Children, Education and War:

Reaching Education For All (EFA) Objectives in Countries Affected by Conflict

Marc Sommers
Summary findings

Conflict’s path of devastation and chaos has dramatically slowed the ability of war-torn countries to reach the Education for All (EFA) goals adopted in Dakar in April 2000. This paper sketches the situation confronting children, their families and governments in conflict countries and describes the challenges of reaching universal primary education. These challenges are enormous—in answer to the question, “How can countries affected by conflict arrive at EFA objectives?” an emergency education expert answered, “The short answer is, ‘They can’t.’”

Whether this is true or not, it is certainly the case that far more could be done to support education in countries suffering from conflict. The most logical starting point lies in supporting emergency education where it exists and dramatically expanding access to education where it doesn’t.

Yet, most primary-school-age children in war-affected areas are not in school and have no realistic hope of enrolling in one. Forced migrant children in refugee and IDP camps and settlements have the best chance of going to school. Of these two, support for refugee schooling is usually far greater than anything available for internally displaced children. Children not living in camps, whether in their country of origin or in an asylum country, are likely not attending formal schools. Little is known about their lives and learning opportunities. In all cases, girls generally are far less likely to be attending school than boys.

In addition, education for and efforts to engage with youths, remain limited. This creates a volatile and dangerous situation. Youth programming, when it does exist, is usually poorly supported, and may not offer much hope in terms of opening employment and income opportunities. It generally faces stiff competition from aggressive military or criminal operatives who recruit (or abduct) children and youths into their militias or gangs, promising rich and immediate rewards.

Periods before and immediately after conflicts require careful policy development. Preparedness planning and contingent strategies require attention. The paper also warns against top-down, material-based educational solutions.

More than any other circumstance, war makes the case for providing appropriate educational responses to the needs of children and youth at risk, and exposes the dangers of neglect. Education for children whose lives have been affected by war is a vital protection measure. Appropriate formal and nonformal education can provide important alternatives to child soldiering and other forms of exploitation (sexual and otherwise), social and cultural alienation, violence, and self-destruction. War also exposes the dynamics of gender in education and socialization, and the vulnerability of boys as well as girls, making responses to gender needs critical. Lack of investment in and creative, participatory work on education for children and youth at risk makes a return to peace extremely difficult if not impossible.

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I. Introduction

Conflict’s path of devastation and chaos has dramatically slowed the ability of war-torn countries to reach the Education for All (EFA) goals declared at the World Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal in April 2000. In some cases, war’s impact on an education system has been so extensive that approaching the EFA targets seems nearly impossible. Consider the following assessment of education problems in Somalia:

*The key trait in recent years has been destruction: an entire education system has been almost totally destroyed. There is inadequate training of teachers, inadequate quality of teaching, inadequate monitoring systems... in short, inadequate teaching and learning. In fact, the education situation in its entirety is problematic, and so is, evidently, the implementation of Education for All.* [UNESCO 1996:19]

UNICEF’s basic data sheet on education issues in Somalia sheds further light on the situation there. Out of a population of five million children under the age of 18, 36 percent of boys and 14 percent of girls are literate. Twenty-one percent of boys and thirteen percent of girls attend school. Of those who attend primary school, only twenty percent ever reach the fifth grade (UNICEF 2000).

Conflict has affected formal education systems in diverse and frequently unexpected ways. In 1994, for example, soon after Rwandan refugees had arrived in the North Kivu area of the former Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), overwhelmed humanitarian aid officials headquartered in Goma were initially opposed to supporting primary schools for Rwandan refugees. Filling the vacuum created by this inaction and meeting the demand for formal schooling in the refugee community, former organizers of Rwanda’s ethnic genocide opened primary schools in refugee camps. It was reported that these schools featured a version of Rwandan history stressing a rationale for exterminating ethnic adversaries.¹

The disastrous effects of conflict on education systems are not specific to any one region. Examples of education’s failures and challenges in the wake of war extend across the world. Prior to NATO’s war in Kosovo in 1999, the Serbian-dominated government introduced an assimilation policy that eliminated Albanian as the language of school instruction and introduced their own curriculum and textbooks. In response, Kosovar Albanian parents sent their children to illegal, non-accredited parallel schools run by Albanians. As a result, “there can be no doubt that the schism in education in Kosovo was a major contributor to the upsurge of violence that reached it’s horrifying zenith in 1999” (UNICEF 2000a:19).² In Colombia, “financial roadblocks and bureaucratic maneuvers” implemented by the government has kept hundreds of thousands of internally displaced children out of school (Myers and Sommers 1999: 11). And in different parts of Sudan, as well as in nearby countries hosting Sudanese refugees, Sudanese students follow different school curricula and languages of instruction (Sesnan 1999: 1). In all of these examples, the recruitment of children – girls as well as boys – into armies, militias and support units keep many children out of formal schooling and involved in the perpetuation of war.

Despite the daunting task illuminated by these examples, the purpose of this discussion paper is to consider the various impacts of armed conflict on the ability to reach the goals stated in the “Dakar Framework for Action”, particularly the second stated goal: “ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances [including boys and girls affected by war] and

² A similar situation occurred during Ethiopia’s civil war between the Derg regime and rebel forces based in Tigray and Eritrea. The rebels developed their own school curriculum, portions of which were incorporated into post-war curricula. It became known as “The Struggle” curriculum (Tigray Regional Education Education Bureau members, interviewed in 1995).
those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to and complete, free and compulsory primary education of good quality” (UNESCO 2000: 8).

To do this, the paper will attempt to answer two central questions:

• What is the impact of war on children and education systems?
• Which programs and policies can begin to help countries engulfed by war arrive at EFA objectives, and what roles should international actors play to support this process?

Once the impact of war on children and education systems is reviewed, the scope of the problem is considered, and current trends and lessons that have been learned are highlighted, the paper will offer a set of conclusions and recommendations illuminating steps that are needed to help children in war-torn countries complete their primary school education.

Before proceeding to the substance of this paper, five clarifying points must be made. First, although primary education issues are the focus of this paper, other important war-affected groups, such as out-of-school youth, and child soldiers, and issues such as nonformal education, will also be considered. Second, the sections on current activities and suggested follow-up are divided into three phases: preparing education systems for the prospect of war, education issues arising during war (here also termed the emergency phase, or the period of emergency education, even when wars continue for years or even decades), and early reconstruction issues surfacing immediately after war. This final phase concerns itself with educational challenges during the earliest stages of peacetime activity, when forced migrants (that is, the combination of refugees and internally displaced persons, or IDPs) are just beginning to return to their homes, security is being reestablished, and the education system is resurfacing. Third, the paper will not address the longer-term post-war reconstruction phase, which will here be considered a separate area of concern with its own literature and set of experiences. Fourth, other forces that can undermine the provision of education for children, such as HIV/AIDS, will not be directly addressed here.

Fifth and finally, it should be noted that the following descriptions are not intended to be comprehensive. The literature is too thin and the range of experience is too wide to be covered in one paper. Instead, the intent is to sketch a general picture of the problems and prospects of reaching EFA targets in countries impacted by war. A bibliography of supplementary sources on war, children and education can be found at the end of this paper.

**II. Background: Children and War**

While children are impacted by war in a variety of ways, it is safe to say that the damage wrought by war is widespread, deep, and lasting. This section will first examine the geographic and demographic reach of war, with an eye towards educational implications. It will then briefly review the variety of circumstances that children find themselves in during war. A review of war’s devastating impact access to, equity in, and the quality of education will follow. The section will conclude with a look at the psychological impact of war on children and the potential of children to recover from trauma.

**The Scope of the Problem**

The sheer demographic dominance of children in most of the world’s conflict zones means that many if not most victims of warfare are children. The most recent statistics of the U.S. Committee for

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3 The concept of forced migrant is designed to merge two formally distinct categories – refugee and IDP – into a single group. A forced migrant is someone who has been forced to migrate from their home. It gives prominence to the fact that a person had to flee, instead of merely identifying whether a person fled to another part of the same country (to become an IDP) or sought asylum in another country (as a refugee).
Refugees\(^4\) indicate that there were more than 35.5 million forced migrants in the world at the end of 2000 (14.5 million refugees and asylum seekers and more than 21 million internally displaced persons). Since precise statistics do not exist for the world’s forced migrants, organizations such as the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children (WCRWC), an advocacy organization based in New York, has been forced to develop a rule of thumb to estimate the proportion of children among the forced migrant population. The WCRWC estimate that at least half of all forced migrants are children (or, at minimum, nearly 18 million children).

The statistical imprecision of data on populations affected by wars presents a serious constraint on the ability to accurately estimate war’s impact on education systems, administrators, teachers and students. All we know for certain is that the impact has been tremendous. In response to this confounding situation, four attempts to analyze exceedingly limited data will be applied here.

The first attempt is simply to identify those countries or territories where either full-scale war is currently taking place, where significant yet fairly isolated armed conflict or rebellion continues, or nations or territories emerging from wars that ended during the past decade.\(^5\) The following chart identifies these three categories of countries and territories:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries/Territories with Major Current Conflicts</th>
<th>Countries with Isolated Conflict or Rebellion</th>
<th>Countries Emerging From Conflict Since 1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola: June 1975-90; October 1992-95; May 1997–Present</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi: 1972-73; 1988; 1993–Present</td>
<td>Azerbaijan; Georgia</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina; East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia: 1948-Present</td>
<td>Indonesia; Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Eritrea; Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia: Sept. 1991–Present</td>
<td>Tajikistan; Turkey</td>
<td>Rwanda; Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank/Gaza: Dec. 1987-89; 2001-Present</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are twenty-six countries in the world with at least a quarter of a million IDPs and 15 countries and territories hosting at least 250,000 refugees. The second attempt to gather a sense of the scope of the problem of addressing EFA objectives in countries affected by war will focus on those twelve countries and territories that contain the highest total number of forced migrants in the world.\(^6\) These

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\(^4\) Gathered from the U.S. Committee for Refugees’ (USCR) website at www.refugees.org. It should be noted that the USCR’s statistics will be referred to in this section. All forced migrant statistics are subject to debate, given the fact that the populations they are counting are both difficult to identify and their numbers and sources may be controversial. The USCR’s data is regularly updated, widely thought to be credible, and tabulates data on both IDPs and refugees. USCR has thus been chosen as the primary source for statistics on forced migrants for this section.

\(^5\) The two territories referred to in this discussion are the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

\(^6\) Statistics on IDPs and refugees are based on the U.S. Committee for Refugees’ latest information (Dec. 31, 2000), present on their website: www.refugees.org.
twelve countries have either the highest number of citizens who have been internally displaced by war or refugees who have sought asylum in their countries due to conflict. Some countries, such as Sudan and Yugoslavia, contain both internally displaced persons and refugees from wars in nearby countries within their borders. The list of these twelve countries is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Territory</th>
<th>Number of IDPs (million)</th>
<th>Number of Refugees (million)</th>
<th>Total Number of Forced Migrants (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>4.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>up to 3.80</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>up to 3.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>(250)</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.R. Congo</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>2.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank/Gaza</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>up to 1.00</td>
<td>(3000)</td>
<td>up to 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>up to 1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>up to 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>up to 1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>up to 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>up to 15.18</td>
<td>8.06</td>
<td>up to 23.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The third attempt will identify the largest refugee populations located near the refugees’ countries of origin. This perspective is significant because sheds light on the regional dimensions of war and exile. Civil wars affect countries throughout the region they take place in, and large refugee populations living in nearby countries constitutes a direct and visceral way of recognizing the tragedies that wars create. Please note that this examination is inexact – some large and devastating conflicts, such as Colombia, have created relatively small refugee outflows.

Refugee populations above 200,000 that are located within the same geographic region as their country of origin:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>4,044,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan</td>
<td>2,025,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudanese</td>
<td>462,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>421,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angolan</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>389,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrean</td>
<td>355,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congolese</td>
<td>342,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian</td>
<td>314,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>295,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burmese</td>
<td>258,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>247,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvadoran</td>
<td>235,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian</td>
<td>234,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fourth and final attempt is listed in Annex I, but requires some description here. The 12 countries and territories analyzed were drawn from a list of countries identified as: (i) countries considered “at-risk” of not achieving the EFA goal of universal primary school completion which (ii) were either engulfed in conflict currently (Angola, Burundi, D.R. Congo, Somalia, Sudan, West Bank/Gaza) or were recovering from recent conflicts (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Yugoslavia). All of these countries are presumed to be at the highest risk of failing to reach current
EFA targets by 2015. The intent in Annex I is to give a statistical perspective, with admittedly limited data, on the degree to which war has affected the practice of formal education.

For each country analyzed, the initial step was to establish the formal education enrollment trend prior to the onset of war. This was done by identifying the change in gross enrollment between two years: one that was five to ten years before the beginning of conflict, the other that was one to two years before war began (data availability being a major constraint in devising the selection of years that were used). A similar process was used to establish, when statistics were available, the change in enrollment levels between the first and final years of conflict. These two rates of change in enrollment – one indicating a pre-war rate, the other suggesting the enrollment rate while conflict was taking place – formed the basis of the statistical analysis elaborated in Annex I, which also contains a more complete description of the methodology applied.

While the data tested in Annex I is incomplete and somewhat unreliable, evidence of the staggering educational difficulties countries submerged by war face is underscored by evidence of the educational situation in Burundi and Congo. The analysis suggests that overall school enrollment has dropped as much as fifty percent during the conflict years. In the two countries combined, the equivalent of more than 11.2 million student-years of schooling have been lost during the period of war which continues in both countries.

**Child Warriors and Forced Migrants**

Conflicts across the world are largely civil in nature and directly involve increasing numbers of children. Once they are abducted from their families, children not only become involved in wars as soldiers, but also as spies and many types of forced laborer, including sex slave, porter, domestic and miner. They may enter into some sort of military “service” as early as, reportedly, age five. Given the diversity of skills that children can contribute to a war effort, the easy availability of lightweight weaponry to arm them (the lighter the weapon, the smaller the child who can use it), the increasingly refined techniques employed to capture, train and, most important, control children, the fact that they are rarely paid (and, when paid, usually in paltry amounts), and their prodigious availability in most war zones, children in conflicts across the globe are considered critical to war strategies and an exploitable resource of nearly inexhaustible supply. “Children,” Judith Herman has noted, “are the most powerless of victims” and are “often dependent upon their abusers” (1997: 245). The exploiters of child warriors continue to apply this knowledge to exceedingly devious ends.

If children make it to structured refugee or IDP camps or settlements, they are fairly easy to identify and serve (though not necessarily easy to influence). Yet many forced migrants are in hiding and frequently on the move. They may be seeking the shelter of anonymity in large cities. They may be trapped by an armed group that refuses to let them escape or caught in a war zone that leaves them afraid to move. They may roam from hiding place to hiding place in search of refuge. They may work for, at best, bare subsistence wages, their desperation transformed into an illegal but cheap labor source. In these and other scenarios, survival and preserving very basic human rights are paramount. Accessing opportunities like formal education are usually unattainable while the threat of health risks such as AIDS and sexual violence increase.

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7 Cited from an interview with a Sierra Leonean human rights official. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers reports the lowest age at seven (2001: 23).

8 A useful compendium of recent child soldier data and country-by-country description is contained in Child Soldiers Global Report (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2001).
Access, Equity, Quality, and War: Sketching the Education Landscape During Conflicts

In war-affected areas, many children who should be in school are hard to find, hard to get into school, and hard to make sure they remain there until completing, at the very least, their primary education. Of these three, the first challenge is often the most difficult – children are too often fighting, fleeing, or hiding during conflicts. They are not hard to get into school, relatively speaking, if they’re already in a refugee or IDP camp. Nonetheless, the proportion of children in war-affected areas receiving education is usually very low: during much of Sierra Leone’s recent civil war, for example, tens of thousands of children in camps attended primary schools, but hundreds of thousands more were either difficult to locate or completely unable to regularly attend school.9

There are other access and equity problems that limit participation in primary school, including:

- The legitimacy of governments is severely questioned when they are embroiled in civil war. In these highly politicized situations, the legitimacy of the state’s school curricula may be questioned as well. This is particularly true during ethnic conflicts, where rebel forces may challenge the national education system by developing their own curricula and school system (UNICEF 2000). Often military and political forces use school curriculum as a tool for indoctrinating students to become loyal followers. This can decrease school demand and undermine efforts to enhance school access, equity and quality.10 In these and other ways, “schools are often battlegrounds for the hearts and minds of the next generation” (Chung 1999: 1).

- International agencies arriving during and following wars may unintentionally undermine the national government’s capacity to educate its citizens. A common practice is for agencies to offer relatively high salaries to experienced local educators who might otherwise work for the education ministry or a school. A United Nations (UN) education official cited an example in a war-torn country where “the most senior [available] local civil servant worked as the most junior UN officer” because the UN salary was several times higher than those offered by the local government.11 International agency operations can further weaken national government legitimacy by demonstrating their ability to provide education, health or other services that are normally provided by a government that has become weakened, overlooked, and unable to carry out its responsibilities (Sommers 2000: 102).12

- School buildings and compounds are common war targets in conflict zones. Some military forces turn schools into bases. Fear of abduction, rape, stepping on landmines or being caught in crossfire makes travel to school treacherous. These and other factors are obviously disincentives for attending school, except in situations where schooling takes place in alternative locations.

- Even when schooling is available, the fact that wars tend to change the social and economic roles and activities of children can limit school attendance. Life becomes focused on survival, and sometimes entrepreneurial activities as well. Families and communities may lose members and absorb new ones. They may disintegrate or become deeply dysfunctional. In response, some children may become household heads, spouses, prostitutes, soldiers, or workers. Boys and young men may be sent to report on their family’s holdings or search for work in a city or a mine, even

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9 Lange reported that, in 1997, 60,799 students from Sierra Leone and Liberia (the majority of whom were Sierra Leoneans) were attending schools in refugee camps in Guinea. Although the International Rescue Committee-led (and UNHCR supported) program was considered successful, it reached less than 29 percent of all school-age refugees in the refugee camps (refugees between ages 4-18) (Lange 1998). That same year, an estimated 700,000 children were internally displaced, of which only a small proportion were able to attend school (Sommers 1997).

10 Personal interview with emergency education expert. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers also notes that “In many countries, military training and indoctrination is provided through schools and youth movements” (2001: 22).

11 Private interview.

12 An example of this problem was also described by an emergency education expert with reference to post-war Liberia.
if that means crossing into a war zone. Girls and young women may become domestics, young brides, and mothers. Child “marriages,” in some situations, are common. These are among the lifestyle issues that can limit school enrollment levels.

- An irony surrounding education in war-affected areas is that, although wars may force boys to be mobile and girls to settle and reduce their mobility, it is girls who are usually much less likely to attend school. This is the case even in refugee camp settings where programs are set up to entice girls to attend. In some situations, girls are kept out of school less because of their responsibilities elsewhere or the low social value placed on girls’ education than because avoiding school is seen as a protection measure against sexual abuse and early pregnancy (Rhodes, Walker and Martor 1998, Sommers 1999).

- Schooling may seem irrelevant or of low value to community and family members during wars, in addition to children themselves. Though economic necessity, lack of access to schooling, or parental concern “about what their children will learn” (Machel 1996: 57) may cause this, another reason lies in the fact that child exploitation in wars changes how children are seen. Their value and utility in the eyes of some adults\(^{13}\) can transform how children see themselves. They may realize that a gun in their hands accords them previously unimaginable levels of power and respect, and they may not want to give it up.\(^{14}\) Child and youth alienation from their society may prevent them from participating in its most treasured institutional activities, school among them. As Boyden and Ryder have noted about youth, “Education delays participation in the world of adults and lengthens childhood dependence. This is bitterly resented by many youth. When it does not guarantee employment, education can also raise false expectations among young people” (1996: 12).

Once in school, problems regarding quality education abound, such as:

- Schools may be badly equipped, and classroom structures may be in poor condition or may not exist.

- Teacher performance may plummet during times of war and instability. It is not only students who may have suffered from violence, trauma and sexual abuse. In addition to these factors, teachers are also vulnerable to political pressure and may be forced to work for little or no salary (Machel 1996: 55). Such serious impacts on teachers will negatively affect their ability as instructors.

- Even when teacher morale is high, the authoritarian teaching methods that are pervasive in many war-torn countries may reinforce the sense of powerlessness that students already feel. This issue is being addressed in some situations, such as the Norwegian Refugee Council’s human rights education programming in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (Brochmann and Midttun 1999). A central principle of the Program was making it clear that there was a “correspondence between the contents [of a course] and how it was taught” (Johannessen 2002: 3). The program focused on introducing both participatory teaching methods to teachers and a new human rights course for students. Results of the program’s evaluation found considerable enthusiasm for the program from teachers and students alike, but the actual process of change slow. Altering the fundamentally hierarchical structure of the relationship between teacher and student proved especially difficult and culturally sensitive. The following response from a teacher in Armenia is emblematic of the challenge faced when reforming teaching methods: “The hardest part was to change my former way of thinking and my authoritarian style” (Ibid.: 13). A program evaluator

\(^{13}\) The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers notes that “often children are recruited [as soldiers] because of their very qualities as children–they can be cheap, expendable and easier to condition into fearless killing and unthinkable obedience” (2001: 22).

\(^{14}\) From an interview with a child soldier expert.
admitted that “It is... extremely delicate to introduce the notion of a child having the right to oppose adults, to discuss with them on equal terms, have another opinion and to make choices that may not be accordance with their teachers’ or parents’ wishes” (Ibid.: 4).

- Schools located in zones of instability or war may be disconnected from a larger school system. Basic issues of school administration, including providing adequate materials, following a curriculum, supervising teachers, participating in national examinations, and paying staff salaries may be, at best, irregular, poorly conceived, and ineffectively carried out.

**Child Trauma Resilience**

Children are affected by war in ways that can directly impact their ability to learn. Trauma is serious and widespread among war-affected children, which creates a picture of a child’s life as a chasm of tragedy beyond repair. Yet what is as striking as the horrifying diversity of child exploitation in modern warfare is evidence of child resiliency in the face of it. War transforms lives, and although the changes are primarily negative and frequently severe, the potential to excel in school and elsewhere appear to already exist within some children.

The idea of traumatized children having the ability to reconstruct their lives is at first difficult to understand when the effect of the trauma is considered. Trauma arises from victimization and is, in Herman’s words, “potentially self-perpetuating.” Herman also describes trauma as a dialectic between two “opposing psychological states” wherein a person is “caught between the extremes of amnesia or of reliving the trauma, between floods of intense, overwhelming feeling and arid states of no feeling at all” (1997: 47).

The ability of war to impact the lives of children is so great that even limited exposure can prove lasting. As Garbarino suggests, “Only a few moments of war experience can produce images of such power [in a child] that they reverberate over weeks, months, years...over a lifetime perhaps” (1991: 5). Garbarino et. al. also suggest that, while “children as young as three years old can describe traumatic events” in considerable detail, children exposed to repeated trauma “begin to prepare mentally for the next assault” by employing defense mechanisms such as numbing and denial (1992: 203). Unfortunately, although children may be “incidental victims of armed warfare” whose war experience may have been momentary, children are more commonly caught in wars where “an aggressor specifically tries to maim, kill, and spiritually destroy the enemy’s children” (Apfel and Simon 1996: 5). From Colombia to Sierra Leone to Sri Lanka, children lie at warfare’s core. Child actors in and survivors of such wars are commonly blanketed by loss (including of their childhood) and burdened by severe traumatic distress. For them, school can become an essential form of psychological intervention, a critically important step on the road to recovery and a bulwark against what can be severe and profoundly destructive (including self-destructive) behavior.

Governments and international actors who aim to provide schooling for the war-affected have competition. Many who conduct modern wars are expert at using educational settings to indoctrinate and control children. As Garbarino has explained, “Children manage to cope with the trauma of war by holding fast to an ideology that explains and justifies their lives” (1991:23). The perpetrators of war may manipulate children’s search for meaning in war zones by leading them towards “a process of dehumanization (‘What the enemy does is less than human’) and demonization (‘The enemy are devils’)” by “training children to seek destruction of their enemies as the path to emotional survival and personal integration” (1991: 22-23). The result is a loyal band of traumatized children who are

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15 See “Selected Readings on the Impact of War on Children and Youth” in the Supplemental Literature and Resource List for supporting documentation.

16 In addition to creating “schools” for child soldiers, Richards documents how members of Sierra Leone’s rebel Revolutionary United Front used *First Blood*, the initial Rambo movie, as a training video for new child recruits (1996).
committed to warfare, becoming, in the terminology of Colombia’s guerilla groups, “little bees,” or, in the parlance of Colombian paramilitaries, “little bells.”

Despite the horrors wreaked by war, some children nonetheless manage to become “healthy, vibrant, contributing adults.” A growing body of research suggests that “it might be possible to foster resiliency” in war-affected children. Apfel and Simon (1996: 9-11) have produced a web of interlinked factors that help children bounce back from traumatic events, including:

- Resourcefulness, including “the ability to extract some amount of human warmth and loving kindness in the direst of circumstances, even from one’s enemies or persecutors”.
- The ability to attract and use adult support to promote reciprocity in exchanges with adults, so that “adults also feel that they are deriving something from the relationship.” This still “leads to an early sense of one’s own power and competence.”
- Curiosity and intellectual mastery, where knowledge about the crises “increases the chances of survival.”
- An ability to conceptualize an experience as “a phenomenon affecting others” as well as oneself.
- A conviction of one’s right to survive.
- The ability to remember and invoke images of good and sustaining figures.
- Maintaining a goal to live for, and a vision of the restoration of a civilized moral order.
- The need and ability to help others.
- An affective repertory (such as the ability to laugh “even in the most trying circumstances”).

The existence of coping strategies that help children repair and begin to rebuild their lives provides ground upon which young lives can be revitalized. The next section will explore how educational interventions have attempted to do this.

III. Educating Children Affected by Conflict: Current Experience

Rights and Timing: Emergency Education in Context

While the literature on education during emergencies makes for interesting, important and often surprising reading, it tends to be limited in depth and scope and fairly defensive. Much of this is explainable: despite the diversity of conflicts across the globe in recent decades, emergency education remains a new and emerging field that is still trying to establish itself. The literature’s articles and reports (books on this subject, excepting two edited collections, do not seem to exist) usually begin with a reminder that access to quality education is the right of all children under Article 28 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, and proceed with arguments defending and advocating for the significance of educating children whose lives have been directly impacted by wars.

During the early stages of a humanitarian emergency, it is common to find forced migrant parents and educators developing some sort of education for children in their communities before they receive

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19 The Article states, among other things, that “States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular: (a) Make primary education compulsory and available to all... States Parties shall promote and encourage international cooperation in matters relating to education, in particular with a view to contributing to the elimination of ignorance and illiteracy throughout the world and facilitating access to scientific and technical knowledge and modern teaching methods. In this regard, particular account shall be taken of the needs of developing countries.” (United Nations General Assembly Resolution 44/25, 20 November 1989; entry into force on 2 September 1990).
humanitarian agency recognition, collaboration and support (Sommers 1999). But in some cases, support from international actors either does not arrive or is limited. Resistance among some donor and humanitarian agency personnel persists. As recently as December 2001, Sinclair was able to state that “there are donors and even staff of humanitarian institutions who do not see education as part of a humanitarian intervention, or who do not think that it is urgent, or who do not think that it should be professionally organized and monitored even if their own organization is funding it” (2001: 7).

Sinclair also calls education “the invisible activity” during emergencies and in “the discourse on policy” (Ibid.: 69). In almost every way, education for war-affected populations is either overlooked or accorded low priority by donors and many humanitarian agencies who apply, in Sinclair’s view, “the ‘macho’ philosophy that education is a luxury in emergencies, and not a humanitarian requirement” (2001: 9).

It is worth trying to understand just why resistance to supporting education for children during humanitarian crises continues. Those who counter arguments for the need – indeed, obligation – to provide education for war-affected children tend to boil the issue down to timing. Education should be supported, the argument goes, but providing schools for tens if not hundreds of thousands of children during a humanitarian emergency is a costly and time-consuming undertaking. During the early stages of an emergency, providing education just doesn’t seem nearly as important as providing the necessities of food, shelter and clean water. Moreover, humanitarian workers are busy, governments in conflict zones are usually weak, and donor funding may not even be earmarked for education activities. There is an attendant fear that schools provided in displaced or refugee camps may hinder repatriation efforts once peace is achieved: building schools in camps seems to imply that forced migrants won’t return home for a long time (Sommers 1999: 22). It also remains common for relief agencies to view “education as a development activity” (Foster 1995: 20). The best thing to do, accordingly, is to wait either until the humanitarian emergency subsides or forced migrants go home. Choosing this strategy, however, is usually fraught with tragic consequences for children because periods of displacement and war caused by war can last for years, and sometimes even decades.

Governments submerged in conflict may take stances quite similar to those critiqued above. A veteran emergency education expert noted that “often, war-torn governments don’t reserve much money for education in their budgets. They want international donors to invest in education instead.” In times of war, education may not seem as important as other priorities. As an emergency education expert notes, “if there was willingness in such governments to increase their commitment to education, they could.”

Given the clarity and universal recognition of the need to provide education for children, such limited commitment from international actors and national governments is striking, and it explains the tone of defensiveness that often surfaces in the emergency education literature. In virtually all of the primary articles on this subject, authors strive to respond to criticisms. Schools in camps, for example, can be held in tents or under trees to suggest their impermanence and the portability of schools (although schooling in the open air or, for that matter, in bombed-out buildings, is difficult and not recommended). Sinclair provides several other reasons as well. Emergency education lessens the psychosocial impact of war on children; supports child development; provides physical and social protection; sustains study skills; re-introduces schooling; inserts survival and peace-building messages and skills; and, of course, responds to the human rights of children by providing them with education (2001: 7-11). Salmi supports these reasons by stating that “education is an important instrument to overcome violence and improve respect for human rights” (n.d.: 17).

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20 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) describes the tension between education having limited support and being a fairly low priority during emergencies, on the one hand, and the right of children to access education, on the other, in the following way: “due to funding constraints, difficult decisions related to the required prioritization of limited resources have often had a negative impact on the education sector. This being said, education remains a fundamental right and UNHCR therefore strives to provide at least primary education to all children of concern to the Office” (UNHCR 2000: 2).
Finally, there is the simple fact that emergency education never waits until the time is right: over and again, forced migrant teachers, school administrators, parents and students regularly assert the value and importance of education, and frequently accept dangerous circumstances in the process, to create schools. In some situations, the efforts are sincere and remarkable (Lange 1998), but during ethnic conflicts, these schools can become “channels for transmitting hatred to the next generation, leading to new crises in the future” (Sinclair 2001: 14), making the need for non-partisan support to schooling essential. Nonetheless, the biological imperative that underscores the focus of so many donor and humanitarian agencies on the survival of forced migrants makes it difficult, as one emergency education expert noted, “to take seriously the notion that you should be putting schools in place when people are crying out for shelter, are separated from their families, disorganized, and at serious risk of injury and disease.” Agency officials, the expert continued, “need to be helped to understand that no one is arguing that education is more important than these basic needs, and understand that the sense of structure and purpose that organizing schooling gives to communities, and the assurance of safety that having some kind of institutional care for children, is also a basic need. If they doubt that, they need to ask why the first thing almost all communities do when they stop running (and even sometimes before) is to do something about their children’s schooling.”

While it is not the purpose of this paper to delve deeply into the issue of generally inconsistent support for emergency education, it is nonetheless important to highlight the following fact: that emergency educators are compelled to repeatedly defend the mere existence of education for war-affected children – even where wars and the period of exile are protracted for years or even decades. This situation obviously looms as a considerable limit on efforts to reach EFA targets in countries affected by conflict.

**The Roles of Key Actors: A Primer**

When humanitarian emergencies arrive, agencies have different roles in which to provide education (providing funding is available to do so). The roles are not always clear, not always complimentary, and not always mutually understood. Lack of coordination and cooperation, together with too much competition, may divert energies that could be more usefully put toward collaboration.

Interviews with NGO and UN agency officials revealed a diversity of views on this issue, albeit with agreement on the broad outlines on the roles of key actors. The first perspective will address the people who are the direct providers of educational activities to war-affected populations: education personnel within the affected communities themselves – teachers, school administrators, parent groups – in addition to NGOs. The second perspective are those agencies about whom educators and students have little or no interaction: UN agencies who tend to support and coordinate education work and donor agencies. Local governments straddle this divide, often in the background with UN agencies but sometimes are present at schools as well.

While the role of war-affected communities in providing education for children is often lauded as essential, the record of their involvement once international agencies arrive is inconsistent: the imperatives of mandates and swift action may override the work that communities have already begun. A UNESCO document sums up a common dynamic between the two groups in the following way: “Crisis-affected communities provide much of the resources for emergency education, but support from the wider international community is often needed to permit an adequate response” (UNESCO 2001: 20). In many cases, communities in war zones or in underorganized post-war situations that find some way to arrange compensation for teachers may have, in return, a degree of formal or informal schooling for some children. The connection between communities, teachers and education as a protective strategy for children is dramatized by this recent description from the D.R. Congo:

Since war broke out in Congo in August 1998, civil servants and teachers have not been paid, so parents, who can afford to, pay the teachers. “When the children do not bring any money,
we forbid them to attend school,” said Makati Manganga, principal at the main primary school in Bunia... “It’s a difficult decision to make, but if we didn’t, we would never receive any salary.” As a result, thousands of children in Bunia don’t go to school. Instead, they don crisp new [military] uniforms and march through the town’s dusty streets singing rebel songs.

[Zajtman 2002]

While UN agencies tend to be directly involved in funding and supporting emergency education programming, it is customary for international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to assume the implementation role. The capacity, ingenuity, adaptability and dedication of these agencies on the ground is often remarkable: international NGOs such as the Norwegian Refugee Council, Save the Children, CARE, International Rescue Committee and Jesuit Refugee Service, among others, work with communities (in most cases) to develop structured formal education systems and sometimes nonformal education services as well. Yet their efforts cannot keep up with the diversity of educational work that war-affected communities provide. In addition to creating primary schooling, communities may develop preschools, conflict negotiation and language classes, and vocational training and apprenticeships, as well as counseling services, support groups, and a diversity of other offerings, on their own. Much of the educational offerings may receive support or sponsorship from religious institutions in the community.

The best field situations involve NGOs developing synergies with communities to stabilize, expand and formalize positive and productive education initiatives. The most common role that international NGOs play is in supporting primary schooling. Without NGO involvement, communities have difficulty having their teachers accredited, trained and paid, getting stable and reasonably safe school structures built, gaining recognition from education ministries for the teacher training and examination certificates that communities require, increasing the number of girl students in school, ensuring that the psychological needs of teachers and students are addressed, and promoting values and methods for peacefully resolving present and future conflicts.

Synergies that involve local NGOs are much less common. Local NGOs tend to be marginalized from the emergency education scene for a number of reasons. Their ability to absorb large amounts of resources efficiently may be questioned. They may lack the experience of working in emergency settings, although it must be said that donors are also much more accustomed to working with large international NGOs. As one UN education expert noted, “known international NGOs with emergency education experience can go in quick and be trusted to do an adequate job with less supervision from UNHCR and UNICEF than local NGOs would require.” Much of this is understandable: local NGOs, as an emergency education expert noted, “may not have good accounting and logistics skills, may be overloaded with staff from one tribal group, and the pressure for corrupt behavior is hard to resist.” Implied here is the assumption that international NGOs do not suffer similar weaknesses. It is also true that international agencies tend to give capacity building for local NGOs (and local government officials) a low priority during emergencies (Sommers 2000).

When emergencies are underway, it is not unusual to find national governments, either those in countries impacted by war or those hosting refugee populations nearby, in the background of education sector work. The reduced national government role promises to exacerbate dysfunction in an education system, and carries the potential for making recovery to a reasonably functional education system more difficult. Although United Nations agencies are typically expected to work with and through supporting government ministries, in developing nations the ministries themselves are frequently in dire need of support, especially when their problems are compounded by an emergency. International agencies are usually armed with the funding, experience, veteran personnel, and logistical support to begin working on providing education to war-affected populations quickly. Governments in or near war zones generally lack this capacity, and, at any rate, may not see this work as their primary responsibility. This is particularly true for refugee situations, where UNHCR normally takes the lead at the outset of emergencies and then maintains its position.
Assuming the lead in organizing and coordinating education responses for refugees is an essential part of UNHCR’s responsibility. UNHCR and UNICEF have developed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that allows UNICEF to provide education to refugees provided both sides agree to each agency’s roles and responsibilities. Two examples of UNICEF assuming the lead agency role is in the Burundi refugee camps in Tanzania and with Kosovar refugees in Macedonia in 1999. It should be noted, however, that most of UNHCR’s work involves supervising and coordinating education activities in refugee camps. It does not regularly extend to support for refugees who are not in camps, particularly for urban refugees, who are often expected by host nation governments to return to a camp if they expect to receive any formal schooling.

Of the three primary UN agencies (UNICEF, UNHCR and UNESCO), UNICEF’s capacity is undoubtedly the largest and the most recognizably present in all three phases of an emergency (pre-crisis, during crisis, and post-crisis reconstruction). Already equipped with country programs in most developing countries before wars take place, working on emergency education often amounts to adjusting their existing sector programs and resource allocations, and then adjusting them again when peace and/or stability arrives and refugees and IDPs begin to return to their homes.

With UNHCR generally in the lead for providing education to refugees, and UNICEF usually in the lead for providing education to IDPs (UNHCR only assumes responsibility for IDPs if the UN General Assembly or the Secretary-General requests that they do so, and this is unusual), UNESCO’s role during emergencies is less well defined. As one UN official noted, “UNESCO has a mandate to do all aspects of education everywhere,” and the lack of clear definition of its role during emergencies is a subject of ongoing discussion within UNESCO, an effort that has been widely supported.

UNESCO’s PEER (the Programme for Education for Emergencies and Reconstruction) unit, based in Nairobi, allows the agency to be operational in some parts of Africa, and in some of those countries (such as in Somalia), it is quite active. PEER devises and implements programming, and is involved in coordinating education as well. PEER’s rapid response role within UNESCO has not been replicated in other regions of the world, making it somewhat of an anomaly within the organization. At the same time, a number of other parts of UNESCO are increasingly involved in emergency education activities, including the Education in Crisis and Reconstruction Unit, the Educational Policy Research and Studies Unit, and the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP). UNESCO describes its general role in emergency situations as providing technical support (UNESCO 2002: 2).

It is when the post-war reconstruction period appears on the horizon that the roles and responsibilities of UN and NGO actors tend to fray, and more actors enter the scene. Donors formally reluctant or institutionally unable to support education during the emergency phase, such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the regional development banks and the World Bank, are much more interested in supporting education during the reconstruction phase. In addition, when compared to providing education for refugees or IDPs residing in a camp, not necessarily an easy task, education in preparation for or during reconstruction is much more fluid and complex, and the roles of agencies may require some clarification.

Such clarification is rarely forthcoming. No formula exists for establishing complementary roles among the actors. Institutional mandates clash. Competition, confusion, and some level of conflict is commonplace. Early in the post-war reconstruction phase, mandates between UN agencies are not clear, although UNDP’s stated decision to downscale its technical capacity in education, reducing its

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21 A fourth UN agency, the World Food Programme (WFP), is sometimes involved in providing food to school students and teachers in emergency and post-war situations. Their presence in education might be understood more as a support to the education sector than as an actor within it.

22 In addition to being a landmark book on emergency education more broadly, “Education as a Humanitarian Response” also documents the PEER experience at length (Retamal and Aedo-Richmond 1998).
mandate overlap with UNESCO and UNICEF, may be seen as a step towards clarity. At the same time, UNDP remains a critical contributor to and supporter of the Education for All effort. In the view of one UN official, “Progress toward EFA is crucial to the work of the United Nations system in helping nations implement their anti-poverty strategies. Where UN inputs can be effectively articulated with key country-level agencies, these efforts are likely to be more beneficial. Thus the role of UNDP, and [UNDP] Resident Coordinators, is essential.”

Notwithstanding this broad commitment to EFA among UN agencies, war can inspire mandate clashes. Conflicts may arise between UNICEF and UNHCR over their respective institutional responsibilities for IDPs (usually UNICEF) and refugees (UNHCR) who return to the same post-war communities. UNESCO will almost certainly be involved in educational policy issues, but institutions such as the World Bank and UNICEF, in addition to a host of others, will also need a policy role to play. Given the responsibility and authority vacuum that exists immediately after wars, international NGOs may be among those seeking to expand their operational roles in education and other sectors. This situation is further complicated by the lack of institutional agreements identifying clear roles, for example, between UN agencies and between UN agencies and NGOs. Meanwhile, a post-war country’s weak and essentially disempowered education ministry may view the jockeying by powerful international actors with considerable consternation and lack the resources, capacity or credibility to wrest control of the situation. Within post-war communities, teachers lacking the prospect of a stable salary move on to other work, schools are in ruin, and the education system may seem to be in complete flux.

In some cases, the roles of key actors in education and other sectors are mainly determined by their assertiveness, capacity and successful maneuvering. Yet it appears that those international actors working in the education sector – UN agencies, NGOs, multilaterals such as the World Bank and the regional development banks, bilateral donors – are beginning to succeed in developing, on a case-by-case basis, reasonably workable coordination systems. One of the central reasons for this has surfaced from important initiatives that have been established in the wake of the Education for All conference in Dakar in 2000. UNESCO is the site for two of these activities. The Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) seeks to “promote access to and completion of education of high quality for all persons affected by emergencies, crises or chronic instability.” Its Steering Group is presently comprised of CARE USA, the Norwegian Refugee Council, UNESCO, UNHCR and UNICEF. UNESCO’s International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) is also seeking to expand its role in the emergency education and reconstruction field through collaborative research, training and policy development work. A third point for information-sharing is the Global Information Networks in Education (GINIE) website, based at the University of Pittsburgh, which contains a wealth of documents on emergency education policies, programs, projects and general experiences (the INEE is also developing a website on related issues). Still another is emerging at the Social Science Research Council, which is developing a plan for researching education during crisis situations and disseminating findings widely.

Providing Education in Advance of, During and After Wars

Although the following consideration of current trends will be divided into three separate sections (pre-conflict, conflict, and early post-conflict), the effort to approximate three separate opportunities for action is somewhat artificial. Wars are rarely sectioned so clearly, and all three periods can be enshrouded by uncertainty and instability. Wars also rarely affect all parts of a country evenly: some parts may seem fairly safe while other parts are exceedingly unstable. In countries such as Angola, Colombia, Sri Lanka and Sudan, this situation can continue for decades, and it is one of the reasons why it can be difficult to make out just when a war begins or ends.

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23 The humanitarian coordination conundrum has produced a cottage industry of publications. See, for example, Donini 1996, Lautze, Jones and Duffield 1998, and Sommers 2000.
The inability to identify the difference between conflict and unstable peace, perhaps for prolonged periods, affects the lives of war-affected civilians and their schools. Massacres and human rights abuses may happen before a war is seen to start and continue after it is thought to end. During war times, brave pioneers (usually young men) may venture back to their homes to test whether it’s safe for their families to return home. And following wars, marauding gangs, the unknown location of landmines and other threats can contribute to a high degree of instability for years.

These are merely examples of what can denude a nation’s education system before it has a chance to grow and flourish. Despite the imperfect time demarcations surrounding periods of war, some semblance of sequence between education concerns taking place before, during and after war is nonetheless useful for conceptualizing problems and formulating solutions. The following description of trends is offered with this in mind.

Before turning to current trends in each of the three time periods outlined above, some brief notes on eleven important general trends require mention:

- The bulk of emergency and post-war reconstruction programming centers on formal primary education.

- During emergencies, humanitarian actors support most of their educational services in camps for refugees and IDPs. Urban refugees and IDPs in cities tend to receive little or no assistance. In many situations, significant numbers of refugees and IDPs may be in hiding and difficult to locate (Kibreab 1996, Kuhlman 1994).

- Secondary schools and nonformal education opportunities for forced migrant youths are rare, relatively expensive and, when they do exist, almost always seriously underfunded (Sommers 2002). As Sinclair has noted, “There has been a tendency in emergencies to ignore [youth and adolescents during emergencies]: it is much easier to organize classes for very young children” (2001: 33). For those who receive post-primary education of some sort, a second problem often surfaces: the fact that there are often few ways to apply their learning during and soon after wars. Frustration and boredom are common themes in forced migrant youth lives. Work opportunities for refugee youth tend to be highly restrictive, and it is not unusual to find them carrying out work deemed illegal. Sometimes military activity is among the only available activities for this population group. For example, refugees and education officials reported that if Sudanese refugees graduate from secondary schools in Uganda and Kenya, they qualify to become officers in the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Some graduates have embraced this option.

- The pronounced lack of funding for youth in nearly all forced migrant situations is not only punishing to youths generally but can change how programming for former child soldiers is viewed. Child soldiers commonly comprise a small proportion of the child and youth population in war-affected areas. When it exists, programming for child soldiers tends to vastly outshine

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24 For example, the practice of sending male youths back to check on a family’s holdings, and sometimes to help work the land, has been a hallmark of Burundi refugee society for decades (Christensen 1985: 124, Sommers 1998: 11, Sommers 2001a: 69-71).

25 An example of this tendency can be seen in El Salvador, where “more people are dying of violent crimes now (7,000 violent deaths reported for 1997) than during the civil war (with a yearly average of 6,000 deaths)” (Malone 1998, in Flores 1999). Flores also notes that “youth gangs have been blamed for most of this violence” (Guggenheim 1998, in Flores 1999).

26 Derived from personal interviews in 2000 in Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya and refugee camps in northern Uganda.

27 Two notable exceptions are the Kakuma Refugee Camps in northwest Kenya (described in Sommers 2001b) and Kosovo (see Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children 2001). See also Lowicki 2000 for an extensive review of youth programs.
anything available to children and youth who were not officially engaged in soldiering. This discrepancy may compound feelings of alienation that other children and youth already feel, and make them even more dangerous and self-destructive than before.

- Governments submerged in conflict may have little interest in or capacity to provide formal schooling for school age, war-affected children. An example of this unfortunate tendency is Colombia, where “Hundreds of thousands of displaced children, denied access to schooling and the benefit of a stable home life, have no alternatives to lives of inactivity and illegal employment” (Myers and Sommers 1999: 17). An example of a government involved in conflict that has made at least limited moves to facilitate access to education, on the other hand, is the government of Burundi’s support for refugee education. Despite the fact that refugees and the ruling government were mainly from opposing ethnic groups in the civil conflict, UNICEF and other agencies facilitated the Burundi government’s “Education for Repatriation” policy in 1996. This policy insured that a framework for “ensuring that children receive a curriculum recognized by their home country while they remain in the camps” was in place (Bird 1999: 2). The policy has resulted in little forward movement, however, as Burundi’s education ministry has delayed marking national school examination papers that refugee students have carried out (Jackson 2000).

- It is difficult to highlight emergency education programs that have or have not succeeded in reaching their objectives because so few have been adequately evaluated. Without such evaluation, Pigozzi observes, “We... run the risk of promoting activities that are not, in the long run, in a child’s best interest” (Pigozzi 1999: 19).

- The participation of girls in formal education is a problem as seemingly intractable as it is perplexing. Although this problem plagues primary schools in countries not affected by war, additional problems can prevent girls either from attending school or dropping out early during crises (Rhodes, Walker, and Martor 1998). As the Action for the Rights of Children (ARC) notes, “Girls and young women are, by far, more vulnerable to being excluded from the educational process, or having it cut short, than boys are. Other factors such as disability, ethnicity, class or refugee status can further reduce their chances” (ARC 2000: 48). Despite this troubling problem, and although a number of humanitarian agencies expend considerable effort to recruit and retain girls in schools during and following emergencies, documentation and dissemination of how to successfully address this problem remains minimal.

- Most emergency education and post-war reconstruction efforts emphasize simple technological approaches. The popular yet controversial school “kits” employed by UNESCO-PEER, UNICEF and the Norwegian Refugee Council exemplify this tendency. Employing technologies such as computers in education programming (Lyby 2001) and distance education (Thomas 1998) remain infrequent and exceedingly underutilized.

- While there is growing interest in peace education programming in many parts of the world, indications of its effectiveness are thin because program evaluations are rare (Sommers 2001b). Some argue that evaluating peace education is not possible. As Obura has surmised, “Is there any way of measuring the outcome of Peace Education? My own answer would be in the negative... Just as Education cannot solve the problems of unemployment – that is the business of economic planners in a nation – so Peace Education cannot be expected to prevent war” (Obura 1996: 5).

Much peace education programming is infused with Western values and approaches (Sommers 2001b). An example of this tendency is the attention paid to individuals and their self-esteem in

28 Although school kits are examined in a host of emergency education articles (such as Aguilar and Retamal 1998, Retamal and Aedo-Richmond 1998, Sommers 1999) probably the most extensive assessment of school kits can be found in Sinclair 2001. The “kitting” issue will be examined shortly.
many peace education curricula (often at the outset of a course), an approach that has been criticized because the strong emphasis on the individual in the West is often not shared in non-Western societies that place a higher value on collective rights and views (An-Na‘im 1998). Boyden and Ryder criticize peace education approaches in part because of the tendency to emphasize individual conflicts while in their view the nature of armed conflict is based on “group identity and group behavior.” As a result, Boyden and Ryder argue that, since the disconnect between peace education’s tendency to focus on correcting individual views and behavior about war while wars themselves emanate from group conflicts is so fundamental that “the premises upon which peace education and similar approaches are built are false” (1996: 56).

Boyden and Ryder further cite the critique of psychologist Ed Cairns, who charges that emphasizing behavior change exclusively among children while “adult role models are built on conflict” may make peace education programming counterproductive, producing “anxiety and distress in children” instead of compassion, empathy, active communication, and other values stressed in peace education programs (Ibid.: 55-56).

Critiques notwithstanding, peace education initiatives are charging ahead in many parts of the world. They have been found to be highly popular with refugee populations who have been exposed to programming (Sommers 2001b), and a small proportion, such as UNHCR’s peace education program, address perceived weaknesses in the field with reasonable success (Ibid.). Peace education may take other forms, such as human rights education, civic education, or as a component of basic or life skills programs. UNICEF’s “Schools as Centers of Peace” is an example of holistic attempts to inculcate children with peaceful values. But despite the different emphases in various programs, Brochmann and Midttun note that “one will largely find similar content and approaches” (1999: 6). The tendency to provide peace education programming of some sort as a component of formal schooling in war-affected areas remains strong.

- Teacher salary levels is a persistent problem in emergency and post-war reconstruction settings. One emergency education expert declared that “The crux of the problem [during these two phases] is teacher salaries.” Another expert noted that during emergencies, “Many teachers leave the profession. We need to bring them back.” Other frequently cited problems involving teachers are ensuring reliable teacher certification and training activities during crises.

- Formal school education for forced migrants is frequently not recognized by the education ministry in their home country. “Schools being accredited is key,” one education expert observed. “Parents and students want a recognized education certificate.” “School certification for people who cross borders is so important”, another expert added, “so students can continue their schooling wherever they are.” Without proper certification, a refugee or IDP student can graduate from a school and not have their school certificate accepted when he or she returns home. Sesnan outlined the gravity and scope of the problem in the following way: “There are... many circumstances in which people need to be able to have their learning certified. This could be by access to a locally or internationally recognized system of assessment and examinations or by having an ‘off-the-shelf’ testing system easily available. The people may be refugees, displaced people, or the urban and rural poor falling outside the system for one reason or another” (1999: 1).

**Pre-Conflict Preparedness**

Of the three periods discussed here, preparedness planning and action is, by far, the most underdeveloped and under researched. Governments under threat of war are generally weak and tend
to be preoccupied with security and political concerns. They are also, as a rule, unprepared for supporting an education system during times of crisis. Agencies in countries threatened by instability and the possibility of war usually lack the capacity to carry out contingency planning in case a humanitarian emergency surfaces. And significantly, most emergency education documents scarcely mention the need to develop pre-emergency contingency strategies in advance of war and calamity.

Preparedness, in other words, constitutes a significant weakness in the emergency education world. Interviews with emergency educators revealed that the preparedness issue as one that has been undervalued and calls out for development. One expert commented that “vulnerability analysis and preparedness planning” should be carried out more comprehensively before conflicts emerge to help countries attempt to reach EFA objectives after crises emerge.

Pigozzi connects the dire need to improve preparedness capacities in agencies (she does not mention governments, though her comments apply equally to them) to education as a human right: “Inherent in a commitment to the right to education is the willingness to plan and ensure that this right can be accessed during an emergency situation” (1999: 6). She then suggests that educators can access early warning systems information to help them prepare contingency plans, and recommends, equally, that emergency early warning systems “could be further strengthened through the inclusion of educational indicators.” Other recommended steps are safeguarding school and teacher training curricula, identifying alternative learning material sources, and ensuring that a full set of textbooks is “safe” (Ibid.). This last suggestion may seem obvious and easy to do, yet the lack of virtually any available textbooks is a persistent problem early in emergency situations. In Burundi refugee camps in Tanzania, for example, this problem was addressed by gathering refugee teachers and allowing them to draw up textbook materials based on everything they could remember from the textbooks they had used in Burundi before they were displaced (Sommers 1999: 10).

Arguably the most concerted preparedness effort in the emergency education field is also among the most controversial. It involves the logistics and appropriateness of school kits. These kits are pre-packaged boxes of school supplies and teaching materials aimed at swiftly providing short-term literacy and numeracy education during the early emergency phase. It was first developed by Gonzalo Retamal and UNESCO-PEER in 1991 and called the “Teacher Emergency Package,” or TEP. A slightly different UNICEF version was later developed and called, among other things, “School-in-a-Box.”

The “kitting” approach to emergency education has been expanded to include packages for recreation (developed by UNICEF and UNESCO-PEER) and early childhood (developed by UNICEF). Debate over whether UNICEF’s stocks of school kits in their Copenhagen warehouse should be shipped to the site of a new emergency continues. Another debate concerns whether school kits should be warehoused in sites where emergencies might emerge. The kits issue has been comprehensively examined by Margaret Sinclair, who has noted that “as far as refugees are concerned, the use of kits has not been and should not be a major feature of refugee education, since local procurement of materials through NGOs is normally a better option” (2001: 57). Given its short-term timeline for use, the inflexibility of the contents and approach of kits, the controversy over their applicability and, most important, the comparative inattention to developing the capacity in agencies and governments to prepare and plan for implementing education during times of severe crisis (a much more serious deficiency), “kitting” as a preparedness issue would appear to have, at best, limited utility.

**Education During Wars**

The fundamental challenge to reaching EFA targets in countries during conflicts is the lack of an effective, widely accepted policy or strategy to tackle the dual problems of weakened governments in war zones and the absence of clear mandates and coordinated action plans for international response. A UNESCO document sums up the problem admirably:
The information on education for populations within crisis-affected countries is much less comprehensive than for refugees [outside crisis-affected countries]. For refugees, international agencies have mandates to provide assistance, including education. International funding is used, and reporting is therefore needed. In contrast, in countries or regions undergoing conflict, or in post-conflict situations, the responsibility for education rests with national and local education authorities that may be functioning under conditions of great difficulty or not at all. [1999: 20]

Much of the emergency education literature veers away from confronting this confounding situation, which represents the most significant gap in both the literature on and coordinated action for education during crises. Initiatives are often piecemeal and difficult, and almost always dangerous. They also rarely reach the majority of war-affected people. As one emergency education expert noted, “There’s hardly a war that doesn’t involve shooting at schools.”

While emergency situations cry out for support to education ministries and the education system when wars descend upon a country, the issue of the commitment of governments to education is regularly called into question. International actors are prone to exasperation at the perceived incapacity, inaction or insincerity of education ministries in conflict countries (Sommers 2000). One emergency education expert criticized education ministries in countries at war for too often “lacking much willingness to improve education.” Indeed, teachers are often lucky to be paid. Schools are fortunate if they are not attacked and looted. And there are other things for agencies to do besides education, such as addressing the humanitarian imperative of keeping war-affected populations alive. Education, such a mainstay of peacetime activity, is too often a forlorn sector during conflict situations.

Successful examples of effective support for formal schooling in war zones do exist, however. One such example took place in Angola in 1995, when UNICEF and the Norwegian Refugee Council worked with education officials in both the national government and the UNITA opposition to develop a ‘neutral’ education curriculum for primary schooling. Both sides of the conflict, one of the officials involved in the initiative explained, saw the “merit to having a neutral education program.” Such successes, of course, are always subject to security concerns: in mid-1998, the program had to be stopped in UNITA-held areas because “the conflict escalated.” A UN education official supported this example with the general claim that “it’s possible to use a neutral education system with the government and rebel sides” in a number of crisis situations. This is a significant finding, and one that can and should be built on in the future.

There is a simplified emergency education model that is achieving growing acceptance among emergency educators in the major humanitarian NGO and UN agencies. The model addresses the challenge of establishing an education system when surrounded by the chaos. It is usually applied in refugee and, much less commonly, IDP camp settings. It is clearly explained in publications by Aguilar and Retamal (1998) and Triplehorn (2001). The Framework for Education Programs in Emergencies consists of three phases: safe spaces and recreational activities (Phase I); non-formal education (Phase II); and formal education (Phase III) (Triplehorn 12).

Phase I is aimed at establishing areas of safety for children and recruiting and registering children for organized recreational and expressive activities like sports, art and drama. These are all elements of psychosocial interventions that will be addressed in more detail shortly. Aguilar and Retamal highlight the significance of this phase by arguing that “Expression and play can be fundamental in building resilience” in children. Such children “have the capacity to make sense of stressful and traumatic events confronting them” (1998: 13).

While children are occupied with recreation and other activities, initiating teacher training and developing a primary school structure are also supposed to take place during Phase I. A UNESCO document highlights the significance of organizing school management or education committees
comprised of refugee or IDP community leaders and education professionals during this early phase, as well as parent-teacher associations (UNESCO 2001: 20-21). Sinclair highlights the importance of training teachers and community members in school management, and recruiting youths to get involved in structured activities (2001: 18-19).

Phase II is designed to “promote social reintegration and [the] development of cognitive/social skills by affected children and youth through structured non-formal education activities” (Triplehorn 2001: 14). It is here where literacy and numeracy approaches such as school kits are used, under the assumption that the shock of war and flight have caused the need to simply get children used to learning before they are reinserted into a formal education program.

There are critiques to this second phase, however, and they are worthy of serious consideration. It is not at all clear whether this phase is required or appropriate in every case. Some Rwandan refugee teachers resisted this intermediate literacy and numeracy step, reasoning that it would be better to move directly from initial recreational activities (Phase I) to resuming formal schooling (Phase III).\footnote{31} Governments may be similarly impatient with a Phase II approach. Such situations raise the issue of whether Sinclair’s principle of community-based approach and capacity-building (2001: 18) in emergency education, something other emergency educators generally endorse, is being followed consistently.

Re-establishing the formal education system is a goal shared by war-affected communities and emergency educators alike. As mentioned previously, some communities are developing formal primary schools before the arrival of international agency support. Triplehorn notes that “In a limited number of situations, the first two phases can be bypassed and formal education can start very quickly” (2001: 15).

This final phase has been broken into Phase 3A and Phase 3B in UNHCR’s Guidelines for Educational Assistance to Refugees. Phase 3A assumes that the return of refugees period of exile will be short. It focuses on re-introducing the “normal” curriculum (that is, the curriculum from the refugees’ home country), and using this curriculum to help prepare both refugees and the home country’s education ministry for repatriation (UNHCR 1995).

UNHCR’s Phase 3B is entitled “Adjustment to Extended Stay,” and it is here where refugee education can become unusually complicated and contested. The difficulties largely emanate from the ultimate purpose of education during exile. Should the curriculum be directed for repatriation (such as Burundi refugees in Tanzania, who continue to apply Burundi’s national curriculum and standards in refugee camps) or integration (such as Sudanese refugees who attend schools where the curriculum of the host nation – Kenya, Uganda – is used)? Or should the curriculum be “mixed” to accommodate the dual possibilities of repatriation and extended exile? In many cases other problems, such as addressing teacher stipends or salaries eventually rising above those offered in the education ministry in their home country, upgrading education materials and facilities, and, quite often, confronting reduced education budgets, must also be addressed (UNHCR 1995).

In addition to developing materials, building schools, creating teacher training programs, recruiting school system personnel, etc., a number of education modules are inserted into the formal education schedule.\footnote{32} These modules are designed to address the diversity of problems that face refugees and IDPs, and may be offered both to primary school students in addition to youths and adults in non-formal education settings. Examples of the kinds of modules that have been developed are provided by Aguilar and Retamal: HIV/AIDS, environmental awareness, health practices, cholera awareness, landmine awareness, and peace and reconciliation (1998: 34).

\footnote{31} Drawn from personal interviews with teachers and officials present in the Rwandan refugee camps in Western Tanzania, 1996 and 1998.

\footnote{32} In some cases, modules are introduced in Phases I or II.
There are potential problems with this phased approach. The initial phase essentially comprises a variety of psychosocial education methods, and many believe that these methods should remain as an integral component of the war-affected students’ educational life. In addition, the fact that the second phase is contested raises the issue of whether phases are necessary at all. If, for example, an NGO assigned to work in the education sector finds a refugee or IDP community already developing a formal education system (this is common), is Phase I really necessary before Phase II and then III? Moreover, the structured phases do not address the immediate needs of children and youth who cannot or will not be attending primary school. And waiting to address the needs of youth, given the options that may immediately present themselves to them (such as prostitution, laboring under exploitative conditions, and recruitment into gangs and militias), is dangerous not only to youths themselves but to the security and stability of their communities. The continued inadequate response to the educational, emotional, and vocational needs of youths during crises remains a serious weakness in the emergency education field. While humanitarian agencies are increasingly aware of the significance of addressing youth needs, youth programming remains seriously underfunded and underdeveloped.

Another important component of an effective emergency education approach is pre-school for young children. Communities commonly start pre-schools of some sort early in an emergency phase, but supporting them stabilizes young children, provides them with structure and, not least, frees up time for their parents and guardians to address other concerns. It is also thought to be an effective way of ensuring that girls attend and remain in primary school. Since girls are usually called on to care for their younger siblings (as well as orphans, neighbors and other young children), they can attend school provided that those they are responsible for are also there. As a result, “the introduction of simple kindergarten and pre-school activities can contribute to girls’ enrolment and retention in school” (Sinclair 2001: 33).

Among the most important components in all of this work is successfully meeting the challenge of addressing the psychosocial needs of war-affected students (and, where possible, their parents or guardians), as well as their teachers. Implicit in this work is the contention that the experience of war transforms the educational environment of a school community, making teaching and learning more difficult and recognition of psychosocial needs exceptionally important.

There are two general schools of thought on how to best approach this issue. The minority view is simply to provide formal education to children. Schools, after all, provide children with structure, a routine that creates an environment of normalcy, hope for the future, intellectual stimulation and, not least, time for parents to work while their children are constructively engaged. School also replaces idle time that left children prone to recalling traumatic memories and limiting their development.

Most emergency educators view this approach as necessary but insufficient. Despite the presence of traumatic stress in children, sometimes at extraordinarily high levels, the resilience of children can be tapped as a resource if appropriately accessed. As one physician with experience working with traumatized children has noted, “Someone has to intervene to prevent children from reenacting the behavior that traumatized them.” Appropriate interventions for children are critical and “can make a difference in a child’s life.”

Pirisi’s research demonstrates how psychosocial interventions in educational settings can dramatically improve the lives and educational potential of children affected by wars. “Experience shows that children can bounce back” from war trauma, Pirisi notes, citing an educational program in Sierra Leone where “children showed a 70 percent improvement in concentration at school after four weeks of a school-based program that integrated educational and emotional needs, using storytelling, drawing, drama, writing, music and games” (2001: 2-3). Pirisi also highlights the significance of intervening as early as possible in a traumatized child’s life, as it enhances the chances of their recovery.
Psychosocial interventions in school settings are varied, and many are contained in approaches described in Phase I above. Nylund, Legrand and Holtsberg explain that “Psychosocial programming consists of structured activities designed to advance children’s psychological and social development and to strengthen protective factors that limit the effects of adverse influences.” Activities such as drawing, painting, dance, music and drama constitute “vehicles” for children “to tell their stories and to be heard and acknowledged.” Targeted programming, the authors conclude, is required “to ensure that psychological recovery and social reintegration can take place” (1999: 17, 19).

As with the literature on peace education, the tendency in literature on psychosocial programming is to emphasize school activities and undervalue their potential connections to other activities available to children. War-affected communities resort to other practices to help them recover both from trauma and emphasize values supporting understanding, forgiveness and avoiding violence. Some become active in religious congregations. Research in the Rwandan refugee camps in Tanzania, for example, found that prayer groups were popular, and many joined church choirs in part because they found the experience psychologically healing (Sommers 1998). None of this understates the importance of psychosocial programs or peace education in schools. Instead, it suggests that the world of psychosocial and peace education activities tend to find related forms of expression outside the confines of schools. Programming that recognizes and coordinates with complimentary activities in war-affected communities promises to strengthen the positive impacts that psychosocial and peace education programs seek to achieve.

Education During the Early Post-War Reconstruction Phase

Since efforts to rebuild countries and reconstruct education systems have been documented at length elsewhere, some very brief comments about the initial phase of this work, and some of the dangers that may exist during this period, will be shared here.

One emergency education expert described a number of principles common to early reconstruction plans: rebuilding school structures, attracting teachers back to the profession, retraining teachers, revising the curriculum to address concerns such as “conflict resolution, human rights, and AIDS and drug prevention,” vocational education for ex-combatants, and decentralizing the education system, which the expert considered critical to “stabilizing the situation and introducing an element for democracy, peace and building civil society.”

But a second emergency education veteran issued a number of warnings about the sequence of reconstruction work. The key question, particularly at the outset, the expert insisted, is not materials but “what to teach.” “The big thing is to reestablish learning, not to build schools,” he explained. Learning spaces, defined as a place “where kids can learn” did not necessarily require school structures that might become targets for vandals or militias in the area. Experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo, Palestine and elsewhere suggest that formal schooling need not be carried out on school compounds to be successful: “The re-establishment of learning cannot wait for construction programs.” In addition, educating students in locations considered safer than schools represents an important form of child (and teacher) protection.

A common problem of formal education arising in different parts of a country and operating separately is the lack of education system coherence. Early in post-war situations, a UN emergency education official observed, schools often need to be persuaded to re-join a national education system. As a result, the official recommended developing an incentive-driven approach to trade “textbooks and supplies” in exchange registering the schools, supplying a teacher competency testing tool, and introducing other initiatives that can begin to bring a system into line. The official also emphasized the importance of expanding on existing efforts and not starting a new education system afresh at the outset of peacetime. “There’s no such thing as no system,” the official insisted. Education systems “exist in people’s heads and expectations. You need to build on their existing system.”
Outside actors such as the World Bank, moreover, can “work more closely with whatever authorities there are and with communities to get agreements on what’s needed” in their education system. It is these relationships, he added, that are “much more important than building schools” at the outset of the post-war phase. On the thorny issue of curriculum – history and language policy often being hotly contested issues in such situations – the starting point should be “what we keep and what we chop out.” Controversial issues can often be negotiated later: the first step, the official urged, is to help get a school system back on its feet by teaching those subjects that are widely acceptable. Kingsley and Elu’s view about education reform during wars appears to apply equally to immediate post-war circumstances: “War is not an ideal situation in which to introduce any reform, let alone education... reforming education under such circumstances seems totally foolish” (1997:495).

Another emergency education expert felt that opportunities are too often missed to prepare for either emergencies or post-war reconstruction. Refugee camps, for example, tend to be treated like ghettos instead of “a source for capacity development.” Had qualified Afghan refugees in Pakistan been recruited to be trained as education administrators prior to September 2001, for example, “they’d return with the talent to work for the education ministry in Afghanistan.” The expert added that “investing in education for peace” during wars promises to “help people live with one another in war and post-war situations.”

IV. Recommendations

War makes education’s power to provide psychosocial recovery, stability, normalcy, hope, and the inculcation of values and skills for building and maintaining a peaceful future at least as essential as it is during peacetime. It is thus disappointing and unfortunate that support for education in advance of, during, and immediately after emergencies remains so under supported. Education during wartime emergencies and post-war transitions remains a small field, even though the potential benefits of supporting education for children and youth during emergencies are compelling and the negative impacts of not doing so create a multitude of opportunities for destructive and violent tendencies to thrive.

There is much to be done to assist countries affected by wars approach EFA targets for students. Educating children during emergencies requires a set of skills that education ministries and agencies, and the international institutions that work with and support them, need to learn, value, and apply. The circumstances of warfare call for creativity, adaptability, placing a high value on the needs and capacities of teachers, and recognizing that war necessarily expands education curricula and teacher training to address the psychosocial needs of and violence in the lives of students, teachers and communities. It also calls for supporting displaced communities, who are adapting to and learning from the hardships of war as they go, and pioneering emergency education with verve and creativity in the process. Such support, at the same time, might call for guiding communities away from styles of education that inspire conflicts of all sorts (history and the language of instruction being the most important issues to watch).

Civil conflicts, moreover, threaten the legitimacy, and even the relevance, of education ministries. At the same time, wars underscore the need for an active, responsive education system that can ensure, at the very least, that teacher and student performance is recognized and accredited by their home government.

With this general framework for need and response in mind, proposed recommendations are:
**Enhancing Commitment and Investment**

Reaching, much less approaching, EFA targets cannot get off the ground until the major donors aggressively support education in advance of, during and immediately after wars. To do this, they must educate themselves about the field and its hallmarks, among them the fact that it is community-based but not material-based, flexible in its approach and valuing psychosocial interventions and conflict-resolving measures for teachers and students in its programming.

One way to begin this process is to attend or simply learn about the activities and actors involved in emerging initiatives that are surfacing, including: INEE, UNESCO’s IIEP, and the Social Science Research Council. Another important effort is for international agencies, including NGOs and UN agencies, to develop methods for enlightening members of their own staff about the severe impacts of war on children and the potentially disastrous effects of ignoring or underfunding education during crises.

**Working with Governments Directly Affected by or Involved in War**

Past experience suggests that learning to prepare for, adapt to, and respond to crises that can render education systems dysfunctional requires a proactive response. Accordingly, international actors accustomed to working with national education ministries (such as the World Bank, regional development banks, donor governments, and UN agencies) should not wait for crises to end before assisting education ministries. They should work with ministries to grapple with education in crisis situations on preparedness concerns (through training, contingency planning, and assembling reserves of critical materials), establish an active, supportive, accountable presence during crises, and commence planning for post-war situations before they arrive. Similar support should also be extended to relevant local NGOs, which can be carried out, in part, through active, collaborative, capacity-building arrangements with international NGOs with emergency education experience.

Although providing formal education for internally displaced students is a major weakness in most emergency education contexts, such engagement with education ministries and local NGOs will help prepare international actors to facilitate important innovations such as developing a neutral national curriculum that can be used in schools on both sides of the conflict divide. The Angola experience provides an important example of how to successfully expand educational access in war zones. Influential international actors need also to push education ministries to actively support the maintenance of their systems. They need to find ways to carry out their work with ministries even when it means working with a government whose actions are considered distasteful or even reprehensible. Similarly, donors should view displaced and refugee communities as resources for building the capacity of post-war education systems. Students shouldn’t be punished because of the actions of a difficult government. The responsibility to help students attain EFA objectives calls for concerted action even in situations where international actors do not normally work.

**The Primacy of Teachers**

More than during peacetime, education during and soon after emergencies centers on teachers. School curricula, materials, equipment, supplies, and buildings may not be available, but if teachers are present and able to respond, educating children can continue. Teacher training that is certified, features the replacement of authoritarian teaching styles with participatory ones, and emphasizes psychosocial skills and methods as positive interventions for teachers and students, is essential. Other supports – providing regular teacher salaries, maintaining teaching conditions, providing relevant supplies – are also necessary.
New Educational Requirements in New Settings

Just as war upends lives and makes them unstable and vulnerable, so does war change the context of education and the needs of students. In order to learn, students require psychosocial interventions as a component of their educational experience to access their potential for resilience under extreme stress. Without this, their processes of learning and retention will be clotted by trauma. In order to successfully prepare for a peaceful, stable future, communities impacted by war can benefit from the values and approaches present in viable and appropriate peace education, human rights, conflict resolution or other related education modules.

A weakness in the emergency education field is the generally low value accorded to evaluations (both for reasons of expedience and funding), and this applies to psychosocial and peace education programs as well. It is important to know what works, and why it works, in emergency education. This applies to all programming, but special consideration should be accorded to peace education.

Peace education and related programming can and should be evaluated. The field is, in fact, burdened by its title. “Peace” is not attainable through a course. However, baseline studies prior to the beginning of peace education work can give a sense of the starting point for those to be involved with peace education activities. The absorption and use of peace education-related skills and values, moreover, can be assessed. The value-laden aspect of much of this programming, in fact, should attract particular attention. Many peace education programs contain a Western bias and approach to problems and how they should be solved. Many also focus on educating students without targeting their parents and guardians, as well as the larger community. Community-led efforts in peace education have been attempted, yet their progress has neither been adequately evaluated nor the findings sufficiently disseminated. Given all of these potential weaknesses, including the potential for peace education to create conflict and confusion in communities if it is misapplied, means that evaluation is appropriate, possible, and necessary.33

The Protection Dimension

Providing education during and after emergencies is a protection measure – but only if children have access to education. For example, schools can create a structured environment for former child soldiers to re-start their lives provided they are welcomed to attend. For too many children and youth at risk are not in schools during and following wars. Adolescent girls and female youth form probably the most vulnerable population segment in war-affected communities, and their involvement in schooling tends to be low. This is a matter of profound and serious concern, yet low female enrollments in schools occurs even when considerable effort to promote and keep girls in school is carried out. Preschool education is thought to be a viable method for getting girls to school and keeping them there for at least a reasonable amount of time. But preschool alone is an insufficient remedy to low girl enrollments. The diversity of skills and roles that girls can play, together with the low value that war-affected communities may give to educating girls and the potential danger that girls may confront simply by going to school, means that more concerted and collective attention needs to be paid to the issue of low girl enrollments in schools. Directing educational technologies such as distance education to girls at risk has not been adequately tested or evaluated. These and other efforts call out for concerted collaboration, evaluation, and creativity.

Similar efforts need to be directed at adolescent boys and male youths. Although boys are not as vulnerable to sexual violence and exploitation as girls are, the towering threat created by their alienation remains. Simply put, leaving out-of-school, at-risk boys and girls out of education programming dramatically increases the prospect for increased instability and violence in their lives.

33 A more complete description of the author’s findings and conclusions on peace education can be found in Sommers 2001b. This article reviews a particularly promising peace education program (which has since been evaluated) carried out by UNHCR.
and communities. It is a difficult and perplexing issue to address, but doing so remains vital and deeply important.

**Understanding the Dynamics of Education During War: Research Needs**

The continued paucity and unreliability of current statistics on education during and following wars is nothing short of alarming. Without a more concerted effort in this direction, it will remain difficult to calculate the scope of need that exists and the level of investment that is needed to address it. Efforts to collect statistical data, such as a current effort being carried out by the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, are stymied by the remarkably low value accorded to reporting education statistics even when they exist and the unreliability and meagerness of obtainable data. Agencies involved in emergency education need to be supported and encouraged to dramatically improve this situation.

To help spur concerted action and insure that the action is informed and well-directed, creative research on a number of important emergency education topics is urgently needed. Here are four of the most pressing research concerns:

- We need to learn more about the lives of children who are not in school, particularly those in cities and difficult-to-reach rural areas, so that ways to make schooling available to them can be tested.

- We also need to know about the lives of male and female youth, to understand what they need from education programs and how programming can be made accessible and attractive to them.

- An array of efforts have been carried out to promote school attendance and retention of female students. These efforts need to be catalogued and the conditions for success and failure for various efforts needs to be studied.

- Emergency education has, largely out of necessity, remained technologically simple and straightforward. Researching and testing viable educational and vocational innovations in emergency and post-war settings should be supported. Youths may be encouraged to get involved in educational offerings, for example, provided they contain the right combination of computers, training, microcredit, and participatory methodology. Such piloting, monitoring and evaluation has yet to be adequately carried out.

**V. Conclusion**

The thrust of this paper has been aimed at sketching the situation confronting children, their families and governments in war zones and describing the challenges of reaching universal primary education in war-afflicted countries. These challenges are precipitous: in answer to the question, “How can countries affected by conflict arrive at EFA objectives?” an emergency education expert answered, “The short answer is, ‘They can’t.’”

Regardless of whether this is true or not, it is certainly the case that far more could be done to support education in countries suffering from conflict. The EFA’s Dakar Framework for Action highlights both the problems caused by war and the prospects promised by education:

> The significant growth of tensions, conflict and war, both within nations and between nations and peoples, is a cause of great concern. Education has a key role to play in preventing conflict in the future and building lasting peace and stability. [UNESCO 2000: 15]
This widely agreed statement notwithstanding, and the fact that the severe and tragic impact of war on the lives of children is attracting increasing attention, responses to providing education for children during or immediately following wars remains limited. The persistent reminder in emergency education literature that education is a right for all children and a need that must be met, in short, has tugged more at the heartstrings than the purse strings of major international donors. The will to act to support education for children is also insufficient in some international NGOs and UN agencies and among many governments affected by conflict.

The most logical starting point for addressing the policy challenges outlined above lies in supporting emergency education where it exists and dramatically expanding access to education where it does not. Emergency education is a small but growing field led by international experts who lead the charge for providing education to war-affected children. Most emergency educators, however, are local education professionals working for little or no pay as members of war-affected communities. It should be clear, however, that emergency education is community-centered largely by default. Governments involved in wars are usually too weak or negligent to lead the education sector during times of war. Community members consequently take up the slack and become leaders themselves.

While emergency education employs simple technologies in virtually all situations, emergency educators themselves – from parents and teachers to administrators and international actors – are often highly creative. Rarely have these efforts been well evaluated, however. Statistics about the scope of the problem or how emergency education efforts are meeting the needs of a limited proportion of children in need are poor, and insufficient effort has been made to improve this situation.

If education provides the sort of psychosocial support, structure, normality, stability, stimulation and sense of hope that the child trauma and emergency education literature suggests, then the issue of the kind and extent of education available during war and immediate post-war situations bears noting. The lion’s share of education efforts in both situations lie in primary education. This represents a foundation, however shaky and insufficient it may be, for developing strategies aimed at approaching EFA goals for completing primary schooling. Yet it is also the case that most primary school-age children in war-affected areas are not in school and have no realistic hope of enrolling in one. Forced migrant children cloistered in refugee and IDP camps and settlements have the best chance of going to school. Of these two, support for refugee schooling is usually far greater than anything available for internally displaced children. Children not living in camps, whether within their own countries or in an asylum country, are likely not attending formal schools. Little is known about their lives and learning opportunities. In all situations, girls generally are far less likely to be attending school than boys.

Education and efforts to engage with youths, in addition, remain limited. This has created a volatile situation. Youth programming, when it does exist, is usually poorly supported, may not seem to hold great promise for future opportunity, and ordinarily faces stiff competition from experienced and aggressive military operatives who recruit (or abduct) children and youths into their militias and promise rich and immediate rewards.

The periods before and immediately after wars require policy development. Preparedness planning and contingency strategizing has been found, in general, to be underdeveloped. Precautions against top-down, material-based educational solutions have been noted above.

Finally, it should be noted that, more than any other circumstance, war makes the case for providing appropriate educational responses to the needs of children and youth at risk and exposes the dangers of uninvolvelement. Education for children whose lives have been affected by war is a vital protection measure. Appropriate formal and nonformal education can provide important alternatives to child soldiering and other forms of exploitation (sexual and otherwise), social and cultural alienation, violence, and self-destruction. War also exposes the dynamics of gender in education and
socialization, and the vulnerability of boys as well as girls, making responses to gender needs critically important if not essential. Lack of investment in and creative, participatory work on education for children and youth in danger makes returning to peace and stability difficult if not fairly impossible.
References


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Selected Readings on Education during Post-War Reconstruction


Dizdar, Srebren, Dr. 1996. Analysis of Educational Services for Children in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Study commissioned by UNICEF Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sarajevo, UNICEF. Available: www.pitt.edu/~ginie/bosnia


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Anera Newsletter: www.anera.org
Current Issues in Comparative Education: www.tc.columbia.edu
Embassy of the Republic of Angola: www.angola.org
Eritrean Development Foundation: www.edf.org
Forced Migration Review: www.fmreview.org
Global Information Networks in Education: www.ginie.org
Human Rights Education Associates: www.hrea.org
IDP Project: www.idpproject.org
International Rescue Committee: www.intrescom.org
Interconnection, Technology Assistance to NGO’s in Developing Countries:
    www.interconnection.org
The Journal of Addiction and Mental Health: www.camh.net/journal/
Living Values: An Educational Program: www.livingvalues.net
Norwegian Refugee Council: www.nrc.no/engindex
Office of the High Representative: www.ohr.int
Relief Web: www.reliefweb.org
Save the Children-UK: www.savethechildren.org.uk
Save the Children-US: www.savethechildren.org
Sudan Net: www.sudan.net
UNESCO: www.unesco.org
UNHCHR: www.unhchr.org
UNICEF: www.unicef.org
United Nations: www.un.org
U.S. Committee for Refugees: www.refugees.org
Annex I: Results of Analysis of Armed Conflict on EFA Goals in a Sample of Twelve Conflict Countries

I. Objective

To estimate the impact of armed conflict on the EFA goals of universal primary school completion and gender equality in enrollments.

System Student-Years Lost During Conflict Period, Selected Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Conflict years</th>
<th>Year Prior to Conflict</th>
<th>Last Year of Conflict</th>
<th>Year 2002</th>
<th>System student-years lost after start of conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>1993-2002</td>
<td>63 3.50</td>
<td>-2.84</td>
<td>46* 98</td>
<td>46* 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>1993-2002</td>
<td>77 3.76</td>
<td>-3.80</td>
<td>56* 115</td>
<td>56* 115</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MF</td>
<td>1993-2002</td>
<td>70 3.63</td>
<td>-3.32</td>
<td>51* 106</td>
<td>51* 106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, DR</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>1996-2002</td>
<td>58* -0.32</td>
<td>-6.98</td>
<td>44 56</td>
<td>44* 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>1996-2002</td>
<td>88* 1.25</td>
<td>-20.15</td>
<td>48 96</td>
<td>48* 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MF</td>
<td>1996-2002</td>
<td>73* 0.48</td>
<td>-13.58</td>
<td>46 76</td>
<td>46* 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>1990-1994</td>
<td>66 0.68</td>
<td>11.20</td>
<td>94* 72</td>
<td>114* 75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>1990-1994</td>
<td>68 0.22</td>
<td>12.10</td>
<td>96* 70</td>
<td>115* 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MF</td>
<td>1990-1994</td>
<td>67 0.44</td>
<td>11.70</td>
<td>95* 71</td>
<td>114* 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>1991-2000</td>
<td>41 -0.22</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>56 39</td>
<td>62* 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>1991-2000</td>
<td>60 -0.17</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>60 58</td>
<td>60* 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MF</td>
<td>1991-2000</td>
<td>50 -0.20</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>59 49</td>
<td>60* 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia, FR</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>1991-1995</td>
<td>73 0.00</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
<td>71 73</td>
<td>70* 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>1991-1995</td>
<td>71 0.00</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>69 71</td>
<td>69* 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MF</td>
<td>1991-1995</td>
<td>72 0.00</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>70 72</td>
<td>69* 72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*estimate

II. Data

Twelve conflict countries were selected from the set of countries classified as being “at-risk” of achieving the EFA goal of universal primary school completion. Conflict periods were then identified for each country. Gross enrollment ratios, both aggregate and gender disaggregated, were collected from UIS (UNESCO) for the period 1970 to 1998, inclusive. Seven countries were subsequently dropped from the analysis due to insufficient and/or inconsistent data (Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and West Bank and Gaza). The remaining sub-sample of countries that were analyzed are: Burundi, DR Congo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Yugoslavia.

III. Methodology

First, a trend rate of change in gross enrollment ratios prior to the conflict period was constructed for each country as follows. An initial baseline year, 5 to 10 years prior to the onset of the conflict period, and a second baseline year, in the year or two prior to the conflict period, were chosen within the constraints of data availability. The pre-conflict trend in enrollments was computed as the average annual change in percentage point terms between these two observations.

Second, a trend rate of change in gross enrollment ratios during the conflict period was constructed for each country in a similar manner. In most cases, the two observations with which the conflict period trend was computed consisted of the first and last years of the conflict period. Again, data availability was the major constraint in determining the years with which the conflict period trend was constructed.

34 By Nicholas Wilson, Junior Professional Associate, Human Development Network, World Bank.
Third, a hypothesized (or counterfactual) trend in enrollments in the absence of armed conflict was constructed by projecting the pre-conflict trend in enrollments through the conflict period. In the cases (e.g., DR Congo) where this trend implied a negative gross enrollment ratio (in not just rates, but levels (i.e., a gross enrollment ratio of negative 33) in a year during (and/or in 2002) the conflict period, the trend was forced to equal zero and enrollment ratios assumed to remain constant across time.

Fourth, the impact of armed conflict on enrollments was estimated as the difference in the projected (or counterfactual) trend in enrollments in the absence of conflict and the actual (or true) trend in enrollments during the conflict period. Specifically, in a given year, the change in enrollments (in terms of number of pupils) due to conflict was estimated as the difference in these trend lines multiplied by the official population of primary school age in a given country and year. (The population data are the UN World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision.)

Fifth, for each country, two estimates of the total number of children whose enrollment status was changed by armed conflict were calculated as follows. First, the number of “student-years” lost (or “gained” in some peculiar instances) during the conflict period was calculated by estimating the area below (or above in the peculiar instances) the counterfactual trend line and above (or below) the actual trend line and between the beginning and ending years of the conflict period in the graph describing enrollment trends across time. Second, the total number of “student-years” lost (or “gained”), even after the secession of conflict, was calculated by estimating the area below (or above) the counterfactual trend line and above (or below) the actual trend line and between the beginning year of the conflict period and the current year (2002) in the graph describing enrollment trends across time. Both of the estimates have also been reported as the proportion of student-years possible with the assumption of 100 percent gross enrollment in each country (that is, the total number of student-years has been normalized by the population of official primary school age in the year of the end of the conflict and in year 2002).

Finally, as the analysis was conducted using both aggregate and gender disaggregated gross enrollment ratios, it is possible to see how in many cases armed conflict had a differential impact by gender on primary school enrollments.

IV. Results

The results of the analysis are presented in the chart at the beginning of this Annex, entitled “System Student-Years Lost During Conflict Period, Selected Countries.” Countries where a negative number is reported for student-years “lost” to armed conflict (e.g., Rwanda) are those countries where the change in enrollments across time actually improved as the conflict period began and progressed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children, Education and War: Reaching Education For All (EFA) Objectives in Countries Affected by Conflict</td>
<td>Marc Sommers</td>
<td>June 2002</td>
<td>1</td>
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