communities has a direct poverty reduction effect in both areas. Women told us that they are able to tend their vegetable gardens, that their houses remain standing and are not burned, and that fewer people are being killed or injured.

Bringing Rumbek North into the initiative and the three-way peace conference was community driven. The meeting appears to have been successful in helping cement the peace between Tonj East and Mayendit. The conflict between Tonj East and Rumbek North has abated also, but not as dramatically as between Tonj East and Mayendit and there are still conflict problems between Tonj East and Rumbek North.

A number of other neighbouring communities are also involved in the conflict in the area. Stakeholders interviewed expressed the need to include these communities in the process. Some of these communities were represented at the three-way peace meeting as observers. World Vision has applied for funding to other donors to include these communities in the peace building process, but has not yet been successful.

The extent to which the community feels ownership of the process is not clear. Members of the Peace Committees drove the peace process by selecting participants for the three-way peace meeting, setting the agenda and developing recommendations and resolutions.

However, community members interviewed attributed responsibility to World Vision for the implementation of those resolutions.

The peace committees in the three communities seem to have been conscientious in working in their own communities. However, it was not straightforward (or even possible) for these committees to work with the committees of the other communities. Problems of access to other areas of the region are a key issue for this process. Communication links are very poor and without the support of outside agencies such as World Vision, it would not be possible for activities such as the conference to be implemented.

The conference was a key element of the success of this component. It allowed people who were central to their own communities to meet people of similar status and discuss the peace process face to face, in a safe place, facilitated by people respected in all three communities (the Council of Churches). This had not happened before and contributed enormously to the success so far of peace building in the region.

Without strong community ownership, these interventions will not be sustainable. The peace committees have members who are present as representatives of local government authorities. The fact that these people are on committees as part of their professional role makes those particular committees more sustainable than those that are purely community based.

The Tonj East peace committee told the review team that they had not been given any 'motivational gifts' to ensure their cooperation. The implication was that if these gifts were exchanged the committee would go about its business with increased fervour. However, both the project accounts and WVSS staff confirmed that the committee had received some material support such as bicycles and t-shirts to aid them in their work. Their request for a two way radio was more practical. This could have a real benefit and could allow immediate warnings of impending raids to be sent from one area to another. The provision and use of two way radios is a component in DIPLCAP III.

There are some vested interest groups who are not represented on the peace committees. The most notable of these are the spear masters, to whom young men go to for blessings before raids, and who, according to interviewees, benefit from the proceeds of the raids. Attempts have been made to involve the spear masters but they have proved unsuccessful to date. The peace building process would benefit considerably if spear masters participated.

### *Conclusion*

The success of the peace initiative is based on positive interaction between the communities and gradually building trust. This increased trust may explain the gains made between Mayendit and Tonj East. The lack of ongoing contact between Rumbeck North and Tonj East made it difficult to make much progress in the search for peace between those two communities. Community ownership of the process is crucial to ensuring the sustainability of the initiative.

## **Strengthening Disaster Preparedness and Community Livelihoods Systems**

The purpose of this component was twofold:

- To increase food and livelihood security in targeted communities through crop diversification
- To improve community disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation capacities by training key groups, establishing preparedness committees and providing basic emergency equipment.

Community Disaster Preparedness Committees were comprised of community representatives. Disaster preparedness in Tonj East centred on improving food and livelihood security through crop diversification and conflict prevention (discussed in the peace component above). Flooding is a bigger issue in Mayendit so disaster preparedness was concerned with early warning and Dike rehabilitation and construction, as well livelihood security. There has also been debate within the committees about how to enable an early warning system for conflict prevention. Provision of two way radios to communicate information about approaching conflict will be an element of DIPLCAP III.

Work done on rehabilitating and building the dike tended to depend on who was available to, for example, mend a fissure in the dike, rather than whose responsibility it was through committee membership. Women generally did most of the manual labour for general repairs. However, in the case of a large break in the dyke young men would be called to come and fix it with the local chief then butchering one of his own cattle to reward them.

### *Findings*

This intervention was relevant to the situation of the people of South Sudan. Disasters that the project addressed included flooding and conflict. Both of these situations were endemic in the region and of particular concern to the people of Tonj East and Mayendit where the review took place.

World Vision staff took Sphere training and some handbooks have been distributed<sup>2</sup>. Committee members have not taken Sphere training.

Sphere standards have been complied with in the boreholes that were observed during the course of the review.

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<sup>2</sup> Sphere is a set of standards for application in emergency situations in order to improve the quality of life of people affected. It focuses on the handbook which details the standards to be met in, for example, physical infrastructure; it focuses also on collaboration and a commitment to quality and accountability.

### *Tonj East*

Three Community Disaster Prevention Committees were created with 5-6 members each. The committees developed action plans to respond to disasters through local capacities and were trained in disaster risk management.

The Project worker had more contact with the community during DIPLCAP I. During DIPLCAP II, the community primarily liaised with local authorities to establish the activities that would be undertaken.

Disaster preparedness (primarily social conflict) training was delivered as promised in Tonj East and households received vegetable gardening equipment and seeds. Community members interviewed noted benefits derived from crop diversification.

### *Mayendit*

The food security objective in DIPLCAP I focussed on providing farmers with seeds and some training in crop diversification.

In DIPLCAP II this component developed to the provision of training in flood resistant crop cultivation techniques to sixty farmers, fifty eight of whom are women. Seeds for several different types of vegetables were distributed and grown. Because of raids and flooding seeds were not saved for replanting.

One Community Disaster Prevention Committee was formed with 20 members, including six women. The Committee developed an action plan to respond to potential disasters using local capacities and resources.

World Vision staff attended a number of training sessions in providing agricultural extension services, conservation practices and crop disease control. Training and extension services provided to farmers were evaluated by the Project Agronomist and deemed satisfactory. A number of participants have been trained as trainers and have agreed to provide farmer-to-farmer extension services. Several women told of working with their friends and neighbours to help them learn about vegetable gardening.

The project provided seeds and tools to households in Mayendit; fishing lines had been provided as part of another World Vision project. Community members interviewed noted the benefits of crop diversification but commented that some of the tools (hoes) were inappropriate for the work to be performed. The project had bought hoes from Kenya which were not the traditional type used in South Sudan.

Initially, community reinforcement of an existing dike in Mayendit was not very successful because of the level of work needed. An opportunity presented itself to work with local authorities and approach an oil company that was drilling locally to help build a more substantial dike. This represents a substantial additional benefit that was not anticipated in the proposal but evolved from World Vision's initiative. The placement of the dike was decided between the community and bulldozer operator. World Vision

provided food to local workers who assisted in the dike building. However, technical expertise was not sought.

The dike represented very good value for money, as World Visions contribution was (financially) limited to providing food for workers and organising the liaison between local authorities and the oil company. However, effectiveness might have been improved by employing a technical expert to discuss the placement of the dike with the communities and the bulldozer operator. World Vision staff and some community members noted that some other communities did not benefit from the dike and may even have been negatively affected as the floodwaters were redirected. The DIPLCAP III proposal does not envisage approaching the oil company to extend or strengthen the dike.

Community consultations take place to ensure that community views are represented in planned activities. However, at the time of the field visit (January 09) World Vision had not yet communicated its plans for DIPLCAP III to the community or project workers.

### *Conclusion*

The disaster preparedness element of the project has had a positive impact on the people of Mayendit village with the reinforcement of the dike. It has been innovative in the use of the oil company's resources. The livelihoods element is much appreciated by the people of Mayendit and they have plans to continue to train each other with resources from WVSS.

The use of technical expertise may have further enhanced this element of the project, helping ensure maximum benefit from the support provided by the oil company.

## **Improved access to functional community services (DIPLCAP I)**

### *Background*

This component has not been carried forward to DIPLCAP II & III. Its purpose was to foster improved relations between the communities of Mayendit and Tonj East by locating shared services between them. The original plan was for the creation of centralised services (school, clinic, community centre, boreholes) that would be accessible by communities in Tonj East and Mayendit. However, as the flood basin swelled during the rainy season, this proved impossible and it was agreed to build the structures in Tonj East. The rationale was that the area chosen in Tonj East is a settlement area for Mayendit communities during flooding period and care was taken to sensitize community in Tonj East that the services should be shared.

### *Findings*

There was a very limited risk analysis undertaken of this component of the project, particularly for DIPLCAP I where World Vision did not build risks into the design. Also, as the CPA had just been signed, assumptions were made regarding the ability of

government to deliver services such as health, and these turned out to be overly optimistic.

Community participation in this component is evident through their provision of bricks and labour for the school, clinic and community centre. While this made the project more economical, the lack of skilled labour made the construction less efficient.

Although Mayendit representatives were involved in the decision to locate the structures in Tonj East, this seems to have been on the assumption that further phases of the project would provide similar structures in other areas, including Mayendit. The lack of structures in Mayendit does appear to have caused some resentment there, though it does not appear to have negatively impacted on the peace process.

The school was not in use during the evaluation visit. Commitments that the government would staff the school have not transpired as yet and it is not clear when this might happen.

There were probably quite unrealistic expectations surrounding the idea that the communities would share the school, in particular that families from Mayendit would send their children to boarding school in Tonj East. One woman in Tonj East thought it was a very good idea, though she had married into Tonj East from Mayendit. She was not sure if she would send her children to Mayendit to school, if one existed there.

The construction of the Primary Health Care Unit in Tonj East was driven by needs expressed by the community. Although no other agencies were involved in the provision of primary health care in the particular payam (administrative area) in which it was constructed, *Medicin sans Frontier* had a presence in the county at the time and an Italian medical mission, CCM, continues to operate in Tonj. The clinic in Tonj East is currently closed and World Vision is not providing any further support to it. Community members expressed disappointment with the lack of supply of medicine and primary health care. No discussions have taken place between World Vision and CCM in relation to the possibility of CCM taking over the clinic.

The Tonj East community uses the community centre occasionally. Two of the review meetings with the community were held there. It is in reasonable condition.

The community had another interesting perception of the buildings. Several members, both women and men, said that the buildings gave them pride in their village. It showed that such buildings (fairly permanent structures with cement blocks and windows) could exist in their community. They felt that they may one day live in such a house. The development of this sort of community pride is an unforeseen consequence of building these structures.

World Vision has used this lesson learning opportunity to good advantage. In hindsight, it would have been better to revise construction plans when it became clear that services would be shared to a limited extent at best, this knowledge came when the structures

were already built. World Vision was quick to absorb this lesson learning and make alternative plans for the second phase of the project. There is some resentment in Mayendit that the buildings are in Tonj East, but that does not seem to have affected the progress of the project in Mayendit, which is good.

### Overall Achievement of Objectives

The table below indicates to what extent the objectives of DIPLCAP I and II were achieved. The scoring was developed for the purposes of the review and provides only a general and qualitative guide to performance.

Programme Objective	DIPLCAP I		DIPLCAP II	
	Relevance	Effectiveness	Relevance	Effectiveness
Scores: 1 = Good, 2 = Fair, 3 = Poor				
Improved access to functional community services	1	3		
Strengthen community livelihood systems			1	2
Strengthen community resilience, disaster preparedness and mitigation capacities	1	2	1	1
Promote local capacities for peace and conflict transformation, and foster inter community peace discussions	1	1	1	1

#### *Access to functional community services*

Improved access to functional community services was a relevant aspiration of the programme. However, because the objective was based on assumptions that the government of South Sudan would be able to run the services, this objective has not been achieved.

#### *Strengthen community livelihood systems*

Community livelihood systems were enhanced by the introduction of vegetable gardening, distribution of seeds and training. However, this was not as successful as hoped because the seeds ran out and the equipment was not relevant to the local context, particularly the hoes. The community members were enthusiastic however, and asserted that they would take this forward with the assistance of WVSS.

*Strengthen community resilience, disaster preparedness and mitigation capacities*

Disaster preparedness was one of the successes of the project, particularly in Mayendit where the reinforcement and strengthening of the dike has led to much less flood damage than in previous years. This was a relevant objective, which was successful.

*Promote local capacities for peace and conflict transformation, and foster inter community peace discussions*

The highlight of this project, particularly for the communities of Mayendit and Tonj East, was the peacekeeping element. This was relevant to the three communities (Mayendit, Tonj East and Rumbek North), and was effective in two communities. Ongoing communication is maintained between Tonj East and Rumbek North, and though there has been some lessening of conflict between these two communities, success is not as dramatic as between Mayendit and Tonj East. However, this is given a good score as the change has been dramatic for two communities and foundations are in place for change in the situation between Tonj East and Rumbek North.

## **Conclusions, Key Challenges and Lessons Learnt**

### **Conclusions**

#### *Relevance*

The Project is relevant to the people it serves. It addresses three areas which impact severely on the lives of the people in Mayendit, Tonj East and Rumbek North, and its core aim is the same throughout the three phases: strengthening of local capacities to improve livelihoods, anticipate and mitigate disasters and negotiate peace.

World Vision structured the project according to needs that were evident on the ground at the time and incorporated community's views into its plans. It initially took an optimistic view of the future, such as the assumption that the government would be in a position to staff schools and health clinics.

Methods used to address these issues are also relevant to the situation. Participatory techniques have been used as much as possible, and committees and ongoing interaction with the community members is inclusive and cordial.

The project built on lessons learned from earlier phases as it progressed. Thus, it took into consideration the changing assumptions of government involvement and resources as the years went on. DIPLCAP II benefited substantially from lessons learnt during DIPLCAP I by deepening its engagement with the peace building aspect of the project, which was the most successful aspect. It pursued the elements which had benefits for communities (disaster preparedness and livelihoods security) and dispensing with those aspects that were unsustainable or not contributing to the goals of the project (health and education infrastructure).

#### *Efficiency*

The management team in WVSS has extensive experience in relief and development, and there is a strong core of institutional memory in the agency. Key management staff are committed and professional.

Project staff on the ground face a very difficult challenge. Lack of resources at field level, logistical challenges, weather inclemency and difficulties in recruiting and retaining project staff have led to gaps in implementation. These gaps have, in turn, contributed to difficulties in timely communication with the local communities, particularly Tonj East.

Given the logistical and other difficulties, it is the team's view that the project represents value for money.

### *Effectiveness*

Management structures in WVSS have been reviewed since the move to Juba from Nairobi. These revised practices should assist in the effectiveness of the project. In particular, the formalisation of technical support from one level of management to the other should give information and support more directly where it may be needed.

The Peace Building elements of the project have been particularly successful, and have shown real change in Tonj East and Mayendit. This peace has resulted in an improved quality of life for people of these villages, an anti poverty effect. However, the programme has not been effective in improving access to basic services (DIPLCAP-I).

WVSS was developing a new monitoring system at the time of the field trip. This should assist in ensuring even greater effectiveness of the project.

### *Sustainability*

The construction of the school, clinic and community centre in Tonj East did not result in sustainable services for the people of Tonj East and Mayendit. However, the community of Tonj East appears to reason that if World Vision leaves because instability returns that at least the buildings will remain and they provide a sense of permanence and stability in the community.

The Peace Building and Disaster Preparedness Committees have varying degrees of sustainability. Members are selected according to various categories. The members who attend the committees as part of their jobs as, for example, local government officials, will assist in the sustainability of these bodies due to it being a professional duty rather than a voluntary one.

Community members seem extremely dedicated to the disaster preparedness groups and those outside the committees also have strong inputs and roles in repair and maintenance of the dikes.

The peace building committee's work would be enormously enhanced if some of the vested interest groups who are not represented were persuaded to be involved. The most notable group here is the spear masters, who are a key element in the process, giving blessings and permissions to young men to go on cattle raids, and in some cases gaining some of the stolen cattle for themselves as a result.

Exit strategies need to be developed for all components of the project to ensure sustainability of the activities supported by the project. This is particularly important for the committees to be properly entrenched in local authorities and traditional decision making bodies to ensure that they carry on after WVSS has completed its involvement in these communities.

## *Impact*

The review was not asked to look at impact specifically. However, it is striking that in such a short time, the impact is seen and felt by the communities. The peace building component has had a marked effect on people's lives in Mayendit and Tonj East, improving relationships between the two communities and reducing cattle raids and the related death and violence.

The disaster preparedness component has also had an impact on Mayendit, which has benefited from the dike built most of the way around the village. People in Mayendit commented that they have been able to plant vegetable gardens and live in the same house for some time.

## **Key Challenges**

Lack of a national plan means that NGOs working in Southern Sudan have no guidance as to government priorities or future plans. Coming from an emergency situation, some issues are evident (including the peace building and disaster mitigation that WVSS is involved in). However, a functioning government would assist in targeting efforts.

Returning Internally Displaced Persons add to the already stressed situation in the region. Though there is a culture of assisting returnees and others, resources are very limited, and may be further curtailed at any time through conflict, and more so during the rains and flooding.

Transportation and access are extremely difficult, particularly during the rainy season. Moving project staff from one area to another is very expensive and difficult to arrange at short notice. Transport of materials and other resources is also difficult and expensive. This not only affects the actual project implementation, but also makes very key activities, such as paying staff, very difficult and time consuming.

It is recommended that joint training sessions on peace issues should be conducted where practical in order to enhance communication and interaction between the communities.

Communications are difficult throughout the region. However, the use of radios and satellite phones is common. In addition, some mobile phone coverage is available in calm weather, even in the very remote areas.

Corruption is endemic in South Sudan. Difficulties in moving supplies to project areas can be especially difficult, when demands for compensation can be made with a threat of violence, according to senior World Vision staff in Juba. WVSS has a good relationship with the government in Juba and local authorities in the project areas.

Insecurity is one of the issues the project addresses well, but it is still an issue to be taken into consideration. The review team was not able to travel to one of the project sites

(Rumbek North) because of ongoing insecurity. Automatic weapons are now part of the culture of South Sudan and flash points of violence are regular and shifting.

The greatest internal challenge the project faces is hiring and retaining staff. Working conditions in South Sudan are extremely difficult. All posts are seen as ‘unaccompanied’ posts. Most (female) management staff in Juba live on WVSS premises. Many senior staff have families in Kenya or Uganda. Project officers live in very difficult conditions, some in very remote areas. This situation is not likely to change in the near future.

Planning cycle for one year funding makes project continuity difficult and encourages agencies to try and pack proposed activities into an unrealistic timetable. As discussed earlier, a longer planning and funding cycle would make the project much easier to implement.

### **Recommendations**

1. It is recommended that programme exit strategies should be developed with each community served by DIPLCAP.
2. It is recommended that technical expertise is employed whenever necessary, especially where infrastructure is involved, and that this expertise be planned for in the project documents.
3. It is recommended that WVSS should consider supporting the communities in getting the cooperation and support of oil companies for the implementation of disaster preparedness interventions, such as the dike building and other infrastructure.
4. It is recommended that the new monitoring system being developed by WVSS will take into consideration the challenges faced by project staff in the field and work to assist in the projects relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability.
5. It is recommended that the project be staffed appropriately at all times in order to help minimise exposure to risk.
6. A standard reporting format should be developed based on project objectives and core deliverables. Financial reporting should also be standardised.
7. It is recommended that joint training sessions on peace issues should be conducted where practical in order to enhance communication and interaction between the communities.

## **Lessons Learnt**

### Putting more effort / time / resources into scoping studies

1. Bearing in mind the difficulties of working in South Sudan, and budget constraints, a deeper, wider ranging scoping study prior to the programme's design may have avoided the difficulties experienced in the first phase of the programme ( DIPLCAP I).
2. Scoping studies should also have been done beforehand, or as part of the process of working with the oil company on the dike in Mayendit in order to avoid some of the problems encountered, and to maximise the benefit of the support received.

### Engineering expertise

3. For any work done which uses skills and/or equipment not familiar to the project team, 'expert' advice should be sought. WVSS should have had some of its own engineering expertise (from within the region or elsewhere) advise on technical aspects of the programme. In the case of the dyke, an 'expert' from outside could have liaised with local communities in advising where the dyke should be fortified and why.
4. The environment is a resource and its benefits and challenges can be analysed to ascertain its social impact. The social impact of flooding is immense, and so conversely, the social impact of a structure such as the dyke should also have been analysed as far as possible, before assisting in dyke building and reconstruction.

### Communications with communities

5. The poor communication of plans to communities was evident during the field visit. During the time World Vision project officers worked in a community they were welcomed and worked well. However, community members in Tonj East did not seem to know when to expect a visit from an officer, or what was the next stage of the project. A project officer lived in Mayendit so this problem was not noticed in that community. Community members in Tonj East and Mayendit did not know that DIPLCAP III had been funded three months after the funds were approved, and did not know what to expect from this new phase.
6. Close relationships and ongoing discussions with communities is key to successful implementation and maintaining trust between the community and the implementing agency.

## Multi annual funding

7. Multi annual funding would have enabled a longer planning horizon for the DIPLCAP programme. It would have given greater scope for follow-on activities to be built in to the project. It would also have given community members an assurance that World Vision would be involved in the longer term, thereby helping promote local participation and ownership. In Southern Sudan in any given year, the time realistically available for project implementation is largely restricted to the dry season.
8. Nevertheless, there was a big change in direction of the project between DIPLCAP I and DIPLCAP II and it is arguable that this was in some way facilitated by the fact that a final report had to be written on DIPLCAP I, and a totally new project proposal written for DIPLCAP II. This was a chance to change the project, without having to go through permission granting and budget reallocations with the donor.

**Appendix**  
Annex 1

**Terms of Reference**

***Review of Irish Aid Support to the World Vision  
Disaster Preparedness and Local Capacities for Peace Programme,  
Southern Sudan***

**Background**

The Disaster Preparedness and Strengthening Local Capacities for Peace project (DIPLCAP) was devised in 2005 in response to the changing environment within South Sudan following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). With the influx of returnees into South Sudan the region was also suffering from severe food insecurity brought on by changing weather patterns. The result was a tense environment as both host communities and returnees struggled to co-exist with limited resources. Combined with the long history of inter-tribal clashes, incidences of cattle rustling between the Dinka and Nuer tribes over limited access to grazing and water points further exacerbated the situation.

World Vision has been working with South Sudan since 1989 and has extensive sectoral and regional experience. During 2004, WVS undertook a number of field analysis and assessments relying both on surveys and focus groups. Some key findings in the region around Tonj indicated a serious problem with food security and an escalating conflict between the Dinka and Nuer groups. Based on the findings, a holistic project approach was designed that would address i) livelihoods/food security, ii) disaster preparedness and iii) peace building and conflict transformation for communities within the Warrab and Unity State. This was extended to include the Lakes State during Phase II after stakeholders during Phase I pointed to the ongoing tension with this Dinka group that was upsetting the balance within the region.

The overall goal of DIPLCAP (as stated within phase ii) is to reduce vulnerability and foster a peaceful co-existence among populations in post-war South Sudan. This is achieved by:

- Strengthening community livelihood systems
- Strengthening disaster preparedness capacities
- Strengthen local capacities for conflict transformation

In the third phase of DIPLCAP the objectives focus increasingly on the role of youths and communities as it will aim to:

- Enhance the capacity of civil society, local authorities and youth to prevent, analyse and transform conflict, thereby enabling conflict-sensitive development and promoting unity in the region
- Strengthen community disaster preparedness and resilience through diversified agricultural practices, and community-based mechanisms to reduce vulnerability in face of disasters and resulting tensions and conflict

Since 2005, Irish Aid has funded 3 phases of DIPLCAP. The third phase and final phase of this project is due to begin before the end of 2008. While the initial phase of DIPLCAP envisioned a central project location, this proved to be problematic and meetings between communities are now conducted in central points that are seen as more neutral. There is a project officer based permanently in Mayendit (Unity State) where activities relating to all three sectors are being implemented. This Project Officer guides the day-to-day running and implementation of activities. Mayendit is also the key location for disaster preparedness due to the high risk of flooding that is being mitigated through the construction of Dikes. Staff such as community mobilisers and agricultural extensionists support the activities further with the cooperation of programme managers and sector officers who help guide these sector-specific activities.

## **2. Purpose of the Review**

The purpose of the review is to provide Irish Aid and World Vision with an assessment of the effectiveness of the Disaster Preparedness and Local Capacities for Peace (DIPLCP) programme.

## **3. Scope of the Review**

The Review will primarily assess the performance and achievements of the DIPLCP to date, keeping very much in mind the context from which the programme evolved.

The review will assess the DIPLCP using the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Sustainability.

In terms of **Relevance**, key questions will include:

- To what extent does the DIPLCP address the developmental challenges and priorities of the people of the areas in which it is being implemented?
- Has the DIPLCP clearly focused on issues of poverty reduction and disaster preparedness, and is it addressing these?
- Are the programme's areas of intervention appropriate given the social, political and development contexts within which it is being implemented?
- Is there evidence that the programme has been designed in a collaborative manner with communities and other authorities?

In terms of **Effectiveness**, key questions will include:

- How effective has the DIPLCP been in terms of achieving its stated objectives, taking account of their relative importance?
- Have physical outputs met the SPHERE standards?

- How effective is the programme's performance measurement/monitoring system?
- Are the cross-cutting issues of HIV and AIDS, Governance, Gender and Environment being dealt with effectively?

In terms of **Efficiency**, key questions will include:

- Has the programme been efficiently managed?
- To what extent are the costs of the programme justified by its results?
- Is there sufficient coherence, complementarity and synergy between the programme's component parts?

In terms of **Sustainability**, key questions will include:

- How sustainable, in terms of continuing benefit, are the programme's interventions?
- Are there particular challenges (in terms of ensuring sustainability on resources committed), and how are these being managed?

**While the primary focus of the review is not on the impact of the programme it is expected that where evidence of programme impact is available (positive or negative) that this will be documented.**

#### **4. Methodology**

The review will comprise two primary components: a literature review followed by a field visit to Southern Sudan (Juba, Mayendit and Tonj). The field visit will take place in the second half of January 2009, and will include site visits and interviews/meetings with stakeholders at all levels.

#### **5. Outputs**

A final report (maximum 30-40 pages excluding appendices) that will include findings, analyses, key lessons and recommendations.

#### **6. Review Team**

The review team will comprise two external consultants (one of whom will be the team leader with overall responsibility for writing the report) and an officer from the Emergency and Recovery section of Irish Aid.

## **7. Timeframe**

The review will ideally commence in December 2008 (the literature review) with the field visit completed by the end of January 2009.

## **8. Management Arrangements**

The review will be managed by the Evaluation and Audit Unit of Irish Aid. A steering committee comprising representatives of Irish Aid and World Vision will oversee the overall exercise. World Vision will assist with arrangements and logistics for the field visit.

## **Annex 2**

### List of meetings during field visit

#### *Juba*

- World Vision South Sudan Operations Director Patrick Kapukha
- World Vision South Sudan Financial Team
- World Vision South Sudan Internal Auditor, Lavington Adego
- World Vision South Sudan Design, Monitoring and Evaluation manager
- World Vision South Sudan Sector Leads for the project Morris Kenyi and Sarah Gerein
- OCHA, Evaline Dinga

#### *Mayendit*

- Project Officer for DIPLCAP Joseph Milla
- World Vision South Sudan local staff for DIPLCAP
- Local community consisting of representatives from the Peace Committee, Disaster Preparedness Committee and farmers who had received training under the programme
- Representative of the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) in Mayendit

#### *Tonj East*

- World Vision South Sudan County Leader for Tonj East
- County Commissioner for Tonj East
- Representaive of the SSRRC in Tonj East
- Group of local women
- Group of local men
- Representatives of the Disaster Preparedness and Peace Building Committee

### Appendix 3

## World Vision South Sudan Review

### Review Matrix

Criterion	Key Issues/Questions	Notes
Relevance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How have the aims and objectives of the programme evolved?</li> <li>• Is there some agreed local/regional development plan?</li> <li>• What is the quality of WV's needs assessment?               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Who did it? How participatory was it? How comprehensive was it?</li> </ul> </li> <li>• To what extent did the needs assessment address the social/ political/ economic context?</li> <li>• Is there evidence of community participation in the assessment?</li> <li>• Is there evidence of collaboration/coordination with other donors and/or statutory authorities? Is there any duplication of effort?</li> <li>• Has the design of the programme avoided duplication?</li> <li>• Are the programme's component parts appropriate ways to address the identified needs?</li> <li>• How have the cross-cutting issues been addressed?</li> </ul>	
Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To what extent is the programme being implemented in collaboration/coordination with communities and other donors and/or statutory authorities?</li> <li>• Is there evidence that partners (communities/others) are effectively playing their roles envisioned by the WV programme plan?</li> <li>• Has WV staff been appropriately prepared to implement the programme – training in the Sphere standards, etc.?</li> <li>• Look for reports that demonstrate the Sphere standards have been used.</li> <li>• What is the quality of water infrastructure as per Sphere standards?</li> <li>• How effective is the programme's performance measurement/monitoring system??</li> <li>• To what extent are the peace building and governance activities achieving their intended objectives, or are likely to do so?</li> <li>• Is there evidence that trainings have been effective? Who provides the training?</li> <li>• Seek updated health data</li> <li>• Have there been constraints to implementation and how</li> </ul>	

	<p>were these addressed?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•</li> </ul>	
Efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Who manages the programme? Look at the decentralisation of management to Juba.</li> <li>• How much time is being spent on the project by the Country Director? Is it enough? How do we know?</li> <li>• Look at financial controls.</li> <li>• Look at timeliness and any constraints to efficient implementation</li> <li>• To what extent are the costs of the programme justified by the results?</li> <li>• Is there sufficient coherence, complementarity and synergy between the programme's component parts? Look at project documents and ask other agencies.</li> </ul>	
Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How sustainable (in terms of continuing benefit) are the programme's interventions?</li> <li>• Is there an exit strategy?</li> <li>• Where do people see the programme and/or its outputs in 5 years?</li> <li>• Are there particular challenges for ensuring that benefits will perjure?</li> <li>• What do they now see as risks to the programme? What are they doing about them?</li> <li>• Did the initial assumptions prove valid? Are there assumptions being made that might be unrealistic, detrimental to the desired sustainability?</li> <li>• Has thought been given to possible conflicts arising from the referendum of 2011?</li> </ul>	