East Timor’s fragile peace may rest on the shoulders of one outgoing prime minister and the practice of paying off former combatants with depleting oil and gas reserves
A new report by UK think tank the Overseas Development Institute shows how Timor-Leste, a democratizing, rapidly-developing, resource-rich nation has experienced a remarkable period of relative safety since a third of its population perished from military action, starvation or disease during the 24-year Indonesian occupation that ended in 1999.
But the report warns that the fragile peace in Timor-Leste has to date rested on the leadership of Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão whose term ends in 2017, and whose exit from the political scene could trigger a return to violence.
A highly popular guerrilla war veteran, Prime Minister Gusmão holds a status of “mythical primacy” for many voters. He has held the country together by, among other things, bringing together key rival militia leaders and using Timor-Leste’s petroleum fund to “buy the peace” with direct cash-transfers to military veterans. In 2014, handouts to veterans were bigger than either the health or education budgets, but as one government advisor pointed out to ODI, “the cost of the solution has to be cheaper than its alternative, which is conflict”. Veterans and other potential spoilers win a majority of state infrastructure and agricultural contracts, in what is seen by some as a reward potential spoilers of the peace.
But “the very same things that have allowed Timor-Leste’s stability could be Timor-Leste’s undoing,” said one NGO leader quoted in ODI’s report. “They have enough resources to buy the peace for the moment, but it’s not peace, it’s stability for the elite.”
This approach is creating a potentially dangerous inequality between veteran families and the “maubre”, the ordinary Timorese, the vast majority of whom work the land. Although buying the peace is seen by many as a “necessary evil”, it risks embedding a sense of entitlement that is politically difficult to break. This could be a time bomb because much of the oil relied upon to pay these veterans will run out in five years, according to the UK operator of one of Timor-Leste’s two operating oil fields ConocoPhillips.
These decisions to prioritize short-term security have proved effective in maintaining stability, but have also sowed resentment within parts of Timorese society, particularly over the wide-scale “pardons” during 2006’s military crisis, including 26 soldiers and policemen accused of serious and violent crimes.
While former militias have been coopted, Timor-Leste’s myriad martial arts street gangs have not. Armed with bamboo rods and knives, they proliferated in response to the occupation, but have been repressed in recent years, sometimes with blanket bans, causing another threat to the peace. Many rural families encourage their young men to join martial arts groups to protect their land, thereby promoting stability. But the ODI also found many examples of groups such as Kera Sakti, KORK and PSHT acting as a fan to conflicts, facilitating the rapid spread of violence across the country, particularly during the 2006 crisis. The government recognize this threat. In 2008, UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador Jackie Chan visited schools and martial arts groups across the country to preach “respect for your martial art” before meeting – and sparring with – Mr Gusmão.
Amongst the reports other key findings are:
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Reported crime has declined year on year over the 2009-2012 period, generally aligning with available perception survey data, which show there have been marked improvements in Timorese perceptions of security. One poll cited in the report puts satisfaction with the police at 89% in 2013, up from 51% in 2008.
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Improvements to Timor-Leste’s security have been driven in part by a UN peacekeeping mission which cost US$3.2 billion between 1999 and when it pulled out in 2012. Additionally the country has benefited from substantial foreign aid. Based on 2000-2010 figures, Timor-Leste was the 7th most aid dependent country in the world, although oil and gas returns are now substituting for foreign donors.
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Timor-Leste has recovered well from the 2006 crisis, when tensions spilled onto the streets as police, army and disaffected veterans fought one another, and over 100,000 Dili residents were displaced. In response, Prime Minister Gusmão appointed himself as joint Security and Defense Minister, in order to oversee both the police and military and to improve relations between the two forces.
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Prime Minister Gusmão, who was the independent country’s first president (2002-2007) before assuming the more powerful role of prime minister, governs Timor-Leste with a strong emphasis on personality politics rather than ideology. He has appointed himself as joint security and defense minister. He has politically and economically coopted most threats to stability including the F-FDTL and PNTL and has promoted weak figures to key posts within security services to maintain his power.
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The Government of Timor-Leste can draw 3% per year from the Petroleum Fund, which currently has assets of $16 billion, in order to support government spending. In practice, it has tended to draw slightly over this amount (with Parliamentary approval). Since the military crisis of 2006, these funds have increasingly been used to pay pensions to veterans, war widows and other vulnerable groups, including a one-off cash transfer to citizens languishing in camps for internally displaced persons.
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Between May 2006 and February 2008 various human rights abuses were perpetrated when members of the security services from the west of the country mutinied over alleged discrimination. The crisis culminated in the shooting of president Ramos-Horta, whose killers were pursued by a “joint command” between western and eastern police and military, which helped bring the crisis to an end and in turn strengthen the government and Prime Minister Gusmão’s authority.
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Citizens of Timor-Leste obtain their security not just from the police and courts but also alternative and long-standing sources of authority. These include tribal leaders and village councils, which were repressed under Indonesian occupation.
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In many parts of Timor-Leste black magic is considered a threat to peace. For example, the city of Ermera suffered from a series of incidents in early 2013 where a self-proclaimed ritual arts group was selling membership cards at the promise of acquisition of magical powers. People felt insecure both due to the threat of black magic itself, as well as due to the threats, suspicions and revenge attacks that it could prompt.