Analyses
The current election crisis in Somaliland: outcome of a failed 'experiment'?
Until recently Somaliland was perceived by many benevolent observers as 'Africa's best kept secret' in the sense of being democratic, peaceful and showing signs of modest economic development, without enjoying international recognition. The country that had seceded from collapsing Somalia in 1991 certainly is a stunning success story regarding bottom-up peace building and the establishment of a hybrid system of governance, incorporating 'traditional' and 'modern' aspects of authority and rule.
The democratisation process that was initiated in 2001 by the adoption of a new constitution unfolded quickly and led to a series of mostly free and fair elections. Shortly before the presidential elections in 2003 the long-term observer Matt Bryden confirmed that Somaliland would pass the test of statehood easily, particularly if compared with its undemocratic, highly militarized and internally divided neighbors in the Horn of Africa. Nonetheless, he also cautioned that 'in reality, the foundations of democracy and rule of law in Somaliland are still fragile and the transition has far to go.' Bryden confirmed that corruption was endemic, and clan-based interest groups would cling to power. He stressed that only the government's relative poverty and its lack of coercive authority rendered it somewhat accountable to the public.
The most recent Human Rights Watch report on Somaliland published in July 2009 can be read as a continuation of Bryden's analysis. It shows the growing tendency of the government in Hargeisa to disrespect the laws of the country, including the constitution, and deny the democratic freedoms of Somaliland's citizens. These negative developments climaxed in the election crisis since 2008, which in late September 2009 resulted in the fifth postponement of the elections (without any clear date set) and the third prolongation of the president's term. The government seems to be generally unwilling to compete with its contenders in free and fair elections. The crisis is not entirely 'home made'. It was fuelled by a well-meant but, ex post, obviously misguided initiative of the European Commission (EC) and the international NGO Interpeace.
Voters' registration and election crisis
According to the constitution, the elections had to take place in April 2008. Yet, neither the administration nor the opposition had taken the necessary steps for holding the vote. Already the nomination of the seven members of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) through the government, the opposition parties and the Guurti (House of Elders) took longer than expected. After its establishment, the NEC was continuously criticised inside Somaliland, but also (certainly more diplomatically) by international donors, for ineffectiveness and even inability to organise the elections.
The elections had to be postponed repeatedly, and the president's term was prolonged accordingly. The process was complicated by the agreement between the government of Somaliland, the European Commission and Interpeace to organise a country-wide voters' registration that should result in the issuing of voters' and ID cards. The Somaliland parties and NEC opted for a sophisticated biometric registration system based on fingerprint identification, against the explicit advice of the donors and Interpeace. The ID cards were supposed to contain photographs. Fingerprints should be taken, in order to be able to sort out double registration.
In preparation, hundreds of laptops and the accordant software had to be brought to the country, and local staff had to be trained to handle the equipment. Transport throughout the country and security had to be provided. This made the registration a highly ambitious endeavour in the absence of basic infrastructure such as tharmac roads and electricity in much of the country (apart from a handful of urban centres).
The registration carried also considerable symbolic value. It was the first time that all willing citizens of Somaliland were able to receive a document identifying them as 'Somalilander'. The whole process started in October 2008. It came to a sudden halt when Somaliland was shaken by three concerted suicide bomb attacks on 29 October 2008, which most probably had been planned and executed by Islamic extremists related to Al Shabaab southern Somalia. The voters' registration in Somaliland continued after a break of six weeks. Initial registration concluded by end of 2008; until February 2009, 'late comers' had a chance to make use of supplementary registration.
The registration, however, had produced some problems. Just after the first region (Saxiil) had been registered in October 2008 it had already become obvious to close observers that many people had registered several times and circumvented registration rules. Nonetheless, the politically responsible actors in Somaliland and the donors let the process continue. The full scale of the misconduct only became public in January 2009, when it was announced that about 1.4 million people had registered, over 50% without fingerprints.
My ex post analysis suggests two main reasons why it should have been clear to all involved parties (particularly those in Somaliland) from the beginning that the voter's registration was not feasible for securing (democratic) elections in Somaliland.
First, Somaliland society is still characterised by pastoral-nomadic traditions, involving extreme mobility. This is true even though the majority of the country's population resided meanwhile in towns. Also the borders between Ethiopia, Djibouti and Puntland are not strongly administered, and movement within Somaliland as well as across borders is possible almost unrestricted. Already in the past, various clans had mobilised their relatives across the border (particularly in Ethiopia and Djibouti) to vote in Somaliland and thereby influence the outcome of the elections in the clan's interest (that was frequently, but certainly not exclusively, related to one of the three national parties). Second, registration and census are classic statetechnologies of control. Somalis all over the Horn have a long history of avoiding permanent state control in general, and taxation and other interferences in their daily lives in particular. It is also well known that Somali pastoralists categorically exaggerate the numerical strength of their own group in order to boast and/or to scare off potential adversaries. During the voters registration 2008/2009, people in Somaliland reacted accordingly. As certain locations in Somaliland could easily be identified as strongholds of United Democratic People's Party (UDUB), Kulmiye or Justice and Welfare Party (UCID), respectively, it was clear that the multiple registrations particularly in Booroma, Hargeisa and Burco and surroundings had had the aim to enhance the voting powers of the different constituencies.
Tensions between the political actors and the donors in early 2009 showed that sorting out the extra registrations was not only a technical issue. EC and Interpeace delegations repeatedly visited Hargeisa to contribute to the solution of the crisis that they helped to create. However, neither the opposition party leaders nor the government were ready to compromise. Representatives of the three parties lamented the 'misbehaviour' of the respective opponents' supporters, but sought to play down the fraud of their own followers. It became again impossible to hold elections at 29 March 2009, the date that had previously been set.
In early March 2009, the so far unelected House of Elders prolonged the president's term for the second time to October. It referred to provisions of the constitution concerning the 'security situation' (article 83[5]) that arguably did not apply to the situation. This unconstitutional delay, in the eyes of many, caused raising tensions in Somaliland. Calls of the opposition parties for demonstrations were regularly met with threats from the administration that declared any demonstrations illegal, accused opposition leaders to undermine the "peace and stability" of Somaliland, and deployed armed police and military in the major cities to keep the situation under control. Nonetheless, protest marches took place in the capital and the regions in August and September, and at least one person died when the police opened fire during a demonstration in Hargeisa on 12 September. On 25 September, the Guurti extended the term of the President and Vice-President 'until one month after holding the presidential elections', without presenting a date for these elections. This decision means that a vacuum of power in the country and possibly further escalations of violence were prevented, yet, the election crisis continues.
Conclusion
Clearly, between 2008 and 2009, the political process in Somaliland got stuck without the necessary change of government. The problem is not exclusively 'home made'. It involved otherwise highly credible external actors such as Interpeace and the EC. It is unclear why these actors were willing to provide funds and equipment for registration process that at least some experts in these organisations had recognized as highly problematic from the beginning. In my view, the registration was a kind of 'real life experiment', and Somaliland was - with the consent of its ruling elite - used as a laboratory.
The ordinary people partly resisted in their own way, but also have to pay the price, which is basically the extreme delay of holding elections and political tensions that occasionally escalated in violence. If the voters' registration in Somaliland was an experiment, then all involved actors have to be held accountable for the outcome. This also points to the paradoxical position of the donors who are on the one hand extremely powerful in poor and underdeveloped Somaliland, but on the other hardly can sanction their national partners for non-compliance, since the latter officially do not exist (as recognized government of a recognized state). Also, even if there are many aid-projects in Somaliland, the daily survival of its citizens is provided by the diaspora, not by the donors.
Furthermore, the crisis illustrates the risks of political transition that could be observed in many other African countries since the late 1980s. It also shows that state institutions per se do not guarantee peace. They are frequently involved in oppression and escalating violence. The question, that has been asked by Bryden already some years ago, is: what kind of state institutions can support Somaliland's continued and peaceful existence? It seems that the incumbent government does not have a vision for a democratic future of Somaliland. This certainly undermines the stability of the country, more so since Islamic extremists operating in southern Somalia do not loose hope that people in Somaliland, once they are fed up with being fooled by their own leaders, join their ranks and fight for a united Islamic Somalia.
Markus V. Hoehne is a PhD candidate at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle/Saale,Germany. His research focuses on identity and confl ict in northern Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland). Currently, he participates in a research project funded by the European Union on 'Diasporas for Peace'.