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Ukraine

Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 5 July 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations compared to the previous reporting period. Most of the fighting was recorded in the areas around Yasynuvata, Shyrokyne and Donetsk city. In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded a number of ceasefire violations, most of which were assessed as live-fire exercises. The Mission confirmed reports of three children killed by a grenade explosion in Yenakiieve. The SMM followed up on reports of shelling and conducted crater analysis in Kominternove, Horlivka and Myronivka. It continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons and observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. The Mission continued to monitor the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. The SMM observed the situation at the administrative boundary line between Kherson and Crimea.

The SMM observed more ceasefire violations [1] in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period.

Whilst at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM heard 130 undetermined explosions at locations ranging from 2 to 8km north-east, north-north-east, north, north-north-west and north-west of its position.

In Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM continues to be non-operational during night hours due to security reasons (see SMM Daily Report 2 July 2016)*. Even during daylight SMM’s observation in this area remains restricted due to security concerns.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 193 undetermined explosions and about 16 bursts from anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) at locations ranging from 2 to 6km west and west-south-west of its position. In government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM recorded nine undetermined explosions, five explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds of unknown calibre and five explosions assessed as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds at locations ranging from 3 to 7km south-west, south and south-south-east of its position.

During the night of 4-5 July, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded at an unknown distance north, north-north-east and north-east of its position: two explosions assessed as impacts from an unknown weapon type north-east of its position and a total of 28 undetermined explosions. Likewise, the camera recorded an exchange of tracer fire, which began in the late evening hours with (in sequence) 27 bursts fired south-east to north-west and 45 bursts fired from east to north, six bursts from north to east, 24 bursts from south to north, six bursts from north to south and 20 bursts from south to north, and ended by 03:00 with three bursts from south-south-west to north-north-east and one burst from east to west.

Whilst in Debaltseve (“DPR”-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions at locations ranging from 8 to 15km north- west of its position.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded a number of ceasefire violations most of which were assessed as live-fire exercises. Whilst in “LPR”-controlled Vrubivskyi (22km south-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 10km west of its position which it assessed as related to live-fire exercises in a training area in Shymshynivka (“LPR”-controlled, 27km south-west Luhansk), outside the security zone. Still in Vrubivskyi the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and five single shots of small-arms-fire and four bursts of automatic-gun fire 10km west of its position. The SMM assessed that the shooting was related to live-fire exercises in the training area in Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk).

Whilst in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard approximately ten undetermined explosions 10km south of its position.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling. In “DPR”-controlled Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed an impact on the western-facing roof of a house. The SMM found fragments of a recoilless-gun (SPG-9) and assessed the impact as caused by a SPG-9 round fired from a westerly direction. Within one week the same house has been hit for the second time (see SMM Daily Report 27 June 2016). The residents of the house, a middle-aged couple, told the SMM that they had just finished repair work on the roof after it had been damaged last week. The SMM observed remnants of an anti-tank guided missile (type 9K111 Fagot) stuck in the asphalt of the main road in Kominternove. The SMM assessed the round had been fired from a westerly direction. In “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM saw shrapnel damage to a south-facing wall of a house as well as damage to the fence wall around the house. The SMM assessed that the impact was caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a south-westerly direction. At a second location, approximately 2km north of the first location, the SMM observed shrapnel damage to a southern-facing wall, roof and windows of a house; the SMM saw that an electricity pole had been severed. There was no crater, but based on damage observed at the house, the SMM assessed that the shell had been fired from a south-south-westerly direction. In a field in government-controlled Myronivka (64km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 15 fresh craters (with diameters 2.5 to 3 metres wide and 30-40 centimetres depth) covering an area of approximately 300x300meters. The SMM assessed that the impacts were caused by 122mm artillery weapons systems fired from a south-south-easterly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) moving at high speed towards government-controlled Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk). In government-controlled Anadol (39km north of Mariupol) the SMM observed four static self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm).

Beyond the withdrawal lines, but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed ten tanks at a training site in “LPR”-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk) and 16 tanks (T-64) at a training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. In government-controlled areas, the SMM visited such a site and noted that nine tanks (T-64) were missing.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed one armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a heavy machine-gun at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and six infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-2) in the area of Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM followed up on reports about civilian casualties. Personnel at the hospital in “DPR”-controlled Yenakiieve (41km north-east of Donetsk), told the SMM that three children (11, 5 and 1.5 years old) had died due to an explosion of a grenade. According to a Russian Federation Armed Forces representative at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), the children had found the grenade on 3 July and brought it to their home. On 4 July, while handling the grenade, it exploded and injured the father and killed his three children. According to hospital staff, the father will recover from his injuries. The SMM spoke with the morgue personnel in Yenakiieve who confirmed that they had received from the hospital the bodies of three children.

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw a queue of approximately 100 pedestrians at the “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of the Siverskyi Donets river waiting to walk towards government-controlled areas and about 50 pedestrians in the opposite direction. At a government checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 168 civilian vehicles and 300 pedestrians waiting to enter government-controlled areas. The SMM spoke to one driver who said that he had been already waiting for seven hours. The SMM observed 76 civilian cars and 65 pedestrians waiting to proceed in the opposite direction. The SMM noted that the eight anti-tank mines which had been placed at the checkpoint entrance for several months were not present anymore (see SMM Daily Report 20 May 2016). The SMM saw an improvised mine hazard sign (in Cyrillic and Latin alphabet – red letters on a wooden box) that had been put at the eastern entrance to the checkpoint.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. In Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable workers to conduct maintenance on a water pump within the power plant. In “LPR”-controlled Pryshyb (34km north-west of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable ongoing maintenance works on gas pipelines.

The SMM monitored the situation at the administrative boundary line between Kherson region and Crimea at the three crossing points in Kalanchak, Chaplynka and Chonhar (95, 90 and 162km south-east of Kherson, respectively). At the Kalanchak crossing point, the SMM observed 12 civilian cars, all with Ukrainian licence plates, lined up to proceed towards Crimea. The SMM saw two members of the Asker civil formation at the crossing point. At the Chaplynka crossing point, the SMM observed four civilian cars, all with Ukrainian licence plates, lined up to proceed towards the peninsula. The SMM saw one member of the Asker civil formation sitting next to the civil formation’s booth. At the Chonhar crossing point the SMM observed about 50 civilian vehicles with Ukrainian licence plates waiting in order to proceed towards mainland. The SMM spoke to several pedestrians who said that the waiting time for pedestrians is about 12-20 minutes to cross from Kherson region to Crimea. The SMM spoke to a female Asker member present at the crossing point, who said that the civil formation has 41 members.

  • Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Besides the abovementioned general restrictions, the SMM was not subject to any specific restriction to its freedom of movement.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

For PDF attachments or links to sources of further information, please visit: http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/251071

Contacts:

Alexandra Taylor
26 Turhenievska Street
01054 Kyiv
Ukraine
mobile: +380 67 650 31 57
alexandra.taylor@osce.org

Iryna Gudyma
26 Turhenievska Street
01054 Kyiv
Ukraine
mobile: +38 067 4021716
Iryna.Gudyma@osce.org